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PREFACE 
This audit report has been written by Dr. Geoffrey Shannon with the assistance of Mrs. Hilary 
Coveney Nash, Mr. Cian O’Connor and Dr. Imelda Ryan. The audit, and the research involved 
in same, was designed with the following aims: 
(1) to conduct a comprehensive review, employing a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative research methodologies, of current work practices in the initiation of 
section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991, including an assessment of the processes and 
procedures adopted or followed by members of An Garda Síochána (AGS) before, 
during, and after its use; 
(2) to establish the extent of the use of this power and the circumstances in which it is 
employed; 
(3) to uncover the actions taken by AGS after removing the child to safety; 
(4) to discover “what happens next” by ascertaining the outcome of the use of section 
12, both in the short-, and on a longer-term basis with regard to the role of the Child 
and Family Agency and any court process; 
(5) to emphasise what works well in the exercise of such emergency measures and to 
pinpoint shortcomings that exist, with a view to informing both future policy and 
practice. 
 
The report does not make any findings in relation to any individual, organisation or body 
corporate. This report is based solely on data collected through examining Garda PULSE 
resources, written questionnaires (each questionnaire covering a particular instance of section 12 
use by AGS in 2014), semi-structured interviews with individual Gardaí who exercised section 12 
in September 2015, and focus groups, to gain a deeper insight into Garda understanding of their 
legal authority under section 12, its limits, and the appropriate use of that power in pressurised, 
time-sensitive contexts.  
 
Every care has been taken not to identify any of the children/young people and their parents 
who were the subject of the section 12 power. In order to provide additional safeguards of 
anonymity, the audit generally has not identified the geographical area the child/young person 
came from. Moreover, the audit has avoided including any identifying details of audit 
participants, particularly members of AGS who were interviewed as part of the audit.  
 
viii 
 
In attempting to preserve the anonymity of members of AGS, members have each been 
designated an identifying letter. This device is used solely as a means of distinguishing each 
person for the purpose of fulfilling the remit of the audit and is not intended to detract in any 
way from the individual child or young person the subject of the section 12 power.  
 
It is recognised with regret that the publication of this report may cause additional distress to 
family members and foster-carers as well as to the professionals who worked on the cases 
discussed. This is not the intention.  
 
What was unquestionably clear from this audit is that members of AGS are very concerned with 
ensuring the child’s experience in Garda care is not traumatising. Indeed, the overwhelming 
finding in this audit is that Garda members commit great efforts to treating children sensitively 
and compassionately when that child has been removed under section 12. 
 
Nobody could fail to be affected by the circumstances surrounding the lives of some of the 
children and young people who have been the subject of the section 12 power, particularly in 
those cases discussed in Chapter 3 where chronic neglect played a significant role in the section 
12 power being invoked. 
 
All reports inevitably contain some errors. One unavoidable source of error in many of the cases 
discussed in this report has been the difficulty in extracting the PULSE data. In many cases this 
may have led to errors appearing in the completed text although every effort has been made to 
prevent this. 
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Section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 
This is an audit of the use of section 12 of the Child Care Act by An Garda Síochána. Section 12 
is the principal legal mechanism through which An Garda Síochána performs its child protection 
function. The section authorises a Garda member to remove a child from the care of his or her 
family, or a person acting in loco parentis, in circumstances where that Garda believes “there is 
an immediate and serious risk to the health or welfare of a child”, and where that Garda also 
believes “it would not be sufficient for the protection of the child from such immediate and 
serious risk to await the making of an application for an emergency care order by [the Child and 
Family Agency] under section 13”. Section 12 grants members of An Garda Síochána 
exceptional powers to enter any place without warrant, and remove a child to safety. Exercise of 
this power is not dependent on prior authorisation of a court, a member of the judiciary, or any 
other Garda member. Section 12 is a power exercisable on the judgement of the individual 
Garda faced with what he or she believes to be a serious and urgent child protection risk. 
 
Executive Summary 
In this audit, the Garda respondents’ accounts of contemporary policing in Ireland highlights the 
increasingly diverse and demanding roles expected of members of An Garda Síochána, of which 
child protection is now firmly a part. 
 
In various interviews throughout the interview stage of this audit, a number of Garda 
respondents cited their overriding professional obligations in terms of public protection, which 
flowed from their roles in An Garda Síochána. Many spoke with pride on the role of An Garda 
Síochána as “first responder”. 
 
What was unquestionably clear from this audit is that members of An Garda Síochána are very 
concerned to ensure the child’s experience in Garda care is not traumatising. Indeed, the 
overwhelming finding in this audit is that Garda members commit great efforts to treating 
children sensitively and compassionately when a child has been removed under section 12. 
 
For example, this audit has found numerous instances of Garda members staying long beyond 
their rostered working hours to organise the care of a child removed under section 12. This 
finding is broadly consistent with, and reflective of, the audit’s findings of compelling evidence 
that members of An Garda Síochána demonstrate very high levels of commitment to the welfare 
of children they have removed under section 12.  
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The audit also shines a light on a truth the Irish public are somewhat uncomfortable with: some 
parents, or others acting in loco parentis, for various reasons fail to protect their children, and it is 
then the responsibility of An Garda Síochána to protect those children by removing them from 
their care. Therefore, the powers granted to members of An Garda Síochána to remove children 
from parental care under section 12 of the Child Care Act are an essential tool in the broader 
child protection framework within the Irish State. 
 
The audit’s largely positive findings on the attitude by Garda members to the treatment of 
children following their removal under section 12 must, however, be contextualised. This audit’s 
remit was confined to an examination of the treatment of children when removed under An 
Garda Síochána’s child protection powers and functions. It did not examine any cases where the 
child was arrested for suspected commission of a criminal offence – though, admittedly, there 
may be some overlap between these two legal and material categories of Garda intervention in 
the care of children. 
 
The audit has found inadequacies in the operation of the Garda PULSE system, risking the 
operational and accountability functions of the PULSE system. 
 
The PULSE system was not able to provide a consistent and accurate picture of section 12 use 
by members of An Garda Síochána. Months of repeated inquiry found numerous gaps, flaws and 
variations in the data captured and saved on the PULSE system in relation to instances of 
section 12 removal of children.  
 
The audit has also identified outstanding questions and ambiguities in relation to Garda practices 
in recording case narratives on the PULSE system. An Garda Síochána has confirmed that 
systemic reform of PULSE is underway, and this process of reform is clearly to be welcomed. 
However, ambiguities exist in relation to the role of the Garda Information Services Centre 
(GISC), in particular in how narratives are recorded on PULSE, and whether it is aiding or 
undermining comprehensive and accurate reporting of cases on the system, and more generally 
its role in the management of key statistical data on the work of An Garda Síochána.  
 
Evidence from all stages of this audit has demonstrated inconsistencies in terms of data 
collection and data management. It is clear that crucial demographic data in relation to 
individuals who engage with members of An Garda Síochána is not routinely recorded on their 
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PULSE file. There are also inconsistencies in the quality and detail of PULSE entries regarding 
particular incidents involving An Garda Síochána. Consistent, comprehensive and accurate data 
collection, and the careful and secure management of that data, is an essential part of 
contemporary best practice and evidenced-based policing strategies. Comprehensive and 
rigorous data collection practices facilitate effective and reflexive policing practice, and enable 
the efficient management and deployment of limited policing resources towards addressing risks 
identified through careful data analysis. More fundamentally, proper data collection and 
management is also central to the realisation of appropriate transparency, and full accountability 
of An Garda Síochána in its performance of all its duties, including child protection.  
 
The audit echoes the call from the Garda Inspectorate for systemic reform of the Garda PULSE 
system, and recommends an audit of the role and operation of GISC in light of the central 
operational and accountability functions of proper data collection and management by An Garda 
Síochána. 
 
One of the principal objectives of this audit was to examine the appropriateness, proportionality, 
and legality of section 12 removals of children by members of An Garda Síochána. The grounds 
upon which a Garda member removes a child are the main factual antecedents to the authority 
of a Garda member to remove a child under section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991. In 
documenting and critically evaluating these grounds for section 12 removal, the audit sought to 
account for the circumstances that members of An Garda Síochána encounter, which require the 
use of extraordinary powers of intervention in the private life of the family. In the overwhelming 
majority of cases, the audit found that members of An Garda Síochána exercised their powers 
following a period of careful consideration of the circumstances and available evidence. The 
audit found no evidence that section 12 is being used in an over-zealous manner by members of 
An Garda Síochána. 
 
The most frequent circumstance encountered by Garda respondents requiring removal of 
children under section 12 was some form of failure by a parent or person acting in loco parentis, or 
a temporary lack of capacity or competence to care for the child. The nature of these failures and 
losses of capacity were manifold, including addiction-related failures on the part of some parents, 
and a parent’s inability to control a violent and disruptive child.  
 
xiv 
 
The evidence from each stage of the audit suggests that exercising section 12 removal of children 
is a rare occurrence for the average member of An Garda Síochána. It appears that an individual 
member may only invoke the section 12 power a handful of times over his or her entire career.  
 
Garda respondents demonstrated, on the whole, a significant degree of critical sophistication 
when exercising their section 12 powers. Many respondents engaged in some degree of 
information-gathering before deciding to remove a child under section 12, with some 
undertaking considerable effort, investigations and research to ensure the appropriate decision 
was made. There was no evidence that decisions to exercise section 12 are taken lightly, or that 
alternatives to removing the child were not considered by respondents. Insofar as the 
information available or provided enabled the audit to determine, the cases examined involved 
an appropriately restrained use of section 12 powers by respondents. 
 
The audit’s findings clearly show there is no standard case in which a child is removed under 
section 12. The power is invoked in a highly diverse and contextualised range of circumstances. 
 
The interview stage of the audit found some evidence that the fallout from the ‘Tallaght’ and 
‘Athlone’ cases1 has resulted in a degree of anxiety among some members of An Garda Síochána 
in the exercise of the child protection powers under section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991. This 
general finding of Garda reluctance to use section 12 may create a situation where children are 
not removed from situations where it would be best to do so. In this regard, is should also be 
noted that the terms of reference of the audit did not include cases where section 12 was 
considered, but not invoked.  
 
A further finding in the audit is that there is little or no emphasis on formal training of new 
Garda recruits in relation to child protection. It is, however, acknowledged that problem-based 
learning has been introduced as part of the training regime currently in place, which is a positive 
development. That said, the audit found little evidence of discrete training on child protection. 
The overwhelming majority of current serving members of An Garda Síochána have received no 
such training. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of Garda respondents in this audit had not 
                                                     
1 These cases refer to two incidents of section 12 removal of Roma children in October 2013. The 
children were removed in separate circumstances from their families in Tallaght and Athlone during 
extensive international media coverage of the “Maria” case in Greece. These cases were the basis for the 
2014 Report of the Ombudsman for Children, which recommended this audit. 
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received training that emphasised children’s rights or child welfare during their time as new 
recruits in the Garda College in Templemore, or subsequently in their career. 
 
A more general finding of this audit relates to a deep-seated culture within An Garda Síochána 
privileging ‘on-the-job’ training and learning, over, and possibly to the detriment of, formal core 
training in the Garda College.  
 
This dearth of appropriate training is also significant for a more general thematic finding of this 
audit: the increasingly diverse role of An Garda Síochána in contemporary Irish society. Findings 
from the interview and focus group stages of this audit highlighted the increasing societal 
expectations and demands on what functions Garda members must fulfil, particularly in the 
realm of child protection (but also, for example, mental health), and the new and diverse range 
of responsibilities these expectations place on An Garda Síochána. These findings also highlight 
an emerging risk of role ambiguity in An Garda Síochána, as the boundaries between its proper 
functions and responsibilities become blurred as they overlap with the functions and 
responsibilities of other State agencies and actors.  
 
It is important that Garda members should not be propelled into bypassing their own risk 
assessments under section 12 by being influenced by a risk assessment by Tusla. No such 
evidence of influence was found by the audit. That said, it is of paramount importance to 
appreciate that the risk assessment under section 12 is separate to, and independent of, a general 
welfare risk assessment. Accordingly, An Garda Síochána risks being exposed to litigation under 
the Child Care Act 1991, the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 42A of the 
Constitution, where it does not adopt its own independent risk analysis. 
 
In England and Wales, the requirement of internal oversight of police emergency child 
protection powers is an important organisational gatekeeping check on the exercise of section 46 
of the Children Act 1989. It may be appropriate to consider a similar approach in this 
jurisdiction in any revised protocols on the exercise of section 12 powers. 
 
The audit sought to evaluate the nature of inter-agency communication between Tusla and An 
Garda Síochána. It sought to examine the processes and cultures, if any, in which Tusla social 
workers provide feedback on cases to Garda members, following their removal of children under 
section 12. Interview respondent Gardaí described a general situation where Tusla do not 
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routinely provide feedback or updates to Garda members following the handover of children 
into Tusla’s care. The audit has found that as well as being personally and professionally 
frustrating, this absence of routine and meaningful feedback also reinforces a ‘mystification’ 
experienced by Garda members in relation to their understanding of Tusla’s practices and 
procedures. Additionally, the absence of consistent feedback undermines the valuable learning 
potential for both Gardaí and social workers from these cases, and reinforces the institutional 
silos between agencies tasked with pursuing the same child protection objectives. There is no 
evidence of formal routine follow-up from Tusla regarding the progress of a particular case after 
a member of An Garda Síochána has handed over responsibility. Moreover, there is no evidence 
of effective and robust systems for inter-agency information-sharing and cooperation after the 
invocation of section 12. Despite respondents clearly articulating a desire and need for feedback 
on how they handled a case, and how it progressed, there is no systemic provision for such 
feedback. Unless a member of An Garda Síochána commits a significant degree of his or her 
own time and energies to following up on a case, or unless he or she has an existing strong 
professional relationship with the local social work team, he or she is likely to be left in the dark 
about how a child’s case progressed.  
 
The audit found continually poor and limited levels of inter-agency cooperation and 
coordination between An Garda Síochána, the Child and Family Agency (Tusla), and other 
agencies within the broader child protection infrastructure in Ireland during and after the 
invocation of section 12. Examples of these failures were most pronounced in the audit’s 
findings of very low levels of provision for joint training programmes on child protection 
between Garda members and Tusla social workers. The audit also consistently found low levels 
of meaningful communication between agencies, and that the most significant cooperation 
appears to be confined to Garda members occupying higher levels within the organisation’s 
hierarchy; to particular Garda regional divisions; or to the sporadic, informal development of 
strong professional relationships between Gardaí and social workers. The vast majority of 
respondents never participated in case conferences in relation to a child – with a handful of 
instances where respondents were not permitted to attend such meetings due to overtime 
restrictions. The evidence from the interview and focus group stages of the audit also strongly 
indicated that good inter-agency cooperation and coordination was largely dependent on the 
organic development of good, informal, personal relationships with individuals within other 
agencies with child protection functions and responsibilities. There is little evidence that An 
Garda Síochána, Tusla and related agencies have developed formal structures to foster good 
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inter-agency cooperation. The few existing mechanisms for such cooperation, provided on a 
national basis, such as HSE/Tusla notification forms, appear to only serve a minimum 
superficial level of inter-agency communication. The critical theme of “notification is not 
communication” emerged again and again at every stage of the audit. 
 
While An Garda Síochána has rhetorically committed to the inter-agency ‘partnership’ model of 
child safeguarding and protection, the practices and working ideologies of child protection 
within An Garda Síochána fall far short of this international best practice paradigm.2 
 
This audit has also found an almost total absence of training, or strategic policy direction felt at 
an operational level, in how An Garda Síochána should respond to Ireland’s increasing ethno-
cultural diversity. This finding, consistent across multiple stages in this audit, raises issues in 
relation to the central overarching question in this audit, namely racial profiling in the exercise of 
An Garda Síochána’s child protection function. The audit has found no evidence that racial 
profiling influences the exercise of section 12 powers of removal by An Garda Síochána. In each 
instance examined that involved a minority ethnic child or family, there were very strong factual 
grounds for removing that child under section 12. That said, this finding must be tempered by 
the finding that certain ethno-cultural demographic information does not appear to be routinely 
documented by An Garda Síochána on the PULSE system. For example, whether a child or 
parent is an Irish Traveller does not appear to be routinely documented by Gardaí, as the 
PULSE system does not include a specific field for Irish Travellers. At a quantitative national 
level, this means any finding that there was no racial profiling in the exercise of section 12 
powers by An Garda Síochána must be somewhat qualified because of an absence of consistent 
documenting of a child’s ethno-cultural background. However, the interview and focus group 
stages of the audit found no evidence that Garda respondents were wrongfully influenced3 by a 
child or parent’s nationality or ethnicity when deciding to remove the child under section 12. It 
should be noted that it was beyond the remit and focus of this audit to examine the treatment of 
ethnic minorities by An Garda Síochána more generally in the performance of their statutory 
                                                     
2 Among the most developed policies on inter-agency child protection working are those in the UK: Department of 
Education, Working together to safeguard children: A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children 
(HM Government, 26 March 2015). 
3 There were some cases where a child or parent’s nationality was a legitimate factor in the decision-
making around section 12 removal by a Garda – particularly where the nationality (among other factors) 
suggested to the Garda that the family may be a ‘flight risk’. Such instances of considering nationality are 
legitimate and appropriate in the context of child protection, though nationality should not be the sole 
determiner of whether a family is a flight risk. 
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duties. These qualified findings in relation to the question of racial profiling are confined to the 
exercise of section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 by members of An Garda Síochána. 
 
The audit has found evidence of repeated removal of some children under section 12, from the 
same family circumstances. Such findings suggest some systemic failings with regard to child 
protection systems in Ireland. The audit has also found evidence in each stage highlighting 
systemic failures to help children with challenging behaviour. Despite this particular finding, the 
audit found no evidence of over-zealous use of section 12 removal of children from families 
living in social or economic deprivation. Removal in all instances was generally well within the 
subjective risk threshold under section 12. However, the audit’s findings also indicate that the 
children and families in which section 12 is invoked are typically experiencing some level of 
social dysfunction, trauma or insecurity. 
 
The audit has found that in the majority of Garda districts, the Garda station is used as the de 
facto ‘initial place of safety’ for children removed under section 12. The audit’s findings from the 
interview and focus group stages also emphasise the inappropriateness of using the Garda 
Station as the initial place of safety, where most Garda respondents described a Garda station as 
a completely inappropriate and unsafe environment for children. For example, Garda 
respondents working in busy urban stations advised the audit on how busy the station was, with 
a high level of “prisoner traffic” throughout the day.  
 
The audit has also found that public hospitals serve as the de facto ‘initial place of safety’ in a 
minority of Garda districts. Garda respondents from these areas were also emphatic on the 
inappropriateness of a hospital as a place of safety, as these hospitals were not equipped or 
appropriately resourced to deal with this responsibility. 
 
The audit found very positive evidence on the operation of the specialist child protection units in 
An Garda Síochána. These units have been set up on an ad hoc basis in a handful of Garda 
stations throughout the State, and do not operate on a 24-hour basis. However, the members of 
these units generally have the most extensive training and experience in child protection, and the 
strongest links with colleagues in Tusla and related agencies. The continued expansion and 
formalisation of this model on a nationwide basis is recommended. 
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The provision, or lack, of out-of-hours social worker services by Tusla was the subject of 
considerable criticism from Garda respondents. Where there was an out-of-hours Tusla social 
worker service available, Garda respondents suggested it is systemically inadequate, as it is often 
under-resourced, and cannot facilitate access to case files on particular children. This finding 
suggests the absence of a comprehensive and unified system containing information on the 
children and families with whom Tusla is engaging, and to which all Tusla social workers have 
access. 
 
The use of private fostering service providers as the de facto ‘official’ out-of-hours child 
protection service by An Garda Síochána was among the most prominent themes that emerged 
throughout this audit.4 As a significant number of the cases reviewed as part of the audit 
occurred outside of Tusla’s standard hours of service, a number of respondents placed the child 
removed under section 12 with emergency foster placements arranged through the Five Rivers 
organisation. Respondents who expressed opinions on the quality of this service were generally 
very positive. However, it is crucial to note that no Garda respondent was able to give the audit a 
detailed insight into the nature of the Five Rivers organisation. Nor was any Garda respondent in 
a position to explain the legal basis upon which children were transferred from the care of An 
Garda Síochána, into the care of an emergency foster placement organised by the Five Rivers 
organisation. In a number of instances, Garda respondents appeared to confuse the Five Rivers 
organisation with the Child and Family Agency/Tusla. 
 
These findings in relation to the handover of the child indicate gaps in support for Gardaí 
undertaking their child protection function from other outside agencies – principally Tusla. The 
audit’s findings also detail serious weaknesses within An Garda Síochána in terms of procedures 
for managing post-section 12 removal of children, and how Garda resources are managed and 
deployed to deal with post-section 12 circumstances. 
 
The audit found a pattern of private foster care services refusing to organise placements for 
children with challenging behaviour. These findings highlight a key issue with heavy reliance by 
the Irish State on private, non-statutory frontline service providers. In these cases where 
placements were refused by private providers, there was no agency available out-of-hours with 
                                                     
4 It should be noted that the Five Rivers organisation, a private company, has, from the beginning of 
2016, been contracted by Tusla to provide its Out-Of-Hours Services to deal with Section 12 referrals and 
placements. According to its website, Five Rivers is the first independent fostering agency in Ireland. It is 
a subsidiary of the UK-based Five Rivers Child Care.  
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an express statutory obligation to take the child into care. Where Tusla provides no service, the 
private service providers who have filled the gap are under no statutory obligation to take 
children they deem to be too problematic or difficult. Additionally, it is not clear upon which 
criteria private foster care service providers such as Five Rivers determine children too 
problematic to take into care. That said, the audit makes no criticism of Five Rivers in that it is 
not Five Rivers’ function to ensure facilities exist to accommodate children with challenging 
behaviour. 
 
In November 2015, Tusla commenced an Emergency Out-of-Hours Social Work Service 
(EOHS) which cooperates with and supports An Garda Síochána in relation to the removal of a 
child from his or her family under section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 and separated children 
seeking asylum. Through the service, An Garda Síochána can contact a social worker by phone 
or arrange access to a local on-call social worker. The EOHS is to be welcomed as it strengthens 
inter-agency cooperation. That said, there continues to be no comprehensive social work service 
that is directly accessible to children or families at risk outside of office hours. 
 
Statements made by individual Gardaí in this report, in particular where critical of other persons, 
are allegations only, and while there are no grounds for the audit to doubt any statement, the 
audit has not had the opportunity to independently verify all statements made and none of them 
are thus held out as facts. 
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SUMMARY OF THE AUDIT’S RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
An essential change which must occur throughout the child protection system is a change in the 
culture. Each and every person working within the system, including members of An Garda 
Síochána must take responsibility for his or her own role in promoting the welfare of children 
and in ensuring their protection. The following is a summary of the Audit’s recommendations 
based on data collected through examining Garda PULSE resources, written questionnaires, 
semi-structured interviews with individual Gardaí who exercised section 12 in September 2015 
and focus groups.  
 
New Garda Protocol 
1 
The section 12 power is not subject to any external oversight prior to its invocation and while such extraordinary 
measures may be necessary at times to protect the health and welfare of vulnerable children, it should be stressed 
that these measures are to be used as a last resort. Clear guidelines for the use of Garda powers under section 12 of 
the Child Care Act 1991 should be produced and made available to the public. Such guidelines should clearly 
stipulate that the powers granted under section 12 of the Child Care Act are to be used only as a last resort.  
2 
An Garda Síochána should develop a protocol requiring the exercise of section 12 powers to be confirmed by a 
member not below the rank of Sergeant. 
 
Laminated Card 
3 
A laminated card as set out in Appendix 4 with regard to the operation of section 12 should be furnished to every 
member of An Garda Síochána. 
 
PULSE 
4 
Members should be required to complete mandatory information fields on PULSE as set out in Appendix 6. The 
Garda PULSE system does not routinely record instances where section 12 was seriously considered but decided 
against. Such information should be recorded on PULSE. 
 
In overall terms, the average number of section 12 removals per annum is not so large that a full reporting of 
relevant information would present an onerous task for a Garda member. A monthly or other regular review by an 
xxii 
 
appropriate person of data entries relating to the invocation of section 12 powers is also recommended. Such a post-
event review process should capture difficulties and/or errors, if any, with regard to correct practice and procedure. 
It would also allow a practical review of the operation of any new provisions to be introduced in due course. 
 
Risk Assessment 
5 
An Garda Síochána must conduct a risk assessment prior to the invocation of section 12 powers independent of 
the risk assessment undertaken by Tusla. It is imperative that the psychological and mental health needs of 
children and young people form part of the risk assessment.  
 
Risk Principles 
6 
In light of best international practice,5An Garda Síochána must adopt risk principles for guidance in operational 
decision-making. The following provides a draft set of risk principles. 
 
Risk Principles for An Garda Síochána 
Principle 1: An Garda Síochána performs a central role in the child protection system in Ireland. Like all 
professionals working in child protection, members of An Garda Síochána are required to make decisions in 
conditions where the degree of probability that a risk to a child’s welfare will materialise is uncertain. 
 
Principle 2: The Irish legal order expressly recognises distinct constitutional rights of the child, of the family, and of 
communities of religious belief. As agents of the State with distinct protective functions and responsibilities, 
members of An Garda Síochána are required to respect and vindicate those rights in any decision-making that has 
the potential to infringe those rights.  
 
Principle 3: Maintaining and protecting the safety, security, wellbeing, and constitutional rights of individuals and 
communities is a primary consideration in risk decision-making by State agents involved in child protection.  
 
Principle 4: Risk-taking involves judgment and balance, with decision-makers required to consider the value and 
likelihood of the possible benefits of a particular decision, against the seriousness and likelihood of the possible 
harms.  
                                                     
5 From England and Wales: The College of Policing’s Risk Principles. See 
<https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/risk-2/risk/>.  
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Principle 5: Harm can never be totally prevented. Risk decisions should, therefore, be judged by the quality of the 
information-gathering and decision-making, not the outcome.  
 
Principle 6: Taking risk decisions and reviewing others’ risk decision-making is difficult. Account should therefore 
be taken of whether that decision-making involved dilemmas, emergencies, was part of a sequence of decisions, or 
might properly have been taken to other agencies, or actors.  
 
Principle 7: If the decision-making is shared with appropriate partner agencies and actors, then the risk is also 
shared, and the risk of error is reduced. Decision-making on child protection concerns should therefore involve 
meaningful engagement, information-sharing, and cooperation with all responsible and competent partner agencies, 
so that a wealth of experience and insight can be brought to bear on the risk decision.  
 
Principle 8: Since good risk-taking depends on quality information, those working in child protection should share 
relevant information with partner agencies about people in the household affected who pose a risk of harm to 
themselves or others, or people in the household affected who are vulnerable to the risk of being harmed, and devise 
effective structures, procedures and systems to facilitate information-sharing between partner agencies.  
 
Principle 9: The standard expected and required of those working in child protection is that their risk decisions 
should be consistent with those that would have been made in the same circumstances by professionals of similar 
specialism or experience. 
 
Principle 10: To reduce risk aversion and improve decision-making, child protection needs a culture that learns 
from successes as well as failures. Good risk-taking decision-making should be identified, commended and shared 
in a regular review of significant events.  
 
Child Welfare and Mental Health 
7 
From a child welfare perspective, any child who is the subject of section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 should 
have a developmentally informed, culturally sensitive, comprehensive assessment that addresses his or her basic 
needs, his or her safety, barriers to effective parenting, the appropriate fit between the type of care needed and 
between caregiver and child. This assessment should also address the child’s medical, educational, emotional and 
behavioural needs. 
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The assessment should of necessity be sensitive to any emotional trauma the child may experience as a result of 
being removed under the section and address the effects of separation from his or her family and the effects of 
disrupted attachments. In particular if a child, as a result of the section being invoked, has been placed in a 
different geographical location away from community, school and peer supports, the assessment should address as a 
matter of priority, how to return the child to his or her natural environment as soon as is possible and practicable. 
 
An awareness of the likely traumatic impact of the predisposing factors that exist in the child’s life prior to the 
section being invoked together with a sensitivity of the likely impact on children who are removed under section 12, 
should permeate all aspects of decision-making in relation to children by An Garda Síochána and Tusla. 
 
Out-of-Hours Service 
8 
A social work service that is directly accessible to children or families at risk outside of office hours should be 
developed as a matter of priority to ensure a comprehensive and unified child protection system.    
 
The 1995 Foster Care Regulations should be expressly referred to in any contract between Tusla and a private 
provider. 
 
The legal framework applying to emergency placements with private providers should be clarified to remove any 
ambiguity as to the standards to be applied in respect of such placements, particularly in cases where children have 
emotional and behavioural problems. 
 
Review of the Operational Guidelines for Policing 
9 
Given the now express constitutional status of children’s rights in the Irish legal order, it is an opportune time to 
weave the constitutional rights of children (as well as other fundamental rights holders in our constitutional order) 
into operational guidelines for policing. In this way, express reference to those rights, and their implications for 
policing practice, should be a core part of all Garda policy on child protection operations and training. 
 
Training 
10 
Comprehensive training on child protection should be provided as part of the Garda training programme reflecting 
the current law and international best practice. 
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Diversity Training 
11 
The Garda Racial, Intercultural and Diversity Office (GRIDO) should be expanded and reviewed to ensure that 
the positive work undertaken by the Office is relevant to all members of An Garda Síochána and not only 
members occupying the higher levels within the organisation’s hierarchy. 
 
All members of An Garda Síochána should be required to undergo diversity training. 
  
Inter-Agency Cooperation 
12 
The implementation of the Children First Act 2015 (when fully commenced) should be reviewed from the 
perspective of An Garda Síochána and clear guidelines on how cooperation should work in practice between An 
Garda Síochána and other State agencies should be drafted.   
 
Data Sharing 
13 
It is essential that agencies dealing with child protection can share information. Such free flow of information is 
imperative to the proper functioning of the child protection system. In this regard, the Data Protection Acts should 
be reviewed to ensure no legislative roadblock impedes child protection services sharing information relating to 
vulnerable children and their families. 
 
Child Safety Belts and Car Seats 
14 
All Garda vehicles should be equipped with child safety belts and car seats, in the event that it is necessary to drive 
with children following the use of section 12. 
 
Specialist Child Protection Units 
15 
Specialist child protection units within An Garda Síochána should be established on a national basis. 
 
Social Workers assigned to Specialist Child Protection Units 
16 
Consideration should be given to having social workers assigned to specialist child protection units. 
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Implementation and Review 
17 
To address any concern that the section 12 power is not being used appropriately and proportionately, An Garda 
Síochána should publish statistics on an annual basis on the invocation of section 12 in the preceding year. This 
reporting should also include details on the challenges/difficulties experienced by Gardaí in the exercise of the 
power. 
 
Any review process on the exercise of section 12 should make explicit reference to the monitoring of ethno-cultural 
demographic patterns in those children subject to section 12 removal, with the possibility of a robust investigation of 
such patterns, using a methodology comparable to this audit (access to all PULSE data, and the authority to 
interview select Gardaí about particular cases of relevance).  
 
It is suggested that one year after submission of this report, An Garda Síochána examine the implementation of 
the recommendations of this audit and, if any recommendations may not have been implemented, provide reasons 
explaining why they have not been implemented, together with proposals to address such an event. 
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1.1 AUDIT OF PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES ADOPTED BY MEMBERS OF 
AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA IN INITIATING THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 
12 OF THE CHILD CARE ACT 1991 
 
1.1.1 General   
This audit is a significant development in ensuring deeper public knowledge and 
confidence that An Garda Síochána (AGS) exercises its exceptional child protection 
powers lawfully and proportionately. Public confidence in such exercises of coercive 
executive powers depends, in large part, on the robustness and independence of 
oversight and accountability mechanisms monitoring such exercises of power. This audit 
fulfils a degree of that necessary external review and accountability.  
 
The key methodologies employed in this audit include: data collection through examining 
Garda PULSE resources; written questionnaires (each questionnaire covering a particular 
instance of section 12 use by the Gardaí in 2014); semi-structured interviews with 
individual Gardaí who exercised section 12 in September 2015; and focus groups, to gain 
a deeper insight into Garda understanding of their legal authority under section 12, its 
limits, and the appropriate use of that power in often pressurised, time-sensitive contexts.  
 
Through these methodologies, this audit aims to facilitate the emergence of a culture 
change in AGS in relation to child protection, and the emergence of a new ‘best practice’ 
in relation to the role of policing in child protection in Ireland. It is hoped that this audit 
will be an opportunity for AGS to examine how and why particular responses and 
practices in the exercise of section 12 powers came about in particular cases. It is hoped 
that child protection will achieve a broader organisational relevance within AGS, and that 
mature, critically reflective and transparent approaches to issues such as risk decision-
making (see Statement of Risk Principles6), and cultural sensitivity will emerge.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 See, for example, Annex A p. 96 Interim Report and The Munro Review of Child Protection: Final 
Report: A child-centred system (ISBN: 9780101806220 HMSO 2011). 
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1.2 METHODOLOGY 
 
1.2.1 Introduction 
Section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 creates a unique power exercisable only by 
members of AGS in emergency situations. Enacted under Part III of the 1991 Act, which 
concerns the protection of children in emergencies, section 12 gives AGS the power to 
intervene in circumstances where there is an immediate and serious risk to the child.   
  
It provides that where a member of AGS has reasonable grounds for believing that – 
(a) there is an immediate and serious risk to the health or welfare of a child, and 
(b) it would not be sufficient for the protection of the child to await the making of 
an application for an Emergency Care Order by the Child and Family Agency, 
the member may enter any place and remove the child to safety. 
 
Pursuant to section 12(3), where a child has been removed by a member of AGS, the 
child must be delivered into the custody of the Child and Family Agency (Tusla) in that 
area as soon as possible. Upon receipt of the child, Tusla is required to decide whether to 
return the child to the care of his or her parent or custodian, or whether to apply for an 
Emergency Care Order at the next sitting of the District Court. Such an application must 
be made within three days, taking account of situations where a child is removed into 
care during the weekend and there is no Tusla social work service available until Monday. 
 
Section 12 represents the only legal power through which a child may be removed from 
the care of a parent, or person acting in loco parentis, without a court order first having 
been obtained. As section 12 is such an important and exceptional power, its seriousness 
cannot be underestimated. Similar powers exist in child protection legislation in other 
jurisdictions, and the necessity for a police power of this kind is widely accepted. 
Nonetheless no study into the use of section 12, the frequency with which it is employed, 
and the nature of the cases in which it arises, has ever been carried out in this 
jurisdiction. This audit conducted a comprehensive review of the current work practices 
in the area, shedding light on the processes and procedures adopted by AGS in initiating 
the provisions of section 12. This audit aimed to facilitate accountability, public 
confidence, and best professional practice within AGS in the exercise of section 12 
powers by its members. 
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1.2.2  Report of the Ombudsman for Children 
In December 2013, a Special Inquiry was established by Order of the Minister for Justice 
and Equality, pursuant to section 42 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005. The then serving 
Ombudsman for Children, Ms Emily Logan, was appointed to inquire into the exercise 
by AGS of its section 12 powers in relation to two separate instances in October 2013.   
 
In both cases, children in Roma families who had blonde hair were removed by Gardaí 
from their families, in circumstances where the identities of the children were called into 
question. The public debate stemming from these cases demonstrated that the use of 
section 12 by AGS is an issue of “significant public concern”.7  
 
Among the recommendations made in her Report, published in July 2014, Ms Logan 
called for an independent audit of the exercise by AGS of section 12 of the Child Care 
Act 1991. Necessitated by the need to ensure public accountability and confidence, the 
Inquiry stated that this audit should include: “a breakdown of the reasons cited for invoking 
section 12; a comparison with the number of successful applications for emergency care orders in the 
District Courts; an examination of the length of time the child was deprived of his or her family 
environment; and the ethnic background of the children in respect of whom section 12 of the 1991 Act 
has been invoked.”8 Using the method discussed below, the audit addresses the 
aforementioned recommendations and considers the issues that were raised in the 
Inquiry in order to provide an accurate picture of the use of section 12 powers among 
the police force in Ireland. A comparison of the number of successful applications for 
Emergency Care Orders flowing from a section 12 removal of a child, and a 
comprehensive examination of the length of time the child was deprived of their family 
environment, are beyond the scope of this audit, which was confined to the use of 
section 12 by AGS only. 
 
One issue worth stating at the outset of this audit is that section 12 powers are exercised 
independently of section 13 of the Child Care Act 1991. Section 13 grants the District 
Court, on the application of Tusla, the power to make an Emergency Care Order, 
removing a child into the care of the Child and Family Agency. Though this power 
contains a similar threshold of “immediate and serious risk to the health or welfare of a 
                                                     
7 Report of the Ombudsman for Children, July 2014, para 4.5.1.  
8 Report of the Ombudsman for Children, July 2014, para 4.6. 
5 
 
child” as that found in section 12, the decision-making of the court to grant such an 
order is fundamentally different in that it necessarily operates within, and is governed by, 
the evidential and constitutional rules around court proceedings. The foundational 
difference between sections 12 and 13 of the Child Care Act 1991 is grounded in their 
distinct operational contexts. When a Garda member exercises his or her power to 
remove a child under section 12, he or she does so in the context of circumstances that 
are highly time pressured. While servants of the Executive such as Gardaí have 
obligations to respect and uphold the constitutional rights of individuals and families, 
section 12 is envisaged for circumstances where there is insufficient time to seek a 
section 13 order from a District Court. As such, the power is exercisable on the 
judgment of the Garda alone, after evaluating the evidence reasonably available to him or 
her at that time. It is therefore not possible to draw negative inferences from the fact the 
invocation of section 12 powers does not always lead to an Emergency Care Order 
application under section 13 of the 1991 Act. 
 
Section 12 of the 1991 Act is a discrete independent power invested in AGS to deal with 
an immediate and serious risk, a risk to the child that may have abated by the time the 
matter is referred to Tusla. The fact that Tusla returns the child to the family without 
applying for an Emergency Care Order does not necessarily indicate that the section 12 
power was either correctly or incorrectly invoked.  
 
1.2.3 UK study 
In England and Wales, an equivalent power to section 12 of the 1991 Act is afforded to 
police officers under section 46 of the Children Act 1989. Pursuant to this provision, the 
police have the power to remove or prevent the removal (for example, from hospital) of 
any child who would otherwise be likely to suffer significant harm. A study, published in 
Protecting Powers (Wiley, 2007), has been carried out by Professor Judith Masson in respect 
of the use of police protection powers in the UK. This represents the most extensive 
study of police protection ever conducted, and the first such study to look at police 
records. The research carried out involved two stages. Stage 1 involved a survey of 
officers in charge of Child Protection Units in 16 police forces, which were randomly 
selected. This took place by telephone and sought to establish the procedures in place for 
monitoring the use of section 46 of the 1989 Act. In Stage 2, eight of the 16 forces were 
asked to participate. The researchers analysed records of the use of police protection, and 
6 
 
conducted interviews with officers who had been involved in the most recent cases 
where section 46 had been employed. 
 
This audit into the use of the corresponding Irish power has taken some guidance from 
the approach taken in Masson’s UK study. In particular, the findings made in the audit 
have been compared with the conclusions reached in Masson’s report in order to 
ascertain the parallels and differences that exist between jurisdictions. It is worth noting, 
however, that the audit into section 12 of the 1991 Act is on a much wider scale than the 
study carried out in the UK, as it performs a comprehensive review of the exercise by 
AGS of section 12 powers on a national basis. The use of this emergency measure by 
AGS in the entirety of the Republic of Ireland is analysed and it is the first audit of its 
kind to take place in this jurisdiction. 
 
1.2.4 Aims of the Audit 
The audit, and the research involved in same, was designed with the following aims: 
(1) to conduct a comprehensive review, employing a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative research methodologies, of current work practices in the initiation of 
section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991, including an assessment of the processes 
and procedures adopted or followed by members of AGS before, during, and 
after its use; 
(2) to establish the extent of the use of this power and the circumstances in which it 
is employed; 
(3) to uncover the actions taken by AGS after removing the child to safety; 
(4) to discover “what happens next” by ascertaining the outcome of the use of 
section 12, both in the short-, and on a longer-term basis with regard to the role 
of Tusla and any court process; 
(5) to emphasise what works well in the exercise of such emergency measures and to 
pinpoint any shortcomings that exist, both with a view to informing future policy 
and practice. 
The method described below was employed in order to achieve these aims. 
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1.3 METHOD 
 
The audit was commissioned by the Commissioner of AGS. It involved submitting a 
summary report of the research findings to AGS for circulation, which has been duly 
carried out. 
 
In recognition of privacy rights, any personal data used and disclosed was in accordance 
with the Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 and the European Convention on Human 
Rights Act 2003. The research data used and processed was in accordance with the rights 
and freedoms enshrined within the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.   
 
In line with the security obligations placed on a Data Controller under the 1988 Act, 
appropriate security measures were put in place to prevent accidental or deliberate 
compromise of the data for the audit and avoid damage. The research data was processed 
without unreasonable delay and AGS were invited to review the security provided for the 
conduct of the audit. 
 
All members of AGS were free to talk specifically in interviews about cases that they 
have been involved in concerning the use of section 12, safe in the knowledge that this 
was a legitimate disclosure of information, and they were not breaching their Code of 
Practice.9 It was communicated to all participating Gardaí that any identifying 
information about the families involved would not be included in the audit report. In 
addition, Gardaí were informed that neither they nor their station would be identified in 
any dissemination of the research conducted. 
 
1.3.1 Procedure 
The audit encompassed a number of different stages to deliver a complete review of the 
exercise by members of AGS of their section 12 powers, and to achieve the aims set out 
above. The audit did not merely look at a short period of time in a vacuum in order to 
assess the use of this emergency measure. Access to the PULSE system enabled the 
analysis of quantitative data from 2008 to 2015 to establish patterns, highlight practices 
                                                     
9 Data Protection in An Garda Síochána, Code of Practice under the terms of section 13 of the Data 
Protection Acts 1988 and 2003. 
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and clarify the circumstances of its use. Notwithstanding this comprehensive review of 
PULSE data from 2008 to 2015, there was also an in-depth focus on qualitative data 
from the start of January to the end of December 2014. This component of the audit 
provided detailed information on the use by Gardaí of their powers under this provision 
during the course of the most recent calendar year period, from when the audit was 
commenced. In addition, the audit included an evaluation of instances of section 12 
exercise in a particular calendar month in 2015, conducting interviews with members 
who exercised their power under the 1991 Act during that month, September 2015.   
 
It is worth noting that this study did not simply involve a random sample of Garda 
stations in Ireland in order to paint a small picture of the presumed general State-wide 
approach to the use of police powers under this section. Instead, it sought to establish on 
a comprehensive national scale the actual work practices regarding section 12 across the 
country, reviewing data gathered in the entire jurisdiction. 
 
Audit Stages 
The following stages took place: 
 
1.3.1(i) Stage (1)  
Review of statistical data: From 2008 to 2015, all quantitative statistical data available 
relating to the use of section 12 was analysed and processed on a monthly basis.   
 
1.3.1(ii)Stage (2)  
2014 study: This stage encompassed a review of all valid cases involving the use by a 
member of AGS of his or her power pursuant to section 12 of the 1991 Act, during the 
course of 2014. Three distinct sources of information were examined in relation to this 
twelve month period: 
 
A) PULSE: An extract from the computerised database utilised by AGS as its core 
information platform was examined in respect of each occasion section 12 powers 
was exercised in 2014. The PULSE system records not only court convictions, but 
also incidents, intelligence and “soft information” (i.e. non-court conviction 
information) and it was a crucial resource for the purposes of this audit.  
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B) Questionnaires: A detailed questionnaire was sent to each Garda station in the 
jurisdiction. This questionnaire was to be completed by a Garda member who 
invoked his or her section 12 powers, at any stage during the course of 2014. A 
questionnaire was required to be completed in each instance section 12 was used. 
This questionnaire gave the Garda respondents an opportunity to provide an 
account, in their own words, of the circumstances which led to the exercise of 
section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991. Garda respondents also had to provide some 
personal information, including details concerning any training in child protection 
and diversity they had received. Respondents were required to provide the PULSE 
incident number for the occasion of use of section 12, and indicate whether or not 
there exists a paper file relating to that specific invocation of their emergency 
protective measures.  
 
In addition, Garda respondents were required to answer specific questions relating to 
the invocation of section 12. These related to the beginning of the process:  
 
Who initiated the involvement of the Gardaí? How many children were removed?;  
 
the exercising of the power itself:  
 
Who accompanied the respondent? Was resistance experienced? The grounds for section 12 use?;  
 
and the aftermath:  
 
Into whose care was the child placed? Was appropriate feedback received? Was a Tusla notification 
form completed?  
 
As well as seeking factual information, the questionnaire provided an opportunity for 
individual members to give their views, particularly with regard to communication 
and cooperation with social workers.   
 
C) Available files: A complete review of all files available was undertaken in respect of 
any occasion section 12 powers were employed throughout 2014. This ensured that 
the requisite demographic data was gathered in relation to the child and his or her 
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family, if that data was not available elsewhere, including the following details: the 
child’s age and gender, the area in which the family reside, socio-economic 
background of the family, nationality, disability and whether the family was 
previously known to AGS. It was also important to establish whether there was a 
criminal investigation arising out of the circumstances in which the section 12 powers 
were invoked. 
 
1.3.1(iii)Stage (3)  
Interviews: This stage concentrated on instances of section 12 use that occurred during 
the calendar month September 2015. Focusing on September 2015 enabled Garda 
members to give a detailed account of his or her invocation of the emergency power 
under the 1991 Act, while the incident remained fresh in his or her memory.  First, those 
members of AGS who had employed section 12 during that nominated month were 
ascertained. Next, a random sample of those Gardaí were asked to participate in an 
interview. This stage allowed the audit team to enrich the data collected from other 
stages with unique and valuable personal insights from respondents, and helped provide 
a comprehensive and contemporaneous picture of section 12 use by AGS. These 
interviews took place face-to-face in Garda stations, and followed a semi-structured 
interview format. The questions asked were focused on subjective perceptions of Garda 
respondents in order to examine the necessarily personal nature of Garda perceptions of 
what constitutes “immediate and serious risk to a child”. They included the following: 
“Would section 12 have been invoked if an out-of-hours social work service was available?” “Do general 
presumptions operate for Gardaí in their use of emergency protective powers for children?” “Is section 12 
used to bypass delays in obtaining court orders?” The interviews were recorded by the audit team 
who took detailed contemporaneous notes during each interview. 
 
1.3.1(iv)Stage (4)  
Focus Groups: In this stage, focus groups were established. These operated to discuss 
specific questions, such as “What constitutes imminent and serious risk?” and “How serious a 
risk is neglect?” This stage was undertaken subsequent to the previous three stages. The 
discussion topics were informed by the results of the research conducted and data 
gathered under these previous three stages. These discussion topics in the focus groups 
were designed to fill gaps in information remaining in the data set after the initial stages, 
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and also enrich existing data on particular questions in a dynamic and collaborative 
discursive environment.   
 
Two focus groups were organised. The first involved senior management, including 
specialist unit officers, while the second focus group consisted of a representative sample 
of Gardaí who have exercised section 12 powers. These sessions were digitally audio 
recorded with the consent of the participants, in order to best capture the insights from 
the group discussions. 
 
1.3.2 Overview of Research Data Analysis Methodology 
The audit undertook the following approach to the processing, compilation and analysis 
of the research data: 
 A number of encrypted folders were created by the audit team to store all 
information gathered in the audit process, using Trucrypt encryption software. These 
encrypted folders were located in specified catalogued electronic devices. 
 All sensitive data, which the audit team was given access to was stored on four 
electronic devices. The principal device, an encrypted personal computer, was given 
to the audit team by AGS. This device contained all PULSE data, and all returned 
case files and completed questionnaires from the questionnaire phase. The other 
devices were an encrypted memory stick, two computer disks and another two 
personal computers with an encrypted folder in which all data was stored. Data was 
transferred via the memory stick to the second personal computer for the 
questionnaires and case files to be analysed by more than one member of the audit 
team. The encrypted memory stick containing backups of all data given to the audit 
team was stored in a secure location by the principal member of the audit team.  
 
For the purposes of this audit, “all sensitive data” includes personal information 
about any person, including the following: Garda PULSE data, identifying 
information of any children, parents, or carers with whom AGS had any contact, and 
any information that might identify members of AGS who participated in the audit. 
Identifying information includes the names of those persons, where they are from, 
where they work, etc. In most circumstances, gender identifiers have also been 
changed to further avoid possible identification of individuals. 
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 Data from the Garda PULSE system was anonymised, coded10 and analysed using 
Microsoft Excel. 
 Data from the Questionnaires was anonymised, coded and analysed using Microsoft 
Excel. 
 Data from the Interviews was anonymised, coded and analysed using NVivo 
qualitative analysis software. 
 Data from the Focus Groups was anonymised, coded and analysed using NVivo 
qualitative analysis software. 
 A general analytical framework was developed surrounding the core research 
questions established at the outset of the audit. 
 A grounded theory methodology was employed to develop and expand upon the 
analytical themes and concepts generated by the core research questions. 
 
1.3.3 Data Protection and Confidentiality Procedures 
In order to ensure compliance with data protection and privacy rights of individuals in 
research subject cases, and the Garda respondents who participated in this audit, a 
number of security precautions in relation to research data were taken as outlined below: 
 Only researchers named in the Data Processing Agreement were given access to 
research data in any form. 
 Named researchers carefully redacted any identifying information in relation to 
individuals in the research subject cases in each stage of the audit, before research 
data compilation and analysis began.  
 A record was kept tracking the data transferred to and held by each named researcher 
individually. 
 All personal electronic devices used to process, compile and analyse research data 
were listed in a “personal electronic device” catalogue. 
 All “soft” copies containing research data held by named researchers were accessed 
and stored in encrypted folders on catalogued electronic devices. 
 All hard and soft copies of research data were either returned to the Garda Data 
Controller or destroyed at the conclusion of the audit. 
 
                                                     
10 “Coding” in the context of this audit refers to the process of translating raw information collected 
through the various methodologies of this audit, and converting it into usable forms of data for analysis.  
13 
 
1.4 RESEARCH 
 
1.4.1 Practices in other jurisdictions 
During the conduct of the audit, research was undertaken on approaches adopted in 
other jurisdictions towards corresponding emergency powers vested in police forces. The 
following took place: 
1) An examination of practices in other jurisdictions where a similar police power exists; 
2) A consideration of literature on international best practice. 
Looking at policies, procedures and attitudes elsewhere in the world was informative 
from an Irish perspective, in particular with regard to shaping future development of 
policy in this jurisdiction regarding section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 and its use. 
 
1.4.2 Interview of experts 
During the course of the audit, any additional professionals that could provide useful 
information, opinions or guidance regarding section 12 powers were interviewed.   
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2.1 OVERVIEW 
  
2.1.1 Exceptional Powers 
Section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991, as amended, is an exceptional exercise of 
executive power in advance of a care application to a court by the Child and Family 
Agency, Tusla. It provides as follows:  
12. —(1) Where a member of the Garda Síochána has reasonable grounds for believing 
that— 
  
(a) there is an immediate and serious risk to the health or welfare of a child, and 
  
(b) it would not be sufficient for the protection of the child from such immediate and 
serious risk to await the making of an application for an emergency care order by the 
Child and Family Agency under section 13, … the member, accompanied by such other 
persons as may be necessary, may, without warrant, enter (if need be by force) any house 
or other place (including any building or part of a building, tent, caravan or other 
temporary or moveable structure, vehicle, vessel, aircraft or hovercraft) and remove the 
child to safety. 
  
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) are without prejudice to any other powers 
exercisable by a member of the Garda Síochána. 
  
(3) Where a child is removed by a member of the Garda Síochána in accordance with 
subsection (1), the child shall as soon as possible be delivered up to the custody of the 
Child and Family Agency. 
  
(4) Where a child is delivered up to the custody of the Child and Family Agency in 
accordance with subsection (3), the Agency shall, unless it returns the child to the parent 
having custody of him or a person acting in loco parentis or an order referred to in 
section 35 has been made in respect of the child, make application for an emergency care 
order at the next sitting of the District Court held in the same district court district or, in 
the event that the next such sitting is not due to be held within three days of the date on 
which the child is delivered up to the custody of the Agency, at a sitting of the District 
Court, which has been specially arranged under section 13(4), held within the said three 
days, and it shall be lawful for the Agency to retain custody of the child pending the 
hearing of that application. 
 
(5) … 
  
The prerequisites for the exercise of section 12 powers are that: 
 there are reasonable grounds underpinning a belief that there is a risk to a child’s 
health or welfare; 
 the gravity of the risk is both immediate and serious in nature; and   
 the risk is such that there is no time to wait for an application to the District Court 
for an emergency care order under section 13 of the 1991 Act. 
 
16 
 
2.1.2 Guidance in Ireland and England and Wales  
 
An Garda Síochána’s policy on the use of section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 is now 
set out in HQ Directive 48/2013 and the accompanying policy document, entitled Garda 
Síochána Policy on the Investigation of Sexual Crime, Crimes against Children and Child Welfare 
(2013). This replaces HQ Directive 141/95 (1995), which merely set out the relevant 
legislative provisions, and which predated the European Convention on Human Rights 
Act 2003. 
  
The 2013 Policy Statement now provides as follows: 
   (8) “Real and immediate” 
Guidance can be gleaned from the leading case in the United Kingdom 
concerning a “real and immediate” threat which is In re Officer L [2006] UKHL 
36. In this case, the House of Lords said that a real and immediate threat is one 
that is: 
(a) Objectively verified; and 
(b) Present and continuing. The threshold is a high one. In making this 
assessment, police officers should consider all relevant sources of 
information and ensure that all decisions are justified and recorded.  
 
(9) “Feasible Operational Steps” 
In the event that it is established that a real and immediate threat exists the next 
issue is what, if anything, the Garda members are required to do. The legal 
requirement is for Garda members to take measures within the scope of their 
powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid the risk to 
life.11 Accurate and detailed recording of relevant decisions and the decision-
making process can assist in this regard. 
  
Interesting comparisons can be drawn between section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 
and section 46 of the Children Act 1989 in England and Wales.  
  
The guidance given to Police regarding the exercise of section 46 powers (Home Office 
Circular 17/2008) is extensive. There had been earlier Home Office guidance both in 
1991 and 2003 and it seems that the 2008 guidance was issued after the case of Langley v 
Liverpool City Council and Chief Constable of Merseyside Police.12 
  
It is submitted that the most significant difference between the position in England and 
Wales, and Ireland, is that the continued exercise of the exceptional power in England 
                                                     
11 See section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991. 
12 [2005] EWCA Civ 1173. 
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and Wales must be authorised by a high-ranking police officer. The risk assessment 
conducted by the initiating officer is subject to internal oversight by the designated 
officer. Home Office guidance (HOC 17/2008) requires such an officer to be of the rank 
of Inspector or above. 
 
The Circular provides (paragraph 15) that: 
Police protection is an emergency power and should only be used when 
necessary, the principle being that wherever possible the decision to remove a 
child/children from a parent should be made by a court. 
 
Paragraph 16 provides that: 
All local authorities should have in place local arrangements (through their local 
Chief Executive and Clerks to the Justices) whereby out-of-hours applications for 
Emergency Protection Orders (EPOs) may be made speedily and without an 
excess of bureaucracy. Police protection powers should only be used when this is 
not possible. 
 
District Courts in Ireland are accessible “out-of-hours” and such applications are made 
routinely, as can be seen from the number of ‘special sittings’. 
 
There are interesting textual differences between the procedural safeguards in section 12 
of the Child Care Act 1991 and section 46 of the Children Act 1989. 
 
Section 46(1) of the Children Act 1989 provides as follows: 
Where a constable has reasonable cause to believe that a child would otherwise 
be likely to suffer significant harm he may; (a) remove the child to suitable 
accommodation and keep him there, or, (b) take such steps as are reasonable to 
ensure the child’s removal from any hospital or other place in which he is then 
being accommodated is prevented. 
 
Subsection (2) provides: 
For the purposes of this Act a child with respect to whom a constable has 
exercised his powers under this section is referred to as having been taken into 
police protection. 
 
The subsequent subsections lay down the statutory obligations upon the police once a 
child has come into police protection to alert the relevant local authority, the child and 
the parents of the steps that have been taken.  
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Accordingly, section 46 of the Children Act 1989 creates two distinct roles: the “initiating 
officer” – the constable who initiates police protection – and the “designated 
officer” who is assigned by the chief officer to carry out enquiries. 
  
Section 46(7) enables the designated officer to apply for an emergency protection order 
whilst a child is in police protection. The designated officer is an officer appointed in 
accordance with section 46(3)(e) to inquire into cases where children have been taken 
into police protection. 
  
This requirement of internal oversight of police protection within the police organisation 
is an important organisational gatekeeping check on the exercise of section 46 powers. It 
may be appropriate to consider a similar approach in this jurisdiction in any revised 
protocols on the exercise of section 12 powers. 
 
2.1.3 Importance of Avoiding Role Ambiguity  
In many cases Garda members come upon situations where they have no option but to 
exercise their powers under section 12 – for example, where they come upon a young 
child who is found abandoned or wandering with no parent; or where members are 
called to a domestic dispute/public order incident/crime scene and the parents are 
incapable of caring for the child. 
  
When exercising such intrusive powers against the family, Garda members must act in a 
proportionate manner. For example, Garda members must make every effort to engage 
with a parent and find out if there is a suitable relative or person known to the child who 
could care for him or her in the period before AGS notify Tusla of its concerns. This 
facilitates Tusla making a risk assessment, and, if necessary, an application to the District 
Court for an Emergency Care Order or an Interim Care Order. 
  
Even in an emergency situation, it is desirable, where possible, to work in partnership 
with a parent. This is necessary to achieve the constitutional/ECHR (European 
Convention on Human Rights) requirement of proportionality, in any intervention in 
private family life. As noted in other jurisdictions, parents can, with careful and 
sympathetic explanation, be brought to agree to regimes of ‘supervision’. Alternatively, 
parents may, after consultation, agree to the child remaining in hospital or even a short-
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term voluntary care arrangement. Where access to a solicitor is available, the parent can 
have the benefit of legal advice, facilitating a consensual realisation of the goal of family 
reunification. That said, care is also needed to ensure that the parent is not pressured or 
coerced into a course of action against his or her consent.13 
  
There is also a category of circumstances where Tusla seeks the assistance of AGS and it 
is in those circumstances that section 12 powers are exercised.  It is increasingly 
important for Tusla and AGS to work together. One area of cooperation involves AGS 
support for Tusla social workers who must visit locations and deal with mentally 
unstable, violent, and/or substance-abusing individuals. Social workers generally do not 
have on-site self-protection and there may indeed be a history of hostility, threats and 
violence towards social workers. Because of this, and the stabilising effect the presence 
of a Garda member can have, it is often necessary for AGS members to accompany 
social workers to conduct their investigations.  AGS is also available 24 hours per day, 
365 days a year, whereas Tusla social workers are often only available within standard 
office hours, 9am to 5pm, Monday to Friday.14 There are a number of national protocols 
in place between Tusla and AGS to ensure good co-operation, discussed below. 
However, in terms of section 12 powers, AGS has a separate statutory risk assessment 
role and responsibility.15 There is also a formal Child Protection Notification System in 
place. The 2011 ‘Children First’ guidance16 recommends the use of Joint AGS/Tusla area 
action sheets, and that Tusla case files contain a record of the joint action sheet. 
  
There is a danger that AGS could be propelled into bypassing its own risk assessment 
under section 12 by being influenced by a risk assessment undertaken by Tusla. It is of 
paramount importance to appreciate that the risk assessment under section 12 is separate 
and independent of a general welfare risk assessment. Accordingly, AGS risks being 
exposed to litigation under the 1991 Act, the ECHR and Article 42A of the Constitution, 
if it does not adopt its own independent risk analysis. 
  
‘Role ambiguity’ occurs when individuals lack a clear definition of their role expectations 
                                                     
13 See Re A-W & C (Children) [2013] EWHC B41 (Fam) (07 October 2013), discussed below. 
14 Out-of-hours social work services are provided by Tusla in the greater Dublin area, and Cork. From 
early 2016 a national out-of-hours service is also now provided on contract by Tusla. All three services 
serve as a referral service for AGS.  
15 See page 54 of the Child Protection and Welfare Practice Handbook. 
16 <http://www.dcya.gov.ie/documents/Publications/ChildrenFirst.pdf> (last visited 13 February 2016). 
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and the requirements/methods to complete their job tasks and obligations. Police 
officers in every jurisdiction may encounter role ambiguity for a variety of reasons. They 
are frequently entering sensitive and pressurised situations where there is no possibility 
for complete information. Therefore, it is difficult to receive clear instructions, or apply 
particular training to a specific situation. Gupta and Jenkins note “[t]his lack of 
information may raise the uncertainty regarding expectations associated with the role”.17 
 
The training of rank and file members of AGS on the exercise of section 12 powers, and 
multidisciplinary training afforded to members of AGS, needs to be clear. Moreover, the 
reporting and review of the exercise of such powers, and the learning opportunities 
offered by this critical reflection, also demands clarity. 
 
The case of Langley v Liverpool City Council and Chief Constable of Merseyside Police 18 focused 
on the lawfulness of police use of section 46, when County Council social workers could 
have applied to the courts for a care order. Though Dyson LJ found the section 44 court 
ordered protective scheme held statutory primacy over the police powers under section 
46, he overturned the trial judge’s finding that police use of section 46 was unlawful 
where an EPO is operative. While an EPO is the preferred means of removing a child at 
risk from parental custody – due to the oversight of the court under section 44 – in 
certain circumstances the exercise by police of section 46 may be called for where there 
are “compelling reasons to do so”.19 Citing Home Office Circular 44/2003,20 Dyson LJ 
held:  
[S]ection 46 should be invoked only where it is not practicable to execute an 
EPO. In deciding whether it is practicable to execute an EPO, the police 
must always have regard to the paramount need to protect children from 
significant harm.21 
 
However, in the specific case, Dyson LJ did find an Article 8 breach by the police officer, 
as the mere existence of an EPO is not a sufficiently “compelling reason” for the exercise 
of section 46. A police officer should assess the instant circumstances independent of any 
                                                     
17 Gupta, N & Jenkins, GD, “Dual Career Couples: Stress, Stressors, Strains and Strategies”, in TA Beehr 
& RS Bhagat (Eds), Human Stress and Cognition in Organizations: An Integrated Perspective (Wiley 1985) 141-
175; Lewis, SNC & Cooper, CL, “Stress in Dual Earner Families”, in BA Gutek (Ed), (1988) 3 Women and 
Work: An Annual Review 139-168. 
18 [2005] EWCA Civ 1173. 
19 Langley, [35]. 
20 Langley, [41]. 
21 Langley, [40]. 
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EPO that is in effect. The correct approach is for the police officer to facilitate the 
County Council in executing the EPO: the preferred means of removing a child from 
parental custody. 
 
2.1.4 English and Welsh Case Law on Police Exercise of Section 46 
The English and Welsh case law on section 46 is instructive from the perspective of 
principle, though it is not on all fours with the legislative position in Ireland. 
  
In X Council v B,22 the English High Court focused mainly on Emergency Protection 
Orders (EPOs), but the judgment is also relevant to the general constraints on 
intervention in family life by the Executive under the ECHR. The key components of the 
judgment relevant in Irish law concern Munby J’s detailed analysis of the procedural 
rights of parents in any care proceedings.23 For example, while the County Council may 
be exercising parental responsibility for the child under section 33 (Emergency 
Protection Order) of the Children Act 1989, this does not mean that the Council can 
automatically exercise such power without consulting or notifying the parents of the 
child. Any changes to a care plan must include parents in the decision-making: “…the 
fact that the local authority also has parental responsibility does not deprive the parents 
of their parental responsibility.” The court emphasised that parental rights under Articles 
6 and 8 of the ECHR necessitate this procedural requirement on the part of the Council. 
As EPOs are an extremely harsh, draconian and exceptional example of Executive 
power, the ECHR requires such powers to be used only in exceptional circumstances. 
Munby J asserted “the court should adopt a ‘non-interventionist’ or ‘least interventionist’ 
approach” in determining whether to interfere in the autonomy of family decision-
making. This underlying conservative philosophy for the role of the State “inherent” in 
the statutory scheme,24 combined with the ECHR, requires strict scrutiny by the court of 
any further limits on parental rights following removal of a child into care. Courts should 
be conscious of any dangers to the family relations between the parent(s) and a young 
child. However, while a fair balance needs to be struck between parental and child 
interests, the best interests of the child are paramount in any balancing exercise:25 “…a 
                                                     
22 [2004] EWHC 2015 (Fam). 
23 See in particular the much-cited 14 principles at [57]. 
24 See Johnson J in B v B (A Minor) (Residence Order) [1992] 2 FLR 327, 328 – cited by Munby J in X 
Council, [43]. 
25 Johansen v Norway (1996) 23 EHRR 33. 
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parent cannot be entitled under Article 8 ECHR to have such measures taken as would 
harm the child’s health and development.” 
 
According to Munby J, “Article 8 ECHR includes a right for the parent to have measures 
taken with a view to his or her being reunited with the child and an obligation for the 
national authorities to take such action.” Adopting a proportionality analysis, Munby J 
stated that as Article 8 requires the least interventionist approach by the State – other less 
intrusive means should be considered before a child is removed from parental custody. If 
a removal order is made, it should only be exercised by the relevant authority for as long 
as is absolutely necessary. Additionally, Munby J emphasised that courts and judges 
should be available out of normal office hours to hear and evaluate emergency 
applications: “[s]uch fundamental matters are not to be regulated by the non-availability 
of courts or judges…”.26 
 
Crucially in X Council, Munby J was also unsympathetic to the County Council’s defence 
that the Article 8 breaches (specifically, the failure to provide the parents with contact 
time with their children while in care) were partially due to limited resources.27 
 
The case of Re X: Emergency Protection Orders 28 involved serious systemic failures by 
County Council social services in its pursuit of an EPO, and a flawed understanding of 
the legal tests governing the legitimate authorisation of EPOs.29 Given the enormous 
significance of making EPOs, the High Court emphasised the importance that courts 
hear evidence from frontline social workers first hand; prioritise EPO applications – not 
forcing the hearing into a busy court list;30 and that judges (in England and Wales, lay 
magistrates) be advised of the legal context of such decisions – specifically Munby J’s 14 
principles.31 McFarlane J also highlighted the heightened scrutiny courts and social 
                                                     
26 X Council, [49]. 
27 X Council, [88]. 
28 [2006] EWHC 510. 
29 Re X: EPOs, at [80]. 
30 Re X: EPOs, at [91]. 
31 Re X: EPOs, at [101]. The full 14 principles are found at [57] in X Council and are provided here in full: 
“i) An EPO, summarily removing a child from his parents, is a “draconian” and “extremely harsh” 
measure, requiring “exceptional justification” and “extraordinarily compelling reasons”. Such an order 
should not be made unless the FPC is satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate and that no 
other less radical form of order will achieve the essential end of promoting the welfare of the child. 
Separation is only to be contemplated if immediate separation is essential to secure the child's safety; 
“imminent danger” must be “actually established”.  
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ii) Both the local authority which seeks and the FPC which makes an EPO assume a heavy burden of 
responsibility. It is important that both the local authority and the FPC approach every application for an 
EPO with an anxious awareness of the extreme gravity of the relief being sought and a scrupulous regard 
for the Convention rights of both the child and the parents.  
iii) Any order must provide for the least interventionist solution consistent with the preservation of the 
child’s immediate safety.  
iv) If the real purpose of the local authority’s application is to enable it to have the child assessed then 
consideration should be given to whether that objective cannot equally effectively, and more 
proportionately, be achieved by an application for, or by the making of, a CAO under section 43 of the 
Act.  
v) No EPO should be made for any longer than is absolutely necessary to protect the child. Where the 
EPO is made on an ex parte (without notice) application very careful consideration should be given to the 
need to ensure that the initial order is made for the shortest possible period commensurate with the 
preservation of the child’s immediate safety.  
vi) The evidence in support of the application for an EPO must be full, detailed, precise and compelling. 
Unparticularised generalities will not suffice. The sources of hearsay evidence must be identified. 
Expressions of opinion must be supported by detailed evidence and properly articulated reasoning.  
vii) Save in wholly exceptional cases, parents must be given adequate prior notice of the date, time and 
place of any application by a local authority for an EPO. They must also be given proper notice of the 
evidence the local authority is relying upon.  
viii) Where the application for an EPO is made ex parte the local authority must make out a compelling 
case for applying without first giving the parents notice. An ex parte application will normally be 
appropriate only if the case is genuinely one of emergency or other great urgency – and even then it 
should normally be possible to give some kind of albeit informal notice to the parents – or if there are 
compelling reasons to believe that the child’s welfare will be compromised if the parents are alerted in 
advance to what is going on.  
ix) The evidential burden on the local authority is even heavier if the application is made ex parte. Those 
who seek relief ex parte are under a duty to make the fullest and most candid and frank disclosure of all 
the relevant circumstances known to them. This duty is not confined to the material facts: it extends to all 
relevant matters, whether of fact or of law.  
x) Section 45(7)(b) permits the FPC to hear oral evidence. But it is important that those who are not 
present should nonetheless be able to know what oral evidence and other materials have been put before 
the FPC. It is therefore particularly important that the FPC complies meticulously with the mandatory 
requirements of rules 20, 21(5) and 21(6) of the Family Proceedings Courts (Children Act 1989) Rules 
1991. The FPC must “keep a note of the substance of the oral evidence” and must also record in writing 
not merely its reasons but also any findings of fact.  
xi) The mere fact that the FPC is under the obligations imposed by rules 21(5), 21(6) and 21(8), is no 
reason why the local authority should not immediately, on request, inform the parents of exactly what has 
gone on in their absence. Parents against whom an EPO is made ex parte are entitled to be given, if they 
ask, proper information as to what happened at the hearing and to be told, if they ask, (i) exactly what 
documents, bundles or other evidential materials were lodged with the FPC either before or during the 
course of the hearing and (ii) what legal authorities were cited to the FPC. The local authority’s legal 
representatives should respond forthwith to any reasonable request from the parents or their legal 
representatives either for copies of the materials read by the FPC or for information about what took 
place at the hearing. It will therefore be prudent for those acting for the local authority in such a case to 
keep a proper note of the proceedings, lest they otherwise find themselves embarrassed by a proper 
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services must afford to the EPO application process, when parents are not present and 
legally advised. In that case, the local authority’s legal advisor was unsure whether there 
were sufficient grounds for the risk threshold of “significant harm” under section 31 to 
be met, but the social worker in court went ahead and sought an EPO from the court. 
McFarlane J found due diligence failures by the County Council and the court under the 
Act and the ECHR, where the court was not provided with the minutes of the most 
recent case conference, and where it did not receive evidence from a medical expert, 
even though the EPO was sought on medical grounds. These procedural and evidential 
failings at the application hearing made it very difficult for the parents to challenge the 
EPO, thereby violating their Article 6 and 8 ECHR rights. McFarlane J found the social 
workers had sought the EPO principally to have the child medically assessed – a gross 
misuse of the protective power under the Children Act 1989. 
 
In A v East Sussex County Council (ESCC) & Ors,32 the English High Court again critically 
examined the use of section 46 by police to take a child into care, where police were 
acting in coordination with the respondent local authority’s social workers. Consistent 
with the Article 6 and 8 ECHR requirements of proportionality, Hedley J’s general 
                                                                                                                                                                     
request for information which they are unable to provide.  
xii) Section 44(5)(b) provides that the local authority may exercise its parental responsibility only in such 
manner “as is reasonably required to safeguard or promote the welfare of the child”. Section 44(5)(a) 
provides that the local authority shall exercise its power of removal under section 44(4)(b)(i) “only ... in 
order to safeguard the welfare of the child.” The local authority must apply its mind very carefully to 
whether removal is essential in order to secure the child’s immediate safety. The mere fact that the local 
authority has obtained an EPO is not of itself enough. The FPC decides whether to make an EPO. But 
the local authority decides whether to remove. The local authority, even after it has obtained an EPO, is 
under an obligation to consider less drastic alternatives to emergency removal. Section 44(5) requires a 
process within the local authority whereby there is a further consideration of the action to be taken after 
the EPO has been obtained. Though no procedure is specified, it will obviously be prudent for local 
authorities to have in place procedures to ensure both that the required decision-making actually takes 
place and that it is appropriately documented.  
xiii) Consistently with the local authority’s positive obligation under Article 8 to take appropriate action to 
reunite parent and child, sections 44(10)(a) and 44(11)(a) impose on the local authority a mandatory 
obligation to return a child who it has removed under section 44(4)(b)(i) to the parent from whom the 
child was removed if “it appears to [the local authority] that it is safe for the child to be returned.” This 
imposes on the local authority a continuing duty to keep the case under review day by day so as to ensure 
that parent and child are separated for no longer than is necessary to secure the child’s safety. In this, as in 
other respects, the local authority is under a duty to exercise exceptional diligence.  
xiv) Section 44(13) requires the local authority, subject only to any direction given by the FPC under 
section 44(6), to allow a child who is subject to an EPO “reasonable contact” with his parents. 
Arrangements for contact must be driven by the needs of the family, not stunted by lack of resources.   
32 [2010] EWCA Civ 743. 
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guidance to County Council social workers was to choose the least distressing option for 
the mother and child in the circumstances, to manage the particular risks as the social 
workers perceived them. Hedley J emphasised the first priority of social and police 
services in child protection scenarios should always be to attempt to work in partnership 
with the child’s parents.33 As in the decisions summarised above, the High Court was 
sympathetic to the precautionary logic employed by social workers and police in child 
protection circumstances, and advised restraint when critically evaluating the perceptions 
of actors in high-stakes, time-sensitive scenarios; hindsight should not be excessively 
harsh:  
There has been now for some time heightened public concerns about child 
protection and it is not right to criticise ESCC for taking what with the 
benefit of hindsight might appear an unduly cautious or even heavy 
approach. In my judgment ESCC were entitled to conclude that the exercise 
of statutory powers was necessary to protect B.34 
 
Hedley J concluded by offering a piercing contextualised insight into the operation of all 
systems of child protection: 
 Social workers in these situations are in a very difficult place. If they take no 
action and something goes wrong, inevitable and heavy criticism will follow. 
If they take action which ultimately turns out to have been unnecessary, 
they will have caused distress to an already distressed parent. On the other 
hand they are also invested with or have access to very draconian powers 
and it is vital that, if child protection is to command public respect and 
agreement, such powers must be exercised lawfully and proportionately and 
that the exercise of such powers should be the subject of public scrutiny. 
This litigation demonstrates that child protection only comes at a cost: to an 
innocent parent who is subject to it based on an emergency assessment of 
risk and to public authorities who have had to account in a judicial setting 
for their exercise of power. It is, however, a cost that has inevitably to be 
exacted if the most vulnerable members of our society, dependent children, 
are to be protected by the state.35 
 
In summary, in A v ESCC it was held that removal by police to protect children should 
be a measure of last resort where other procedures could not be implemented without 
delay. 
 
                                                     
33 A v East Sussex, at [9]. 
34 A v East Sussex, at [15]. 
35 A v East Sussex, at [21]. 
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The more recent decision of Re A-W & C (Children)36 developed the Langley 
jurisprudence and examined the interplay between sections 44 and 46 of the Children Act 
1989. Though not named as respondents, the police were directly implicated in the 
respondent Council’s handling of this case, as the applicant mother argued their exercise 
of section 46 in this case was both deeply inappropriate in the circumstances, and 
unlawful under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). In this case, the parents had been 
generally cooperative with social services, but had, following independent legal advice, 
refused to agree to an accommodation order (provided for under section 20 of the 
Children Act). Citing Surrey County Council v M, F & E,37 Singleton J emphasised that the 
threat of section 46 to coerce parental agreement to a section 20 procedure was deeply 
inappropriate, and represented an attempt by police and social services to circumvent the 
section 44 EPO process. As in Langley, though it was open to the social workers to apply 
for an EPO (the local court could have accommodated an application hearing), the police 
and social workers opted instead for the police to exercise section 46. 
 
The court applied Articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR to the draconian powers of police under 
the Children Act 1989, and found the Convention obliges police to ensure not only that 
removal was absolutely necessary, but also that the means of removal was absolutely 
necessary: “There was a duty, it seems to me, not just on the social worker but on the 
police themselves to look at the route into protection.”38 
 
In Kiam v Crown Prosecution Service,39 the English High Court held that taking a child into 
police protection under section 46 of the Children Act 1989 was not unlawful in 
circumstances where it was too late to obtain an EPO. 
 
2.1.5 Tusla 
In 2013 Tusla (CFA) issued a “best practice” guidance, which is published on the 
Internet. 
    
 
 
                                                     
36 [2013] EWHC B41. 
37 [2012] EWHC [2400]. 
38 Re A-W & C, at [38]. 
39 [2014] EWHC 1606. 
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2.1.6 The Court Process 
What is similar in both section 12 and section 46 is that removal under both provisions is 
envisaged as but the first step in a process, which may later include an application for an 
Emergency Protection Order/Emergency Care Order/Interim Care Order.  
  
Whether section 12 is exercised properly or not is not determined in the District Court, 
as this is a discrete independent provision exercised by AGS. The District Court is 
merely involved in determining whether to grant an Emergency Care Order (ECO) 
under section 13, and the case law in that regard is clear. The risk must be both 
immediate and serious and the intervention must be proportionate to the risk.  The 
District Court Rules have been changed to ensure that a parent’s Constitutional and 
Convention rights to fair procedures are protected. 
  
2.1.7 The District Court 
First instance hearings in the District Court in respect of ECOs are not infrequent. Such 
cases take a considerable time at hearing given the high threshold necessary to satisfy 
section 13 of the 1991 Act. On occasion, Tusla and AGS persuade the parent to consent 
to a voluntary arrangement to obviate a determination under section 13.40 
 
A detailed review of the relevant case law reveals that only a small number of ECOs have 
been challenged through Judicial Review/Article 40 High Court hearings or appeals. 
Many of the decisions are only reported at the hearing of the Care Order. As previously 
stated, the threshold criteria for section 13 applications is a high one which must be 
established evidentially, and fair procedures must be afforded by Tusla and the Court. It 
is vitally important that: 
 the parent(s) knows the reason for the application; 
 SI No 143 of 2015 is applied ensuring the procedural rights of the parent(s); 
 the parent(s) or the person in loco parentis is legally represented; 
 the parent(s) have the minimum notice period under the Rules of Court; 
 if the parent(s) operate under a disability that they have an advocate/translation 
facility etc.; 
 where appropriate the Vienna Convention obligation is discharged by the Child and 
                                                     
40 See Child and Family Agency and NK (Care Order - Proportionality - Likelihood of Future Harm - Reception into 
Voluntary Care) [2014] IEDC 14.  
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Family Agency; 
 where the order is made ex parte (for particular exceptional reasons) the grounding 
affidavit addresses fully the reason for not affording notice to the parents; 
 the parents are aware of their right to come to court on short notice to discharge the 
Emergency Care Order. 
 
2.1.8 Irish Jurisprudence 
The Irish courts’ approach to interpreting the Child Care Act 1991, and applying Articles 
40, 41 and 42 of the Constitution to child care cases, is comprehensively set out in the 
cases identified below.  
 
 The case of State (D and D) v Groarke41 considered the rights of parents to natural justice 
when the State brings care proceedings to remove a child from her family. The Supreme 
Court set aside care orders made by the District Court on the basis that the procedures 
employed by the District Court breached the parents’ right to natural justice when 
dealing with Executive bodies. Finlay CJ, for the unanimous court, also found that 
parents have a general right42 to know the location of their children throughout child care 
proceedings; such access – aside from exceptional cases, for example where the child is at 
risk of being abducted from care by the parent – was considered by the court to be “a 
very necessary ingredient in the welfare of the child”. 
 
 In Eastern Health Board v McDonnell,43 the High Court was called upon to interpret the 
Child Care Act 1991, the boundaries and distinctions between the jurisdictions of the 
District Court who issued and supervised care orders under the Act, and the Health 
Boards who carried out the care orders and assumed parental responsibility for the care 
of the child. Distinguishing English case law on the interpretation of similar provisions in 
the Children Act 1989, McCracken J emphasised the significance of the Irish 
Constitution’s explicit protection of family rights, and implicit protection of the rights of 
children (now explicit following the insertion of Article 42A), and how that impacted on 
                                                     
41 [1990] 1 IR 305. 
42 The courts did not recognise the formal corollary right of children to have access to their parents until 
the judgment of Carroll J in MD v GD [1992] FLJ 34. In MD, Carroll J found that as the welfare of the 
child was the paramount consideration – questions of access should privilege the child’s rights, rather 
than the parent’s. G Shannon, Child Law (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters 2010), at [12–62]. It is suggested that 
in the post Article 42A context, this approach is now expressly constitutionally obliged. 
43 [1999] IEHC 123; [1999] 1 IR 174; [1999] 2 ILRM 382. 
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the question of competing jurisdictions under the Act. The court held that by virtue of 
the Constitution, but also express elements of the statutory framework, the District 
Court maintained on-going jurisdiction to review and supervise the Health Board’s 
undertaking of parental responsibilities for a child. The Constitution envisages the courts 
as the upholder of the Constitutional rights of the child – not Health Boards, or the 
successor to the Health Boards, the Child and Family Agency. 
 
In W v Health Service Executive,44 the High Court examined whether Article 40.4.2 was an 
appropriate means for parents, from whose care the child had been removed, to 
challenge the operation of care orders – in this case an Interim Care Order (ICO). The 
Court held that once such an order was lawfully made, Article 40.4.2 was not engaged. 
Peart J also explored the differences between section 17 ICOs, and full Care Orders 
under section 18 – specifically the varying evidential threshold authorising the continuing 
removal of the child from the custody of its parents: 
 In the circumstances of an urgent application for an interim order, it is 
clear that the Oireachtas has decided that a lower threshold of proof is 
required in order to obtain an interim order, as time may not permit for 
the gathering of all witnesses and evidence for the purpose of a full care 
order application.45 
 
Under the time-limited section 17 ICO, the District Court must be satisfied that there is 
“reasonable cause to believe” that offending circumstances exist justifying removal of the 
child. While under the open-ended section 18 Care Order, the District Court must be 
satisfied those offending circumstances actually do exist, the lower threshold for section 
17 intervention reflects the immediacy of Executive action demanded in certain 
circumstances. 
 
Noting the central importance of the family in the Irish Constitutional order, Peart J 
emphasised it is “…only in very exceptional circumstances that the right of a child to the 
company and care of his parents within the family should be overridden.”46 
 
In JG & Ors v The Child & Family Agency,47 the applicant parents sought High Court relief 
restricting Tusla from continuing its investigations into alleged child abuse in the family. 
                                                     
44 [2014] IEHC 8. 
45 W v HSE, at [11]. 
46 W v HSE, at [44]. 
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The parents argued that Tusla’s conduct in investigating alleged child abuse had breached 
their constitutional rights to fair procedures (also known as “Constitutional Justice”).48 
Given the seriousness of the claims being made against the parents, O’Malley J agreed 
that aspects of Tusla’s conduct in its investigation had breached the constitutional rights 
of the parents to be given an opportunity to respond to those allegations before any 
findings were made by Tusla.49 Detailing Tusla’s own policy document50 on the operation 
of such investigations, O’Malley J noted that the parents’ right to constitutional fair 
procedures required Tusla to act with impartiality; to give the parents details of each 
allegation in advance and in writing; to give advance notice of each stage in the 
investigation process and in writing; to keep the parents informed of any developments 
in the investigation; and to give the parents sufficient time to respond to those 
allegations.51 Even, as was alleged by Tusla in this case, where alleged abuser parents 
refuse to cooperate with an investigation, they are constitutionally entitled to be kept 
informed in writing of every stage, and given time to respond to each stage and finding. 
 
However, as Tusla is statutorily charged with ensuring the welfare of children at risk of 
serious harm, O’Malley J rejected the suggestion that the body could – similar to when 
the Director of Public Prosecutions is prohibited from taking prosecutions due to 
unfairness to the accused – be injuncted from investigating alleged child abuse. That said, 
the judge did suggest Tusla might, in a very rare case, be injuncted from taking a 
particular care order application due to abuse of process.52 
 
Interestingly, in relation to whether non-statutory case conference procedures could be 
judicially reviewed, O’Malley J found that as such processes were significant to the 
statutory functions of Tusla, they had legal effect, and as such are an interference in the 
autonomy of the family. Case conferences were accordingly found reviewable by the 
High Court.53 The judge concluded that the parental rights to constitutional fair 
procedures were also operative during case conference processes.54 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
47 [2015] IEHC 172. 
48 See In Re Haughey [1971] IR 217 and Dellway Investments v NAMA [2011] IESC 4. 
49 JG, at [54]. 
50 “Policy & Procedures for Responding to Allegations of Child Abuse & Neglect”, JG, at [43].  
51 JG, at [55]. 
52 JG, at [96]. 
53 JG, at [103]. 
54 JG, at [104]. 
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The case of A & X & Y (suing through their mother and next friend Ms A) v CFA involved an 
application for judicial review taken by the applicants in respect of various decisions and 
actions taken on behalf of Tusla.55 Ms A was in a long-term, non-marital relationship 
with her partner and they had two children. Various allegations were made against Ms 
A’s partner, which purportedly placed her children’s welfare at risk. Tusla staff attended 
at Ms A’s home with members of AGS and the Tusla staff recommended that Ms A 
leave the home and obtain safe accommodation. Ms A was also advised that if she did 
not bring the children to a place of safety, Tusla would consider making application for 
Child X and Child Y to be placed in care. Ms A had felt that the departure from her 
home would be short-term, but it turned out to be much longer.  
 
A child protection case conference took place about four weeks after Ms A had moved 
to safe accommodation. At that conference a decision was made to place the children’s 
names on the Child Protection Notification System (CPNS).  
 
The applicant sought various reliefs including an order of certiorari in respect of the 
decision at two child protection case conferences to continue to keep the family 
separated, and the decision to place the children on the CPNS. Further declaratory relief 
was sought that Ms A’s rights were violated by not allowing her bring a lawyer to the 
child protection case conferences.  
 
In considering the question of whether the actions of a child protection conference are 
judicially reviewable, Barrett J disagreed with the judgment of O’Malley J in JG v Child and 
Family Agency and Others.56 The Court cited O’Malley J’s view previously alluded to in this 
section of the audit that a  
…finding by the statutory body charged with the protection of children in the 
State that a child is at risk to the extent justifying this measure cannot be 
described simply as part of an investigation process. It may be that access to the 
system is restricted to a small number of professional persons – however, it is, in 
my view, an interference with the autonomy of the family and something that 
very few parents would welcome. It cannot be said to be without legal effect, 
since it gives access to private information about the family to persons who 
would not otherwise be entitled to that information. 
 
 Barrett J stated at paragraphs 15 and 16:  
                                                     
55 [2015] IEHC 679. 
56 [2015] IEHC 172. 
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This Court finds itself in the uncomfortable position that, with all due respect, it 
cannot agree with this particular finding of the court in JG. Why so? Take, for 
example – the example is not drawn from the facts of this case – a child who 
goes today to the Gardaí and says ‘Last night I saw my father punch my mother’. 
That complaint will be entered into the Gardaí’s PULSE system and, the court 
understands from counsel for the CFA, will always remain on that system, even 
when the event is later fully dealt with. Is the retention of such detail an 
“interference with the autonomy of the family”? No. It is the expected action of a 
competent police force. Why then is the CFA’s maintenance of the CPNS any 
different? If anything, the CPNS seems to be something that is highly desirable, 
enabling the CFA, and the limited categories of person who are able to access the 
CPNS, to bring an informed and refined response to any interactions with a 
particular child, instead of coming afresh to that child each time s/he comes 
under the radar of, e.g., the CFA and/or the Gardaí. Contrary to the view 
expressed by O’Malley J, this Court respectfully considers that most 
parents would consider it to be – sadly – both necessary and desirable that to 
prevent ‘damage’ occurring to vulnerable children, the State, acting through the 
medium of the CFA, should maintain a confidential list of vulnerable children 
whom it encounters, provided that access to such list is suitably restricted. After 
all, the great risk with an entity as large as the State is that a child could come to 
the attention respectively of, e.g., the Gardaí and the CFA, giving them 
cumulative knowledge that the child is highly vulnerable but not giving them 
individually enough knowledge to recognise that this is so. 
 
It also does not appear to this Court, again with all due respect, that inclusion of 
a child’s name “gives access to private information about the family to persons who would not 
otherwise be entitled to that information.” At the moment in time that the child is 
included on the register, the CFA is undoubtedly entitled to that information. 
Provided the CFA shares that information, and legally it is entitled to share that 
information, in a manner consistent with the obligations incumbent upon it 
under the Data Protection Acts, it is not sharing that information with people 
who are unentitled to that information. 
 
The Court did not consider that the investigatory matters at issue in the within 
application were properly the subject of judicial review and the court declined to grant 
the relief sought.  
 
The Court then went on to consider the claim that Ms A’s rights were violated by not 
allowing her to bring a lawyer to the child protection case conference. The court 
expressed considerable unease with Tusla’s request to Ms A not to bring a legal 
representative to the child protection case conference. With respect to the facts of this 
case, the court commented: 
(i) Ms A is, with all respect to her, a vulnerable person facing a traumatic 
situation; and (ii) she comes from a so-called ‘ordinary’ background and so, 
rightly or wrongly, may feel herself to be, and may be, at a considerable 
disadvantage when in the presence of a number of qualified professionals. It is in 
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precisely such circumstances that a person like Ms A would naturally turn to a 
solicitor and want that solicitor to attend a Child Protection Conference with her. 
 
In Child and Family Agency (formerly Health Service Executive) v OA,57 the Supreme Court 
addressed the question of costs in child care cases where the parental challenge to an 
application by the Child and Family Agency is “unsuccessful”. Noting the constitutional 
right to fair procedures and Article 42 includes a right to legal representation in the 
District Court, MacMenamin J set out various principles governing the awarding of costs. 
In particular, he noted the atypical nature of such proceedings, and the inappropriateness 
of applying the traditional rules of costs following the event.58 Generally, where parents 
employ a private solicitor to represent them, they will be awarded costs where the CFA 
“acted capriciously, arbitrarily or unreasonably in commencing or maintaining the 
proceedings”; where “the outcome was particularly clear or compelling”; where it would 
be particularly unjust towards the parents to award costs against them; and the court held 
that the District Court must give reasons for its decision to award costs.59 
 
2.1.9 Emergency Powers and State Intervention under the Irish Constitution 
The Supreme Court jurisprudence provides useful guidance on the governance of 
exercise of emergency powers and State intervention under the Constitution. 
 
In North Western Health Board v W (H),60 a seminal judgment on family autonomy and the 
Irish Constitution, a majority of the Supreme Court (Keane CJ dissenting) found Articles 
40, 41 and 42 (Article 42.5 in particular) placed a very high threshold for constitutionally 
legitimate State intervention in the marital family’s decision-making autonomy under 
section 3 of the Child Care Act 1991. Under the NWHB reasoning, the State, under 
Article 42.5, could only interfere in the authority of the marital family to determine the 
appropriate upbringing of their children, where there was a serious “physical or moral”61 
failure of the parents in their duties towards the child. While various members of the 
majority found the parents’ refusal to permit a PKU test on their child “[u]nwise and 
                                                     
57 [2015] IESC 52. 
58 OA, at [48]. 
59 OA, at [49]. 
60 [2001] IESC 90 (8 November 2001).  
61 NWHB, at [145]. 
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disturbing”,62 and potentially harmful for the child, the court found it was within the 
legitimate decision-making authority of the marital family. 
 
In Western Health Board v KM,63 a consultative case stated from the District Court, the 
Supreme Court addressed appropriate constructions of sections 18, 36 and 47 of the 
Child Care Act 1991. Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed questions of whether a 
Health Board (a power now exercised by Tusla) charged with caring for a child, or the 
District Court could place that child in the care of a relative outside the State, and 
whether that placement could be time-limited. The court determined that a Health Board 
could not, under section 36 place a child outside the State, but the District Court, under 
section 47, could do so – and that placement could be time-limited.  
 
In N & Anor v Health Service Executive & Ors,64 the Supreme Court reinforced the 
significance of marital over non-marital families in the Constitution, and the threshold 
for legitimate State incursions into the decision-making autonomy of the marital family 
under Article 42.5. In this disputed adoption case, the Supreme Court overruled the High 
Court which had, under section 3 of the Adoption Act 1974, ordered that a two-year-old 
child remain with her putative adoptive parents, and not be returned to her objecting 
birth parents. The child’s birth parents had married during the adoption process – an 
adoption process to which the then unmarried birth mother had initially consented to – 
and withdrawn their consent to the adoption. The Supreme Court found Article 42.565 
required reading “best interests of the child” under section 3 of the 1974, as 
presumptively being raised by the married birth parents of the child. The court found 
this presumption remained even where there was compelling evidence that the removal 
of the child from her putative adoptive parents could result in lasting psychological harm 
for the child. As in the NWHB case, the Supreme Court held this presumption could 
only be pierced by the State under Article 42.5 in exceptional cases of “moral or 
physical” failure by the marital family – a threshold not met in that case. 
 
A new Article 42A.2.1˚ has been inserted in the Constitution since the NWHB decision.  
This amendment now places a greater focus on the effects of the parental failure on the 
                                                     
62 NWHB, at [231] (Murray J). 
63 [2001] IESC 104. 
64 [2006] IESC 60 (13 November 2006). 
65 In line with the Re JH [1985] IR 375 authority on “best interests of the child” under the Constitution. 
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child. It will be interesting to see what impact this may have on the invocation of section 
12 powers. 
 
Article 42A.4.1˚ places the best interests test on a constitutional footing, emphasising 
that the child’s welfare and well-being is the cardinal principle to which the court should 
direct itself in the proceedings specified in the section. While this is in keeping with what 
is already contained in existing legislative provisions, the raising of this principle to a 
constitutional status arguably places a fresh emphasis in Irish law on this issue.  
 
It is important to note that the best interests test has, as stated above, been read in light 
of two constitutional presumptions. These presumptions flow from Articles 41 and 42 of 
the Constitution, and arise in cases where marital parents are involved. The first of these 
is that marital parents are presumed to act, in the decisions they make, in the best 
interests of their children. Decisions made by marital parents have thus not been 
displaced unless the parents have in exceptional cases failed in their duty towards the 
child, or unless compelling reasons existed to justify an alternative outcome.66 That is not 
to say that parental decision-making rights necessarily override the rights of children, but 
rather the courts are reluctant to intervene too readily to overturn what parents regard as 
being in their children’s best interests.67  
 
The second presumption is that a child’s best interests are generally best served in the 
custody of its marital parents.68 This presumption has been rebutted in exceptional cases 
where parents have failed in their duty towards their child, or where compelling reasons 
existed justifying the grant of custody to a third party.69 A similar, though somewhat 
weaker presumption, has arisen in cases involving a non-marital child, the interests of 
whom have been presumed to be best served in the custody of its mother.  
 
In these cases, the best interests of the child have been interpreted as requiring respect 
for the decisions of parents and as favouring custody for the parents. As Articles 41 and 
42 will continue to protect the rights of the family and the rights and duties of marital 
                                                     
66 North Western Health Board v HW [2001] 3 IR 622. 
67 Where the welfare of the child is seriously endangered, the court may override the decision of a parent. 
See for instance, In the matter of Baby AB: Children’s University Hospital, Temple Street v CD and EF [2011] 
IEHC 1 and Re Baby B, High Court, Birmingham J, 28th December, 2007. 
68 Re JH and N and N v Health Service Executive [2006] IESC 60. 
69 See for instance FN v CO [2004] 4 IR 311. 
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parents in respect of their children, it is possible that the courts will continue to apply the 
same presumptions in the future, harmonising the provisions of Article 42A.4.1˚ with the 
safeguards in Articles 41 and 42. Nonetheless, by reference to Article 42A.2.1˚, it is likely 
that the test for rebutting these presumptions will change, with the result that the 
circumstances in which the State may intervene will be different. In particular, as stated 
above, Article 42A.2.1˚ places greater emphasis on the effect of parental failure on 
children, such that a more child-centred approach may be envisaged in such cases.  
 
Recommendation 
Given the now express constitutional status of children’s rights in the Irish legal order, it is an opportune 
time to weave the constitutional rights of children (as well as other fundamental rights holders in our 
constitutional order) into operational guidelines for policing. In this way, express reference to those rights, 
and their implications for policing practice, should be a core part of all Garda policy on child protection 
operations and training. 
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3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
As outlined in chapters 1 and 2, far-reaching child protection powers are exercised by 
AGS through the use of section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991. The specific 
circumstances for the use of these powers are prescribed in the legislation, as set out in 
detail in paragraph 1.2.1 above.  
 
A key aspect in auditing the exercise of these powers included an examination of Garda 
PULSE records, the Garda electronic system of recording data. In particular, a careful 
review was undertaken of numerical, geographical and other statistics for the period from 
2008 to 2015 inclusive, the details of which are set out at paragraph 3.3 below. More 
detailed information for all section 12 incidents which occurred from January 2014 to 
December 2014 inclusive was also reviewed, to include the circumstances in which the 
power was invoked and details of the children involved. The results of this review are set 
out at paragraphs 3.4 to 3.9 below.  
 
The PULSE data provides a rich and useful source of information and insight into the 
situations in which section 12 is invoked by AGS. The contemporaneous reporting of 
incidents provides a clear picture of events as they transpired. However, this is subject to 
the limitations of the data review, as outlined below. 
 
The aim in analysing the above data was largely twofold, namely to gain a better 
understanding of the circumstances surrounding the use of section 12 in practice and to 
conduct a detailed statistical examination of this data. Subject to the limitations set out at 
paragraph 3.2.4 below, the analysis was a source of useful quantitative and qualitative 
statistical information.  
 
Where examples are given with regard to particular incidents in this chapter, every care 
has been taken to extract any identifying information and individual PULSE incident 
references or numbers have also been omitted for that reason. Rather, each incident or 
example is referred to with sequential numbering. It should be noted that the successor 
to the HSE is Tusla and that the majority of data entries refer to the HSE rather than to 
Tusla. 
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3.2  GARDA PULSE DATABASE  
 
The database system employed by AGS is known as PULSE (an acronym for Police 
Using Leading Systems Effectively). It is described as a relational database system, 
meaning a database which has been designed to recognise links or relations between 
relevant entries.  
 
PULSE comprises seventeen operational and integrated system areas to include 
recording of crime, traffic management and child welfare.  
 
3.2.1 Data recorded on PULSE  
For each section 12 incident reported in 2014, it appears that the PULSE database 
currently allows for the following information to be recorded by AGS: 
 
 Date and time the incident occurred; 
 Date and time the incident was reported; 
 Relevant AGS Region, Division, District and Station; 
 Location where section 12 incident occurred, i.e. place from where child or 
children were removed; 
 Any contributing factor(s), to include consumption of alcohol or other 
substances; 
 Narrative relating to the incident in general terms (see further below); 
 Other information specific to AGS reporting, to include PULSE identifying 
information, GPS coordinates, and other matters.  
 
For each child or children to whom the above section 12 incidents relate, the following 
information may be recorded by AGS: 
 
 Name of child or children; 
 Age(s) at the time of the incident; 
 Date(s) of birth; 
 Gender; 
 Nationality; 
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 Appearance, to include any identifying features; 
 Home circumstances and/or living arrangements; 
 Any disability, mental or physical; 
 Details of any prior incidents, criminal conduct or other reports by AGS relating 
to the child or children, whether as offender, victim, witness or otherwise. These 
include missing person reports, theft of property, criminal damage and assaults.  
 
The method of recording entries on PULSE is set out in the next paragraph. 
 
3.2.2 Method of recording entries on PULSE 
AGS operates a 24/7 crime and incident recording service known as the GISC (Garda 
Information Services Centre). This central facility is located in Castlebar, County Mayo 
and provides a call centre service to oversee most data entry on PULSE.  
 
According to information received from AGS, there are two HQ Directives relating to 
the GISC. HQ Directive 018/2007 refers to the establishment of the GISC, where all 
Gardaí are required to enter all incidents (except sexual crime incidents, which includes 
child welfare incidents) on PULSE by telephoning the GISC. HQ Directive 116/2011 
refers to the recording of Sexual Crime Incidents (including child welfare incidents) on 
PULSE by the GISC. 
  
Child welfare incidents are given the same classification as sexual incidents for audit and 
Key Performance Indicator (KPI) functions on PULSE. 
  
All operational Gardaí have their own personal issue digital Tetra radio, which includes a 
limited mobile telephone function. The GISC can be telephoned by Gardaí who are on 
patrol to have incidents recorded on PULSE. The Garda gives the information over the 
telephone while the GISC operator inputs the data onto the newly created PULSE 
incident. The Garda also rings the GISC to have any updates entered onto a PULSE 
incident. When particularly busy out on patrol, Gardaí may wait until they return to the 
Garda station before ringing the GISC to create/update PULSE incidents. 
  
In accordance with the Garda Síochána Policy on the Investigation of Sexual Crime, 
Crimes Against Children and Child Welfare (HQ Directive 48/2013, section 5.2.2) 
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Worksheet Contents Information Gaps
S12 Incidents 
2014
List of 595 incidents reported in 2014. Includes incidents 
marked as invalid and the reason for invalidation.
Does not include information relating to 
the MO, Weapons field or reporting 
Garda
S12 Children
List of 504 children who are linked to these incidents with 
link type "HSE Notification Concerning"
If a child is incorrectly linked as a witness, 
or has multiple links, they may not appear 
on this list
S12 Incidents All 
People
List of all people linked to the 595 incidents and their link 
types (If a child has been linked to an incident by an incorrect 
or multiple link type, you will find them here)
Does not drill into what constitutes a 
multiple link
S12 Children All 
Incidents
Lists all incidents associated with the 504 children linked to 
S12 incidents with link type "HSE Notification Concerning", 
whether the incident was before or after the S12 incident.
If a child is incorrectly linked as a witness, 
or has multiple links, their additional 
incidents may not appear on this list
Gardaí are required to record all incidents immediately upon becoming aware of same. 
HQ Directive 46/2014 also refers to the need to record child abuse incidents 
immediately.  
 
The GISC operators are trained to know what is required to be recorded on PULSE for 
each incident type/category and suggest what the most appropriate category of PULSE 
incident is used. However, the Garda is ultimately responsible for the category used and 
the accuracy of data on the incident. 
 
3.2.3 Data furnished by AGS for the purposes of the Audit  
 The data provided by AGS for the purposes of the audit comprised the following: 
 
 Tranche 1: 
 
In the first place, the audit was provided with an extract from PULSE by way of Excel 
workbook on 24 July 2015.  This comprised four separate Excel worksheets, which were 
summarised by AGS as follows: 
 
   
 Very extensive data was provided in this regard to include: 
 Particulars relating to each of 595 section 12 incidents recorded in 2014, to 
include the time and date the incident occurred, Garda Region, Division, District 
and Station, location of the incident and a narrative or summary account of what 
transpired;  
 Particulars of 504 children being the subject of section 12 invocation in 2014, to 
include their nationality, date of birth, gender, home circumstances, any physical 
or mental disability and religion; and 
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 Lists of all people and other incidents recorded on PULSE, being linked with 
these children, whether the incident arose prior to or subsequent to section 12 
being invoked in 2014. In this regard, several thousands of data fields were 
provided for review and analysis. One worksheet alone, namely “Section 12 
Children All Incidents” contained in excess of 135,000 data fields or cells to be 
reviewed. Each other worksheet also contained very significant data and 
information to be examined.  
 
Upon receipt of this data, it was necessary to structure the extensive data and endeavour 
to extract relevant qualitative and quantitative statistical data, where it was possible to do 
so in the circumstances. It was necessary in this regard to try to link the separate sheets 
together, where possible. In doing so, the aim was to be in a position to answer the main 
questions posed by the audit and all matters set out at paragraphs 3.4 to 3.9 below.  
 
Due to the difficulties in reading and analysing the data in the format provided which 
required extensive and time-consuming cross-referencing between the various 
worksheets, AGS was also requested to provide printouts of each PULSE incident which 
would contain particulars with regard to the child and the incident in one location. These 
were provided in December 2015.  
 
Following extensive review and analysis of all data and documentation over a period of 
months, it was apparent that a number of significant anomalies existed in the information 
and documentation provided. These included the following: 
 
 Difficulty in reconciling the number of valid section 12 incidents as furnished by 
AGS (see further at paragraph 3.5.1 below); 
 
 Omissions with regard to the children the subject of section 12, namely:  
o Particulars with regard to 504 children only were furnished. While a small 
number of children were the subject of section 12 on more than one 
occasion in 2014, a significant gap still remained in the data review regarding 
the 595 reported incidents in 2014; and 
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o Particulars with regard to prior or subsequent history on PULSE for children 
were not included in 31 instances. 
 
In addition, a substantial difficulty in extracting complete and reliable statistical 
information was evident, in circumstances where data entries (including nationality) had 
not been completed in many instances and where much of the detail to be analysed was 
contained in the narrative or summary entries. Other than some clear data fields, the 
narratives were the main source of information in almost all incidents. As set out in 
paragraph 3.2.4 below, these entries vary significantly with regard to the content and level 
of detail provided, which rendered the task of distilling a full and reliable data set 
problematic.  
 
While it had originally been hoped to complete the review of data and report accordingly 
in January 2016, this did not prove possible in the light of these anomalies and 
omissions. As a result, these queries were set out fully in correspondence to AGS of 19 
January 2016 and repeated in a subsequent exchange of correspondence with AGS.  
 
Further data was received from AGS on 18 March 2016 to address some of the 
unresolved queries, but this did not deal with all matters arising. As a result, further 
correspondence was forwarded to AGS on 20 March 2016 to again set out the 
outstanding information and anomalies for the avoidance of any doubt.  
 
Tranche 2: 
 
The audit was provided with historical statistics with regard to the operation of section 
12 from January 2008 to December 2014 inclusive, on 10 September 2015.  
 
This data provided particulars with regard to the number of times section 12 was 
invoked in each of these months, in addition to providing a breakdown according to 
Garda Region, Division, District and Station.  
 
The outcome of this review is set out at paragraph 3.3 below.  
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Tranche 3:  
 
At the request of the audit, AGS provided statistics with regard to the operation of 
section 12 from January to December 2015 inclusive, on 18 January 2016.  These figures 
were requested so that the audit would have the benefit of the most up to date statistics 
available.  
 
This data provided particulars with regard to the number of times section 12 was 
invoked in each month of 2015, in addition to providing a breakdown according to 
Garda Region, Division, District and Station.  
 
The outcome of this review is set out at paragraph 3.3 below.  
 
 Tranche 4: 
 
Finally, the audit was provided with a further extensive set of data on 18 May 2016, 
which comprised a full reiteration of the dataset provided in Tranche 1, with additions 
and amendments, arising from the queries which had been raised on 19 January 2016 and 
subsequently. This effectively superseded in its entirety the data originally furnished in 
July 2015, which had already been reviewed and analysed in detail in the context of the 
audit.  
 
As a result, it was necessary to again conduct a review of several hundreds of thousands 
of data entries ab initio, to ensure that the data review undertaken by the audit was 
accurate in all respects and properly captured both the quantitative and qualitative data 
sets, insofar as it was possible to do so, given the obvious limitations to the data as 
provided.  
 
The outcome of the review in this regard is set out at paragraphs 3.4 to 3.9 below. While 
additional data was provided with regard to children – particulars with regard to 541 
children were furnished – a significant deficit in data remained in relation to all other 
children. There also remains a difficulty in reconciling the number of valid incidents 
which occurred in 2014.  (See further at paragraph 3.5.1 below.)  
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3.2.4 Limitations of data review 
A significant number of logistical and practical difficulties were encountered in reviewing 
the PULSE database.  
 
In the first place, large numbers of data entry fields were either left blank or were not 
fully completed. This aspect of the audit is, therefore, relying on the extent of detail 
provided by each reporting Garda, further details of which are set out in paragraph 3.2.1 
above. Considerable gaps and omissions are found, for example, with regard to the 
children involved, to include their nationality and living circumstances. It should also be 
noted that the audit was not furnished with particulars for all children who were the 
subject of section 12 powers in 2014. As a result, it is important to state that this data 
source cannot be said to be entirely accurate, due to the absence of recorded information 
for many incidents. The review of this data source should, therefore, be viewed in light 
of these limitations.  
 
In large part, the majority of the information which was relied upon was found in the 
Narrative entries field, which appear to be utilised to capture a more comprehensive level 
of instant detail on the database as a PULSE incident log contains only a limited number 
of designated fields. However, these narrative entries vary significantly with regard to the 
content and level of detail provided. There is little consistency in the information 
provided or the method of reporting. For example, most narratives do not provide any 
information with regard to the specific evidence available to AGS prior to invoking the 
section or any critical evaluation of the evidence available and/or risk assessment, having 
regard to the provisions of the legislation. This made the task of assessing the actions of 
AGS in this light considerably more difficult.  
 
It should also be noted that while some of the data review represents an extraction of 
factual data from the PULSE data provided by AGS, for example the number of section 
12 orders made and the dates/times the section was invoked, other data is presented 
according to the audit’s classification of these incidents and the grounds upon which 
section 12 was invoked.  
 
One further limitation related to the presentation of the data where a number of the 
incidents as recorded were subsequently invalidated, whether by reason of duplication or 
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otherwise. In addition, very significant work to cross-reference the data as furnished was 
required, in circumstances where the database of incidents did not actually contain the 
names of the children in question. As a result, it was necessary to review the relevant 
PULSE database numbers and ‘work backwards’ to establish the name of the child and, 
from that point, establish age, home circumstances and other relevant information.  
 
A key limitation and qualification of the PULSE review undertaken by this audit is that 
the audit was furnished by AGS with a relevant extract of PULSE relating to section 12 
incidents, without access to the entire PULSE database. For this reason, a written 
assurance was sought from AGS that all data and information provided by AGS 
throughout the course of the audit represents a full and complete account of all section 
12 incidents and related children.70  
 
It should be stated that the detailed data furnished related to a twelve-month period, 
being the period from January to December 2014. It reflects patterns and trends with 
regard to the operation of section 12 by AGS during this period.  
 
In summary, it is the audit’s conclusion that the difficulties encountered by the audit in 
examining PULSE data in relation to section 12 use may reflect problems with the 
collection and management of operational information by AGS. Though members of 
AGS made genuine efforts to facilitate this component of the audit, the process was 
undermined by the foundational systems and technologies involved in the Garda 
information system. As emphasised throughout this audit, these problems with regard to 
data management pose obstacles for both evidence-based operational policing, and wider 
organisational accountability to the public AGS serves. 
 
3.3 SUMMARY OF STATISTICS FROM 2008 TO 2015 
 
The statistics furnished by AGS relating to the period from January 2008 to December 
2015 inclusive show the number of times section 12 was invoked by AGS. It should be 
noted that this metric is assumed from the information provided as the norm (including 
this metric) was not provided in the PULSE information furnished to the audit.  
 
                                                     
70 See Appendix 5. 
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The following table shows the number of section 12 incidents for each year according to 
Garda Region, as follows: 
 
 
 
  
Section 12 Statistics By Garda Region
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Dublin Region 73 139 183 220 218 227 105 157
Eastern Region 49 76 83 72 96 74 67 129
Northern Region 73 92 104 102 138 113 94 85
South Eastern Region 113 158 149 145 128 136 121 126
Southern Region 112 105 131 145 128 133 156 136
Western Region 50 40 95 71 68 79 52 85
Unspecified 1
Total 470 610 745 756 776 762 595 718
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The following graph shows the figures according to the relevant Garda Region: 
 
 
 
The decrease in numbers of section 12 invocations in 2014, both having regard to 
preceding years and the subsequent figures for 2015, is noteworthy. In the absence of 
detailed PULSE records for all section 12 incidents occurring since 2008, it is not 
possible to state with certainty the reason or reasons why this occurred. However, it is 
interesting to note that this reduction occurred following the appointment of the 
Ombudsman for Children to investigate two separate instances in October 2013. It 
should also be noted that the Ombudsman’s Report was published in July 2014.  
 
The significant fall in figures for all Dublin Districts in 2014 is also noteworthy, when 
considered in the light of averages for other years. On the other hand, a considerable 
increase in section 12 incidents in the Southern Region is evident, being the only Garda 
Region where this occurred in 2014. It is not possible from a review of the data provided 
to explain the reason for this, as the audit was provided with a qualitative set of data for 
incidents which occurred in 2014 only.  
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
In
ci
d
en
ts
Year
Section 12 Statistics By Year & Garda Region
Dublin Region Eastern Region Northern Region South Eastern Region
Southern Region Western Region Unspecified
49 
 
Another interesting feature of these figures is those divisions which have consistently had 
lower instances of section 12 incidents from 2009 to 2015. These include the Eastern and 
Western Regions. On the other hand, the numbers for both the Southern and South 
Eastern Regions are higher than might be expected. For example, the number of section 
12 incidents in these regions in 2014 was higher than in all Dublin Districts.  
 
Full details of the review of section 12 incidents which occurred in 2014 are set out in 
paragraphs 3.4 to 3.9 below.  
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The following table shows the above statistics broken down according to Garda Region 
and Division for each year from 2008 to 2015 inclusive.  
 
 
 
The following graphs show the number of incidents broken down according to each 
individual month. It is interesting to see that more incidents appear to occur at different 
times, to include holiday periods during the year.  
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Dublin Region 73 139 183 220 218 227 105 157
D.M.R. Eastern 6 7 13 7 4 16 9 5
D.M.R. North Central 15 17 21 26 36 31 14 41
D.M.R. Northern 15 28 48 45 51 43 25 48
D.M.R. South Central 9 13 18 15 10 44 20 14
D.M.R. Southern 8 21 33 56 32 32 23 29
D.M.R. Western 20 53 50 71 85 61 14 20
Eastern Region 49 76 83 72 96 74 67 129
Carlow/Kildare 3 9 0 0 0 0 0 10
Kildare Div 1 7 21 9 27 18 18 14
Laois/Offaly 14 24 17 29 32 17 21 35
Longford/Westmeath 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Louth/Meath 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 27
Meath Div 6 13 22 12 20 13 17 13
Westmeath Div 2 8 17 15 14 19 3 0
Wicklow Div 5 15 6 7 3 7 8 22
Northern Region 73 92 104 102 138 113 94 85
Cavan/Monaghan 15 31 29 30 59 23 20 25
Donegal 38 29 32 37 19 27 30 28
Louth Div 9 26 36 27 46 54 39 29
Sligo/Leitrim 11 6 7 8 14 9 5 3
Not Assigned Region 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
South Eastern Region 113 158 149 145 128 136 121 126
Kilkenny/Carlow 2 12 34 24 26 29 11 16
Tipperary 57 56 62 50 37 57 33 30
Waterford Div 7 31 28 27 24 22 31 27
Waterford/Kilkenny 18 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wexford Div 23 54 25 44 41 28 46 35
Wexford/Wicklow 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
Southern Region 112 105 131 145 128 133 156 136
Cork City 15 25 31 32 41 31 44 56
Cork North 19 20 11 24 24 20 45 29
Cork West 12 8 8 18 15 11 21 13
Kerry 11 7 29 23 25 30 14 15
Limerick 55 45 52 48 23 41 32 23
Western Region 50 40 95 71 68 79 52 85
Clare 7 8 32 13 9 21 16 18
Galway Div 25 20 39 28 36 30 22 37
Galway West 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mayo 5 10 10 13 16 16 6 17
Roscommon/Galway (East) 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Roscommon/Longford Div 2 2 14 17 7 12 8 9
Total 470 610 745 756 776 762 595 718
Summary of Section 12 Statistics by Garda Region & Division
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3.4 DETAILED REVIEW OF STATISTICS FROM JANUARY TO DECEMBER 
2014 
 
An in-depth analysis was carried out on details of the 595 section 12 incidents recorded 
by AGS between January and December 2014 inclusive, together with information 
concerning the children to whom these incidents related, and their families or other 
caregivers. The audit was also furnished with extraneous information relating to these 
incidents and children, to include prior and subsequent contact with AGS, where 
recorded on PULSE. In many cases, these related to instances of criminal activity and 
conduct.  
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3.5  NUMBER OF SECTION 12 INCIDENTS IN 2014 
 
The following chart and graph set out the number of times section 12 was invoked by 
AGS in 2014, according to the relevant Garda Region.  
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2014
Dublin Region 105
D.M.R. Eastern 9
D.M.R. North Central 14
D.M.R. Northern 25
D.M.R. South Central 20
D.M.R. Southern 23
D.M.R. Western 14
Eastern Region 67
Carlow/Kildare 0
Kildare Div 18
Laois/Offaly 21
Longford/Westmeath 0
Louth/Meath 0
Meath Div 17
Westmeath Div 3
Wicklow Div 8
Northern Region 94
Cavan/Monaghan 20
Donegal 30
Louth Div 39
Sligo/Leitrim 5
Not Assigned Region 0
South Eastern Region 121
Kilkenny/Carlow 11
Tipperary 33
Waterford Div 31
Waterford/Kilkenny 0
Wexford Div 46
Wexford/Wicklow 0
Southern Region 156
Cork City 44
Cork North 45
Cork West 21
Kerry 14
Limerick 32
Western Region 52
Clare 16
Galway Div 22
Galway West 0
Mayo 6
Roscommon/Galway (East) 0
Roscommon/Longford Div 8
Total 595
Summary of Section 12 Statistics 
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It is evident that section 12 powers were invoked most frequently in the Southern Region 
in 2014, with a total of 156 cases. This figure is of particular note when compared with 
figures for the Dublin Metropolitan Region with a total of 105 cases.  
 
3.5.1 Number of Valid Incidents 
 
The review of all data provided by AGS disclosed a total of 560 valid incidents for 2014, 
of a total of 595 recorded incidents. It should be noted that this figure differed from the 
official figure furnished by AGS of 577 valid incidents in 2014.  
 
The invalidated and/or excluded incidents were excluded from review by the audit for 
the following reasons: 
 
Reason for Exclusion Number of incidents  
Officially invalidated by AGS  8 incidents 
 
Duplicate incident recorded  
 
1 incident 
Section 12 was not, in fact, invoked. These 10 incidents  
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Western Region 5 2 3 3 1 5 5 1 2 4
Southern Region 9 5 10 8 12 11 7 7 8 5 8 11
South Eastern Region 7 1 10 11 8 6 8 11 4 9 5 3
Not Assigned Region
Northern Region 4 5 4 7 3 5 7 4 4 5 8 6
Eastern Region 4 5 4 4 6 2 4 2 5 6 3 5
Dublin Region 8 1 11 7 7 9 6 5 5 7 7 3
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include situations where the assistance of AGS 
was sought to execute a care or other order. 
There is also one incident recorded in 2014 
where AGS declined to invoke section 12. See 
further at paragraph 3.9 below. 
 
The incident occurred in a previous year, 
although recorded in 2014. It should be noted 
that 2 of these incidents dated from 2008, 10 
incidents dated from 2009 and 4 incidents dated 
from 2010. This raises an obvious question as to 
why the incidents were not recorded at the time 
they occurred.  
 
 
16 incidents 
Total number of incidents excluded from 
review 
30 incidents 
 
3.6 CHILDREN  
 
The children in respect of whom the section 12 powers are invoked are the centre of this 
review. Considerable time was spent in fully reviewing and analysing the circumstances 
surrounding the use of these powers, together with gathering information about the 
children at the heart of the process.  
 
The audit was furnished by AGS with particulars of 541 children and the relating data 
was analysed under the headings set out in the following paragraphs. As explained in 
paragraph 3.2.4, the data provided is incomplete as the data shows a total of 560 valid 
incidents. It should also be noted that two such incidents refer to more than one child 
being the subject of section 12. However, as each incident is recorded in respect of one 
child only, it is not possible to analyse this question in greater detail.  
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Notwithstanding the inevitable difficulty presented by the omission of some necessary 
data by AGS, having requested the information over a period of several months, the data 
was analysed under the following categories.  
 
3.6.1 Age(s) of children 
The following graph sets out the age profile of the children in question, as disclosed in 
the PULSE records as furnished.  
 
 
 
This shows a broad range of ages from 0 to 18 years, with the highest percentage relating 
to children from 16 to 18 years inclusive71 i.e. those born between 1996 and 1998.   
 
It is noteworthy that some 54 percent of these children are aged between 13 and 18 
years. Paragraph 3.8.4 below discusses this further.  
 
3.6.2 Gender/Sex of children 
The following graph sets out the gender/sex of children being the subject of the 
invocation of section 12 powers. Both categories are recorded on PULSE with similar 
                                                     
71 It should be noted that the reference to children aged over 18 is an error as these have been incorrectly 
classified by AGS on PULSE.  
1
2
29
66
67
65
43
22
15
24
17
10
14
16
17
22
18
23
22
26
22
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1956 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Year of Birth for 2014 Section 12 Incidents 
Total
58 
 
results. There is a higher proportion of male children, being represented at 54.7% and 
female children represented at 44.9%.  
 
 
 
The reference to two “Unspecified” cases arises in this context as no sex or gender is 
recorded by AGS in these cases. Both children appear to be foreign nationals (Indian and 
unknown/unspecified) and their sex is not otherwise clear from other entries on the 
database, as provided.  
 
3.6.3 Nationality 
The following graph sets out details of the nationality of these children, where recorded 
on the PULSE database.  
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The review of this information was instructive in many respects. In the first place, it 
revealed a large percentage of the children, over 77.4%, being of Irish nationality. The 
foreign-national children in respect of whom details were provided were drawn from a 
large cross-section of nationalities, as set out above, including Eastern European, African 
and Asian nationalities. The largest foreign-national grouping comprised Nigerian 
children, being 24 children or 4.4% of the total children involved. Some 10 children were 
of Romanian nationality, representing 1.8% of the total children involved.  
 
However, it should also be noted and factored into account that in 29 instances (or 5.4% 
of the total number of children involved), the nationality of the child is not recorded by 
AGS on PULSE. This is a crucial factor which has relevance with regard to the analysis 
and review undertaken in the course of this audit. 
 
3.6.4 Home circumstances  
The following graph shows the “Home Circumstances” of the children in question as 
recorded by Gardaí on the PULSE database. This is the term used by AGS and the 
categories referred to below are as recorded on PULSE. As in other categories, the 
database shows a high percentage of children with no relevant information recorded - 
233 cases - at 43% of the children subject to section 12 powers as recorded in 2014. Of 
the entries which make reference to this field, the majority relate to children living with 
419
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their parents (217 children), with lesser numbers living with relatives (18 children) or 
others or in other accommodation (73 children).   
 
 
 
The review of the data undertaken in the course of the audit has also endeavoured to 
extract relevant information regarding the home or living circumstances of the children 
being the subject of section 12 invocations. Such review was undertaken on the basis of 
the narratives and other PULSE entries. The results are set out at paragraph 3.8.7 below.  
 
3.6.5  Mental or physical disability 
  No circumstances of mental or physical disability were recorded on the PULSE database
 in respect of the children subject to section 12 in 2014.  
 
3.6.6 Religion 
Reference to the religion of a child was made only once in relation to these children, 
being a child of Roman Catholic faith. No record of religion is made in any other case.  
 
3.6.7 Narratives  
The narratives recorded by AGS provide the most useful information with regard to the 
use of section 12 in each specific incident arising in 2014. For the most part, they broadly 
set out the circumstances surrounding the use of section 12 by AGS in the form of a 
summary, similar to an “attendance note” or noted record. However, as outlined above, 
the narratives vary significantly with regard to the content and level of detail provided.  
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3.7 GROUNDS UPON WHICH SECTION 12 WAS INVOKED 
 
The circumstances of cases where section 12 was invoked during 2014 are many and 
varied. 
 
These include neglect of the child(ren) by parents or other caregivers, family disputes, 
help invoked by the child himself or herself or by his or her parents or caregivers, 
circumstances of abuse and threatened suicide.   
 
The grounds upon which the section 12 power was invoked in each of the 560 valid 
recorded incidents in 2014 were analysed in the following categories in the context of 
this audit.  
  
1. Suspicion or concern that the child is being abused or neglected; 
2. Concern for child welfare (public safety); 
3. Suspected emotional abuse; 
4. Suspected neglect; 
5. Suspected physical abuse; 
6. Suspected sexual abuse; 
7. Child a danger to self/others; 
8. Child under the influence of drugs/alcohol; 
9. Domestic Violence; 
10. Mental health issues within child; 
11. Mental health issues within parent(s); 
12. Active substance abuse within parents leading to abuse or neglect; and 
13. Other. 
 
In this context, it should be noted that the data in the following paragraphs has been 
analysed and presented according to the audit’s classification of these incidents to assess 
and categorise the grounds upon which section 12 was invoked. As these categories do 
not form part of PULSE, all available information was ascertained from the Narratives, 
insofar as possible. 
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Each ground is discussed in detail in paragraphs 3.7.1 to 3.7.14 below, in addition to 
providing examples of incidents where section 12 was invoked by AGS in 2014. In 271 
incidents, two grounds were noted, and 72 incidents demonstrated three or more 
grounds. It is inevitable that there would be potential for overlap among these broadly 
defined categories, given the nature of the circumstances as they present to AGS.  
 
The following graph sets out the various broad grounds upon which section 12 was 
invoked by AGS in 2014.  
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3.7.1 Suspicion or concern that the child is being abused or neglected 
A considerable number of cases fell within this ground and a large number of 
circumstances arose in this context.  
 
The following are some examples of the wide-ranging circumstances which occurred in 
2014, as disclosed on PULSE.  
 
Example 1: 
Gardaí received an anonymous call that a young child had been locked out of her home 
and was crying. The narrative further records “upon arrival of Gardaí, the child was now 
in the home with the mother. Gardaí spoke to [the] mother. Whilst conversation was 
taking place, the child was trying to ask its mother a question from a book she [had]. 
Each time the child approached, the mother pushed the child away more forcibly each 
time. The child had a cut and a bruise under the left eye. When the baby in the house 
started crying uncontrollably, young child appeared frightened. Mother’s social worker 
contacted.”  
 
The narrative further records that the social worker said that he/she would “link in with 
mother” the following day. Unhappy with this situation, section 12 was invoked by the 
Garda members and contact was made with Five Rivers, a private provider of foster 
care72, to secure suitable accommodation for the child.  
 
Example 2: 
The narrative for this incident describes in detail the circumstances which arose. 
“Received call from HSE (Tusla) requesting assistance with a child removed from [name 
of hospital]. While awaiting an x-ray in a&e, the child was removed by her brother who 
has previously admitted to social workers of assaulting the child. Assisted by [Garda 
station] unit [numbers], observed suspect vehicle on [address] heading into [Apartment 
name]. Attended apt [number], child found behind a curtain in the living room which is 
her bedroom where she sleeps on the floor. She was in a distressed state. Brother 
extremely agitated and aggressive towards gardaí. Brother initially denied that the sister 
was in the flat and he was also denying any medical treatment to her. Gardaí believed 
                                                     
72 A further discussion with regard to the operation of private providers in this area is set out at paragraph 
6.2.14.  
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that the child was in immediate and serious risk of harm due to agitated state of her 
brother and took the child from the apt under section 12 child care act and placed her 
into the care of social workers [names] who in turn placed her in secure safe 
accommodation in [location]. Emergency care order to be sought by HSE (Tusla) on 
Monday morning.”  
 
It emerged from further incidents on PULSE, however, that the child was subsequently 
returned to the care of her brother by the HSE (Tusla). In addition, it appears that the 
social workers, when requesting the Gardaí to deal with any calls from this child “as a 
priority”, refused to confirm to Gardaí whether an application for an emergency care 
order had, in fact, been made.  
 
Example 3: 
The circumstances surrounding the invocation of section 12 in this incident are described 
as follows in the narrative: “Following a 999 call to [name] [Garda Station] from an anon 
source voicing concern in relation to above child, Gardaí attended scene. After knocking 
on the door for several minutes Gardaí entered the apartment upon invitation from Mr. 
[name]. The apt was littered with rubbish, there were soiled nappies all over the floor, 
excrement on the floor, broken furniture everywhere, no bedding on the beds. The child 
was running round in a soiled nappy with dried excrement on her clothes. The child is 
almost 4 years of age but is unable to speak. Mr [name] appeared agitated & was 
complaining of a sore hand - when asked by Gardaí what had happened he admitted 
sustaining the injury from punching a wall in his apt a couple of days previous. Garda 
[name] had serious concerns regarding the child’s welfare & as a result invoked section 
12 of the Child Care Act 1991.” 
 
Example 4: 
An immediate risk to the safety and welfare of two children arose in a case where, as 
noted by the narrative, Gardaí were called to a disturbance at a house where they 
“observed a male on the balcony covered in blood. Refused to answer door to gardaí. 
Heard a child crying inside apartment, door forced and entry gained to apartment, blood 
and broken glass all over the apartment. 2 males located in the apartment had been 
fighting with broken bottles. Children dirty and appeared neglected, concerns for their 
welfare as it was an unsafe environment. Section 12 child care act invoked.” 
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Example 5: 
Section 12 was invoked in relation to three children in the following circumstances. The 
mother of the children, who was pregnant at the time, had been brought to hospital 
“while holding a knife to her stomach”. The narrative to this incident states that an 
Emergency Care Order was subsequently granted in the District Court when the mother 
withdrew her consent to the children remaining in care on a voluntary basis.  
 
3.7.2 Concern for child welfare (public safety) 
This broad-based ground can be said to encompass many section 12 incidents which 
arose in the course of 2014.  
 
Example 6: 
The narrative to one incident discloses the circumstances in which section 12 was 
invoked for the safety of a young baby, in the following terms. “[R]eceived call of 
intoxicated female slapping her child at [fast food restaurant]. Met female. There was a 
strong smell of alcohol and she was clearly intoxicated. Female abusive & threatening 
towards gardaí. Staff and witnesses at location informed gardaí female was slapping child 
hard, dragging baby/child across wet ground, throwing baby into the air in a care free 
manner causing concern. Baby had no food, baby was sucking on chips (baby only 8mths 
to 9mths old). Female indicated that she felt suicidal and was on medication for same. 
Gardaí concerned for [baby’s] safety. Section 12 of the child care act invoked. Mother 
and baby brought back to the station. When in station baby taken out of buggy & 
discovered baby had no nappy or any under garments on, (no pants or socks etc.). Baby 
saturated from self urination & from pouring rain. Baby appeared malnourished. Garda 
[name] provided baby with food & nappies from local shop. HSE (Tusla) contacted …”.  
 
Example 7: 
Gardaí located a child who was in the State illegally, having been abandoned by her 
mother and invoked section 12. 
 
Example 8: 
Section 12 was also invoked in a case where child trafficking was alleged and emergency 
care for the child in question was found by Gardaí. 
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3.7.3 Suspected emotional abuse 
A limited number of cases fell within this ground as a sole basis for invoking section 12, 
although this source of abuse might be said to arise in very many cases. As in other 
categories, the potential for overlap clearly emerges in these circumstances.  
 
Example 9: 
Gardaí invoked section 12 in a case where a child had told his father that his “mother 
had told him that she was going to burn down the house and take him to heaven.” As 
the mother appeared to have had custody of the child, Five Rivers was contacted and 
arranged foster care for the child. HSE (Tusla) was also informed by the Gardaí.  
 
3.7.4 Suspected neglect 
This ground again encompasses wide-ranging circumstances, to include those where 
Gardaí were notified of children left alone for periods of time, sometimes overnight or 
for longer periods of time. In many of these cases, the living conditions were also 
deemed unsuitable and to pose a risk to the health, safety and/or welfare of children.  
 
Example 10: 
A postman found a one-year-old child “wandering unaccompanied in a housing estate. 
Child had gone out onto main road”. The Gardaí were called and they invoked section 
12 when they located the child’s mother in an intoxicated state and unable to care for the 
child.  
 
Example 11: 
Following receipt of anonymous information, Gardaí found two children, aged 2 and 6 
years old, “unsupervised and watching television while the mother had been out drinking 
for the night.” Section 12 was invoked and the children were brought to the Garda 
station as a place of safety.   
 
Example 12: 
Gardaí were “alerted by [a] neighbour [of] the possibility of a 5 year old boy home alone. 
Gardaí gained entry through an unlocked garage door which led in to the kitchen. On 
inspection of the house no adults were home. Front and back doors were locked. All 
blinds were closed and a 5 year old boy was locked in an upstairs back bedroom. The key 
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was in the outside of the door. Gardaí removed the child for his own safety to [name] 
hospital.”  
 
It subsequently appeared from entries on PULSE that the child was reunited with his 
mother the following day by the HSE (Tusla), with a “review team in place…they do not 
suspect immediate risk to the child’s safety”.  
 
Example 13: 
In another case, as noted by the narrative, a “7 month old infant child was found by 
security staff in [a] buggy unattended adjacent to ticket kiosk at main entrance to 
[shopping centre], taken into the possession of security personnel at shopping centre at 
3.10 pm at which time they commenced trying to locate child’s guardian and called 
gardaí. Search for the said guardian continued by both garda personnel and security 
personnel on garda arrival at 3.50 pm onwards, this included examination of cctv footage 
at shopping centre. At 4.25 pm having been unsuccessful in locating a guardian for the 
abandoned infant section 12 of the child care act was invoked and the infant was 
conveyed to [name] garda station… gardaí … at 4.40 pm received a call from the infant’s 
guardian and child’s mother met with HSE (Tusla) social worker … later at [name] garda 
station.” The PULSE records subsequently note that the child was left in the care of the 
said guardian and mother.  
 
Example 14: 
Gardaí discovered a seven-month-old child who had been left alone at home while her 
mother went out at night. Section 12 was invoked. 
 
Example 15:  
In another case, Gardaí received a report that “three young children aged approx. 5, 2 & 
less than a year old were reported to be wandering around the [name] area unsupervised. 
The children were almost hit by a bus and a taxi while crossing the street. The 5 year old 
led them to the [name] hotel where staff alerted gardaí.” Section 12 was invoked in 
relation to the children who were brought to the Garda station before being released to 
the HSE (Tusla).   
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Example 16: 
Gardaí were notified that a child was “wandering in a housing estate” at approximately 
2.00 am. This child was aged seven years. Gardaí attended at the scene and the narrative 
discloses that they “found child and called to child’s home, front door and back door 
ajar, nobody at home. Enquiries made to locate child’s mother and found same in local 
nightclub, highly intoxicated.” As a result, section 12 was invoked and the child was 
placed into emergency foster care.  
 
3.7.5 Suspected physical abuse 
There were many instances of suspected physical abuse in the context of section 12 being 
invoked by Gardaí throughout 2014.  
 
Example 17: 
Section 12 was invoked in a case where a child presented himself to a Garda Station 
stating that he had been beaten by an older sibling and his mother. The narrative noted 
that he was “scared to be at home now and sought refuge at the station.” Medical 
attention was arranged by the Gardaí which disclosed “evidence of being hit by a belt on 
his back with some cuts, bruises & welts on his back”. Foster care was arranged for the 
child with Five Rivers and the Gardaí attended at the home in question to assess whether 
other siblings were also at risk.  
 
Example 18: 
Section 12 was invoked in a case involving a three-year-old child with “bruises and 
handprints on body”. Crèche staff had notified social workers of their concern, who in 
turn notified Gardaí. Medical advice confirmed the likelihood of physical violence and 
the narrative notes “Gardaí invoked section 12 on the request of social workers”, further 
noting that the “social workers will attend court on Monday for a sec 13 care order”. It 
should be noted that this incident took place on a Friday evening after 6pm. However, 
later entries on PULSE appear to show that the child was returned to its family that 
Monday after a case conference had been held.  
 
Example 19: 
The narrative to this incident records the following: “Child went to school & reported 
that [he had] been whipped with a stick at home and as a result had marks. HSE (Tusla) 
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was called by school & contacted gardaí. Gardaí called to scene with social workers. Kids 
were in fear and gardaí were informed that parents regularly beat the kids. There was a 
bloody school uniform & blood on the floor & kids state this was caused by mother 
hitting daughter. Kids had not been fed since this morning. S.12 invoked in presence of 
social workers. HSE (Tusla) social worker is [name]. Five rivers contacted & are seeking 
accommodation for the children.” 
 
Example 20: 
Section 12 was invoked in relation to a child whose father had allegedly hit him with a 
bedside locker following an argument.  
 
Example 21: 
In another case involving suspected physical abuse, section 12 was invoked for the 
protection of a child and her siblings. The child’s mother admitted that she had “grabbed 
[the child] by her ponytail and punched her six times in the head. This incident occurred 
in front of 3 of the [child’s] younger siblings.”  
 
Example 22: 
Section 12 was invoked by AGS in a case where a father had been shaking a new-born 
baby in hospital.  
 
3.7.6 Suspected sexual abuse 
A limited number of cases appear to fall within this ground as a sole basis for invoking 
section 12 during 2014. 
 
Example 23: 
Sexual abuse was alleged by a child in one case to have been perpetrated by her father. 
The child’s brother also alleged physical abuse on the part of the father. Section 12 was 
invoked for the protection of the child, who was then brought to hospital by Gardaí.  
 
It does not appear from the PULSE records as furnished that section 12 was invoked by 
the Gardaí in relation to the child’s brother and it is possible that he was aged 18 years or 
over at this time or perhaps it was deemed unnecessary to invoke section 12 in the 
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circumstances. The situation is unclear from PULSE. The records indicate, however, that 
emergency accommodation was organised for him by Gardaí.  
 
Example 24: 
In another incident, enquiries made by Gardaí disclosed that both the boyfriend of a 
child’s mother and another person living in the same house were registered sex 
offenders. Section 12 was invoked for the safety of the child in question. This incident 
arose from suspicion aroused when Gardaí saw a child with two women in a public place 
at 1.40am and a man in their company “walked away when approached” by Gardaí.  
 
3.7.7 Child a danger to self/others 
Many incidents in this category portray a situation where the parents are seeking the 
removal of a child whose behaviour is aggressive, dangerous and difficult to manage. It 
should also be noted that of the 560 valid incidents of section 12 in 2014, the assistance 
of the Gardaí was initially sought by parents and/or other caregivers in 112 of these 
cases and by foster carers/residential care staff in 28 cases, representing 25 per cent of 
the total number of valid incidents.  
 
These circumstances include a child physically attacking family members, or in some 
cases presenting a danger to foster home members or care staff. However, many of these 
cases also include circumstances where the child was at risk of self-harm.  
 
Example 25: 
Gardaí were called to a residential care home by staff who were no longer able to manage 
the behaviour of a child. When the Gardaí attended at the scene, the staff were being 
threatened with a broken chair by the child. The narrative further states that the child 
was brought to the local social work office “who then referred [to the Gardaí] to bring 
[the] child to paediatric unit in hospital”.  
 
Example 26: 
In a further case, a child had thrown a rock through the window of his mother’s house 
and threatened his mother and her partner. The mother was afraid for her son to remain 
in her house and section 12 was invoked.  
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Example 27: 
Members of AGS located a child who had gone missing from a care home, in a public 
playground where she was threatening to commit suicide. It was necessary for the Gardaí 
to spend considerable time trying to locate the child throughout the area in question, 
with the narrative noting “the child had a history of self-harm, suffocation and stabbing 
herself.” Section 12 was invoked and the child was brought to the relevant Garda station 
where the Gardaí arranged for a medical doctor to attend.  
 
Example 28: 
Section 12 was invoked by Gardaí in a case where, as noted in the narrative, a “13 year 
old youth attempted to hang himself. Mother discovered him attempting and contacted 
gardaí.” The Gardaí brought the child to hospital for medical attention.  
 
3.7.8 Child under influence of drugs/alcohol 
Circumstances where a child or children are under the influence of drugs/alcohol are 
prevalent, particularly in the case of older children. As in other categories, these 
circumstances may be said to overlap considerably with other grounds, to include where 
a child presents a risk to him/herself and/or to others.  
 
Example 29: 
Gardaí were contacted by family members in one incident where a child was under the 
influence of drugs and “breaking up the house at his family residence”. Following the 
invocation of section 12, the incident further notes that two members of AGS “had to 
remain in the hospital overnight as [the child] was extremely violent and it took a number 
of hours and several nursing staff to counter the effects of the drugs he had taken.” 
 
3.7.9 Domestic violence 
A limited number of cases appear to fall within this ground as a sole basis for invoking 
section 12 during 2014, although the existence of domestic violence is a factor in a 
number of cases. 
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Example 30: 
In one such case, the mother of three children was hospitalised following a domestic 
assault and the father was arrested. Section 12 was invoked “for the safety of the 
children” prior to his return home.  
 
Example 31:  
The following case is an example of an overlap of circumstances to include domestic 
violence and intoxication. The narrative to this incident contains the following 
information: “While responding to call of domestic violence gardaí discovered mum and 
dad very intoxicated, no heating in the house, house was freezing, it transpired that mum 
had the baby in the pub all day. As a result, section 12 was invoked and [child name] was 
removed from the house and was left with an aunt.”   
 
3.7.10 Mental health issues within child 
There were several incidences of the above ground in the context of section 12 being 
invoked by AGS throughout 2014.  
 
Example 32: 
In one such incident, a child contacted Childline to say that he wished to end his life. The 
Gardaí called to his address and invoked section 12, following which they arranged for 
medical assistance and brought the child to hospital. It is also clear from subsequent 
related entries on PULSE that the Gardaí maintained contact with the family of the child 
afterwards and took an active interest in the well-being of the child.  
 
Example 33: 
A further incident followed a child contacting Childline stating “she had a bag over her 
head and wanted to commit suicide”. When Gardaí attended at the house, she repeated 
her wish to self-harm to the Gardaí who invoked section 12 and brought the child to 
hospital.  
 
Example 34: 
Gardaí were also called to the family home in one incident where a child subject to 
ongoing medical attention had locked himself in his bedroom with knives. He 
subsequently ran from the house through his bedroom window and the Gardaí spent 
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considerable time liaising both with Five Rivers and medical doctors to locate a place of 
safety for him.  
 
Example 35:  
Another incident where several grounds were in existence arose where a child presented 
as suicidal to her GP. When contacted by the child’s social workers, Gardaí found the 
child in a distressed state, her father was intoxicated and unable to care for her and her 
mother refused to have her stay with her. As a result, the child was brought to hospital 
when Five Rivers was unable to find suitable accommodation for her.  
 
Section 12 was again invoked in this case some three days later when the child discharged 
herself from hospital and was subsequently found wandering on a public road. 
 
Example 36: 
Section 12 was also invoked in relation to a child who presented with mental health 
issues following attempts to “throw herself into the river”. Gardaí invoked both the 
Mental Health Act 2001 and section 12, when the child was refused involuntary 
admission to hospital due to intoxication with drugs and alcohol. The child’s foster 
mother also refused the return of the child “for fear of her safety overnight”. It appears 
from later PULSE entries concerning this child that she was brought to hospital as a 
place of safety following the invocation of section 12 by AGS.  
 
Example 37: 
In another case section 12 was invoked in relation to a child who threatened to “kill her 
mother in her sleep and then kill herself”.  
 
3.7.11 Mental Health issues within parent(s) 
There are also several examples of cases falling within this ground, whether solely or 
jointly with one or other grounds.  
 
Example 38: 
In one incident, the narrative notes that the “mother of children expressed to HSE 
[Tusla] staff that she was suicidal and had thoughts of taking the children’s lives. Garda[í] 
were called to the home, where the mother also disclosed this to [a] Garda. There was 
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immediate risk to the children and section 12 was invoked. Mother went voluntarily to 
[name] Hospital. Tusla to seek emergency care order in the morning.”  
 
Example 39: 
Gardaí were contacted by a mental health nurse in relation to a mother who was 
“struggling emotionally with the care of her 14 week old daughter.” The narrative further 
notes “following lengthy discussions with nurse, social worker [name] and mother, gardaí 
felt it was in the best interests of the child to be placed in emergency foster care for the 
night”.  
 
Example 40: 
In another incident, the narrative notes that a “female [was] found by fellow resident [in 
an apartment] in a distressed state, allegedly attempted suicide by hanging, gardaí also 
noted self-inflicted cut marks to her left arm that were a few days old, female heavily 
intoxicated, two children in house at time, female eventually agreed to go voluntarily to 
[named hospital] for assessment, section 12 invoked, taken into HSE (Tusla) care.”  
 
Example 41: 
Gardaí were called to attend at a train station in one incident where a mother was 
threatening to commit suicide. Her two-year-old son was with her at the time and Gardaí 
invoked section 12 for his safety and welfare.  
 
Example 42: 
In another incident, section 12 was invoked in relation to children whose mother had 
told her family support worker “that she was going to shoot her two children and shoot 
herself”. The narrative further noted “when gardaí invoked the act mother admitted that 
she had stated about killing her children but informed gardaí that it was lies, that she just 
wanted to get help. Children taken in the care of social workers and mother arrested 
under mental treatment act. Mother is eight and half months pregnant. Doctor called to 
make assessment.” 
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Example 43:  
Gardaí were called to a house where a child had “a number of stab wounds” and the 
child’s mother was detained under the Mental Health Act 2001. Section 12 was invoked 
by the Gardaí and the child was brought to hospital for treatment.  
 
Example 44: 
A further case raised a concern with regard to mental health issues within a foster parent 
who had threatened suicide, following which the Gardaí invoked section 12 for the 
protection of two foster children.  
 
3.7.12 Active substance abuse within parents leading to abuse or neglect 
This ground appeared in a very significant number of section 12 incidents which arose in 
2014, giving rise to a wide range of situations involving neglect, physical and emotional 
abuse and concern for child welfare generally. 
 
Example 45:  
In one case, AGS invoked section 12 where they found two young children in living 
conditions which were described in the narrative in the following terms: “Call regarding 
the condition of house where 2 children are residing. Gardaí attended house and 
examined same. Gardaí observed a number of syringes lying in bedroom of house. 
Bathroom toilet was blocked. Flies all over bathroom and around house. No clothes on 
children’s bed. No heating in house.” This incident occurred during the winter months.  
 
 Example 46: 
It is worth quoting the narrative to this incident in full, as follows. “[Investigating] 
member discovered child in house with aunts and uncle. There was blood on the floor 
and signs of alcohol having been consumed on the premises. The child showed signs of 
neglect, she was in need of a bath and was wearing a nappy which was very soggy and 
soiled. Member was aware that a care plan had been agreed between [name of social 
worker] and the parents that morning in relation to the welfare of the child and the 
parents had failed to adhere to the care plan and in fact had evaded contact with social 
workers. Member was present in house that am, along with the social workers, and had 
observed the conditions which caused concern for them, namely the filthy condition of 
house; the lack of food in the house; the intoxicated condition of both the mother and 
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father (both showed signs of having engaged in a drinking binge the previous night). 
Member also aware that family members caring for child were aware that a care plan had 
been agreed. They actively participated in an effort to frustrate [Social Work] dept. and 
were evasive as to whereabouts of parents. Interaction with social work department had 
resulted from mother of child presenting at a&e department this morning with injuries 
which she had sustained as a result of an assault by her husband (No complaint 
forthcoming - mother disclosed this to hospital staff but informed Gardaí that she fell). 
Child handed over to … social worker...” 
 
Example 47: 
Similar circumstances presented in a case where Gardaí were called to a house following 
reports of a domestic dispute. As noted in the narrative, “gardaí to scene - on arrival 
spoke to both parties who were highly intoxicated - 4 year old child awake on a mattress 
on sitting room floor in front of open fire - section 12 child care act invoked - parents 
started to threaten to kill each other and very volatile situation - child in care of the hse 
(Tusla) and placed in to the care of foster parent - mother attempted to overdose with 
tablets and was arrested under mental health act …”. 
 
Example 48:  
There were several other incidents where intoxication was a feature, to include a case  
where a mother arrived to school in an intoxicated state to collect her children.  
 
Example 49: 
A further incident concerned a mother who was found intoxicated at a LUAS stop late at 
night with two young children.  
 
Example 50: 
In another incident, it was reported to Gardaí that “a drunk male was cycling with a 
young child on the crossbar”. The narrative further states that Gardaí “found male in 
[place] with young child. Father of child extremely intoxicated not fit to have a child in 
his care. Attempts made to contact the mother. Mother was found in an extremely 
intoxicated state also.” The child, who was two years old, was placed in emergency foster 
care by Tusla following section 12 being invoked by AGS.  
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Example 51: 
Gardaí were called by a witness who had observed “a number of males and females 
drinking in [place], 2 year old present, child was observed drinking from open beer 
container. [Gardaí] arrived at scene, spoke to mother of child who was intoxicated. 
[Gardaí] concerned for the welfare of the child subsequently invoked section 12 child 
care act”.  
 
Example 52: 
Gardaí were contacted with regard to a drunk female at a fast food restaurant. The 
narrative notes “on arrival [Gardaí] met with very drunk female, unable to stand unaided. 
Also there was 2 week old baby and baby’s father. Baby’s father advised to go home with 
the baby but out on the street failed to do so. He was out on the street with the buggy, 
male arrested, became very aggressive, lashed out at gardaí, pepper spray deployed, s12 
care order invoked.” The baby was brought by Gardaí to a nearby hospital as a place of 
safety.  
 
Example 53: 
Section 12 was also invoked following receipt of a 999 call in relation to a three-year-old 
child who had been left unattended in a buggy by her parents who were intoxicated. The 
narrative noted “the mother was highly intoxicated and barely able to stand or speak”.  
 
Example 54: 
Similar circumstances presented in a case where, as noted in the narrative, “[a] member 
of public [notified Gardaí] in relation to a female pushing a buggy with a child in it, that 
was nearly hit by a bus in [name] city centre, female was heading in the direction of the 
[name] pub on [name] street, gardaí stopped female pushing a buggy on [name] street, 
she was attempting to gain access to her apartment, but was unable to do so, due to the 
door being locked from inside, allegedly by the female’s partner, female was clearly 
intoxicated, bottles of [beer] were found in the buggy, mother and child transported to a 
place of safety at [name] hospital … , section 12 care order invoked by garda [name], 
child placed in the care of the hse (Tusla).” The child was one-year-old at the time of this 
incident.  
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Example 55: 
In another incident, the narrative notes “Gardaí found 1 year old child in house 
unattended. Her father and 2 friends were smoking heroin in an adjoining room.”  
 
Example 56:  
Gardaí “[o]bserved [a] female in custody of a young baby while also in the company of 3 
others injecting heroin. Female admitted she had also used heroin that day. Gardaí 
believe there was a serious & immediate risk to the child well-being.” Section 12 was 
invoked in relation to the child who was then aged just six months old.  
 
Example 57: 
Gardaí invoked section 12 in a case where a “very intoxicated” mother was found lying 
on the footpath in a busy urban area holding a ten-month-old child.  
 
Example 58: 
Section 12 was invoked in relation to three young children whose mother was found 
“slumped over in the driver’s seat [of a car], unconscious.” The mother was arrested for 
drunk driving and the children were brought to the Garda station before being handed to 
the care of Tusla.  
 
Example 59: 
Gardaí gained access to a house where a three-year-old child was in the care of her 
“highly intoxicated” father. The narrative notes that the “child clung to Garda [name] 
and looked in fear of her father”. Due to the circumstances, section 12 was invoked and 
the child was brought to the Garda station.  
 
Example 60: 
Section 12 was invoked in relation to an eight-year-old child whose mother was found at 
home “in a highly intoxicated state. House was very unkept with signs of drug taking and 
excessive drinking. 8 yr old child in the house was vomiting and visibly ill.” This child 
was brought to hospital by Gardaí.  
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3.7.13 Other  
A range of situations are evident in this category to include children who were homeless 
and children who were located by Gardaí, having been reported as missing from foster 
care or their families.  
 
This category also includes children who refuse to return to the care of their parents, 
foster care or other residential care. The reasons for such refusal, where stated in the 
narrative, are many, including fear of physical or emotional violence.   
 
In many other cases, the parents, foster carers or a residential care centre, or both, refuse 
to accept the return of a child or children. This often arises in situations involving violent 
or aggressive behaviour, where the child is under the influence of alcohol or drugs or 
following one or more periods where the child ran away from the home. This ground 
was also apparent in situations involving mental health issues of children, for example, 
where parents and/or foster carers were concerned about the risk of self-harm being 
perpetrated by the child. In many cases, parents, foster carers and residential care centres 
were also anxious to ensure the physical and emotional safety of other family members, 
children or staff.  
 
In some cases, a situation arose where both the child was unwilling to stay in the existing 
accommodation and the parents and/or foster carers also wished the child to leave.  
 
This ground also includes situations where there is no one available or willing to care for 
a child or children. Incidents in 2014, for example, disclosed such circumstances where a 
parent was under arrest or had been admitted to hospital in varying circumstances, 
including heroin overdose and domestic violence. 
 
The provision of assistance to authorities outside the jurisdiction by Gardaí also arose in 
some cases, in particular Interpol. The assistance of Gardaí in international matters of 
this nature arose in six incidents in 2014.  
 
Example 61: 
In one case, Gardaí were called to a premises having been alerted to concerns for a nine-
year-old child believed to be homeless. Gardaí found the mother “sitting on the stairs in 
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the apartments while her child was with a couple upstairs who had taken the child into 
their apartment out of concern for the child”.  
 
Example 62: 
Gardaí received reports relating to “3 children found sleeping in back of parent’s car. 
Parents gave false names for themselves & children. Parents could not give current 
address. Kids were both hungry & in dirty clothing. Obvious neglect noted. Section 12 of 
the Child Care Act invoked.” 
 
Example 63: 
A further example was found in a case where a “homeless and vulnerable juvenile [was] 
found in an intoxicated state, nowhere to go”. Section 12 was invoked for the safety of 
the child who was later placed in the care of Tusla.  
 
Example 64: 
Section 12 was invoked in relation to a child who had been reported to be “staggering 
along the road in bare feet and crying…she may have taken overdose” and was lying on a 
footpath when located by Gardaí. The narrative further states that neither the child’s 
parents nor foster carers “were willing to accept care or responsibility of this child”. As a 
result, the child was brought to hospital as a place of safety.   
 
Example 65: 
In liaison with the relevant UK authorities, a “high risk missing person…in the care of 
United Kingdom health services” was located by Gardaí. It should be noted that as Tusla 
indicated it was not in a position to assist in the matter for a number of days, the Gardaí 
made contact with Five Rivers who arranged emergency accommodation for the child.  
 
Example 66: 
Section 12 was invoked in relation to a new-born baby in a case, where the narrative 
records “mum fled from the UK as care plan had been put in place for child to be taken 
into care of the state on being born. Arrived in the [name] hospital with no medical 
history and in heavy labour. Information received from the UK social work dept. 
suggests mum suffers from mental health illness and is a drug user, and previously had 2 
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children taken into care. On speaking to mum she came across as incoherent and … 
[name of Garda] formed the opinion to invoke section 12 for the child.” 
 
Example 67: 
In another incident, Gardaí were also called by Tusla to “invoke [section 12] to remove a 
baby from the mother’s care into a place of safety (nicu) [neonatal intensive care unit] … 
HSE [Tusla] had concerns for the baby’s welfare.”  
 
Example 68: 
The assistance of Gardaí was requested by Interpol in the case of a child who had been 
removed from England without the consent of his father. The narrative records the 
“serious concerns expressed [by] Interpol regarding welfare and safety of child…believed 
to be at high risk”. Section 12 was invoked and the child was taken into emergency care 
by Tusla social workers, following which PULSE notes the attendance of members of 
the Gardaí at subsequent court proceedings involving the child.  
 
Example 69: 
Another section 12 incident involved the provision of assistance by Gardaí to Interpol in 
a case where a child had been reported missing from England and was subsequently 
returned pursuant to the Brussels IIbis Regulation.73 This regulation governs international 
jurisdiction within the European Union in matters of child abduction and certain child 
protection matters.  
 
Example 70: 
Section 12 was invoked by Gardaí in a case where the mother of a six-week-old baby had 
been admitted for psychiatric treatment, leaving no one willing or available to look after 
the child.   
 
Example 71: 
A further case involved the voluntary closure of a private care company, leaving a 12-
year-old child with nowhere to stay. In spite of extensive efforts made by Gardaí to 
                                                     
73 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000. 
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secure alternative accommodation, both with a social worker and Five Rivers, the child 
was ultimately brought to hospital as the only available place of safety.  
 
Example 72: 
Section 12 was invoked by Gardaí in relation to a child whose father wished to discharge 
him from hospital against medical advice. The child remained in hospital for ongoing 
medical treatment following the invocation of section 12. While a social worker was also 
referred to in the narrative, it is presumed that section 12 was invoked, rather than 
seeking an emergency care order, as this incident occurred on a Sunday.  
 
3.7.14 No known reason for invocation of section 12 
In a number of cases, no ground is disclosed in the narrative, for example, one case 
where the narrative simply states “section 12 child care act invoked in relation to above 
children”.  
 
Where it was possible to locate the reason for removal from a review of and cross-
referencing other entries on PULSE furnished by AGS, the incident was classified 
accordingly. In other cases, it was necessary to record that the reason for removal was 
unknown. These cases have been classified in the category “Other” and there were 15 
such incidents noted in 2014.  
 
The review of cases also disclosed one incident where the invocation of section 12 was 
uncertain in the circumstances. The narrative noted that a “youth presented himself at 
[name] a + e. stating he had an altercation with his father. No visible signs of injury.  
Hospital contacted gardaí. Gardaí invoked section 12 child care act. Gardaí called to 
address and parents informed. Child to remain at hospital until arrival of social services. 
Garda believes on the balance of probability that no offence was disclosed. HSE (Tusla) 
to be contacted. Name of social worker to be added. Other children present in the 
house.” 
 
3.8 OTHER INFORMATION  
 
In addition to the grounds upon which section 12 was invoked, the PULSE data was also 
analysed to extract other information, as set out in the following paragraphs.  
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3.8.1 Prior history of child on PULSE 
In the majority of cases where section 12 was invoked, a prior history of contact with 
AGS is evident. These situations include prior situations where AGS have been involved 
with the child, his or her family and other caregivers.  
 
 
 
The following graph contains more detailed information with regard to children where a 
prior history appears on PULSE. This includes children who have previously been the 
subject of one or more section 12 incidents or where the Mental Health Act 2001 has 
been applied, or both. In many cases, PULSE records involvement in criminal activity 
and other situations where the child or children came to the attention of AGS.  
 
73%
27%
Incidents Where Prior History of Child on PULSE
Yes No
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3.8.2 Subsequent history of child on PULSE 
The following graphs show those children where one or more entries appear on PULSE, 
subsequent to the invocation of section 12 by AGS during 2014. This includes children 
who have subsequently been the subject of one or more section 12 incidents or where 
the Mental Health Act 2001 has been applied, or both. In many cases, PULSE records 
follow-up visits and meetings with social workers or other third parties. PULSE also 
records any involvement in criminal activity and other situations where the child or 
children subsequently came to the attention of AGS. 
 
 
274
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Incidents Where Prior History of Child on PULSE 
Yes Yes (incl MHA) Yes (incl s12 and MHA) Yes (incl s12) No
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In one case, it appears that section 12 was invoked on two occasions on the same day in 
relation to the same child. Its narrative notes “section 12 child care act invoked in 
62%
38%
Subsequent History of Child on PULSE
Yes
No
243
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685
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Subsequent History of Child on PULSE
Yes Yes (incl MHA) Yes (incl s12 and MHA) Yes (incl s12) No
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relation to above children, released into care of HSE (Tusla).” This incident occurred at 
12.30pm. It appears from a review of information on PULSE that the child subsequently 
left the care of Tusla and section 12 was again invoked at 7.30pm when the child was 
located in a public place. As Five Rivers was unwilling to provide accommodation due to 
his violent behaviour and drug/alcohol consumption, the child was brought to hospital 
as a place of safety.  
 
3.8.3 Child or family previously known to Gardaí 
In the majority of cases (73.9%), the review of PULSE shows that the child or the family, 
or both, were known to Gardaí prior to the specific invocation of section 12 in 2014. 
 
The following graph sets out the results of the review as follows.   
 
 
 
3.8.4 Criminal activity 
Insofar as possible to do so, the PULSE data was reviewed to assess whether, and to 
what extent, any child the subject of a section 12 power was also involved in alleged 
criminal activity.  
  
The results reveal a high proportion of cases of children aged 13 and upwards where 
such circumstances arise, as set out in the following graph.  
414
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3.8.5 Consultation with social worker or others prior to section 12 being invoked 
The audit considered the question as to whether the relevant member or members of 
AGS had any contact with a social worker or third parties prior to invoking the power 
under section 12. This was relevant to an analysis and review of Garda actions when 
considering invoking the power.  
 
The following graph shows the results of this review, according to the extract of PULSE 
data furnished to the audit.   
 
Difficulties in analysing this data presented in circumstances where the majority of the 
narratives do not contain any information regarding this question and there does not 
appear to be a specific data field to capture it. 
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88 
 
 
 
As shown in this graph, the majority of incidents (81%) are silent as to whether AGS had 
any contact with social workers or other third parties, prior to exercising section 12. It 
may be presumed that there was no contact of this nature. However, in the absence of 
any recorded detail in this regard, it is impossible to say with certainty. In cases where 
such contact occurred, this often arose where Gardaí were contacted by social workers or 
where social workers were present when section 12 was invoked. In other cases, Gardaí 
consulted with ambulance and medical personnel, foster and other care home staff, an 
interpreter and others, including Garda colleagues.  
 
It is certainly possible that such consultation took place in other cases, but this data and 
intelligence is not captured on PULSE. Unfortunately, due to the inherent limitations to 
the PULSE data review for this aspect of the audit, it is simply not possible to assess the 
level of engagement by AGS with social workers or other third parties prior to the 
invocation of section 12. 
 
3.8.6 Socio-economic background of the child and family 
The socio-economic background of the child subject to section 12 or his or her family is 
not routinely recorded by AGS. In the few incidents recorded in 2014 where any 
information to this effect is available, such was gleaned from a detailed analysis of 
narratives and surrounding entries on PULSE with regard to other incidents and people.  
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In seven of these cases, it appears that the child being the subject of section 12 was a 
member of the Travelling Community. Two other children are described as residing in a 
“transitional housing project”. However, this term is not otherwise clarified or defined.  
 
3.8.7 Home circumstances 
Where data was recorded on PULSE with regard to the home circumstances of children, 
this was analysed with a view to ascertaining the living arrangements of children being 
the subject of section 12 powers.  
 
This data showed a majority of children (54.6%) living with parents or other guardians. 
16.7% of these children were living in foster care or other residential care. However, 
these figures must be considered in the light of some 131 incidents (being 23.4%) where 
the home or living circumstances are not known, as they are not recorded on PULSE.   
 
 
 
3.8.8 Initiation of Garda involvement 
The data provided by AGS was analysed to establish the history to section 12 being 
invoked in the incidents under review. This data showed that the assistance of AGS in 
these matters was invoked by parents and other family members in 129 cases, being 23% 
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of the incidents. Garda assistance was invoked by the child or children themselves in 41 
cases, i.e. 7.3% of incidents. Many incidents (9.5%) also arose as a result of a child being 
reported missing.  
 
Section 12 was instigated by the Gardaí in numerous cases, to include circumstances 
where a child had been released from arrest and where Gardaí were attending to criminal 
or other incidents involving the parents of a child or children.   
 
The assistance of Gardaí was also sought by airport authorities in relation to 4 children 
according to PULSE records for section 12 incidents in 2014. In one such example 
where section 12 was invoked, Gardaí were notified by airport authorities in relation to a 
child who was travelling with a male to whom she was unrelated and in possession of a 
forged passport.  
 
 
 
3.8.9 Time of day section 12 was invoked 
The PULSE entries were examined and categorised according to the time section 12 was 
invoked, as follows: 
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(2) 6.00pm to 10.00pm; and 
(3) 10.00pm to 9.00am, including weekends.  
 
The review of PULSE records is set out in the following graph: 
 
 
 
The following table also shows the percentage of incidents which occurred during office 
hours (29%) and those which occurred out of hours, including during weekends (71%).  
 
 
 
3.8.10 Location of section 12 incident 
The following graph shows the many locations where section 12 was invoked by AGS 
during 2014.  
 
The majority of these incidents occurred in what might be described as a family home or 
other residential property (54.1%). Some 95 incidents (17%) occurred at a Garda Station.  
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3.8.11 Tusla out-of-hours service  
One of the key issues which emerged throughout the audit is the role of AGS and the 
invocation of section 12 orders within the wider context of the child protection system.  
 
As a result, the PULSE data was analysed to establish, insofar as possible from the data 
received, the links, relationship and communication with social workers and other 
relevant persons.  
 
This yielded important information with regard to the operation of the child protection 
system in general outside office hours and according to geographical regions.  
 
In particular, the data was reviewed to establish whether, in the cases of incidents which 
occurred outside of office hours or during weekends, a social worker was available to 
Gardaí. The following graph shows the results of this review.  
 
Unfortunately, the incidents as recorded on PULSE do not disclose the position in 232 
cases (41.4%) and this question is, therefore, unknown. While it may be presumed in 
many of these cases that no such out-of-hours service was available, the position cannot 
be stated with certainty in the absence of clear information and data to this effect.  
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The following further examples from the data recorded on PULSE may be instructive in 
this regard.  
 
Example 73: 
In one incident, the narrative notes that Five Rivers was unable to locate a place for a 
child and, as a result, the child was brought to a local hospital as a place of safety.  
 
Example 74: 
One further incident reveals how Gardaí were contacted by hospital staff with regard to a 
child who had been discharged as she no longer needed medical attention and the 
hospital refused to allow her back to the hospital. Section 12 was invoked and the child 
was brought to the Garda station where the narrative notes “Gardaí sat with [child] for 
six hours until a social worker arrived from Dublin”. The child was then taken into the 
care of the social worker. It is noteworthy that this incident occurred in a large urban 
Garda station during office hours.  
 
See also paragraph 3.9 below for further commentary.  
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It is also clear from the review of data undertaken that confusion among some members 
of AGS exists with regard to the role of both the HSE (Tusla) and private providers, in 
particular Five Rivers. This largely occurs in cases arising out-of-hours.  
 
In one incident, the narrative refers to Gardaí contacting “out-of-hours HSE Five 
Rivers”. Another incident refers to a child being placed in the care of Tusla, while also 
referring to being in contact with Five Rivers. This incident occurred out-of-hours.  
 
A further example illustrates the frequent confusion in the roles fulfilled by Tusla and/or 
private providers, where it is stated that Gardaí “contacted [Five] rivers in connection 
with HSE to find alternative accommodation for [name of child]”. The child in question 
was ultimately brought to a hospital as a place of safety. Similarly, another incident  noted 
that a “child [was] dropped to five rivers to [name] at [time] and is now in the care of 
HSE [Tusla].” 
 
Another narrative notes “Gardaí contacted Five Rivers (24 hour emergency HSE line)”. 
Reference is also made to “Five Rivers HSE … out-of-hours services” being contacted 
in another incident. 
 
A further incident stated “Five Rivers out-of-hours HSE service [was] contacted”. 
Another example refers to “Three Rivers”.  
 
3.8.12 Person(s) from whom the child or children were removed 
The following graph sets out the results of the data review with regard to the person or 
persons from whom the child or children were removed by Gardaí when exercising their 
power under section 12.  
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As appears in the graph, the majority of section 12 incidents in 2014 involved the 
removal of a child or children from parents and/or guardians in 395 cases or 70.5% of 
the incidents under review. The remainder of incidents arose in diverse circumstances. 
Moreover, the position is not known in a large number of incidents (9.1%).  
 
As referred to in paragraph 3.7 above, the circumstances surrounding the removal of 
children pursuant to section 12 are many and varied. While this graph shows a high 
proportion of incidents involving the removal of a child from parents and/or guardians, 
it should be borne in mind that many of these incidents were initiated by the parent(s) or 
child(ren) in question, or others, as set out in paragraph 3.8.8 above.   
 
3.8.13 Place to where the child or children were initially removed 
 
The following graph sets out the results of the data review with regard to the place where 
the child or children were initially removed by Gardaí when exercising their power under 
section 12.  
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In the majority (41.6%) of cases under review, the child or children were brought to a 
Garda Station.  
 
A significant number (23.4%) of cases used a hospital as a ‘designated’ place of safety. 
Indeed, in many incidents, it appears to be the only possible or available place of safety, 
in circumstances where no foster or emergency accommodation is available, or where 
family members or foster carers are unwilling for the child to remain with them.  
 
Example 75: 
In one incident, Gardaí were contacted by a GP with regard to a 15-year-old child’s 
behaviour, to include psychotic episodes. The narrative noted “Gardaí attended at the 
[family home] and spoke with [the child’s] parents and ambulance crew at the scene. The 
child had refused to eat, sleep, take medication or leave his room for the past seven days. 
The child refused to speak or cooperate with medical staff, parents or the Gardaí.” 
Having consulted with Tusla out-of-hours service and the GP, it was noted that the child 
could not be involuntarily admitted for psychiatric care due to his age and lack of 
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available facilities. The narrative also noted that “the HSE [Tusla] out-of-hours social 
worker was unable to arrange foster care as the child’s needs would not be met”. Section 
12 was invoked and the child was brought to a hospital as a place of safety.  
 
Example 76: 
In another incident, a child was arrested for a breach of the peace and brought to a 
Garda station. While there, Five Rivers was contacted to provide accommodation, but it 
refused to accept the child as he had consumed alcohol and was under arrest. In these 
circumstances, the Gardaí invoked section 12 and the child was brought to a local 
hospital.  
 
Example 77: 
In a further incident, two hospitals also refused to receive a child. Gardaí had been 
advised by out-of-hours social workers to bring the child in question to a hospital. The 
child was ultimately returned to his father as nowhere else was available.  
 
In a high proportion (12.7%) of incidents in this category, the place to where the child or 
children were initially removed is not recorded on PULSE. 
 
3.8.14 Location where children were placed following invocation of section 12 
 
The following graph sets out the results of the data review with regard to the location 
where the child or children were placed following the invocation of section 12 by Gardaí. 
It identifies the locations where children were placed, following the initial placement at 
Garda Stations, hospitals and other locations, as described in paragraph 3.8.13 above. 
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This data is informative for a number of reasons. It shows the many agencies with which 
AGS may deal following the invocation of section 12, when it might be argued that they 
should properly deal with one central agency for the placement of children once the 
power under section 12 has been invoked, namely Tusla.   
 
The high proportion of cases involving Five Rivers (17.7%) is also noteworthy, in 
addition to the significant number of cases where the position is unknown (18.9%), i.e. 
not recorded on PULSE by Gardaí.  
 
Example 78: 
In one incident, a child was brought to a Garda station following the invocation of 
section 12. The child had gone missing from foster care and when located, the Gardaí 
were unable to contact the relevant foster carer. As a result, they contacted Five Rivers 
and the child was brought to emergency foster care 112 km away. It should be noted, 
although not stated in the narrative, that this would require significant time on the part of 
the relevant members of AGS in completing a 224 km round trip, and prevent them 
from undertaking any other essential Garda work at that time. As it must be presumed 
that this was the nearest available foster care placement at that time, this highlights a 
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potentially significant gap in geographic coverage of Ireland’s child protection 
infrastructure.  
 
Example 79: 
In another incident, it was necessary for the Gardaí to bring a child from one named 
location to another, when the child’s existing foster carer in the original location refused 
to accept his return. It is estimated that this necessitated a round trip of approximately 
260 km for the Gardaí.  
 
Example 80: 
Another case shows that a child was brought from one named location to another to 
secure accommodation, there being no other accommodation available, representing an 
approximate round trip of 212 km and an inevitable occupation of Garda resources for 
that time.  
 
The role of private providers in the context of emergency foster care is brought into 
sharp relief upon a review of the PULSE data – mirroring findings in the questionnaire 
and interview stages of the audit. In a significant number of cases, particularly where no 
out-of-hours service exists, the private provider Five Rivers appears to be almost an 
automatic point of contact for AGS when endeavouring to secure accommodation for a 
child or children.   
 
A further query is also raised as to the extent of the role and functions of the private 
providers. (See further at paragraph 6.2.14 below.) 
 
Example 81: 
One incident records that Five Rivers was contacted with regard to providing 
accommodation for a child but was unable to do so. The child in this case demonstrated 
challenging behaviour. The child was ultimately brought to a hospital as the only 
available place of safety. Such an incident clearly gives rise to concern for a child in these 
circumstances where a question must be posed as to the role of the State in caring for 
this particular child and other children who find themselves in similar circumstances.  
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Example 82: 
One further incident showed the lengths to which Gardaí went following the invocation 
of section 12 to secure accommodation for a child. This incident arose from violent and 
threatening behaviour to care staff (Fresh Start) on the part of a child, following which 
the agency refused to allow him remain. The child was brought to the Garda station 
where the narrative notes “Out-of-hours Social Work Dept. contacted - unable to help, 
Five Rivers have been contacted and do not have a place for this child. ......Fresh start 
were contacted by Sgt [name] and it was explained to them that they, Fresh start, had 
ultimate responsibility for this child, that staff there should contact their management 
with a view to increased security/extra staff, etc....Fresh start are employed by the HSE 
(Tusla) to look after these children, if they can’t do this then it is a matter for Fresh start 
and the HSE (Tusla) to go to the courts with a view to secure accommodation.” In this 
particular case, the child was ultimately returned to reside in Fresh Start, but the outcome 
in each individual case differs greatly and the question must be asked as to the role of the 
private providers and the extent to which they can refuse to care for a child, and the 
particular circumstances in which such refusal may be permitted. This issue is considered 
in greater detail at para 6.2.14.  
 
3.8.15 Presence of parent(s) at time of removal 
 
The audit considered the question as to whether the parent(s) of a child or children were 
present at the time of removal pursuant to section 12.  
 
The results of the data review are set out in the following graph. This shows that parents 
were present at the time of exercising the power in 252 incidents (45%). The position is 
unknown in a large number of cases (20.5%) and the question did not arise in 79 cases 
where parental involvement was no longer applicable, including fostering and other 
arrangements.  
 
As there is no field on PULSE to record this data, the information was extracted from a 
review of the Narratives, insofar as possible and subject to the level of detail recorded in 
each Narrative.  
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3.8.16 Resistance at time of removal 
The PULSE records were analysed to assess the level of resistance, if any, encountered 
by the Gardaí when invoking the power pursuant to section 12.  
 
The following graph sets out the results of the analysis as follows. 
 
 
 
252
114
79
115
Parents Present at Time of Removal?
Section 12 Incidents - 2014
Yes No Not Applicable Not Known
Resistance at Time of Removal of Child(ren)
Section 12 - 2014
Yes No Not Known
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In the wide-ranging circumstances which present in the context of section 12, there are 
many situations in which conduct might be described as “resistance”. Such resistance can 
arise through conduct on the part of the parent or child, or both.  
 
In addition, difficulties in analysing the data arose in this regard since many incidents did 
not refer to the presence or absence of resistance in the narrative. From the data 
provided by AGS, there does not appear to be a data field to capture this entry when 
recording an incident on PULSE.  
 
From a review of the data as furnished, it appears that resistance to the invocation of 
section 12 was encountered in 57 incidents. There does not appear to have been 
resistance in 151 incidents. However, the position is unknown in a significant proportion 
of incidents (352 incidents), being 62.9% of the valid incidents recorded in 2014. 
 
3.8.17 Presence of social workers or others at time of removal 
The extract PULSE data was also analysed to examine whether Gardaí were 
accompanied by social workers or others at the time of exercising the power under 
section 12.  
 
Gardaí were accompanied by social workers and others in 78 incidents which occurred 
during 2014. Many of these occurred during office hours. However, the position is 
unknown in 142 incidents (25.3%). It does not appear that Gardaí were accompanied in 
340 incidents, being 60.7% of all valid incidents in 2014. This information was deduced 
from recorded Narratives. 
 
Gardaí were also accompanied in the exercise of their power under section 12 by staff of 
a residential care home (2 incidents), a medical doctor (2 incidents), a public health nurse 
(1 incident) and ambulance paramedics (2 incidents).  
 
The following graph shows the results of the data review.  
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3.9 LINK WITH HSE/TUSLA IN EXERCISING SECTION 12 POWER AND 
ROLE AMBIGUITY 
 
It is inevitable that a large “crossover” would exist between AGS and Tusla in carrying 
out their respective functions in the sphere of child protection. The review of the data 
shows in many cases a challenging working relationship between members of AGS and 
Tusla. In many cases, entries on PULSE show attempts on the part of members of AGS 
to follow up with regard to children the subject of section 12 orders with varying success.  
 
Many cases also show a difference of approach and opinion with regard to the 
appropriate course of action to take in a case.  
 
Example 83: 
In one case, according to the narrative, Gardaí had located a missing child in 
circumstances where the care worker had voiced concerns that the child may have been 
carrying a weapon and/or drugs. The child was brought to the Garda station and the 
narrative further notes that the “care worker against advice from gardaí was hesitant to 
remain at the garda station, number of procedures and her responsibilities explained to 
her, care worker ultimately left [name] garda station, out-of-hours social services 
Were Gardai Accompanied by Social Workers?
Section 12 Incidents - 2014
Yes No Not Known
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contacted, unhelpful at this stage and after a number of phone calls between gardaí and 
out-of-hours centre (social workers) agreed to be present when child was handed into 
their care, subsequently youth was handed over to senior manager from [name] care 
home, report to superintendent regarding dubious care of child and breakdown of agreed 
protocols between gardaí and HSE (Tusla).”  
 
Example 84: 
The narrative to another incident discloses that the social worker was of the view that 
section 12 should not have been invoked by the member of AGS. The narrative further 
notes that, following invocation of section 12, the child had run away from social 
workers in a named location but had not been reported missing until found in another 
location several hours later. This child had a history of drug use and had originally been 
reported missing by his mother. The narrative also states “the social worker also 
informed youth of a confidential matter that his mother had told the social worker”.  
 
Example 85: 
In one incident, three children had been left alone at home by their mother who, when 
located, was intoxicated and unable to care for them. Section 12 was invoked by AGS. 
However, from enquiries made by AGS subsequently, it appears that the children were 
returned by (Tusla) to the care of their mother the following day.  
 
In a number of cases, the aftermath of a section 12 removal resulted in what appears to 
be a less than satisfactory intervention by the State’s child protection infrastructure.   
 
Example 86: 
This is illustrated in the following case, where “Gardaí received call from ambulance 
service that they found infant at side of road, on arrival 2 year old infant was in care of 
ambulance crew, informed infant was located on her own at 2am at the side of [name] 
road, visited [name] household where gardaí observed front door wide open. Mother was 
asleep upstairs on arrival, confirmed that child was hers. Smell of alcohol from her, also 
informed that she left her child in her buggy in the kitchen while she slept upstairs. 
Infant conveyed to [name] hospital. Out-of-hours social services contacted. Sec 12 
[invoked].” It appears that an emergency care order was subsequently obtained in the 
District Court. However, Gardaí were later notified by Tusla of the outcome of its 
105 
 
investigation in the following terms, as quoted in the narrative: “[Child] returned to home 
due to mother revoking her voluntary consent for [child] to remain in care. Legal advice 
suggested no grounds for [child] to remain in care.”      
 
A number of instances also emerged from the review where an ambiguity in the 
respective roles played by AGS and Tusla might be said to exist. In particular, there 
appears to be a lack of clarity as to when the power under section 12 should be invoked 
and when the appropriate powers should be exercised by Tusla.  
 
Example 87: 
The PULSE records for 2014 include one case where the power under section 12 was 
not, in fact, invoked. It should be noted that other such instances may have occurred in 
2014 since they may not be routinely recorded. The information furnished for the 
purposes of this audit was concerned with an examination of the circumstances where 
section 12 was, in fact, invoked by AGS and the reasons for the use of such a power. 
However, this case is worthy of mention due to its particular facts. Upon receipt of 
concerns notified by Tusla in relation to a child, the Gardaí attended at the child’s 
address but deemed it unnecessary to invoke the power in the particular circumstances. 
Rather, they felt it more appropriate for Tusla to seek an appropriate court order. Once 
the order had been obtained, the Gardaí then assisted Tusla in its execution. 
 
Example 88: 
In another incident, social workers called Gardaí to attend the school where children had 
presented with evidence of physical assault, allegedly on the part of their father. While 
this occurred during office hours, the relevant power was invoked by AGS, rather than 
Tusla. 
 
Example 89: 
In a further incident, the narrative records that the “child was arrested earlier today for 
begging offence. Child spoke no English. Could not give gardaí address or guardian 
details. HSE (Tusla) refused to take child. Child was released to gardaí and section 12 of 
the child care [act] invoked.” The Gardaí in this matter subsequently made further 
enquiries with a Tusla care worker who advised at a liaison meeting that the case had 
been closed by Tusla and the child returned to a family member.   
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Example 90: 
Similarly, an issue arose in a case where a child had been found in a public place by a 
witness and brought to the Garda Station. The narrative notes “Ms [name] Tusla Social 
Worker refused to take [child] to foster care unless she was placed under Section 12 of 
the Child Care Act.” Section 12 was accordingly invoked by the Garda Sergeant and the 
child was then taken into the care of the Tusla social worker.  
 
Example 91: 
Similarly, another incident notes “section 12 child care act [was] invoked as a result of 
social services refusing to take [child] into their care, she was intoxicated and threatening 
suicide, as a result of this Sgt [name] invoked section 12 child care act and conveyed her 
to [name] hospital…”.  
 
On the other hand, PULSE also shows a number of cases where AGS and Tusla worked 
well together. In one such example, at the request of Tusla staff, Gardaí accompanied 
them on a home inspection visit in relation to a child whose crèche had notified Tusla of 
suspected physical abuse. The narrative notes that the “HSE (Tusla) staff deemed child at 
risk [and] child to be taken into their care”. However, when the child refused to leave 
with the staff, Gardaí invoked section 12 and the child was then released to Tusla social 
workers.  
 
In other cases, social workers sought the assistance of Gardaí in gaining access to 
property where they had concerns as to the safety of children.  
 
3.9.1 Joint notification sheet with Tusla 
Very few cases refer specifically to a “Joint Notification Sheet”. There are very many 
descriptions in the narratives with regard to follow-up with Tusla, to include “HSE 
Notification submitted”, “HSE referral form sent”, “Joint Action Sheet”, “Joint Action 
Plan”, “HSE update”, “HSE report”, “HSE follow up” and many variations of these. 
Other incidents make no reference at all to what happened post-section 12.  
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3.10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The review of PULSE data has been instructive for many reasons. The quantitative data 
is useful to show the number of times the section has been invoked and the regional 
distribution across the country. From a qualitative perspective, the data has clearly shown 
both the varied circumstances in which, and the children in respect of whom, section 12 
is invoked.  
 
A careful examination of the grounds for invocation of section 12 was undertaken, in 
line with the recommendations of the Ombudsman for Children. The results, as set out 
in paragraph 3.7 above, show a very diverse range of circumstances leading to the power 
being invoked by AGS. A concern for child welfare is at the heart of these circumstances 
and a desire to avoid the possibility of harm to a child’s safety or welfare. It is clear from 
the data that AGS are often faced with very complex and challenging situations where no 
alternative to the use of section 12 in practical terms may be available. Such situations in 
2014 included young children who were found wandering alone in public places, or those 
suffering from abuse or neglect, whether as a result of parental mental health issues or 
substance abuse, among very many others. 
 
The review of the PULSE data has shown the power pursuant to section 12 to be an 
essential and necessary one within the broader child protection infrastructure of the 
State. The PULSE data reviewed in the audit suggests that members of AGS are, in 
general, acting in conformity with the legislation. However, the absence of clear and 
complete PULSE entries in relation to some cases is a necessary qualification on this 
claim.  
 
The PULSE component of the audit is also, by its nature, limited to the accounts by 
AGS members as recorded in their PULSE entries. It must also be borne in mind that 
these entries are made by the Garda or Gardaí who invoked the power, having believed it 
appropriate to do so.  
 
Yet, with these qualifications in mind, the review of section 12 incidents recorded in 
2014 does not show any pattern of “over-zealous” or precipitous use of the power by 
108 
 
AGS. From the relevant details furnished, there appears to be a proportionate exercise of 
section 12, with an appropriate degree of critical evaluation of the circumstances.   
 
Where disclosed on PULSE, Gardaí appear to make attempts to locate accommodation 
for children and/or enquire into alternatives to invoking the power, where possible. In 
the incidents under review, the absence of any alternatives inexorably led to the 
invocation of the power by Gardaí. It is also clear from the cases reviewed that most 
Gardaí believe it to be better to err on the side of caution rather than risk exposing a 
child or children to any potential risk to their safety and welfare. 
 
In addition, the review has offered a general impression of Gardaí approaching these 
cases with attention, caution and care. A strong ethic of kindness and sensitivity is 
apparent in how Gardaí manage children removed under section 12. At the same time, 
the review provided some stark insights into the dangerous circumstances with which 
Garda members are faced, when fulfilling their child protection function. In one such 
case, Gardaí were attacked with a pitchfork and in another, were subject to violent 
assault, involving biting.  
 
However, the review of PULSE data has also raised some important questions with 
regard to the operation of section 12.  
 
The nationalities of the children who were the subject of section 12 in 2014 are set out in 
paragraph 3.6.3 above. It should also be noted in this regard that of the 560 valid 
incidents which occurred in 2014, the majority (77.4%) of children in respect of whom 
data was furnished were Irish.  
 
While there is no clear evidence in the PULSE review of racial bias or profiling in the 
exercise of section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991, this finding is subject to some 
qualifications and comments. In particular, there appears to be an over-representation of 
Nigerian children, or Irish children of Nigerian origin,74 in the overall number of section 
12 removals of children. In the 2011 census, the population of those of Nigerian 
                                                     
74 As there is no PULSE field capturing ethnic or racial demographic information on individuals Gardaí come into 
contact with, it appears the nationality field is sometimes used in its place. In some circumstances, this may also 
suggest a presumption that children of Nigerian, or other non-Irish ethnic origin are not Irish – despite those 
children being Irish citizens and residents since birth. 
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nationality living in Ireland was 17,642, being 0.385% of the population. As Nigerian 
children represent 4.4% of those removed under section 12 in 2014, this puts their over-
representation at a factor of 11. Similarly, the rate of Romanian children removed under 
section 12 is also over-representative of their population in Ireland. Additionally, the 
absence of mechanisms for routine collection of ethno-cultural demographic information 
by the PULSE system, places a significant obstacle to any review of potential racial 
profiling by AGS.  
 
However, this statistical trend does not in itself establish a practice of racial profiling in 
relation to section 12 use by AGS. In the context of the operation of the child protection 
system in ethno-culturally diverse areas, recent literature75 indicates there may be other 
factors that can explain at least some of this over-representation. For example, part of 
this over-representation may be attributable to different cultural norms in relation to the 
disciplining of children. While all cases examined by the audit involving removal of 
children from Nigerian and Romanian families appear to have been justified, part of this 
over-representation may also be accounted for in a higher level of policing of those 
communities. However, on this latter point, it should be emphasised that the audit did 
not find any evidence of a distinct policy or practice of policing the family lives of 
immigrant communities more heavily. In fact, the evidence of this audit points very 
clearly to an overwhelmingly reactive, rather than proactive, approach to Garda use of 
section 12. The audit found no evidence of Gardaí actively searching for families they 
had prejudged as posing a serious and immediate child protection risk. In the vast 
majority of instances, Gardaí were called to the scene by a family member, another State 
agency, or a concerned member of the public. 
 
This statistical feature of the audit challenges the individual consideration of section 12 
removals. Unfortunately, there is little or no empirical research in Ireland on the 
interaction of the child protection and policing systems with new Irish communities, and 
ethnic minorities of native origin such as Irish Travellers, from which the audit could 
draw conclusions.76 Further examination of this issue, apart from the review of the 
                                                     
75 See: R. Barn, C. Ladino and B. Rogers, Parenting in Multi-Racial Britain (National Children’s Bureau 2006) and C. 
Bernard and A. Gupta, “Black African Children and the Child Protection System” (2008) 38(3) British Journal of 
Social Work 476.  
76 However, Christie has offered a critical race theory account of Irish child protection policy documents – though 
not practice: A. Christie, “Whiteness and the Politics of ‘Race’ in Child Protection Guidelines in Ireland” (2010) 
13(2) European Journal of Social Work 199. 
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legality of individual instances of section 12 removal, was beyond the remit of this audit. 
It is recommended that research on the interaction between State agencies – including 
AGS – and minority ethnic Irish communities is undertaken to begin the invaluable 
process of establishing a knowledge base on the functioning of the policing and child 
protection systems as Ireland becomes more diverse. Similarly, full and effective 
demographic data collection by State agencies, and external monitoring of that data, is 
essential to avoid the potential for marginalisation and discrimination against minority 
ethnic communities. Complacency on this issue is a perilous policy. 
 
The audit also reveals a number of fundamental shortcomings in the PULSE system. In 
the first place, the reporting of incidents on PULSE is not standardised and 
unfortunately the narratives vary significantly with regard to content, quality and level of 
detail supplied. As is emphasised at various points in this audit, this undermines the 
ability of AGS to pursue best practice in evidence-based operational policing, and poses 
an obstacle to the operational accountability of AGS to the public it serves. It is 
recommended that there should be a minimum mandatory level of reporting, with 
specific data fields to be completed in each case, to ensure a standardised form of 
information or data to be recorded in these matters. At a minimum, the grounds upon 
which section 12 is invoked and the supporting evidence should be carefully recorded. 
This will serve both statistical data purposes but also as a meaningful intelligence tool for 
Gardaí who, sometimes, deal with the same children on multiple occasions. The 
recommended mandatory fields are set out in Appendix 6 to this Report and discussed 
further at paragraph 6.3.9. 
 
In overall terms, the average number of section 12 removals per annum is not so large 
that a full reporting of relevant information would present an onerous task for a Garda 
member. A monthly or other regular review by an appropriate person of data entries 
relating to the invocation of section 12 powers is also recommended. Such a post-event 
review process should capture difficulties and/or errors, if any, with regard to correct 
practice and procedure. It would also allow a practical review of the operation of any 
new provisions to be introduced in due course. 
 
As stated elsewhere in this audit, it is also recommended that a clear checklist (laminated 
card) be observed so that Gardaí can confirm compliance with legislation both when 
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implementing the section in practice and when subsequently recording the relevant data 
on PULSE.77   
 
Some entries on PULSE have also shown an incorrect use of terminology and, while the 
effect of the actions of AGS is not altered, it is to be recommended that a consistent use 
of correct terminology be used at all times. Such examples include references to a child 
being “arrested” under section 12, “detained” under section 12, “a prisoner” being 
released into the care of Tusla and reference to a “section 12 Emergency Care Order” 
being invoked.  It is recommended that appropriate training be provided to members of 
AGS in this regard.  
 
Finally, it appears from the review of section 12 incidents that the role of the HSE and 
Tusla, both with regard to interaction with members of AGS in the execution of section 
12 powers and also from a broader child protection perspective, warrants further 
consideration. It is recommended that both AGS and Tusla would benefit from 
enhanced clarity on their respective roles and functions with regard to child protection 
and a clear demarcation of the respective responsibilities in the context of increasing 
interagency partnership in child protection. A greater level of cooperation and 
communication should also be put in place to ensure a “joined-up” and unified approach 
to the protection of children in these cases, to bring Irish child protection systems into 
line with international best practice.  
 
In particular, the apparent absence of an out-of-hours service in the majority of cases 
reviewed in 2014 is a cause for concern. In addition, the nature and role played by private 
providers in sensitive cases such as these must be clarified, in the best interests of all 
concerned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
77 See Appendix 4. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
 
QUESTIONNAIRES REVIEWED 
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4.1 METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter deals with the second source of quantitative data generated in the audit: the 
questionnaires.   
 
Questionnaires were designed to gather comprehensive data on all instances of section 
12 removal of children in the calendar year 2014, including demographic details of the 
particular Garda member who invoked section 12, the child removed, the family from 
whom the child was removed, and the operational thresholds for intervention used by 
Garda members in instances of section 12 removal.  
 
Questionnaires were distributed to each Garda station in the jurisdiction from which 
there had been a section 12 removal of a child in 2014. All Garda members who were 
listed on the PULSE system as having exercised section 12 in 2014 were directed to 
complete the questionnaires, and return copies of all documentation in relation to the 
case. Respondents were requested to complete questionnaires using Microsoft Word, so 
that response data was clearly readable by the audit team. Responses (questionnaires and 
accompanying documentation) were returned in both hard and soft copy formats.  
 
Members of the audit team then coded the responses into a Microsoft Excel template. 
Where questions were not answered, the team sought clarification from the 
supplementary documentation in relation to the incident.  
 
Generalisable response data was then extracted from the Microsoft Excel document and 
converted into percentage formats. In some instances, the audit was unable to categorise 
the data presented. As a result, the information set out in this chapter may not always 
represent a complete population of questionnaire responses. 
 
4.2 FINDINGS 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
This questionnaire component of the audit examined all instances in which section 12 of 
the Child Care Act 1991 was exercised by a member of AGS in the calendar year 2014.  
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PULSE contained 560 valid entries78 in relation to section 12 being exercised in 2014. 
These 560 entries were invoked in 528 distinct events. A questionnaire was sent to each 
member who exercised section 12 in 2014 – totalling 528 questionnaires. 508 
questionnaires were returned to the audit. Of these 470 were completed and deemed 
valid, though some valid questionnaires had not completed sections or answered 
particular questions. 38 questionnaires were blank and are deemed to be invalid. This 
gives a total response rate of 96% and a valid response rate of 89%.  
 
4.2.2 Response data 
For a complete list of questions asked in the questionnaire, please refer to Appendix 2. 
 
The following sections contain questionnaire response data under the following thematic 
headings: Garda Respondent Demographics; Garda Training Relevant to Child 
Protection; The Circumstances and Context in which Section 12 was Invoked; Locations 
of Safety and Time Spent by Child at that Location; and Institutional Communication 
and Knowledge.  
 
4.2.3 Garda Respondent Demographics  
Garda Gender 
The respondent’s gender was requested in order to explore any correlations between 
Garda gender and rate of exercise of section 12 powers, and nature of exercise of section 
12.  
 
467 respondents answered the question in relation to their gender – of these 315 (67%) 
answered that they are male, and 152 (33%) that they are female.  
 
Figures provided by AGS indicate that there are 9,477 (74%) males in active service and 
3,321 (26%) females in active service.  
 
Number of years in force 
Respondents were asked the number of years they had been serving members of AGS. 
This question was asked as respondent age and experience is relevant to a number of 
                                                     
78 One entry reflects one instance in which one child was subject to section 12 – so for any particular 
event where a member was required to exercise section 12, this could involve one or more children. 
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other fields within the questionnaire, including the level of training they might have 
undertaken in child protection, and any possible correlation between a respondent’s 
number of years in service (a possible proxy for experience in relation to child 
protection), and their inclination towards exercising section 12. 
 
Respondent answers have been organised into ranges of years of service. 464 
Respondents answered this question as follows:  
 1 year of service – 1 respondent (0.2% of those who answered) 
 2-5 years of service – 18 respondents (3.8% of those who answered) 
 6-10 years of service – 235 respondents (51% of those who answered) 
 10+ years of service – 210 respondents (45% of those who answered) 
 
 
 
This data shows the vast majority (96%) have at least 6 years’ service. This figure reflects 
the absence of Garda recruits during the public services hiring moratorium 2009-2014. It 
is notable that a significant proportion of respondents have greater than 10 years’ service. 
This suggests that those who exercised section 12 powers were drawing from a well of 
significant professional experience when doing so. 
  
 
 
 
1 
18 
235 
210 
Years of Service 
1 year of service 2-5 years of service 6-10 years of service 10+ years of service
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4.2.4 Garda Training Relevant to Child Protection 
Training in child protection? 
Respondents were asked whether they had training in child protection, and some specific 
questions in relation to any such training. These questions were asked to ascertain Garda 
respondents’ recollections of formal levels of instruction members had received that 
might inform their exercise of section 12 powers, and the nature of any such training 
Gardaí were and are receiving.  
 
463 respondents answered this first general question – 213 (46% of those who answered) 
said they had received training in child protection, 247 (53% of those who answered) said 
they had not received such training. 2 answered “Don’t know” while 1 answered “N/a”. 
 
 
On whether that training was part of the respondent’s general training, 114 respondents 
(25% of those who answered) answered yes, and 64 respondents (14%) answered no.  
Had received 
training, 
46% 
Had not received 
training, 
53% 
Don't know and 
N/a, 
1% 
Training in child protection 
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Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
On whether that training was “specialist training”, 90 respondents (19%) said yes, 89 
(19%) said no. 
 
 
Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
 
 
 
 
Yes, 114 
No, 64 
Whether that training was part of the 
respondent’s general training 
Yes, 90 
No, 89 
Specialist training 
Yes No
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On whether that training was conducted jointly with social workers, 105 respondents 
(23% of those who answered) said yes, 74 (17%) said no. 
 
Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
Respondents were also asked if they felt they had sufficient training in child protection. 
This question is part of the audit’s examination of underlying levels of confidence in 
members of AGS in the performance of their child protection duties. 448 respondents 
(97%) answered this question. Of those who answered this question, 102 respondents 
(23% of those who answered) felt they have sufficient training in child protection; 346 
respondents (77%) felt they do not have sufficient training in child protection. 
 
. 
Yes, 105 
No, 74 
Training was conducted jointly with 
social workers 
Yes No
Sufficient 
training , 102 
Insufficient 
training, 346 
Sufficient training in child protection 
Sufficient training Insufficient training
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Training Documents and Guidance Information 
Respondents were also asked whether they had training documents available to assist 
them in their exercise of child protection powers under section 12. This question is part 
of the audit’s examination of general training, information and institutional knowledge 
available to members of AGS in the performance of their child protection powers under 
section 12. 460 respondents answered this question, of whom 219 answered they did 
have such documents available to them, and 237 respondents answered they did not. 
 
 
Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
Respondents were also asked to specify what types of training documents were available. 
Respondents’ answers included the following: 
 “Children First Guidelines”: 49 respondents (22% of those who answered yes) 
 “Documents from Training course”: 8 respondents (4%) 
 “Garda College handbook”: 2 respondents (1%) 
 “Garda Portal”: 102 respondents (47%) 
 “HQ Directives”: 46 respondents (21%) 
 “Legislation”: 42 respondents (19%) 
 “PULSE”: 1 respondent (0.5%) 
 “Sergeant”: 6 respondents (3%) 
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It is to be noted that more than one response to this question was possible. 
 
Cultural Competency 
Finally, respondents were asked whether they had training in diversity or cultural 
sensitivity. This question is part of the audit’s examination of whether racial bias or 
profiling is informing the exercise of Garda child protection powers under section 12. 
Specifically, this question seeks to understand the background-training members of AGS 
have and are receiving in relation to cultural sensitivity in the performance of their duties. 
 
453 (96%) Garda respondents answered this question. Of these, the vast majority of 331 
respondents (73%) said they had not received training in cultural sensitivity, 121 
respondents (26.8%) said they had received such training, and 1 respondent (0.2%) said 
he or she did not know. 
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4.2.5 Circumstances and context in which section 12 invoked; including prior 
knowledge of family and child (and where they derived that knowledge)  
A number of questions were asked of respondents in relation to the background 
circumstances to the exercise of section 12 powers. These questions sought to develop a 
picture of the nature of the circumstances in which members of AGS typically invoke 
their child protection powers.  
 
Who initiated involvement of Gardaí? 
Respondents were asked who initiated the involvement of AGS in the incident involving 
the invocation of section 12. Respondents’ answers included the following:  
 “Ambulance”: 17 respondents 
 “Family support worker”: 1 respondent 
 “Foster carers”: 28 respondents 
 “HSE”: 15 respondents 
 “Parents”: 138 respondents 
 “Residential Care Staff”: 9 respondents 
 “Response to 999 call”: 5 respondents  
 “Social Workers”: 70 respondents 
 “Unknown”: 1 respondent 
 “Airport Police”: 2 respondents 
Training in Cultural 
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 “Anonymous”: 14 respondents  
 “Child subject to section 12”: 37 respondents 
 “Childline”: 3 respondents  
 “Gardaí”: 24 respondents  
 “Interpol”: 4 respondents  
 “Member of the public”: 23 respondents 
 “Neighbour”: 11 respondents 
 “Other family member”: 18 respondents 
 
 
Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
Number of children removed? 
Respondents were asked how many children were removed into Garda care under 
section 12 in the particular incident. 465 respondents (99%) answered this question. Of 
those who answered, answers included the following: 
 1 child: 329 respondents (71% of those who answered) 
 2 children: 79 respondents (17%) 
 3 children: 37 respondents (8%) 
 4 children: 4 respondents (1%) 
 5 children: 5 respondents (1%) 
 6 children: 11 respondents (2%) 
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Age of the child subject to section 12 power 
Respondents were asked the age of the child subject to section 12 powers in the incident. 
There were 481 ages provided by respondents.79 The age ranges of the children were as 
follows: 
 0-6 months of age: 22 children (5% of the ages provided by respondents) 
 6 months – 2 years of age: 40 children (8%) 
 2-6 years of age: 71 children (15%) 
 7-10 years of age: 45 children (9%) 
 11-15 years of age: 160 children (33%) 
 16-18 years of age: 143 children (30%) 
                                                     
79 This over-provision of ages can be accounted for in cases where respondents gave multiple ages in one 
questionnaire, as multiple children were subject to section 12 in the incident. In these particular cases of 
multiple invocations of section 12, the respondent did not provide individual questionnaires for each 
child subject to section 12. 
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Into whose care was the child placed? 
Respondents were asked into whose care the child subject to section 12 was placed. 
Respondents were given 4 categories in which to give their response. 466 respondents 
(99% of valid responses) answered the question. Responses included the following: 
 “Tusla Social worker”: 139 respondents (30% of those who answered) 
 “Hospital Staff”: 130 respondents (28%) 
 “Residential Unit”: 25 respondents (5%) 
 “Other” (172 respondents – 37%), including:  
o “Foster Carers”: 94 (20% of those who answered) 
o “Five Rivers”: 12 (2.6%) 
o “Father”: 9 (2%) 
o “Mother”: 11 (2.4%) 
o “Grandmother”: 2 (0.4%) 
o “Grandfather”: 1(0.2%) 
o “Aunt”: 6 (1.3%) 
o “Out-of-Hours”: 7 (1.5%) 
o “Care home”: 1 (0.2%) 
o “Other family”: 2 (0.4%) 
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Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
Length of time spent at this location after handover 
Respondents were asked how long the child subject to section 12 remained at this 
handover location. 435 respondents (93% of valid questionnaires) answered this 
question. Of those who answered, their responses were categorised into the following 
time ranges: 
 0-6 hours: 47 respondents (11% of respondents who answered) 
 7-12 hours: 16 respondents (4%) 
 13-18 hours: 17 respondents (4%) 
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 19-24 hours: 43 respondents (10%) 
 Greater than 24 hours: 80 respondents (18%) 
 Not Known: 232 respondents (53%) 
 
 
 
Were you accompanied at the time of invoking section 12?  
Respondents were asked whether they were accompanied when they invoked section 12. 
461 respondents (98% of valid questionnaires) answered this question. Of those who 
answered, 442 respondents (96% of those who answered) said they were accompanied, 
and 19 (4%) said they were not accompanied. 
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Respondents were also asked who (i.e. specific professionals or others) accompanied 
them, and how many accompanied them during their invocation of section 12. 407 
respondents (90% of those who answered) said another Garda accompanied them. Of 
these:  
 289 respondents said 1 other Garda accompanied them 
 72 respondents said 2 Gardaí accompanied them 
 19 respondents said 3 Gardaí accompanied them 
 8 respondents said 4 Gardaí accompanied them 
 16 respondents said 5 Gardaí accompanied them 
 3 respondents said 6 Gardaí accompanied them 
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85 respondents said a social worker accompanied them during their invocation of section 
12. Of these: 
 23 respondents said 1 social worker accompanied them 
 56 respondents said 2 accompanied them 
 1 respondent said 4 accompanied them 
 5 respondents said 5 accompanied them 
 
8 respondents answered “other”, which included 3 who said ambulance services 
accompanied them, and 1 who said a General Practitioner accompanied him or her. 
 
Resistance experienced? 
Respondents were asked whether they experienced any resistance to their invocation of 
section 12. 459 respondents answered this question, 341 (74% of those who answered) 
of whom said that they did not experience resistance, and 117 (25.5%) said they did 
experience resistance. 1 (0.5%) answered “Don’t know”. 
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Respondents were also asked from whom they experienced resistance to their invocation 
of section 12. Of those who answered: 
 35 respondents said they experienced resistance from the child subject to section 
12 
 64 from a parent 
 5 from another family member 
 2 from Tusla 
 4 from social workers 
 1 from Five Rivers 
 4 from a hospital 
 1 from a medical doctor 
 1 from foster carers 
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Grounds under which section 12 was invoked 
Respondents were given a list of possible grounds upon which their decision to invoke 
section 12 was based. Respondents could, and did, select more than one ground upon 
which they based their decision to exercise section 12. Respondents who answered this 
question answered the following: 
 “Suspicion or concern that child being abused or neglected”: 82 respondents 
 “Concern for child welfare (public safety)”: 292 respondents 
 “Suspected emotional abuse”: 100 respondents 
 “Suspected neglect”: 122 respondents 
 “Suspected physical abuse”: 60 respondents 
 “Suspected sexual abuse”: 8 respondents 
 “Child a danger to self/others”: 107 respondents 
 “Child under the influence of drugs/alcohol”: 17 respondents 
 “Domestic violence”: 69 respondents 
 “Mental health issues within parents”: 55 respondents 
 “Mental health issues within child”: 40 respondents 
 “Active substance abuse within parents leading to abuse or neglect”: 82 
respondents 
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 “Other”: 44 respondents answered in this field – these responses are varied and 
are described in a highly contextualised manner. Examples of such responses 
include:  
 
[The] mother was a known drug user and maternal grandmother had care 
of children but she could no longer cope. Mother had arranged with 
social workers that grandmother would care for children. The situation 
became unpredictable. 
 
Child was out begging. Spoke no English. Child was visibly dirty and 
neglected. Child claimed parents were in Romania and didn’t know the 
people she was staying with. Concern that child may have been brought 
to Ireland solely to beg. 
 
Parents would not have him home. 
 
Parents refused to collect child from Garda Station and child refused to 
go into care of her parents. 
 
Child was not being provided with a safe place to stay that evening by his 
mother. 
 
These children were placed in a non-secure care home and didn’t want to 
be there. Each time AGS were called and returned them they would run 
away again so it was decided on consultation to invoke section 12. 
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From whose care was the child removed 
Respondents were asked from whose care they removed the child when they exercised 
section 12. All 470 respondents with valid questionnaires answered this question. They 
answered as follows: 
 “Parent”: 321 respondents (68%) 
 “Guardian”: 10 respondents (2%) 
 “Other family member”: 18 respondents (4%) 
 “HSE”: 14 respondents (3%) 
 “Foster-carer”: 32 respondents (7%) 
 “Absconded from HSE”: 3 respondents (0.6%) 
 “Alone on street”: 2 respondents (0.4%) 
 “Care home”: 7 respondents (1.5%) 
 “Ambulance”: 2 respondents (0.4%) 
 “Unrelated Person(s)”: 1 respondent (0.2%) 
 “Residential unit”: 6 respondents (1.3%) 
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Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
 
If section 12 exercised after 5pm – out-of-hours service available? 
Respondents were asked if the section 12 powers were invoked after 5pm, or during a 
weekend, whether an out-of-hours social worker was available. 422 respondents (90% of 
valid questionnaire responses) answered this question. Of those who answered, 224 
respondents (53% of those who answered) said there was an out-of-hours service 
available, 146 (35%) said there was no service available, and 52 (12%) answered “not 
applicable” or equivalent.  
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Respondents were also asked what any such out-of-hours social work service involved. 
136 respondents (29% of valid questionnaires; 61% of those said there was an out-of-
hours service) answered this question. Of those who answered, respondents’ answers 
included the following: 
 “Five Rivers”: 56 respondents (25% of those who said there was such an out-of-
hours service) 
 “Phone Call” or equivalent: 58 respondents (26%) 
 “Social Worker”: 22 respondents (10%) 
 “HSE”: 5 respondents (2%) 
 “Social welfare”: 3 respondents (1%) 
 “Tusla”: 1 respondent (0.5%) 
It is to be noted that more than one response to this question was possible. 
 
 
Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
 
If there had been an out-of-hours service available, would section 12 have been 
invoked? 
Finally, respondents were asked if there had been an out-of-hours service available, 
would they still have invoked section 12 in the same circumstances.80  
                                                     
80 This question was intended for those who said there was not an out-of-hours service available. 
However, 236 respondents (50% of valid questionnaires) answered this question. This is higher than the 
146 respondents who said there was no out-of-hours service available. 
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 Of those who answered, responses included:   
 “Yes” – they would still have exercised section 12: 102 respondents (43% of those 
who answered)  
 “Not sure”/”Don’t Know”: 91 respondents (39%) 
 “No” – they would not have invoked section 12: 15 respondents (6%) 
 “N/a”: 9 respondents (4%) 
 
 
Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
 
4.2.6 Locations of place of safety and time spent in that location 
The questionnaire asked for information in relation to where children were removed 
following invocation of section 12, and the amount of time the child stayed in this 
location afterwards. These questions were asked to ascertain policies and/or patterns in 
how children are managed after their removal under section 12. 
 
Initial place of safety 
Respondents were asked the initial place of safety, where the child subject to section 12 
powers was removed to. 460 respondents answered this question. Of those who 
answered, answers included the following: 
 “Garda station”: 175 respondents (38% of those who answered)  
 “Hospital”: 92 respondents (20%) 
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 “Five Rivers”: 11 respondents (2.4%) 
 “Tusla”: 15 respondents (3.3%) 
 “HSE”: 24 respondents (5%) 
 “Care home”: 34 respondents (7.4%) 
 “Foster carers”: 42 respondents (9%) 
 “Don’t know”: 6 (1%) 
 
Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
 
Length of time child spent in the initial place of safety 
Respondents were asked the length of time the child removed under section 12 spent at 
the initial place of safety. 426 respondents (91% of valid responses) answered this 
question. Answers fell into the following time ranges: 
 Less than one hour: 40 respondents (9% of those who answered) 
 1-6 hours: 193 respondents (45%) 
 7-12 hours: 8 respondents (2%) 
 13-18 hours: 15 respondents (4%) 
 19-24 hours: 38 respondents (9%) 
 More than one day: 45 respondents (11%) 
 Not known: 87 respondents (20%) 
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Location of the handover place of safety 
Respondents were asked the location of the “handover place of safety” following the 
invocation of section 12. 432 respondents (92% of valid responses) answered this 
question. Of those who answered this question, responses included the following: 
 “Hospital”: 129 respondents 
 “Garda station”: 91 respondents 
 “Five Rivers”: 15 respondents 
 “Foster Care”: 80 respondents 
 “HSE”: 16 respondents 
 “Social Worker”: 11 respondents 
 “Family home”: 12 respondents 
 “School”: 2 respondents 
 Other: 7681 respondents 
 
                                                     
81 A variety of other responses were provided by respondents, including named towns and 
villages, and named individual’s houses. These results are not listed in this audit report as they 
provide very little statistical insight into how section 12 invocations are managed by members of 
AGS. 
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4.2.7 Communication and Knowledge 
The questionnaires included questions regarding the background knowledge (the 
individual respondent’s knowledge and organisational knowledge within AGS) of the 
particular child and family subject to the section 12 power. These questions are part of 
the audit’s examination of correlative patterns around section 12 use by members of 
AGS. 
 
Questionnaires also asked a number of questions in relation to communications 
processes and procedures both internally within AGS, and externally between AGS and 
other agencies in the child protection infrastructure. These questions are part of the 
audit’s examination of the nature and extent of internal and external communication and 
information-sharing systems between institutional actors in the child protection 
infrastructure. 
 
Paper File 
Respondents were asked if there is a paper file in relation to the case. 455 respondents 
(97% of valid questionnaires) answered the question. Of those who answered, 192 
respondents (42% of those who answered the question) answered yes, 248 respondents 
(55%) answered no.  
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Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
 
Child or Family Previously known to Gardaí 
This questionnaire examined prior Garda knowledge of the child or the child’s family. 
This question was asked to ascertain whether there are correlative patterns between 
previous Garda interactions with a child and/or the child’s family, and the invocation of 
section 12 child protection powers by members of AGS. 
 
469 respondents (99.8% of valid questionnaires) answered this question. Of those who 
answered, 254 respondents (54% of those who answered) said they did have previous 
knowledge of the child or the child’s family, and 209 respondents (45%) answered that 
they did not have such prior knowledge.  
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Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
 
Gathering background information 
Respondents were asked if they had an opportunity to gather background information on 
the family before they invoked section 12, and from where they derived any such 
background information. This question is relevant to systems of internal Garda 
knowledge and communication, and the prevalence of communication and information-
sharing between the different institutional actors in the child protection infrastructure, 
principally Tusla and AGS. This question is also relevant to the theme of Garda critical 
evaluation of circumstances prior to the exercise of section 12 powers (see above section 
on grounds for use of section 12, page 130). 
 
462 respondents (98% of valid questionnaires) answered the initial question of whether 
they had the opportunity to gather background information. Of those who answered, 
272 respondents (59% of those who answered) said they did have such an opportunity, 
and 190 respondents (41%) said they did not have such an opportunity. 
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On the question of the source of that background information, respondents gave the 
following answers: 
 Garda intelligence: 165 respondents (61% of those who said they had gathered 
background information) 
 Social Workers: 57 respondents (21%) 
 
Respondents also provided a variety of other sources, with a significant amount of 
qualitative detail in their responses. The following key terms were mined within this data 
set and counted. 
 “Parents”: 7 respondents 
 “Father”: 3 respondents 
 “Mother”: 8 respondents 
 “Aunt”: 1 respondent 
 “Neighbour”: 3 respondents 
 “School”: 1 respondent 
 “Prior experience of respondent/Family Known to Gardaí”: 13 respondents 
 “Care worker”: 4 respondents 
 “Foster carer”: 4 respondents 
 “The child”: 4 respondents 
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Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
 
Consultation prior to invocation 
Respondents were asked if they consulted with anyone before they invoked section 12. 
Respondents were also asked if that consultation was within the Garda organisation, or 
with an outside agency. This question is relevant to systems of internal Garda knowledge 
and communication, and the prevalence of communication and information-sharing 
between the different institutional actors in the child protection infrastructure, principally 
between Tusla and AGS. This question is also relevant to the theme of Garda critical 
evaluation of circumstances prior to exercise of section 12 powers (see above section on 
grounds pursuant to which section 12 was invoked). 
 
466 respondents (99% of valid questionnaires) answered this question. 321 respondents 
(69% of respondents who answered) said they did consult during their consideration to 
invoke section 12. 142 respondents (31%) said they did not consult.  
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Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
 
Consultation within AGS 
Respondents were asked with whom they consulted within AGS prior to invocation. This 
question was asked to evaluate whether Gardaí are seeking informal authorisation or 
guidance from senior members of AGS prior to exercising section 12, despite the decision 
to use this power being within the exclusive discretion of the particular Garda, regardless of 
rank. 
 “Sergeant”: 227 respondents (71% of respondents who said they did consult) 
 “Inspector”: 17 respondents (5%) 
 “Other Garda Colleagues”: 15 respondents (5%) 
 “Supervisor”: 2 respondents (0.6%) 
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Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
 
Consultation outside AGS 
Respondents were asked with whom they consulted outside of AGS prior to invocation. 
This question was asked to evaluate whether Gardaí are seeking informal authorisation or 
guidance from external agencies or authorities prior to exercising section 12, in spite of the 
use of this power being within the exclusive discretion of the particular Garda, regardless of 
rank. 
 Five Rivers: 53 respondents of those who said they did consult (16%) 
 Tusla: 74 respondents (23%) 
 Schools: 2 respondents (0.6%) 
 Parents: 3 respondents (1%) 
 Hospital staff: 6 respondents (2%) 
 Other Police forces: 1 respondent (0.3%) 
 Ambulance staff: 3 respondents (1%) 
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Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
Unable to consult 
Respondents were asked if they would have liked to consult with someone before they 
invoked section 12, but were unable to do so. This question was asked as part of the 
audit’s examination of any possible gaps in information, communication, or support for 
members of AGS in their decision-making regarding the invocation of section 12. 
 
449 respondents (96% of valid questionnaires) answered this question. Of those who 
answered, 98 respondents (22% of those who answered) said they would have liked to 
consult, while 345 respondents (77%) said they would not have liked to consult on the 
case, and 6 answered “N/a” or equivalent.  
 
The questionnaire also asked why those who wanted to consult, were unable to have that 
consultation. 61 respondents (62% of those who wanted a consultation) answered that 
there was no one available to consult at that time. 26 other respondents (26%) similarly 
detailed specific reasons why no one was available, most of which centred on the 
incident taking place outside of social worker office hours. 
 
Tusla notification forms 
The questionnaire asked if the respondent completed a Tusla notification form in 
relation to the case. This question is part of the audit’s examination of levels of formal 
compliance with existing inter-agency cooperation and information-sharing procedures. 
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458 respondents (97% of valid questionnaires) answered this question. Of those who 
answered, 407 respondents (89% of those who answered) said they had completed a 
Tusla notification form, 39 respondents (9%) said they had not completed a Tusla 
notification form, 2 (0.5%) said they did not know if the form had been completed, and 
2 responded “N/a”. 
 
Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
 
Joint Action Plan 
The questionnaire asked if a Joint Action Plan (otherwise known as a Joint Action Sheet)   
had been completed in relation to the case. This question is part of the audit’s 
examination of levels of formal compliance with existing inter-agency cooperation and 
information-sharing procedures.  
 
461 respondents (98% of valid questionnaires) answered this question. Of those who 
answered, 144 respondents (31% of those who answered) said a Joint Action Plan was 
completed, 55 respondents (12%) said a Joint Action Plan had not been completed, and 
236 respondents (51%) said they did not know if a Joint Action Plan was completed. The 
responsibility for the completion of the Joint Action Sheet rests with Tusla. 
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Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
 
Subsequent participation in proceedings  
The questionnaire asked whether respondents had attended a strategy meeting, case 
conference or care order hearing in relation to the case following the particular 
invocation of section 12. This question is part of the audit’s examination of case 
handover and follow-up procedures from all agencies involved in child protection 
proceedings, following the invocation of section 12 powers by a member of AGS. 
 
The respondents’ attendance included the following: 
 Strategy Meeting: 38 respondents (8% of valid questionnaires) 
 Child Protection Case Conference: 23 respondents (5%) 
 Care Order Hearing: 41 respondents (9%) 
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Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
Respondents were given four headings under which to explain non-attendance at any of 
these proceedings. Respondents answered as follows: 
 “Were not asked”: 236 respondents (50% of valid questionnaires) 
 “Invited, but were unable to attend”: 21 respondents (4%) 
 “Case didn’t require such a meeting”: 87 respondents (19%) 
 “Other”: 17 respondents (4%), a majority of whom explained another Garda 
attended in their place 
 
Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. In both parts to this question, respondents could select multiple 
options in each part. 
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Feedback 
The questionnaire asked whether respondents felt they had received appropriate 
feedback in relation to the case. This question is part of the audit’s examination of case 
handover and follow-up procedures from all agencies involved in child protection 
proceedings, following the invocation of section 12 powers by a member of AGS. 
 
457 respondents (97% of valid questionnaires) answered this question. Of those who 
answered, 198 respondents (43% of those who answered) said they had received 
sufficient feedback, 250 respondents (55%) said they had not received appropriate 
feedback on the case, 7 respondents (1.5%) answered “N/a”, 1 respondent answered 
“mixed”, and 1 respondent answered “don’t know”. 
 
Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
 
If they had received appropriate feedback, respondents were asked from where they 
received that feedback. 107 respondents said they received appropriate feedback from 
within their own organisation. 95 respondents said they received appropriate feedback 
from Tusla. It should be noted that respondents could select both options in relation to 
this part of the question. 
 
198 
250 
7 1 1 
Sufficient
feedback
Appropriate
feedback not
received on the
case
N/a Mixed Don’t Know 
Feedback 
150 
 
 
 
4.2.8 Critical Evaluation and Reflection in Use of Section 12 power 
Respondents were asked a number of questions to assess evidence of critical evaluation 
by members of AGS of circumstances in which they considered using section 12. These 
questions are part of the audit’s inquiry into the understanding of the thresholds for State 
intervention in family life under section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991, by members of 
AGS. 
 
Refusal to exercise section 12 
The questionnaire asked if respondents had ever refused to exercise section 12 when 
requested to do so by a social worker. This question is designed to assess whether 
members of AGS were forming independent judgments on the circumstances of a case 
to see whether the threshold of “immediate and serious” threat to the child had been 
met. 
 
452 respondents (96% of valid questionnaires) answered this question. Of those who 
answered, responses included: 
 Yes: 38 respondents (8% of those who answered) 
 No: 363 respondents (80%) 
 N/a: 39 respondents (9%) 
 Could not recall: 7 respondents (2%) 
Own 
organisation, 
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Tusla, 
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Appropriate feedback 
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Note: It was not possible to categorise some of the responses. 
General Discussion 
The questionnaire stage of this audit provides a valuable overview of the operation of 
child protection powers exercised by AGS. Crucial findings from this stage centre on the 
dearth of training in child protection among members of AGS, and the specific gaps in 
training in relation to the use of section 12 powers. In both regards, most respondents 
indicate they have received no training. A substantial majority of respondents (77%) felt 
they are not sufficiently trained in the area of child protection. 
 
Similarly, the questionnaires detail a context where little or no meaningful inter-agency 
cooperation takes place in relation to child protection, beginning at the level of basic 
training. 
 
Perhaps the most important insights from the questionnaire stage relate to the common 
circumstances in which section 12 is invoked to remove children into the care of the 
State. Parents are by a significant margin the most frequent instigator of Garda 
involvement leading to section 12 removal. A substantial portion of the narratives that 
accompanied questionnaire responses detailed circumstances where parents requested 
the involvement of AGS due to an adolescent child’s disruptive, and frequently violent 
behaviour. Relatedly, the majority of children removed in the calendar year 2014 
according to the questionnaires, were between 11 and 18 years old. 
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The majority (68%) of children were removed from the care of their parents. Notably, 
14% of respondents said they had removed the children from the care of the HSE, a 
foster carer, or a care home/residential unit. A majority of respondents (54%) said they, 
or AGS, had previous contact with the child or family before invoking section 12 of the 
Child Care Act 1991.  
 
A high proportion of respondents (59%) said they had an opportunity to gather 
background information on the situation prior to invoking section 12. Similarly, 
respondents offered multiple grounds justifying the removal of the child, reflecting a 
degree of critical sophistication in Garda decision-making around the exercise of section 
12. Relatedly, a large majority of respondents indicated they consulted with a senior 
member of AGS, most often their unit Sergeant, prior to exercising their section 12 
powers. This is significant as it suggests an interesting feature in the operation of section 
12 powers by AGS. It indicates a possible lack of understanding of section 12 powers 
among members of AGS, or a lack of confidence among Garda members in their 
exercise of child protection functions. It also suggests that Gardaí have informally and 
organically developed a similar practice of oversight of section 12 powers to that 
contained in the UK equivalent under section 46 of the Children Act 1989. While many 
respondents said they consulted within the Garda organisation, a large number of 
respondents stated that they consulted with either Tusla or Five Rivers prior to section 
12 removal. 
 
25.5% of respondents indicated they had experienced resistance to the removal of the 
child. This reflects the emotionally tense and challenging circumstances in which Gardaí 
are called upon to remove children from the care of their parents. Parents were the most 
frequent source of that resistance, followed by resistance from the child. 
 
Garda stations and hospitals were by a significant margin the most frequently used initial 
places of safety to which children were removed, with numerous accounts of children 
being kept for hours in Garda stations while a placement was arranged, or of children 
being left in hospitals over a weekend due to the lack of an out-of-hours service.  
 
Children removed under section 12 were placed in the care of a variety of different actors 
and agencies, principally Social Workers (30%), Hospital Staff (28%) and Foster Carers 
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(20%), but also including the Five Rivers organisation, and other family members. Much 
of this variation can be attributed to the absence of out-of-hours services provided by 
Tusla, and various localised policies with regard to treatment of children removed during 
out-of-hours periods, developed in response to the absence of national rules in relation 
to the management of children post-removal under section 12. 
 
53% of respondents indicated there was an out-of-hours social service available. 
However, analysis of these responses, and subsequent related questions about the nature 
of that service, suggests a significant proportion of these respondents believed the 
private fostering service Five Rivers to be the same organisation as Tusla. The 
questionnaire findings, along with findings at all stages of this audit, indicate Five Rivers 
was operating as the de facto out-of-hours child protection service outside of Dublin and 
Cork.  
 
Questions relating to follow-up after a section 12 removal indicate high levels of 
adherence to superficial inter-agency communications mechanisms such as the Tusla 
notification form (89% of respondents completed such a form), and low levels of 
involvement in materially significant inter-agency cooperation. For example, most 
respondents (51%) were not aware if a Joint Action Plan had been completed. 50% of 
respondents said they were not asked to attend a case conference, strategy meeting or 
care order hearing, or were not aware of such a meeting taking place in relation to the 
child they had removed. Most respondents (55%) felt they did not receive sufficient 
feedback on the case either from AGS, or externally from Tusla or other private/third 
sector service providers. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the three substantive sources of qualitative data generated through 
this audit: narratives from the questionnaires – which provided Garda questionnaire 
respondents with the opportunity to give a comprehensive outline of the circumstances 
in which section 12 powers were invoked; interviews with thirteen randomly selected 
members of AGS who exercised section 12 powers in the month of September 2015;82 
and the two focus groups – each of which consisted of six participant members of AGS 
– one group consisted of Gardaí who had exercised section 12 powers between 2014 and 
2015; the other group consisted of their supervising officers (five Sergeants and one 
Inspector). 
 
5.2 METHODOLOGY 
 
The data from the interview stage of the audit was derived from contemporaneous notes 
taken on a laptop computer by one member of the audit team. The same member of the 
team acted as note-taker to ensure consistent documentation throughout this stage of the 
audit. The data from the focus group stage of the audit was derived from transcripts of 
those focus groups, generated from audio recordings of those focus groups. The audio 
recordings of the focus groups were professionally transcribed. The data from the 
questionnaire narratives was directly copied and pasted into the Questionnaire Data 
Master Excel spread sheet from the original questionnaire responses, or was summarised 
during the coding stage of the questionnaire responses. Questionnaire narratives were 
also analysed by the coders as each questionnaire was coded into the Master Excel spread 
sheet. Coders selected narratives83 that were particularly rich with qualitative data, and 
analysed these narratives using themes from the questionnaires themselves, and informed 
by the overarching objectives of the audit. 
 
The interviews and focus groups were coded and analysed using NVivo qualitative 
analysis software. The analytical codes used in this process were generated from the 
questionnaires used in both the interviews and the focus groups. More analytical codes 
                                                     
82 In September 2015, 55 children were removed under section 12, in 35 situations where Gardaí removed 
children under section 12. 
83 The narratives inputted in the questionnaires varied enormously in terms of length, quality and detail. 
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were also generated for the audit from the raw data itself, employing a form of grounded 
theory analysis.   
 
In line with commitments given to Garda respondents, and to ensure compliance with 
the data protection obligations of both AGS and the audit team, Garda respondents have 
been anonymised. Respondents from the questionnaire stage are referred to by a random 
number or two letters (Garda 213, Garda ZY, etc.); respondents from the interview stage 
have been randomly assigned an identifying letter (e.g. Garda A, Garda B, etc.); 
respondents from the focus group stage are not referred to individually, but by the 
particular focus group they participated in (Focus Group 1, Focus Group 2).  
 
In the following chapter, all respondents will be referred to in the masculine to protect 
the conditions of confidentiality under which the interviews and focus groups were 
undertaken.  
 
5.3 THE INTERVIEWS 
 
The following section outlines, contextualises, and critically analyses the findings from 
the interview stage of the audit. The sub-headings under which the findings are 
categorised reflect the questions asked during the audit, and other critical themes that 
emerged during interviews. Where relevant, findings from the audit’s questionnaire 
narratives will be cited to enrich findings from the interview stage. The questionnaire 
narratives will be examined in their own section of this chapter. 
 
5.3.1 Respondent Gender 
Of the 13 respondents in the interview stage, 2 were female, and 11 were male. This 
demographic data is noted to provide a degree of consistency across the different stages 
of this audit. Respondent gender is also noted, as the audit used gender as one of the 
central critical tools to evaluate all data derived in the questionnaire, interview and focus 
group stages of this audit. In this regard, the audit explored if there was a discernible 
pattern of difference in Garda respondents’ approaches to their child protection role, 
depending on the Garda respondent’s gender. 
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5.3.2 How Long a Member of An Garda Síochána 
The number of years respondents had been members of AGS ranged from 6 years (1 
respondent) to 33 years (1 respondent). 1 respondent had served for 7 years, 3 for 8 
years, 3 for 10 years, 3 for 12 years, and 1 for 25 years. This demographic data is also 
noted to provide a degree of consistency across the different stages of this audit. 
Respondent age is also noted, as the audit used respondent age as one of the central 
critical tools to evaluate all data derived in the questionnaire, interview and focus group 
stages of this audit. In this regard, the audit explored if there was a discernible pattern of 
difference in Garda respondents’ approaches to their child protection role, depending on 
the Garda respondent’s length of service in AGS. 
 
5.3.3 Number of Times Respondent had Exercised Section 12 Powers 
Respondents were asked how many times they had removed a child under section 12. 
This question was asked as part of the audit’s goal of exploring the frequency with which 
the average Garda will remove a child under section 12. This question also informed the 
audit’s examination of Garda willingness to exercise section 12 powers.  
 
Most respondents who answered this question indicated they had invoked section 12 no 
more than once or twice before this incident. For example, Garda O had been a member 
of AGS for 33 years, but the instance discussed in the interview had been his first time 
exercising section 12 powers. Both Garda J and Garda B described the use of the power 
as “rare”. Garda P who had previously been stationed in economically and socially 
deprived urban and suburban areas, had himself only exercised section 12 once before, 
but had been involved in a number of other incidents where his colleagues had exercised 
section 12 powers. Garda P, Garda W, and Garda Q all explained that the rarity of 
section 12 cases made it difficult to accurately recall details of other incidents in which 
they had invoked section 12, prior to the invocation in September 2015. 
 
Having invoked section 12 three times, Garda A and Garda Z had the highest number of 
reported uses of section 12 in the interview stage. For Garda A, two of his invocations of 
section 12 powers were in relation to the same child, on different dates in 2014 and 2015. 
Garda Z explained he had exercised section 12 powers twice over 12 years. 
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Both Garda L and Garda T said it was their first time invoking section 12 powers. Garda 
T said he was nervous about exercising section 12 powers, and had taken great care with 
his Sergeant to review the wording of the section in the 1991 Act before proceeding. 
Garda T indicated this hesitancy on his and his Sergeant’s part in exercising this power 
was in part connected to the fallout from the ‘Tallaght’ case.  
 
Overall, this stage of the audit found that the removal of a child under section 12 of the 
Child Care Act is a rare occurrence for the average member of AGS. 
 
5.3.4 Personal Details in relation to Family and Child Removed under Section 12 
The demographic data of the child and family is again noted to provide a degree of 
consistency across the different stages of this audit. The child’s gender, age, socio-
economic, and ethnic background was also noted as a central research question for this 
audit to assess whether Garda profiling in its exercise of powers under section 12 of the 
Child Care Act 1991, exists. The audit also attempted to establish if there were any 
significant patterns in terms of the background of children removed under section 12. 
 
Age 
This issue is considered at para 3.6.1. 
 
Gender 
This issue is considered at para 3.6.2. 
 
Socio-Economic Background of the Child Removed 
Respondents were asked about their knowledge of the child’s or the family’s socio-
economic background. A number of the children, as in the cases discussed by Garda W 
and Garda L, were under the care of Tusla, in a care home or in a foster placement. As a 
result, the respondents were not familiar with the socio-economic background of the 
biological family.  
 
Of those who were able to answer this question, the majority said the families were low-
income. A handful, such as in the cases discussed by Garda Z and Garda S, were families 
“known to the Gardaí” for unrelated criminal activity.  
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Garda S helpfully provided a broader insight into the socio-economic makeup of the 
Garda district in which he was deployed, describing it as a large geographical area with a 
socio-economically diverse population. He also described areas in the district with high 
levels of social deprivation, and what he termed “very challenging clients”, with complex 
issues such as drug addiction, homelessness, and chronic mental health problems. Garda 
S’s interview in particular, along with a number of other respondents’ accounts of 
contemporary policing in Ireland, highlighted the increasingly diverse and demanding 
roles expected of members of AGS, of which child protection is now firmly a part. 
 
In the cases discussed by Garda Q and Garda B, the families appeared to live in middle 
to upper-middle class neighbourhoods, in financially secure circumstances. 
 
From the cases examined at the interview stage of this audit, there was no single 
paradigm for the socio-economic background of families, from whom children were 
removed under section 12. While there were a higher number of children removed from 
families from lower socio-economic backgrounds, there was no evidence that this factor 
was a significant consideration in a respondent’s decision to remove the child under 
section 12. While some respondents noted the physical condition of the home (e.g. level 
of cleanliness) in their description of circumstances at the scene, it was not clear from 
interviews that this was a major or minor ground upon which section 12 was invoked. 
Overall, the audit did not find evidence to suggest over-zealous use of section 12 
removal of children from families living in social or economic deprivation. 
 
Ethnic and National Background of the Child and its Family 
The majority of the cases examined in the interview stage involved Irish parents and Irish 
children. At least two cases involved an Irish Traveller family, though there may have 
been more, as this particular piece of demographic data does not appear to be routinely 
documented on the PULSE system.  
 
One case involved a child and family with an ethnic Roma background, all of whom, 
according to the Garda respondent, were Romanian nationals. One case involved a 
Nigerian national and her Irish children, one case involved a Nigerian child,84 with 
                                                     
84 It was unclear if this child was Nigerian born, or born in another EU member state with Nigerian 
heritage.  
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citizenship in another EU member state, and two cases involved Latvian national 
mothers and their Irish children. One child, who was in a Tusla foster care placement 
when section 12 was invoked, was, as best as the respondent could remember, English-
born, with an English-born biological mother. Another case involved an English family 
who had fled their home jurisdiction, and were sought by Police and Social Services in 
England. One family (a Latvian national mother, and her children, at least two of whom 
were Irish born) was homeless at the time section 12 was invoked – a fact that formed 
part of the respondent’s grounds for exercising section 12 powers. The remaining 7 cases 
involved Irish children, two of which involved a Traveller child.  
 
It should be noted that it is not entirely clear from the interviews, and the data received 
along with those interviews, that a child’s nationality and ethnic background is routinely 
taken as part of normal Garda investigation procedures, and documented on PULSE. 
Some officers, such as Garda J, were not confident in accurately identifying the specific 
nationality of the child, or the child’s parents. 
 
However, despite these uncertainties around the ethnicity and/or nationality of the 
children (uncertainties that are more problematic from a broader national and temporally 
longer perspective), the audit could find no evidence that the ethnic background of a 
child, or their nationality, was a significant consideration in the decision to remove a 
child. While the nationality of the children and family in the case involving Police and 
Social Services in England and Wales was undoubtedly a central concern – this factor is 
relevant due to international legal obligations on the Irish State, rather than any issue of 
racial profiling. As such, the interview stage of this audit showed no evidence of racial 
profiling in decisions to remove children under section 12.  
 
This finding must be tempered by three considerations: firstly, by necessity, the sample 
size in the interview stage is not sufficiently large to draw general conclusions about the 
presence or absence of racial or ethnic profiling in Garda use of section 12 powers. The 
interview stage provided the audit with very valuable insights into the culture and 
professional practices of members of AGS in the performance of their child protection 
functions, but was not designed to generate data of statistical significance. Secondly, as 
noted above and in more detail below, the apparent absence of a requirement for routine 
gathering of ethnic data on children, or others, in the PULSE system makes it difficult 
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for the audit to make firm determinations on the presence or absence of racial or ethnical 
profiling by AGS in the performance of its child protection functions.  
 
Finally, while there may be little or no evidence of racial or ethnic profiling by members 
of AGS in their exercise of section 12 powers (above qualifications excluded) – the audit 
is unable to comment on the presence of racial or ethnic profiling in the performance of 
other policing functions. The most important example in this regard is that the audit’s 
findings are in no way relevant to the question of whether children, their families, or any 
other adults, are racially profiled by members of AGS when those people are considered 
possible offenders. The remit of this audit was confined exclusively to examine cases 
where a child was removed under section 12 – it did not examine any cases where the 
child was arrested for suspected commission of a criminal offence. 
  
Religion 
Most respondents were unable to answer the question covering the religion of the child 
or the family, indicating this kind of data is not routinely taken as part of normal Garda 
investigation procedures, and documented on PULSE. Of those respondents who 
answered, none were wholly confident in their answers, and all said the child and family 
were Catholic. 
 
Disability 
Most respondents were unable to answer this question, indicating this kind of data is not 
routinely taken as part of normal Garda investigation procedures, and documented on 
PULSE. One respondent was able to answer this question, and said he believed the child 
had autism. 
 
Number of Children in the Family and Number of Children Left Behind 
This particular demographic data was gathered and evaluated by the audit, as decisions to 
leave some children behind, when one or more children are removed under section 12, is 
relevant to a Garda respondent’s understanding of the threshold for section 12 removal.  
 
Eight of the thirteen respondents said there was more than one child in the family. In 
one of these cases, the sibling lived in another jurisdiction, and in another case the other 
siblings were half-siblings on the father’s side, not living in the family home. 
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Three respondents said there were two children; three respondents said there were three 
children; one respondent said there were five children; and one respondent said there 
were six children in the family. These responses were total sibling numbers the 
respondents were aware of – including half-siblings not living in the family home. 
 
In four cases, other children were left in the family home and not subject to section 12 
removal. In two of these cases, the other children were biological siblings of the child 
subject to section 12, but the Garda respondents did not feel the situation for those 
particular children met the section 12 threshold for intervention. In another case, the 
half-sibling living in the family home was left in the care of his biological father, while the 
other child was removed under section 12, as no other appropriate adult was available to 
care for the child. In the fourth case, the other children were foster children unrelated to 
the child subject to section 12.  
 
In all these cases, the respondents were able to clearly justify their decision not to invoke 
section 12 in relation to all the children, in line with the risk threshold governing the 
section 12 power. In all these instances, the evidence available to the audit supports the 
genuineness and legitimacy of these justifications.  
 
Was the Child and/or the Family Known to the Respondent or other members of 
An Garda Síochána? 
This particular data was gathered and evaluated for the audit to explore if existing Garda 
knowledge of a child or his or her family is a significant factor in decisions to remove a 
child under section 12.  
 
All but three respondents said the child and/or the family were known to them, or other 
members of AGS (i.e. the child or the family had a record on PULSE). In one of the 
three cases where they were not known, the family was known to Police in England and 
Wales (Interpol initiated the involvement of AGS in this case). In only two cases were 
the children and the family unknown to policing services in this or neighbouring 
jurisdictions.  
 
This finding indicates that the children and families in which section 12 is invoked are 
typically experiencing some level of social dysfunction, trauma or insecurity.  
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In some cases, such as with Garda W and Garda L, the children themselves were known 
to members of AGS. In most cases, the parents (as with Garda S), or other family 
members (as with Garda Z), were known to the Gardaí for crime-related activity of some 
sort.  
 
In a number of cases, such as with Garda W, Garda L, and Garda T, section 12 had been 
invoked in relation to the child or children in those families on previous occasions. 
Garda L’s case, for example, involved a child who was repeatedly subject to section 12 by 
various members of his Garda station due to serial absconding from a foster placement. 
Garda L described how the child was comfortable with the circumstances surrounding 
the invocation of section 12, as she was more than familiar with the routine of being 
temporarily moved out to an emergency foster placement in a nearby town.  
 
In Garda T’s case involving a homeless foreign national mother and her Irish-born 
children, the existence of a history of section 12 interventions in relation to the family on 
PULSE formed part of his decision to invoke section 12. Reflecting on the decision-
making process, he described feeling lucky that such a record existed, as one of his initial 
goals would have been to avoid separating the mother from the children. He felt the 
prior history in relation to the family on PULSE helped him make the right call in 
exercising section 12 powers. Garda T’s account perhaps indicates a greater willingness 
on the part of some members to exercise section 12 where it has been used to remove a 
child from the same family before. While the audit finds that section 12 removal was 
wholly appropriate in those circumstances, it might be suggested that the significance 
placed on previous section 12 removals highlights a potentially problematic reluctance 
among some members to remove children even where good grounds exist. Garda T’s 
emphasis on this history also highlights the value in information-sharing between 
agencies on children deemed to be at particular risk. 
 
In summary, the evidence from the audit indicates that the background knowledge held 
by AGS often plays a significant role in the decision-making around section 12 removal 
of a child. However, the audit has not found that this knowledge superseded or 
supplanted an individual assessment of section 12 criteria in specific cases. Particular 
circumstances are evaluated in their own context – but risk assessments are undoubtedly 
enhanced by background knowledge and understanding. 
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Was the Child and/or the Family Known to Tusla? 
This data was gathered by the audit to explore if the children being removed under 
section 12, or their families, have histories of engagement with Tusla, and what level of 
involvement Tusla has had with those families. This information is relevant to 
determining which children and families are subject to section 12 removals. It is also 
relevant to the overarching question that emerged throughout the course of this audit, of 
whether Tusla is properly fulfilling its obligations to children and the family before a 
child is removed under section 12. 
 
The case involving Garda W and Garda L related to children in a Tusla foster care 
placement. While some respondents knew Tusla social workers were familiar with the 
child and the family – such as Garda P whose involvement in the case was initiated by 
social workers – most respondents were not aware if the child was known to Tusla. This 
absence of knowledge is in part due to the common finding throughout the audit of a 
lack of information-sharing between agencies: a theme expressly articulated by Garda Z 
and others.  
 
5.3.5 Garda Training 
 Training in Child Protection 
Respondents were asked to detail the nature of training in child protection they had 
received, if any, as the question of appropriate training in child protection is central to 
the audit’s examination of whether section 12 is being used appropriately and 
proportionately. Appropriate training in child protection is essential for members of 
AGS to have the capacity and competence to critically evaluate circumstances suggesting 
a risk to a child, in a manner that is sensitive to both the rights of the child and the 
parent, and also the risks associated with removal of a child. Additionally, this data also 
provides a degree of consistency across the different stages of this audit.  
 
Beyond the basic training undertaken during their time at Templemore Garda College, 
most of the respondents said they did not have any training in child protection. A 
common response, articulated clearly by Garda A, was that members were overwhelmed 
with information during their basic training in Templemore. Many, such as Garda L, said 
they could not remember having received any specific child protection training – though 
165 
 
these respondents were generally comfortable assuming they had received such training. 
That said, they were not able to recall the details of any such training.  
 
On the nature of that training received during their time in Templemore, a number of 
respondents, such as Garda Z, described it as a short presentation in a large lecture: a 
format for child protection training that some respondents, such as Garda P, suggested 
was not conducive to active engagement with the material. In summary, the vast majority 
of respondents explained that any such training was basic, and had little impact on them. 
Other respondents also explained that little or no emphasis was placed on children’s 
rights, or child welfare and protection, in the core training and assessment of trainee 
Gardaí while in Templemore. 
 
 Most respondents, such as Garda S, drew a sharp distinction between the more 
theoretical training in child protection in Templemore, and later through HQ Directives 
and Circulars, and the practical training when members were deployed “on the street”. A 
number of respondents, such as Garda N and Garda P, explained the best training came 
through operationalising their basic training in the field: Garda A explained that newly 
attested members required time to “contextualise” this training.  
 
Garda N emphasised his view that leadership was essential in decision-making around 
child protection. The same respondent also echoed the sentiments of other respondents 
by focusing on the ‘common sense’ nature of decision-making by Gardaí in child 
protection cases, and suggested members were guided by how they would want their own 
family to be treated. For a large number of respondents, such as Garda S, this ‘on-the-
job’ learning was the totality of their child protection training. 
 
A number of respondents, such as Garda B, also emphasised their perceived limitations 
of any such formal training, given the extremely diverse range of circumstances that 
might require the exercise of section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991. However, that same 
respondent also echoed the sentiments of a number of respondents, when he said he did 
not feel adequately trained to undertake his child protection role. This respondent was 
particularly concerned that he could exercise such a dramatically intrusive power into the 
private life of a family, with such little training, while specialist child protection social 
workers were required to apply to a court to exercise their emergency powers under 
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section 13 of the Child Care Act 1991. Garda B also articulated the acute anxiety he 
experienced with the significant responsibility attached to exercising section 12, and again 
emphasised his feeling ill-equipped to use such a power in the family context.  
 
On Children First training specifically, most respondents had little or no knowledge of it. 
Garda P reflected the responses of other respondents when he explained his only 
dealings with such guidelines were when his Sergeant referred him to “the manual”. 
 
Some respondents, such as Garda N and Garda R, had undertaken Children First training. 
Garda Q said he thought he had undertaken Children First training “at some stage – as 
part of [his] CPD (Continuing Professional Development)”. Garda R also said he had 
undertaken Children First training one year ago as part of his CPD, but still felt he 
required more comprehensive child protection training.  
 
Some respondents were forthright in their dismissive attitude towards sources of training 
and guidance on child protection in HQ Directives and Circulars: one member explained 
his view that such documents were designed to absolve the higher-level Garda 
bureaucracy from any responsibility in the event of a highly publicised and controversial 
error or failure. A number of respondents, such as Garda S, said these documents were 
too dense to be of significant use, and found it difficult to make time to read them in 
their busy working schedule.  
 
The findings in the interview stage are not unrelated to a pattern observed in the 
questionnaire stage of this audit. In the questionnaire stage a substantial number of 
respondents who answered that they had received child protection training, felt they did 
not have sufficient training in child protection; while a substantial number of those with 
no child protection training, felt they had sufficient child protection training. 
 
In summary, there is no clear consensus among interview respondents regarding what 
they perceive to be an appropriate or ideal form or level of child protection training. 
However, the findings from both this stage, and mirrored in the questionnaire and focus 
group stages of this audit, are clear that there is little or no emphasis on formal training 
of Gardaí in relation to child protection. There is a superficially conflicting view from 
many Garda respondents, that, on the one hand, it is difficult to train members of AGS 
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in child protection, as the cases they are called upon to address are so diverse; while on 
the other hand, many of the same respondents are anxious about exercising these powers 
without being ‘properly’ trained. It is suggested that this reflects a deeper systemic 
inadequacy within AGS in the training of Gardaí. This conflict appears to be rooted in a 
general ambivalence on the part of many Gardaí in relation to the training they receive 
both in Templemore, and as part of continuing professional development. There is a 
clear culture within AGS of privileging on-the-job learning, which undermines respect 
for the value of core training in Templemore.  
 
Joint Training with Social Workers 
All respondents were asked if they had received joint training with child protection social 
workers. This question was asked, as it is relevant to the overarching research question of 
inter-agency communication and cooperation between Tusla and AGS. 
 
The vast majority of respondents said they had not participated in joint training, but a 
small number had taken part in some inter-agency training in child protection. Garda N 
described his experiences of such training as “a little sterile”, as it focused principally on 
the different roles of the different actors in each agency. Garda R described his joint 
training as involving role-playing exercises, which he found interesting. Garda R felt the 
availability of such training, and whether interested members could undertake it, was 
largely dependent on limited resources. 
 
These findings reflect findings in both the questionnaire and focus group stages of this 
audit in suggesting only a minority of members of AGS receive joint training with social 
workers. This also reflects the broader finding in this audit that levels of inter-agency 
cooperation and coordination remain very limited, or are confined to high-ranking 
members of the Garda organisation. The findings in relation to respondent perceptions 
of resourcing issues is also consistent with broader themes in both the interview and 
focus group stages of the audit. The availability of resources was a concern that jumped 
immediately to mind for many of the Garda respondents in these stages of the audit. 
 
Training in Cultural Competency and Understanding of Diversity 
In light of the increasing ethnic and cultural diversification of Irish society, and the 
distinct sensitivities this change demands of policing practices in general, and child 
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protection practices in particular, respondents were asked what training they received in 
how to deal with these changes. Evaluating levels of guidance and training on how 
members of AGS should address these on-going changes to Irish society, is also central 
to an assessment as to whether AGS are racially profiling children in their exercise of 
section 12. Finally, this data is relevant to the equally important prospective question of 
whether Garda members are equipped with the critical skills necessary to avoid racially 
profiling children when exercising their section 12 powers in a future diverse Ireland. 
 
All but one of the interview stage respondents said they had not received such training, 
or had no memory of having received such training. Only Garda L said he had received 
diversity training in Templemore – though he had not received any recent training.  
 
In the questionnaire stage, Garda ZA was the only respondent encountered in the audit 
to indicate he was a JLO (Juvenile Liaison Officer). This respondent also answered that 
he did not have training in diversity or cultural sensitivity. This, it is suggested, is a 
surprising and concerning finding. Given the highly specialised and community-centred 
policing role of JLOs, there ought to be an expectation that such Gardaí have completed 
training to prepare them for the increasingly complex and diverse youth demographics in 
Irish communities. 
 
In the cases where respondents dealt with foreign national children, and/or foreign 
national parents, there was a distinct hesitancy or discomfort among respondents in their 
discussion of those interactions. This was in sharp contrast to the forthright manner with 
which the vast majority of respondents engaged with interviewers.  
 
In what little discussion there was of these engagements in the interviews, the language 
used by those members lacked sensitivity and suggested an absence of critically 
sophisticated understanding of the complex needs of an increasingly culturally and 
ethnically diverse population. Garda Q, for example, made a sweeping and generalised 
claim that male Nigerian nationals were “aggressive”. 
 
This finding of an absence of training in how AGS should respond to the increasing 
diversity in Ireland’s population is also reflected in the questionnaire and focus group 
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stages. This consistent finding raises issues that are central to the overarching question in 
this audit, namely racial profiling in the exercise of AGS’s child protection function.  
 
As discussed above, this audit has been unable to find evidence of racial profiling by 
members of AGS in their performance of their child protection functions under section 
12. That said, this finding must be tempered by the finding that certain ethnic and 
cultural demographic data does not appear to be routinely documented by AGS on the 
PULSE system. For example, whether a child or parent is an Irish Traveller does not 
appear to be routinely documented by Gardaí. As discussed above, this means any 
finding that there was no racial profiling in the PULSE and questionnaire stages of this 
audit, must be somewhat qualified because of an absence of consistent documenting of a 
child’s ethnic background. 
 
Taken together, these findings suggest a possible lack of organisational coordination in 
how AGS should respond to both the historic ethnic diversity of Ireland, and also the 
contemporary ethnic and cultural changes in its population. These findings suggest a 
policy failure on the part of AGS management on how to deal with these changes, or to 
ensure such policies reach through to ordinary Garda members operating in the field. 
Given the recent problematic experiences, failures and successes, in neighbouring 
jurisdictions (most notably police in England and Wales), in adapting to multiculturalism 
from a policing perspective, it is important AGS learn from the experiences of its 
colleagues abroad. 
 
5.3.6 Circumstances Surrounding the Exercise of Section 12 
Interview respondents were asked to explain the circumstances leading up to their 
decision to exercise section 12 powers in the particular incident in September 2015. This 
question was asked to enable the audit to critically evaluate both the context in which the 
decision was made, the decision-making process leading to section 12 removal of the 
child, and whether both of these factors satisfied the legal threshold for section 12 
removal. This question was also aimed at providing the audit with a richer insight into 
the circumstances that necessitate the removal of a child under section 12, than that 
provided in the other stages of this audit. 
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Who initiated the involvement of An Garda Síochána 
Those who initiated the involvement of AGS in the section 12 incident were varied: for 
example, in one case, a biological father living separately to the mother of the child 
subject to section 12 contacted the Garda station with concerns regarding the care of his 
child; in another case, the child subject to section 12 had voluntarily presented herself to 
staff in a hospital stating her parents had physically abused her; and in one further case, 
the child had contacted her nearest Garda station directly with similar allegations of 
domestic violence at the hands of family members. Interpol initiated in one case; Tusla 
initiated in another case; a neighbour in a further case; and a member of the public in 
two cases. Foster carers, the most frequent initiators among the interview subject group, 
initiated the involvement of Gardaí in three cases. 
 
This diversity of initiators reflect a common theme throughout the audit, that there is no 
typical or paradigm case for a section 12 removal of a child. 
 
Previous Exercises of Section 12 in Relation to the Child 
Data surrounding previous exercises of section 12 powers was relevant for a number of 
research questions in this audit. For example, whether previous exercises influenced 
decision-making by later Garda members on whether to remove a child. It was also 
relevant to the background question about the children who are being removed under 
section 12, and whether there is evidence of systemic failure if children identified as 
having challenging behaviour are not being assisted and managed by other State agencies 
with statutory obligations, before the intervention of AGS. 
 
One respondent had exercised section 12 powers in relation to the same child twice. 
These two interventions were separated by the involvement of the HSE’s mental health 
services with the mother. This resulted in the removal of the child from her care, and, 
from what the respondent was able to tell the audit, a structured return of the child to 
the full-time care of the mother. 
 
Other respondents, however, such as Garda T, Garda R, Garda W, and Garda L, 
exercised section 12 in relation to a child that had previously been removed by another 
member of AGS. Some of these cases were in relation to children that were repeatedly 
absconding from foster care. For example, a situation was described to interviewers 
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where the same child would fail to return to a Tusla foster placement; intentionally refuse 
attempts to be contacted by the foster carer, and members of AGS; refuse to return to 
the foster placement; and would then be brought by those same members to an 
emergency foster placement. Garda L detailed how the child subject to his invocation of 
section 12 might abscond 3 or 4 times per week, triggering a missing person notification 
in the local Garda Station: a process which demands a significant amount of Garda time 
and resources. 
 
These findings, reflected in the findings of the PULSE chapter above, of repeated 
removal of children under section 12 are evidence suggestive of serious systemic failings 
with regard to the child protection systems in Ireland – leaving AGS alone with the 
onerous task of protecting vulnerable children. There were multiple examples in each 
stage of this audit highlighting chronic systemic failures to help children with challenging 
behaviour, prior to their removal by AGS.  
 
Circumstances at the scene 
The nature of circumstances responding members of AGS were met with were also 
highly varied. The majority of cases involved a member of AGS responding to a 
domestic dispute. Of these cases, three required the use of physical force by the 
respondent against a parent; two involved parents being taken into custody under the 
Mental Health Act 2001; and two involved the arrest of a parent for a suspected criminal 
offence.  
 
One case saw the respondent Garda force entry into the home, in circumstances where 
the father – who was suspected to be under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol – was 
behaving threateningly towards a very young child. That case, like the majority of cases 
encountered during the interviews, saw the Garda respondent carefully negotiating a 
tense situation, to defuse the immediate threat to the child.  
 
Most other exercises of section 12 by Garda respondents were made without physical 
resistance by the parent. Unlike the questionnaire stage of this audit, none of the 
interview respondents experienced physical resistance from the child subject to the 
section 12 removal. However, one notable case involved the respondent carefully and 
sensitively negotiating with the child who had absconded from the emergency foster 
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placement she had been placed in the night before. In that case, the child, who had 
allegedly been a victim of physical abuse at the hands of family members the night 
before, was in a very agitated and emotionally vulnerable state, and initially refused to 
cooperate with the respondent who was attempting to remove her to a place of safety.   
 
Most cases saw respondent Gardaí being called upon to mediate disputes (three of which 
involved physical violence, or allegations of physical violence – one of these perpetrated 
by the child, the other two by other family members) between the child and their parents 
or legal guardians. A number of these cases also involved children refusing to return to 
their home for that night. One incident saw a missing child presenting to the children’s 
ward of a local hospital for assistance. Two cases saw respondents removing children 
from aggressive and intoxicated parents.  
 
Another case involved the respondent being called to a domestic incident in which a 
Tusla-appointed foster carer alleged the child had engaged in a violent and threatening 
outburst, after the foster carer had refused the teenage child entry after returning home 
after a curfew. In this case, the respondent Garda described how other, unrelated foster 
children in the same foster placement, were traumatised by the outburst by the child. The 
respondent noted how this child was able to switch rapidly into a passive and non-
threatening mode when the Gardaí arrived at the house: a behaviour he, and another 
Garda respondent who had experience with the same child, ascribed to the child’s 
manipulative tendencies, which he exercised on a number of other members of AGS, 
and Tusla social workers, locally.  
 
Three cases involved parents or foster carers refusing to permit the child to return to his 
or her home that night, despite the child being open to returning, and the respondents 
attempting to negotiate the child’s return to the family home. 
 
One case involved a notably high level of advance planning by the respondent Garda – 
the one Sergeant interviewed in this stage of the audit – and his team of Gardaí. This 
case involved an Interpol notification from police and child protection social services in 
England. The respondent coordinated a carefully planned operation in communication 
with his counterparts in England, which involved surveillance of the family in advance of 
Garda intervention. This case did not meet resistance from the parents. 
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Another notable incident involved the respondent answering a call from social workers 
in a nearby Tusla office. In this case, a verbally abusive and threatening mother, who was 
suspected of physically abusing her child, abandoned the child in the Tusla office after 
making explicit threats that she would physically harm the child. This was followed by a 
standoff between the respondent Garda (in consultation with his Sergeant), and the 
social workers, over who should take responsibility for the child. The respondent 
explained he felt he was put under significant pressure by the social workers to exercise 
section 12, as the incident occurred towards the end of the normal working day, and the 
social workers did not want to apply to take the child into care under section 13 of the 
Child Care Act 1991 past their standard working times.  
 
One incident involved a homeless foreign national mother being apprehended by Gardaí 
attempting to break in to a derelict building with her children. Her three very young 
children were found to be in an exhausted state, having not slept in over 24 hours, in 
dirty clothing and smelling of urine. The mother in this case was found in an intoxicated 
state and without any money. The respondent in this case dealt with the family after they 
were discovered by another unit and brought to the station.  
 
It should be noted that in all cases examined in the interview stage, the audit found no 
evidence that Garda respondents had exercised their section 12 powers in a manner that 
was unjustified, disproportionate and unlawful.  
 
Time of Day Section 12 Exercised 
This data was gathered, as it is relevant to the question of whether current inter-agency 
support from Tusla, is available at appropriate times. As most of the State is not serviced 
by a full-time out-of-hours social work system, the audit examined whether there are any 
discernible patterns to section 12 removal times, and whether most occur outside of 
Tusla’s “standard” Monday to Friday, 9am to 5pm, service hours. 
 
The majority of interview respondents exercised section 12 powers outside of these 
standard working hours. Many of these out-of-hours “domestic” incidents took place 
between 10pm and 3am.  
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One case involved the Gardaí responding to a call during these “standard” working 
times. The nearby Tusla office initiated this case, with the call requesting Garda 
involvement coming not long before 5pm. The respondent in that case echoed 
perceptions expressed repeatedly throughout the interview stage of the audit by other 
respondents, that social workers regularly delayed dealing with a case until close to the 
end of their working day, to force a Garda intervention. A number of respondents felt 
this was the easier route for social workers to having a child removed, than obtaining a 
court order under section 13 of the Child Care Act 1991 and the requisite evidence 
required to secure such an order.  
 
It is clear from this, and findings from other stages of this audit, that the majority of 
cases requiring section 12 removal of children occur outside of Tusla’s current standard 
hours of service. There is also a persistent perception among a number of Garda 
respondents that Tusla social workers sometimes delay addressing a particular risk to a 
child, in order to force the involvement of AGS in the case, due to the organisation’s 24 
hour operational basis. 
 
Child in Fear 
This data was gathered from respondents in the interview stage, as the audit attempted to 
provide a general insight into the experience of the child in the background 
circumstances that necessitated a section 12 removal. In a number of cases the interview 
respondent described the child subject to section 12 as being in fear when he arrived. All 
of these cases centred around allegations of physical violence, or the threat of physical 
violence, perpetrated by a parent, or other family member, against the child.  
 
In one incident a teenage child, whose parents refused to allow her to enter the home 
following a night out socialising with other teenagers from the neighbourhood, described 
her fear that her contacting the Gardaí might result in violent reprisals from her parents. 
Another teenage child contacted Gardaí and alleged she had been violently assaulted by 
both her mother and brother during a dispute. In another respondent’s case, a teenage 
child who presented herself voluntarily to a children’s ward in a hospital, alleged that she 
had been assaulted by her parents. 
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In all these cases, the allegation of violence, or the threat of violence, was central to the 
decision by the respondent to invoke section 12.  
 
5.3.7 Respondent Actions prior to Section 12 Exercise 
Interview respondents were asked to account for the circumstances surrounding section 
12 removal of the child. From these accounts, data was gathered in relation to the actions 
and decision-making processes undertaken by respondent Gardaí. The aim of this data 
collection and analysis is to critically review the context in which a Garda respondent 
decided to remove the child, and the robustness of the decision-making process itself. 
This was undertaken as part of the evaluation of the appropriateness and legality of 
section 12 removals, in the diversity of circumstances faced by members of AGS. 
 
Consultation with other Gardaí 
Data was gathered in relation to whether the respondent Garda consulted with other 
Garda members of the same, lower, or higher rank prior to the decision to remove the 
child under section 12. The question of consultation within the Garda organisation on a 
particular case reflects levels of critical self-reflection amongst Gardaí in their 
performance of their child protection functions, and use of their significant 
interventionary powers in the private life of families. 
 
A significant majority of eight respondents consulted either with an attending member of 
AGS, their Sergeant-in-Charge, or the Superintendent. This is a finding consistent with 
the questionnaires, where the vast majority of respondents said they had consulted with 
their Sergeant-in-Charge prior to exercising section 12. 
 
Garda Q said it was common practice to contact the Sergeant in cases where children are 
involved, as it was important to get a second opinion. Others, such as Garda R, explained 
that they contacted their Sergeant for general advice on how to manage a sensitive 
situation, with an extremely vulnerable child.  
 
It is suggested this strong tendency among members of AGS to consult with a senior 
supervising officer prior to exercising section 12, is also consistent with the rarity of 
occasions in which a member of AGS will remove a child under section 12. Many 
respondents were comfortable admitting that they were unsure of the exact wording of 
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the legislation, the grounds upon which they were legally entitled to remove a child, and 
the proper protocols required for such a removal. A number of respondents, such as 
Garda T and Garda P, described careful consultation with their Sergeant, while reviewing 
all available literature on section 12 available to them in the station.  
 
However, there were also a number of Garda respondents who said the circumstances of 
the case were such that they did not feel it necessary to consult with the supervising 
officers. Both Garda J and Garda Z explained that their cases were routine, and evinced a 
distinct confidence regarding the remit of their authority to remove children from the 
care of their parents or legal guardians. 
 
These findings reinforce one of the overarching conclusions of this audit, that members 
of AGS do not exercise section 12 powers lightly. These findings also support the other 
overarching conclusion that Gardaí are uncertain about certain specificities of their role 
and powers in child protection. While respondents were clear that they had such a role, 
they were often unsure about the legal boundaries of this role. The high level of 
consultation with senior officers also reflects the highly hierarchical command structure 
of AGS, and the decision-making deference of junior officers to their supervising 
officers. 
 
Evidence of Gathering Background Information 
Data was gathered in relation to evidence from the respondent Garda’s account that they 
made efforts to locate background information on the situation prior to removing the 
child under section 12. The question of background information-gathering, and the 
degree of effort undertaken in exploring the background circumstances, reflects levels of 
critical self-reflection amongst Gardaí in their performance of their child protection 
functions. All respondents interviewed described some attempt to gather background 
information on the family situation of the child perceived to be at risk – where it was not 
already known to the respondent – and the circumstances triggering the involvement of 
AGS. While a few respondents, such as Garda Z and Garda W, were already very familiar 
with the child and the families involved in the case, most respondents were not.  
  
Respondents consistently demonstrated a strong tendency to gather as much information 
as possible, from all available sources, before making a determination on the most 
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appropriate course of action. Some of these decisions, such as with Garda P, Garda S, 
and Garda Q, were made while respondents were under considerable pressure. For 
example Garda S, though under considerable pressure, made efforts to consult with 
other family members nearby, to determine the circumstances within the family home, 
and potential risks to the child.  
 
Most decisions, however, were made in circumstances where respondents had time to 
carefully examine and consider the circumstances at the scene. Garda B, for example, was 
notable in that he dismissed moderate pressure from a health professional to exercise 
section 12 powers, so that he could contact the family, in order to make a careful and 
fully informed decision regarding the use of the section 12 power. Garda T was equally 
noteworthy, for the fastidious manner in which he sought out, and examined as many 
sources of information on the family available, before making his decision. 
 
These findings are again supportive of the overarching conclusion that members of AGS 
do not exercise section 12 removal lightly, and emphasises the prioritisation of many 
Gardaí to avoid removing children unless absolutely necessary. 
 
5.3.8 Grounds for Invoking Section 12 
Data was gathered in relation to the grounds upon which the respondent Garda based 
his decision to remove the child under section 12. This data was central to one of the 
principal objectives of this audit: to assess the appropriateness, proportionality, and 
legality of section 12 removals of children by members of AGS. The grounds upon 
which a Garda member removed a child are the factual antecedents to the authority of a 
Garda member to remove a child under section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991. In 
documenting and critically evaluating these grounds for section 12 removal, the audit 
sought to account for the circumstances that members of AGS encounter, which require 
the use of extraordinary powers of intervention in the private life of the family. 
 
The grounds for invoking section 12 powers in the cases examined at the interview stage 
of the audit were manifold. In this section, a number of distinct grounds will be outlined 
and commented upon, and will conclude by listing and exploring some general themes 
that emerged during the interview process. It should be noted that few of these grounds 
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were the sole justification offered by respondents for their invocation of section 12 
powers.  
 
Child Abandoned or Refusing to Return Home 
Seven out of thirteen cases examined at the interview stage involved a child being 
abandoned by his or her parent, or a child refusing to return to the family home. The 
potential outcome in both these types of scenarios was the child becoming homeless, or 
the child being left in the care of someone other than an appropriate and competent 
adult.  
 
One case, mentioned above, involved allegations against a mother of physical abuse of 
her son. These allegations were made by another daughter of the mother, and were being 
investigated by Tusla social workers, when the incident involving the respondent Garda 
took place. The mother’s response to the allegations put to her by social workers was 
explosive, and involved her threatening to kill or seriously harm the child. This reaction, 
and explicit threat of violence against the child, led Tusla to contact the Garda 
respondent’s station. When the respondent arrived at the scene, the mother left, leaving 
the child behind in the Tusla office. However, the threat of violence by the mother 
against the child, and the refusal of Tusla to take responsibility for this child after a 
lengthy standoff with the respondent, formed the principal basis for the invocation of 
section 12 powers.  
 
There were other examples where children were effectively abandoned by their parent, or 
foster carer, when refused entry to the family home. For example, one case mentioned in 
more detail above, saw a foster carer exclude a teenage child from the home for the 
night, due to her repeated absconding, and her violent outbursts when confronted by the 
foster carer. In that case, the respondent Garda attempted to mediate the dispute and 
convince the foster carer (who he described as being “at her wits end” with the child) to 
allow her return. When these attempts failed, the Garda respondent was forced to 
remove the child, to avoid her being left without appropriate care for the night.  
 
Another case, also mentioned above, involving a child who alleged physical abuse by her 
mother and brother against her, saw that child excluded from her home for the night by 
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her mother. This, combined with the allegations of physical abuse, formed the basis for 
that respondent Garda’s exercise of section 12.  
 
A further similar case saw a teenage child excluded from her home when she returned 
late after socialising with other teenagers, whom the parents disapproved of. In that case, 
although the parents eventually agreed to allow the child return home, the child 
expressed her concern that her involving AGS might result in violent reprisals from her 
father. She was therefore reluctant to accept the invitation to return to her home, and 
instead suggested she would stay with friends. As the respondent Garda could not verify 
that there were suitable adults to care for her at those suggested locations, he rejected 
this proposal for alternative accommodation and care. This lack of suitable alternative 
carers and accommodation, and the suggestion of violent reprisals against the child, were 
the grounds for that respondent’s use of section 12 powers. However, it should be noted 
that it was unclear from the respondent’s account whether he would have allowed the 
child to return to the home, if she had agreed to return, even with the knowledge of her 
fear of violent reprisals. It is suggested this kind of situation might have resulted in the 
child being returned to the family home, if she had consented. This suggested possibility 
highlights a potential limit to the scope of this audit – namely a gap in knowledge of 
cases where use of section 12 was decided against by a member of AGS. The Garda 
PULSE system does not routinely record instances where section 12 was considered but 
decided against, so it is generally outside the scope of this audit. However, it is suggested 
the general findings of Garda reluctance to use section 12, may create a situation where 
children are sometimes not removed from situations where it would be best to do so. 
 
This pattern of parental abandonment was also significant in the questionnaire stage of 
the audit, where large numbers of responses, such as that of Garda ZB, detailed parents 
refusing to take a child back into their care, when that child had absconded or was 
intoxicated. 
 
Parental Failure or Temporary Lack of Capacity or Competence to Care for the 
Child 
The most frequent circumstance encountered by respondents requiring removal of 
children under section 12 was some form of failure by a parent or person acting in loco 
parentis, or a temporary lack of capacity or competence to care for the child. A total of 10 
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out of the 13 interviewees described some form of parental failure justifying their 
invocation of section 12 powers. Garda R spoke in frank terms, when he described what 
he felt was a truth the Irish public are somewhat uncomfortable with: some parents fail 
to protect their children, and it is then the responsibility of AGS to protect those 
children by removing them from their parents’ care. 
 
Examples of express parental failure included a number of cases where Garda 
respondents felt the parents were largely disinterested in the care or welfare of their 
children at that time. For example, Garda Z described how the family initially refused to 
permit their teenage daughter re-entry into the home, which resulted in the child calling 
the Gardaí. When the respondent arrived, the parents said they were happy for her to 
return home, though the respondent suspected otherwise from their manner – a 
suspicion reinforced by the child’s hesitancy in returning to the home. Garda S described 
a dangerous and chaotic home environment of a young child, where both parents were 
involved in various forms of criminality and substance abuse.   
 
Examples of parental loss of capacity were varied, and included circumstances where the 
parent was suffering from mental health difficulties. For example, one respondent dealt 
with a case where an apparent psychotic episode on the part of the mother, and the 
perceived danger the mother presented to both herself and the children, required the 
removal of the children under section 12. In another instance, evidence that the mother 
was self-harming while intoxicated, led the respondent Garda to remove the child from 
her care. In both cases, the mothers were also detained under section 12 of the Mental 
Health Act 2001. Additionally, in both these cases, there were no other appropriate 
adults available to care for the children, to avoid exercising section 12 powers.  
 
Garda T’s case involved a homeless family, where the mother appeared unable at that 
time to cope with caring for the children. Another respondent described a foster carer 
unable to cope with a defiant, and allegedly violent and threatening teenage child.  
 
Garda W said he encountered numerous cases where foster carers caring for children 
with complex and demanding needs, asked the Gardaí to remove the child temporarily 
from the home, until tensions and moods calmed down: a use of section 12 power the 
respondent explained was wholly inappropriate.  
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Other respondents, such as Garda A and Garda T, encountered parents who were 
intoxicated with alcohol, and were therefore unable to properly care for the children. 
 
Neglect 
Only Garda T and Garda Z explicitly referred to neglect as a ground for their exercise of 
section 12 powers. Garda Z also spoke of a general history of parental neglect in the care 
of all the children in the family. However, in neither case was neglect the sole, or 
principal, ground upon which the respondents invoked section 12.  
 
Domestic Violence and Physical Abuse 
Five respondents recounted some form of domestic violence in the circumstances 
involving their use of section 12. Garda J described a history of domestic violence 
incidents in the home of the family, from whose care the child was removed. Garda L 
likewise described a history of domestic violence in the home environment of the child. 
Some of this violence was directed at the child in question, but others described a home 
environment deeply affected by an atmosphere of violence between adult parental 
figures. One incident involved domestic violence perpetrated by the child, and not a 
parent.   
 
Some respondents, such as Garda B, Garda R and Garda P, specifically referenced 
physical abuse of the child that had recently occurred, as a ground for exercising section 
12 in that circumstance. Other respondents, such as Garda P, referenced anticipated 
physical violence against the child, among the grounds for exercising section 12 powers. 
Garda J described the child’s fear that he would be subject to physical abuse in the near 
future. 
 
Mental Health Issues with the Parent 
As described above, a number of respondents encountered circumstances where parents 
were demonstrating signs of mental health issues. Two respondents exercised their 
powers under section 12 of the Mental Health Act 2001, to take a parent into protective 
custody. Another respondent expressed the view that the mother of the child subject to 
section 12 was suffering from mental health difficulties. In all three cases, the perceived 
inability of the parent to care for the child due to these mental health difficulties, was 
among the grounds upon which the decision to remove the child under section 12 was 
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based. In all three cases, the respondents also considered whether there were alternative 
suitable adults to care for the child, before section 12 removal was undertaken. 
 
Drugs or Alcohol 
Three respondents – Garda A, Garda S, and Garda T – explicitly referred to parents 
being under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time section 12 was exercised to 
remove the child from their care. Other respondents noted histories of alcohol abuse 
within the family unit.  
 
In each circumstance, the parent being intoxicated was not the sole or principal reason 
section 12 was used to remove the child from the parent’s care. In each case, there were 
other factors that also led the respondent to believe the child required removal from the 
care of the parent.  
 
Interpol 
As noted above, one respondent Garda became involved in his case following a 
notification from Interpol regarding a family at risk that had left England. In that case, 
police and social services in England were concerned that the father presented a risk to 
the children. The evidence provided to the respondent through the Interpol notification, 
and his extensive communication with the dedicated team of police and social workers in 
England, were the sole grounds upon which the respondent felt the exercise of section 
12 powers was required to temporarily remove the children from the care of the mother.  
 
Another respondent had also exercised section 12 following a notification by Interpol. 
That case involved international child abduction by the biological parents who had fled 
to Ireland. 
 
While the accounts provided of these cases indicate professionalism and care on the part 
of the Garda officers involved, the length of time the respondents had to deal with the 
cases potentially raise questions with regard to the appropriateness of seeking a court 
order for removal of the children, instead of using section 12. 
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5.3.9 Evidence of Critical Evaluation of Circumstances by Respondent 
As with evidence of background information-gathering, data was also gathered in relation 
to evidence of critical evaluation of the circumstances by the respondent Garda in his 
decision to remove the child under section 12. This data was central to one of the audit’s 
principal objectives: namely to assess the appropriateness, proportionality, and legality of 
section 12 removals of children by members of AGS. Evidence that a Garda respondent 
critically examined the circumstances of a case, and evaluated the risks flowing from that 
examination, is central to the lawful authority of a Garda member to remove a child 
under section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991. In documenting such critical evaluations by 
Gardaí, the audit sought to account for the decision-making processes employed by 
members of AGS in child protection scenarios, and examine whether those processes are 
sufficiently critically sophisticated, and also in accordance with the legislation. 
 
A number of respondents, such as Garda B and Garda S, were careful in the interviews 
to frame their account of their final decision to exercise section 12 within the specific 
wording of section 12. Both referred explicitly to the “immediate and serious risk to the 
health or welfare of the child” threshold in section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991. 
However, most respondents did not frame their final decision in the case in this way. A 
number of respondents, such as Garda W, were comfortable characterising the final 
decision to remove the child as “common sense”. As with interview respondents’ 
discussions of their training in child protection, a number of respondents, such as Garda 
Z, explicitly described relying on their professional experience and judgment in exercising 
their section 12 powers.  
 
A number of Garda respondents described circumstances where they were hesitant in 
exercising their powers. Garda P, for example, invoked section 12 in circumstances 
where, on the information available to interviewers, removal was wholly appropriate. 
Despite the justifiable use of section 12 powers in those circumstances, Garda P was, and 
remained, anxious about whether he had done “the right thing”. Others, such as Garda T 
and Garda B, were compelling in explaining to the audit how serious an intervention they 
considered section 12 removal to be. Both these respondents exercised their powers 
following a period of careful consideration of the circumstances and available evidence, 
and the availability of any alternative and appropriate adults to care for the child.  
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With the exception of Garda P, all other respondents were confident in their view that 
removal of the child was the correct decision in the circumstances.  
 
Interview respondents demonstrated, on the whole, a significant degree of critical 
sophistication when exercising their section 12 powers. As discussed above, all 
respondents engaged in some degree of background information-gathering, with many 
undertaking considerable effort and research to ensure the appropriate decision was 
made. There was no evidence from the interviews that decisions to exercise section 12 
were taken lightly, or that alternatives to removing the child were not considered by the 
respondent. From the description of these cases available on PULSE, and the accounts 
of events provided by respondents in the interviews, all 13 cases examined in the 
interview stage involved an appropriate use of section 12 powers by respondents. 
  
5.3.10 Treatment of the Child Immediately Following Removal 
Respondents were asked specific questions in relation to the treatment of the child in the 
immediate aftermath of the child’s removal under section 12. This data was relevant to 
the audit’s examination of the experience of the child, its critical review of the 
appropriateness of practices and procedures for managing children while in the care of 
AGS, and its exploration of the realities of inter-agency coordination and cooperation 
with Tusla. 
 
Initial Place of Safety 
The location of the initial place of safety, how children are treated in that location, 
whether there are formal procedures regulating the use of that location as a place of 
safety, and the overall appropriateness of that place of safety, is a central question across 
the questionnaire, interview and focus group stages of this audit.  
 
As found in the questionnaire stage of this audit, the vast majority of children were 
removed to the local Garda Station immediately following the invocation of section 12. 
A number of respondents, such as Garda A, described the Garda Station as the default 
place of safety following the removal of a child under section 12.  
 
In two incidents in the same Garda regional division, the initial place of safety was the 
local public hospital – specifically the children’s ward in that hospital. This finding of the 
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hospital as the default place of safety for this region of the State is consistent with the 
findings from the questionnaire stage of the audit. Both these respondents described a 
well-developed formal policy of the children’s ward in the local hospital as the designated 
place of safety. These respondents, and perhaps this Garda Division, were unique in 
having such a considered policy. No other respondents described this kind of formal 
policy regarding the designated place of safety for their station or division. Some 
respondents, such as Garda R, described a more general policy of the hospital as an 
alternative place of safety to the Garda Station.  
 
Respondent’s Perception of the Child’s Experience 
A few respondents discussed their perceptions of how the child reacted to being 
removed to the station. Garda W described a child who was relatively relaxed and 
“resigned to her fate”. Garda J described the child in his case as “happy” to come to the 
station, and remaining so after consultation with social workers. Garda N described the 
value in his case of having female members of AGS in the station: “mothers” who could 
deal sensitively with the children following a traumatic event. 
 
Others, such as Garda R, described a child who was extremely agitated and vulnerable, 
and conflicted about her desire to return to her family or to care. In that case, the 
respondent described efforts by Gardaí in the station to talk to her about general 
unrelated things, in an attempt to relax her. Similarly, Garda T explained his general 
approach being to develop a rapport with children in the station, and described how 
other members of AGS can become frustrated with the responsibility when resources are 
already thin, and have little patience with the child as a result. 
 
In another respondent’s case, the children were exhausted, and slept throughout most of 
their time in the station.  
 
Appropriateness of the Initial Place of Safety 
The two respondents who described a policy of using the local hospital as the designated 
initial place of safety, explained this policy in terms of the general inappropriateness of 
using the Garda Station as the initial place of safety. The more senior officer from this 
region echoed the vast majority of interview respondents when he described a Garda 
station as a “completely inappropriate and unsafe” environment for children. This 
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respondent was also able to give interviewers an insight into the history of the policy of 
using the local hospital as the initial place of safety, describing it as a decision made at a 
divisional level following the enactment of section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991. His 
account was that the policy emerged in consultation with the local Health Board 
following the creation of the power, with the Garda Division setting out a clear position 
that the Garda Station was an inappropriate place to bring children following a removal. 
 
Both of these respondents, however, were also mindful of the inappropriateness of a 
hospital as a place of safety. The less senior of the two noted how hospital staff are 
themselves resource-limited and extremely busy dealing with other “genuinely sick” 
children.  
 
Another participant, Garda R, though not used in his case, commented generally on the 
appropriateness of hospitals as the initial place of safety. He was very critical, describing 
such a policy as a “disgrace”, as the hospitals were already busy, with hospital staff 
already over-stretched, and unhappy with having that particular responsibility placed 
upon them. In his experience, the designated hospital often required Gardaí to stay after 
the handover to ensure the children did not abscond: an occurrence he suggested had 
happened on previous occasions.   
 
Garda S, who removed a child to a hospital for a drug and alcohol assessment, also noted 
a reluctance of hospital staff to keep the child beyond the time necessary for the health 
check. In that case, the hospital staff were concerned that the young child might contract 
a vomiting bug in the hospital. 
 
The other Garda respondents were also emphatic that the Garda Station was not an 
appropriate environment for children. Those working in busy urban stations, such as 
Garda Q, advised about how busy the station was, with a high level of “prisoner traffic” 
throughout the day.  
 
Garda P’s account was unusual in his belief that Tusla’s view was that the Garda Station 
was a more appropriate environment for the young child, than Tusla’s own offices – a 
view not shared by Garda P. 
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In summary, all respondents agreed that Garda Stations and hospitals were not 
appropriate locations to remove highly vulnerable children to. However, given the later 
hours during which the majority of section 12 removals take place, these two locations 
are typically the only place available. What is clear from findings in both the interview 
and focus group stages, is that Garda members generally try to deal with the child in a 
sensitive manner. They are conscious that the experience in the Garda Station poses a 
risk of added trauma to the child, and generally do their best to minimise that risk. 
However, Garda members are left in a situation where there is no formal guidance on 
how a child is to be managed following a section 12 removal, particularly how a child 
should be treated when in an environment such as a police station to avoid greater 
trauma. Combined with the general absence of training in child protection among 
members of AGS, children are placed in a situation where they are at high risk of further 
traumatisation following section 12 removal.  
 
5.3.11 Aftermath of Section 12 Removal 
Respondents were asked about the aftermath of the removal of the child. Questions 
under this general heading sought to gather data on inter-agency cooperation and 
coordination, the availability of appropriate resources at appropriate times, and general 
systemic coordination within AGS itself.  
 
Tusla Notification 
Consistent with the findings in the questionnaire stage of the audit, interview 
respondents overwhelmingly completed Tusla notification sheets as a matter of routine. 
However, as is dealt with in more detail below and in the discussion of the focus group 
stage, feedback from Tusla for such notifications was generally confined to confirmation 
of receipt of notification.  
 
Beyond the formal notification documents, contact with Tusla was wholly dependent on 
two factors: whether the section 12 removal took place during normal working hours, or 
whether there was a formal Tusla out-of-hours service available. In all cases examined at 
the interview stage, section 12 was invoked outside of Tusla’s standard service hours of 
9am-5pm, Monday to Friday.  
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Also of note was Garda L’s discussion of his perception of gender bias in the distribution 
of Tusla Notifications the Gardaí receive in relation to child protection and welfare risks. 
In his experience, female Garda members in his station were routinely tasked with 
dealing with such notifications. Garda L was critical of this practice, as it left those 
female Gardaí with time-consuming, and what he felt was also very often ineffective,85 
work in addition to their other duties. Garda L also suggested this work was not 
considered to be high value or prestige policing work, and that this was part of the 
reason it was distributed to female Garda members. The issue of gender bias was not a 
question considered by the audit for the interview stage, and was only raised by one 
interview respondent. However, it is explored in greater depth in the focus group analysis 
below. 
 
Garda Respondent Going Off-Duty 
Most respondents were still within their rostered working time when the handover of the 
child took place. However, a notable minority of respondents continued dealing with a 
case long beyond the end of their shift. For example, both Garda L and Garda R stayed 
beyond their rostered shifts to ensure children were dealt with properly in the handover. 
Garda N remained in the station completing reports for his Superintendent long after the 
handover of the children had taken place and his rostered working time had ended.  
 
It is suggested this tendency by members to stay beyond their official working time is 
broadly consistent with, and reflective of, the audit’s finding that members of AGS 
demonstrate very high levels of commitment to the welfare of children they have 
removed under section 12.  
 
Handover of the Child 
The circumstances of the handover, and the person(s) or agency into whose care the 
child was placed by the respondents, were varied. As most cases took place outside of 
Tusla’s standard hours of service, a number of respondents placed the child removed 
under section 12 with emergency foster placements arranged through the Five Rivers 
organisation. In these cases, respondents often had to travel significant distances to the 
designated foster placement to hand over the child. For example, Garda W described 
                                                     
85 Garda L’s perception was that involving AGS where there was suspected emotional abuse was 
ineffective – as they would be highly unlikely to observe such behaviour during a visit to the family home 
– and a waste of resources.  
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having to drive over an hour away from the station to the emergency foster placement, 
with another Garda from the station. Respondents, such as Garda L considered these 
handovers to be enormously time-consuming, and resource draining. It is also notable 
that respondents knew little or nothing about these placements, how they were 
organised, or the legal basis upon which these handovers took place. 
 
Garda S’s case was unusual, in that it was outside of standard Tusla service hours, so he 
contacted Five Rivers to arrange a placement. However, in that instance, Five Rivers 
contacted Tusla social workers, and arranged for the child to be placed into their care by 
the Gardaí. Garda S was unable to give any further information on this particular 
arrangement, and it was not encountered with any other interview respondent, or 
anywhere in the questionnaire stage.  
 
In Garda R’s case, due to what he perceived as repeated obstruction by the designated 
Tusla out-of-hours service, the child opted to return to the parent from whose care she 
had originally been removed, due to allegations of physical abuse. This was done with the 
consent of the Tusla social worker.  
 
As discussed above, a number of respondents placed the children in the care of the local 
hospital. The interviewers understood from these accounts that the children would 
remain in the hospital until normal Tusla service hours resumed.  
 
These findings in relation to the handover of the child indicate significant gaps in 
support for Gardaí undertaking their child protection function from other outside 
agencies – principally Tusla. The findings also detail a lack of procedures for managing 
children after they have been removed under section 12, and how Garda resources are 
managed and deployed to deal with children removed. 
 
Subsequent Proceedings in Court 
Respondents were asked whether court proceedings followed the section 12 removal, 
particularly if Tusla had applied for a section 13 order from the District Court in relation 
to the child. Consistent with the questionnaire stage of the audit, this line of questioning 
sought to examine a central question underpinning this audit, namely the rate at which 
section 12 removals lead to a care order being applied for or granted by the courts. It 
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also sought to evaluate the nature of inter-agency communication between Tusla and 
AGS, and processes and cultures among Tusla social workers to provide feedback on 
cases to Garda members who remove children under section 12. 
 
Five respondents were able to explain whether or not there had been care order 
proceedings in their case, but none elaborated on the reasons why proceedings were 
pursued by Tusla. In Garda A’s case, the Emergency Care Order was not granted, 
though he was not informed about the hearing. In Garda B’s case, social workers decided 
not to apply for an Emergency Care Order under section 13 of the 1991 Act – the 
respondent suggested there may have been doubts about the child’s claims of abuse.  
 
In Garda Q’s case, though he did not attend the hearing, the social worker provided 
follow-up in relation to the case, and informed him that Tusla had successfully applied 
for an Emergency Care Order before the courts. In Garda S’s case, the respondent 
provided a report for, though was unable to attend, the subsequent Emergency Care 
Order hearing the following day, at which neither parent was present.86  
 
The case involving Interpol, discussed above, was followed by a court hearing, before 
which the respondent Sergeant gave evidence. In that case, the respondent suggested the 
parents had attempted to have the care proceedings transferred to Ireland, as they 
perceived child care proceedings in the Irish legal framework were more likely to be 
decided in favour of the parents.  
 
Garda T, echoing sentiments of other respondents, said he was not informed of any 
subsequent care order proceedings. In his case, the children were put in an emergency 
foster placement a substantial distance from his station, and outside the jurisdiction of 
the local Tusla office. Describing circumstances echoed in a narrative from the 
questionnaire stage,87 Garda T explained that once the child left the local Tusla district, 
the connection between his station and the child was severed.  
                                                     
86 Garda S explained the mother’s absence by the fact that she had a bench warrant for her arrest for an 
unrelated allegation of criminal wrongdoing. 
87 The narrative from the questionnaire response for Garda ZC involved section 12 being refused by the 
respondent (wrongly inputted into PULSE). In that case the child absconded from foster care, in which 
he had been placed voluntarily. The foster parent said she would no longer take care of him, and as a 
result the child presented himself to a Garda station around 1am. Out-of-hours social workers were 
contacted, but declined to attend the station. The respondent was highly critical of the out-of-hours 
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For a number of Garda respondents, exercise of section 12 was only thought to be a 
temporary removal of the child from the family home, with the expectation the child 
would be returned. Some, as in the case of Garda J, felt it would be a temporary removal 
until tensions between the family and the child died down. Others, such as Garda Z, felt 
it would be a temporary removal, not because the risk to the child had abated, but 
because in his view, Tusla was not interested in addressing the problems in that family. 
 
Interview respondents also described a general situation where Tusla do not routinely 
provide feedback or updates to Garda members following handover of children into 
Tusla’s care. As will be discussed below, this provides operational issues for Gardaí as 
they are not clear about whether they exercised section 12 in an appropriate or helpful 
manner, but it also creates personal concerns for Garda members who have an active 
personal interest in the welfare of the individual child. This absence of routine and 
meaningful feedback also reinforces the ‘mystification’ of Tusla’s practices and 
procedures experienced by Garda members. 
 
Criminal Investigation 
Only one respondent, Garda Q, described on-going investigations by AGS in relation to 
the circumstances around the section 12 removal. That investigation was yet to interview 
the children and the mother in the case. Other respondents, such as Garda R and Garda 
Z, were questioned about the likelihood of criminal investigations into allegations of 
assault, which resulted in the section 12 removal in those cases. Both respondents 
explained criminal charges were highly unlikely to proceed, as the children would 
probably be unwilling to cooperate with any formal criminal investigation. Garda N 
explained that criminal proceedings were underway in another jurisdiction in relation to 
one of the parents. In Garda S’s case, the mother was subject to criminal proceedings not 
directly related to the circumstances surrounding the section 12 invocation.  
 
Criminal proceedings did not follow in any of the other cases examined in the interview 
stage of the audit though a number of these cases involved allegations of assault. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
service as he suggested the service refused to attend as the child was from outside of its jurisdictional 
responsibility. The respondent described the social worker as saying the child was “not their problem”. 
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PULSE Narratives and the GISC 
Due to the highly inconsistent approach to PULSE narratives discovered at the PULSE 
and questionnaire stages of the audit, interview respondents were asked about the 
training and procedures, and their own approaches to recording narratives for PULSE. 
The audit also enquired of respondents about what, if any, role the Garda Information 
Services Centre (GISC)88 had in the recording of such narratives on PULSE.  
 
Garda B explained that he believed he had received training in Templemore on how to 
use the PULSE system – a competence he and others said was refined while working in 
the field. Garda S explained any training he had received in Templemore was very 
limited.  
 
Garda B provided an interesting insight into changing management approach in relation 
to the use of PULSE, in what he described as an improving accountability culture in his 
regional division of AGS. In this regard, Garda B explained that members in his region 
were increasingly encouraged to put as much detail as possible into PULSE, to provide a 
centralised account of the circumstances.  
 
Garda S, who himself provided a very detailed narrative in PULSE for the case examined 
by the audit, explained that the detail and quality of PULSE narratives varied from Garda 
to Garda. Other respondents, such as Garda P, described very recent systemic 
improvements to PULSE, whereby members were given repeated automatic reminders (a 
“traffic light system”) to input case details into PULSE. Garda T attributed these changes 
to the increasing obligations on members as part of the introduction of the EU Victims’ 
Directive into Irish law.89 It was not clear whether these experiences of PULSE were 
dependent on the particular management culture of their Garda Division, or pilot 
programmes operating only in their area.  
 
In contrast to Garda B’s positive accountability-centred account of his approach to 
PULSE inputs, Garda Q explained that he preferred “to keep it short and sweet”, as 
                                                     
88 According to the AGS website, “The Garda Information Services Centre (GISC) is a contact centre for 
operational members of An Garda Síochána. After an incident, Gardaí contact the GISC on mobile 
phones instead of returning to their station to record the case details. They give the details to trained 
civilian call-takers who enter the details on the PULSE system (An Garda Síochána’s database).” 
<http://garda.ie/Controller.aspx?Page=65&Lang=1> (visited 10 May 2016). 
89 See Directive 2012/29/EU and the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Bill 2016. 
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once an input was made, it was a permanent record. It is suggested this account may 
reflect a parallel culture among some Gardaí, or within certain divisions and regions, to 
under-report on the PULSE system, so as to limit the scope of subsequent accountability 
procedures that might seek to use the PULSE record as evidence. This issue might also 
be explained as an anxiety among some members of AGS that such permanent records 
might be taken out of context, or used against that Garda, if the account on PULSE 
turns out to be inaccurate, even if given honestly and genuinely.  
 
Specifically on the role of the GISC, Garda L, like other respondents, said the GISC 
normally inputted the narrative as the respondent described it. However, Garda N 
described a more active or interventionist involvement of the GISC, in which the GISC 
may “follow my lead”, but that they have certain “boxes to be ticked” when inputting an 
incident into PULSE. Garda N also explained that the GISC could be helpful in 
explaining the appropriate way a case should be recorded on the system. Garda W 
similarly characterised the GISC’s role as guiding, rather than directing. Garda Q also 
described a more interventionist role for the GISC, one in which the GISC could 
sometimes reword a narrative. 
 
Following the interview stage, there remain some outstanding questions and ambiguities 
in relation to Garda practices in recording case narratives on PULSE. AGS has 
confirmed that systemic reform of PULSE is underway, and this process of reform is 
clearly to be welcomed. However, ambiguities exist in relation to the role of the GISC in 
how narratives are recorded on PULSE, and whether it is aiding or undermining 
comprehensive and accurate reporting of cases on the system. It is unclear whether any 
system change that may be underway, will address the significant inconsistencies in 
narrative recording on PULSE. Finally, it is unclear whether the possible culture of 
accountability avoidance described above is widespread, and whether any of the reforms 
identified will address this issue.  
 
Attendance at Case Conferences or Strategy Meetings 
Respondents were asked about case conferences or strategy meetings they had attended 
in relation to the child removed under section 12, or more generally in relation to other 
children removed. This data formed part of the audit’s examination of inter-agency 
cooperation between AGS and Tusla, and the extent to which ordinary Gardaí are 
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required/encouraged to engage with Tusla. This data also provides a level of data 
consistency between audit stages. 
 
Very few respondents were invited to case conferences or strategy meetings. Garda Q 
was invited to attend a case conference, but was unable to attend due to family 
commitments. He believed someone from his station attended. Garda Z was invited, but 
was not permitted by his station to attend due to overtime restrictions. Other 
respondents explained that their Sergeant dealt with and attended follow-up interactions 
with other agencies in relation to child protection cases. 
 
The majority of respondents were not aware if such follow-up meetings had taken place 
in relation to the child in their case.  
 
There appears to be no set procedure for who will deal with cooperation with Tusla in 
the aftermath of a removal of a child under section 12. Some stations appear to designate 
one senior member to undertake all inter-agency cooperation. Others, however, appear 
to allow or require the ordinary Garda member who exercised section 12 to deal with 
Tusla. In many instances, there was no follow up contact at all from Tusla, or more 
senior Gardaí who may be dealing with case conferences or strategy meetings. It is also 
not clear from the audit’s finding what attendance rates at case conferences by AGS are, 
due to the localised, district-specific approach to such attendance. In other words, the 
audit was unable to determine if any member of AGS attended a case conference in 
relation to the child removed under section 12, as many respondents did not know if a 
more senior officer attended. 
 
Debriefing and Personal Support Following Section 12 Invocation, and the 
Background Context in which Section 12 Power is Used 
Respondents were asked what kind of supports were available to members following 
traumatic incidents, such as child protection cases resulting in section 12 removal. This 
question was asked to gain a broader insight into the emotional impact on members of 
AGS in undertaking their child protection functions. The question was also relevant to 
the broader issue of whether sufficient systems, procedures and cultures are in place 
within AGS, to facilitate and support its members undertaking its vital child protection 
functions. 
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The general feedback from respondents was that there was an absence of formal systems 
of individual support following traumatic incidents. While there may be designated 
Welfare Officers in stations, respondents explained they gained most support from peer-
support. Garda B, for example, explained that his unit was a valuable source of support 
following a particularly traumatic case. Garda R said that resource constraints have 
limited the welfare supports for individual units, and that formal support was now 
provided through the station’s welfare officer. Garda N explained that the Unit Sergeant 
is also used as a supporting authority figure for members.  
 
Respondents were also asked to describe to interviewers what kind of workload they 
were dealing with that day, other than the section 12 incident. This question was asked to 
gain an insight into the pressures which individual Gardaí, and stations are under when 
the section 12 incidents, which this audit has found to be resource dense and time 
burdensome, take place.  
 
For most respondents, the days (mostly nights) when section 12 removals took place 
were very busy, with many removals taking place on weekend evenings. Only Garda J 
answered that the station was not particularly busy the night he removed the child under 
section 12.  
 
Garda N explained that the case required the majority of the station’s resources, 
including the two available squad cars, for a number of hours, on a busy weekend 
evening. This resulted in a number of other planned operations – such as alcohol breath 
test checkpoints – being cancelled. Garda R described being “crazy busy” that day, where 
he and his partner also had to deal with a number of other youths causing significant 
disturbance while under the influence of alcohol. Garda S explained that on that day, as 
with most others, he was “juggling multiple commitments”.  
 
In summary, Garda respondents described a general situation where children are brought 
to busy Garda stations, with lots of ‘prisoner traffic’ through them, in circumstances 
where Garda resources are already under pressure. When undertaking their child 
protection function following a section 12 removal, Gardaí dedicate a significant amount 
of these limited resources to manage the children. 
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Expectation of Future Dealings with the Child 
Some respondents were asked, given the account of the case provided to the audit, if 
they anticipated having to deal with the child again in the future. This question is relevant 
to the respondent Garda’s perception about the effectiveness of systems of child 
protection, social support, and policing in their area, as an expectation of future dealings 
suggest the issues will not be addressed by current social support and policing 
infrastructures. 
 
A number of respondents told interviewers they expected to have future dealings with 
the child. Garda Z, for example, was forthright in saying he expected the same violent 
situation to arise with the child and her family, and that he or another member of the 
station would be called upon to deal with it. Garda W and Garda L, describing children 
with challenging behaviour and needs, also said they expected to have contact with the 
child again.  
 
A number of respondents also expressed deep dismay with how these children were 
being managed by local social services, with Garda Z describing a situation where the 
family’s designated social workers had “washed their hands” in relation to the family. 
Garda P explained that he had already had contact with the family since the incident. 
 
These responses track a consistent finding throughout all stages of this audit, which 
suggest widespread systemic dysfunction in the provision of child protection and social 
support. The audit has consistently identified instances in each stage where children and 
families experiencing chronic dysfunction fail to receive appropriate kinds or levels of 
support, or are in some troubling instances completely ignored by social services.  
 
5.3.12 Experiences with Tusla 
Crucial questions around which this audit is centred focused on the degree of inter-
agency communication, coordination, and cooperation between AGS and Tusla in the 
area of child protection. Respondents in the interview stage were asked numerous 
questions regarding their experiences with Tusla in the particular case, and more 
generally. Respondents were also asked for any insights from the perspective of a Garda, 
on the operation of Tusla. 
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Communication, Cooperation, Information-sharing and Feedback 
The majority of respondents in the interview stage of the audit had difficulties contacting 
social workers immediately after removing the child under section 12, as the vast majority 
of incidents took place outside Tusla’s standard hours of service. However, even where 
respondents did have access to an out-of-hours social work service, some respondents, 
such as Garda R, were highly critical of the quality of communication and engagement 
with that service. Others, such as Garda Z, in contrast said contact with out-of-hours 
social workers was made easily, and that they also provided a surprising and impressively 
quick response time. 
 
The absence of out-of-hours social work services for consultation when dealing with 
scenarios where a child may need to be removed under section 12 was of concern to a 
number of Garda respondents. For example, Garda B, who also emphasised the lack of 
sufficient Garda training on child protection, said it was inappropriate that members 
exercised such extensive interventionary powers into a family’s private life, without being 
able to consult a child protection expert. While Garda B conceded that some cases 
requiring section 12 removal of a child were straightforward and required no 
consultation, he was emphatic that the majority of cases required, or would at least 
benefit from, such consultation. Garda Q’s general experience of Tusla was mixed, 
explaining that once the agency was involved he found them engaged, but that “initial 
contact is poor at best”.  
 
On the broader question of inter-agency cooperation, the sole Sergeant respondent in the 
interview stage of the audit, was very positive in his descriptions of inter-agency 
cooperation in his local Garda division. However, his account of cooperation was 
confined to engagement between ranking members of AGS and Tusla, not ordinary 
members. Garda T, a non-ranking member, was also very positive in his own experience 
of dealing with local Tusla social workers. However Garda T’s experience of contacting 
social workers in other areas was far less positive. In his view, personal relationships were 
crucial. These accounts are consistent with accounts given by other respondents in the 
interview, questionnaire and focus group stages of the audit. This trend strongly suggests 
that where inter-agency cooperation exists at all, it is largely confined to members in 
higher levels of the Garda hierarchy, to particular Garda regional divisions, or to the 
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sporadic, informal development of strong professional relationships between Gardaí and 
social workers. 
 
The vast majority of other respondents in the interview stage of the audit were not 
exposed to any form of inter-agency cooperation with Tusla. For example, Garda L, who 
has had continuing dealings with the same child with complex behavioural issues, 
conveyed his deep frustration at the failure of social workers to share or explain their 
strategy for managing the child. Garda Q’s closing remark in his interview took the 
opportunity to re-emphasise his perception of a disjoint between Tusla and AGS in 
terms of their operational logics and practices. 
 
A number of respondents, such as Garda Z, Garda W, and Garda Q, expressed a keen 
desire to understand how Tusla made its decisions in relation to the removal of children: 
to know what thresholds for intervention Tusla operate under, and what criteria informs 
its decision-making. Garda B, for example, echoed many respondents when he explained 
both the practical benefit of such feedback to help inform future potential uses of 
section 12, but also the personal desire of members of AGS to know they made a good 
judgment call when dealing with a very sensitive situation.  
 
Follow-up and feedback from Tusla in the days and weeks after handover of the child 
was found to be similarly problematic for the majority of respondents. A number of 
respondents, such as Garda A, Garda P, and Garda J, said they had not received any 
notification or feedback from social workers regarding how cases progressed. Garda P 
and Garda B described significant efforts on their part to get information from social 
workers about how the child removed under section 12 had gotten along following the 
handover.  
 
In summary, the interview findings mirror findings in the questionnaire and focus group 
stages in that there is little evidence of formal routine follow-up from Tusla regarding the 
progress of a particular case after a member of AGS has transferred responsibility over 
to Tusla. Considering at the same time the findings in relation to respondent 
participation in strategy meetings and case conferences, there is no evidence of effective 
and robust systems for inter-agency information-sharing and cooperation. Despite 
respondents clearly articulating a desire and need for feedback on how they handled a 
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case, and how it progressed, there is no systemic provision for such feedback. Unless a 
member of AGS commits a significant degree of his own time and energies to following 
up on a case, or unless he has an existing strong professional relationship with his local 
social work team, he is likely to be left in the dark about how a child’s case progressed.  
 
Tusla Out-of-Hours Service 
As noted above, the vast majority of respondents did not have a dedicated Tusla out-of-
hours service available when they dealt with their case. All respondents said an out-of-
hours service was essential. Consistent with the finding in all stages of this audit, a 
number of respondents, such as Garda Q and Garda S explained that cases requiring 
section 12 removal of children do not normally arise during standard Tusla service hours.  
 
For the majority of the respondents who did not have an out-of-hours service available 
to them, Five Rivers appears to operate as the de facto out-of-hours social work service for 
AGS. 
 
Of the few respondents who did engage with Tusla’s dedicated out-of-hours service, 
Garda R and Garda Z provided the most detailed accounts of their experiences. As 
noted above, Garda R was highly critical of this service. In Garda R’s account, he felt the 
social worker was disinterested in the case, and failed to return repeated calls from the 
respondent. The respondent was also highly critical of the professional demeanour of the 
out-of-hours social worker during telephone conversations, and suggested the individual 
was not taking the respondent seriously. Garda R told the audit that this social worker 
explained to him that the decision concerning the next step for the child’s care, lay largely 
with the child. Garda R vociferously rejected this approach to the management of the 
child, particularly given the nature of the physical abuse experienced by the child and the 
child’s highly vulnerable emotional state. The case concluded with the child opting to 
return to the family home where he had been attacked, with the consent of the social 
worker. This decision, Garda R felt, was taken by the social worker, as it was the easiest 
option. 
 
Garda Z, by contrast, was much more positive in his assessment of the out-of-hours 
service, though his comments were largely confined to the speed of the services’ 
response. In his case, the social workers were immediately contactable, and explained 
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when they would be available to collect the child from the station. Garda Z expressed his 
surprise at their quick response time, which was within the hour. Garda Z did note, 
however, that it appeared the out-of-hours service did not have access to the child’s case 
history, which he felt was a significant inadequacy for any such service. This issue of lack 
of access by out-of-hours Tusla social workers to case files was also echoed in a number 
of questionnaire responses, such as Garda ZD, where out-of-hours social workers did 
not have access to the Tusla database, and were therefore unable to advise the 
respondent if the family were already on Tusla’s system, and if other incidents had been 
reported previously. This is in stark contrast to the information-sharing that occurs in 
similar circumstances in England and Wales, where out-of-hours local authority social 
workers have access to the case files on all children who have come into contact with 
children’s welfare services.  
 
In summary, most respondents did not have access to a Tusla out-of-hours service, 
though all those cases took place outside of Tusla’s standard hours of service. Mirroring 
the findings from the focus group stage, all respondents at the interview stage felt such a 
service was essential. The provision of out-of-hours services by Tusla was, however, the 
subject of considerable criticism in relation to its professionalism and commitment. The 
existing service was also suggested to be systemically inadequate as it could not facilitate 
access to case files or information on particular children. This finding may suggest the 
absence of a comprehensive and unified system covering the children and families with 
whom Tusla is engaging. 
 
Different Risk Thresholds for Intervention 
A number of respondents were keen to discuss their views on what they perceived to be 
different thresholds for intervention in the private life of families for Tusla, when 
compared to AGS. This response data is relevant to the question of inter-agency 
understanding and communication on the question of child protection. 
 
Some respondents, such as Garda Q, expressed anxiety at what he felt were 
inappropriate decisions by Tusla to return children to their parents. These decisions, he 
felt, were the result of different decision-making criteria – though he was not familiar 
with those criteria. Garda R was more strident in his criticism of Tusla. In his particular 
case, he felt Tusla would have advised the respondent not to remove the child under 
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section 12, if he had sought advice from Tusla in relation to the case prior to removal. 
This insight is interesting considering general findings from the questionnaire stage, 
which indicated a desire among many Gardaí for consultation with Tusla about the 
decision to remove a child under section 12. 
 
Garda Z was the most confident in his understanding of Tusla, and explained to 
interviewers that Tusla did have higher thresholds for intervention – thresholds he felt 
were too high. In his case, Tusla took no further action in relation to the child. However, 
Garda Z felt that Tusla’s threshold had certainly been met, as the incident involved 
physical violence against the child by multiple members of her family, in the context of 
on-going issues within the family. Garda Z’s opinion was that while the threshold 
triggering Tusla’s obligations to the child had been met, the social workers were no 
longer interested in engaging with the family.  
 
This data reflects a pattern identified in other aspects of this audit, which suggests the 
desire among Garda respondents to have the workings of Tusla “demystified”. It also 
reflects a vague understanding among Garda members, that AGS and Tusla do operate 
under different risk thresholds for intervention – but there is no real understanding of 
why those thresholds are different. 
  
Pressure to Invoke Section 12 by Tusla 
As with the questionnaire stage of the audit, interview respondents were asked if they 
had ever refused to exercise section 12 when requested by Tusla social workers, or if they 
had experienced pressure from a Tusla social worker to remove a child under section 12. 
This question relates to a pattern of findings in the questionnaire, interview and focus 
group stages of the audit, which suggested Tusla social workers are at times 
circumventing the need to apply for a section 13 order from the District Court, in order 
to remove a child. 
 
A number of respondents, such as Garda L, spoke generally about a perception among 
Gardaí that Tusla sometimes used AGS to bypass the courts, or to offload responsibility 
for a child onto a fully 24 hour service. For example, Garda N was forthright in his view 
that a significant number of cases, which were properly the responsibility of other 
agencies, were effectively imposed on AGS, as those agencies know Gardaí are available 
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at all times, and that Gardaí cannot and will not shift their responsibility onto another 
agency. 
 
One respondent’s case provided what he felt was a clear example of this behaviour. In 
that case, Tusla contacted his station immediately before the end of their standard 
working day, and subsequently pressured the respondent to invoke section 12. A 
standoff ensued, with the respondent’s Sergeant directing the respondent to persuade 
Tusla to take responsibility for the child, and the Tusla staff refusing. The respondent 
explained his sense that social workers were anxious for the encounter to end, as it was 
past the end of their standard working day. This encounter concluded with the 
respondent reluctantly removing the child under section 12 to the Garda station. The 
respondent commented “as soon as I invoked section 12, they were happy”. It should be 
noted this respondent explained his previous experiences with Tusla were positive, but 
that this experience of pressure to exercise section 12 left him feeling frustrated and 
anxious about whether he had exercised section 12 appropriately. It was also notable in 
this case that the Tusla social workers who refused to take the child into care, contacted 
the out-of-hours service to advise them the child was removed to the Garda station. This 
final detail suggests a disconnect between ordinary Tusla social workers, and the out-of-
hours team. This case appears to reflect a paradigm of the view among many Garda 
respondents that Tusla social workers are deflecting responsibility for a child at the close 
of its standard service hours.  
 
Garda Z recalled another unrelated case in which he was requested to use section 12 by a 
social worker. In that case, Garda Z refused, as he felt it was more appropriate for the 
social worker to follow the section 13 route for removal.  
 
Most cases examined were not initiated by Tusla, nor did Tusla become involved prior to 
section 12 invocation. However, the few cases listed above provide evidence which may 
suggest tendencies of some Tusla social worker teams to offload their responsibility to 
children at risk onto AGS.  
 
Concluding Comments 
While most respondents provided some critical comments regarding their experiences of 
Tusla, many of these were also very conscious of the difficult working environment 
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within which Tusla social workers operate. Most respondents, such as Garda R, were 
sympathetic to social workers, who they perceived to be under significant resource 
constraints. In line with comments from respondents in the focus group stage, a number 
of respondents, such as Garda T, explained their perception that there were insufficient 
numbers of social workers to deal with the caseloads required of them.  
 
5.3.13 Other General Themes Emerging from Interviews 
This section outlines and examines themes that emerged during the interview process, 
which were not directly related to the questionnaires around which the interviews were 
based.  
 
Role of An Garda Síochána 
In various interviews throughout the interview stage of this audit, a number of 
respondents cited their overriding professional obligations in terms of public protection, 
which flowed from their roles in AGS. Many, such as Garda R and Garda Z, spoke 
earnestly about their role as “first responder”. Garda B, while emphatic in his view that 
members of AGS were ill-equipped in terms of child protection training, was equally 
emphatic that child protection functions formed a part of a Garda’s core frontline 
functions.  
 
Garda N noted that AGS was one of the few year-round, 24 hour public services: a 
service whose members are not in a position to refuse to take responsibility, particularly 
in the context of child protection and welfare. As a result of this, Garda N was of the 
opinion that AGS inevitably “picked up the slack” from other frontline public services. 
Garda Q discussed his view that child protection, like domestic violence, was a particular 
priority for him and his station, given the inherently vulnerable nature of children. 
 
Garda R and Garda Z were unequivocal in explaining their view that child protection 
was a proper function of AGS. Garda R was, however, also critical of the expectations of 
some other agencies that they also perform a “babysitting” function. This criticism of 
perceived expectations that Gardaí perform this warehousing child protection function 
was echoed by other respondents, such as Garda W. Garda R was also critical of what he 
perceived to be a tendency in public discourse to blame AGS for failings in how it deals 
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with children, without questioning whether parental responsibility was a more significant 
factor in a case. 
 
In summary, most interview respondents carried an overwhelming perception that they 
personally, and AGS in general, are the type of professionals who do not, and should 
not, shirk responsibility in terms of child protection. This was a role and level of 
responsibility Garda respondents were certainly proud of. However, there was also a 
sense among some respondents that other agencies exploited and abused this role and 
responsibility. 
 
‘Standard Operating Procedures’ in relation to Section 12 
A notable theme that emerged across both interview and focus group stages of this audit 
was the inconsistency in terms of procedures adopted by respondents in dealing with 
children removed under section 12. As noted above, it appears from the interview stage 
that some geographical divisions of AGS have expressly developed standard operating 
procedures in relation to the “initial place of safety” to which a child will be removed. 
Garda Z, for example, explained that his station had a ‘standard operating procedure’ in 
relation to section 12, something that was lacking with most other respondents in both 
the interview and focus group stages of the audit.  
 
There also appear to be ad hoc systemic approaches as to which agency (public or private) 
should be contacted following the removal of a child. Some respondents described a 
clear understanding and adherence to the so-called “Five Rivers Protocol” (discussed 
below), while others, such as Garda Q, described having to use internet search engines to 
find details about Five Rivers. As discussed earlier, much appears to depend on particular 
decisions made at a management level in individual Garda divisions. 
 
There was no evidence of clear guidance or procedures for the management of children 
in the Garda station, or elsewhere while in the care of AGS. Respondents appeared to 
effectively ‘muddle through’ using their common sense in attempting to limit the trauma 
that most respondents were aware was a risk while in Garda care.  
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Demand on Resources/Absence of Appropriate Resources 
One of the most significant themes to emerge throughout this audit surrounds the 
general absence of appropriate resources to deal with complex child protection issues, 
and the significant burdens dealing with these cases places on already limited Garda 
resources. Respondents were also anxious to convey their understanding that other 
agencies, particularly Tusla, and its frontline staff, were similarly under-resourced.  
 
Garda L and Garda W were particularly critical of the level of time and Garda personnel 
resources, which dealing with these cases required. Garda N explained specific details on 
how dealing with these cases infringed on other important Garda operational strategies, 
such as drunk driving detection on a busy weekend night. 
 
In terms of availability of appropriate resources, Garda B was highly critical of the 
expectation that Gardaí deal with very sensitive child protection cases, involving highly 
vulnerable children, when they were not properly trained to do so. Garda N compared 
his resources directly with those available in England, where specialist teams were readily 
available to deal with complex and highly specialised cases.  
 
Accountability in An Garda Síochána 
A theme that emerged in a number of interviews surrounded accountability and 
accountability culture in AGS. These discussions were almost exclusively focused around 
interview stage questions about PULSE narrative write-ups, the GISC and the 
dissemination of HQ Directives.  
 
There were two notable perspectives on this. The view proffered by one respondent, 
Garda B, was that the increasing use of PULSE and narrative inputting into PULSE 
encouraged by Garda management was a positive development.  
 
The more common perspective among interview respondents was more cynical. For 
example, Garda Q preferred to limit the level of detail in his PULSE narratives, in what 
he explained was an effort to limit the scope of the permanent record of his involvement 
in a case.  
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Garda S, who was noted by interviewers for his fastidious note taking, and his provision 
of an excellent and highly detailed PULSE narrative, described a “cover [yourself]” 
culture in relation to dissemination of HQ Directives. He, like other respondents, found 
such documents unhelpful in terms of his day-to-day work, and believed their sole 
purpose was a bureaucratic attempt to deflect responsibility from the Garda hierarchy. 
Garda N expressed the same sentiments in almost identical terms. 
 
These findings suggest the presence of a culture of accountability avoidance among some 
members and bureaucratic classes within AGS. 
 
Fallout from ‘Athlone’ and ‘Tallaght’ Cases 
Four respondents made express reference to the controversial ‘Athlone’ and ‘Tallaght’ 
cases, and their potential impact on decision-making by members of AGS in section 12 
incidents.  
 
Garda B, Garda Z, and Garda J all stated that the cases did not affect how they or other 
Gardaí approached situations where children potentially required removal under section 
12. Garda B explained that members regularly “take a beating in the media” for decisions 
they make, and as a result, were somewhat immune from such criticisms. Garda J said he 
was aware of the cases, but that he was confident his case was wholly different, and that 
section 12 removal was wholly justifiable.  
 
Garda T, however, detailed his and his Sergeant’s anxiety about the impact of those 
cases, when deciding to invoke section 12. Referring specifically to the Tallaght case, 
where the respondent felt Garda members had followed correct procedures – but still 
“got in trouble”, Garda T explained he was also worried about “getting into trouble” in 
spite of following correct protocols around section 12 invocation. This, he said, was a 
factor in the decision-making in his particular invocation of section 12.  
 
While it is clear that the Athlone and Tallaght cases have had an impact on the collective 
conscience of AGS, the findings from this stage of the audit are unclear as to whether 
the cases have had a widespread and direct impact on Garda child protection practices.  
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Five Rivers and Private Frontline Service Providers 
The use of the private fostering service Five Rivers as the de facto official out-of-hours 
child protection service by AGS was among the most prominent themes that emerged 
throughout this audit. Outside of the greater Dublin area, Five Rivers functions as almost 
the sole service to which members can turn when dealing with a section 12 removal, 
outside of Tusla’s standard service hours.  
 
As discussed above, this audit has found the majority of section 12 incidents take place 
outside of these standard hours of service. As a result, Five Rivers fulfils a significant role 
in the aftermath of section 12 removal. Only geographical divisions with an established 
policy of using hospitals as the designated initial place of safety appear to have little 
dealings with Five Rivers when section 12 is invoked, though respondents from those 
regions were still aware of the organisation and the service it provides. 
 
Respondents who expressed opinions on the quality of the service, such as Garda W and 
Garda Q, were generally very positive. However, it is crucial to note that no respondent 
was able to give a detailed insight into the nature of the Five Rivers organisation. No 
respondent was in a position to explain the legal basis upon which children were 
transferred from the care of AGS, into the care of an emergency foster placement 
organised by the Five Rivers organisation. None of the interview respondents were able 
to provide information on the regulatory oversight, if any, of the Five Rivers 
organisation. A handful of interview respondents echoed a pattern of responses in the 
questionnaire stage, in suggesting a vague assumption that Five Rivers was contracted in 
some way by Tusla to provide the out-of-hours service.  
 
The positive comments from respondents on Five Rivers were confined exclusively to 
their availability in out-of-hours situations. Garda respondents who dealt with Five 
Rivers were relieved to have some agency – which they assumed to be a specialist in child 
protection – available to advise them on how to proceed after removing a child under 
section 12. Respondents were also reassured that some agency was available in these out-
of-hours circumstances to organise emergency placement of a child and relieve AGS of 
the onerous responsibility of caring for that child.  
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However, some narratives from the questionnaire stage were far less positive in their 
experiences of private service providers. For example, Garda ZE indicated he sought to 
place the child with Five Rivers, but it was unable to organise a placement for the child, 
as he had been violent in the home (the reason for his removal under section 12). 
Similarly in Garda ZF’s case, the private service provider did not provide the child with a 
placement, as she was under the influence of drugs.  
 
This pattern of refusing to organise placements for children with challenging behaviour 
highlights a key issue with heavy reliance by the State on a private, non-statutory 
frontline service provider. In these cases, there was no agency available out-of-hours with 
an express statutory obligation to take the child into care. Where Tusla provides no 
service, the private service providers who have filled the gap are under no statutory 
obligation to take children they deem to be too problematic or difficult. Additionally, it is 
not clear upon which criteria private service providers determine children too 
problematic to take into care.  
 
Even in cases where a care home is provided by Tusla, some questionnaire respondents 
described instances of chronic failure. For example, Garda ZG (see below) noted “an 
extreme reluctance [by] other State bodies to abide by their statutory 
obligations/responsibilities”; a reluctance recounted critically in the respondent’s report 
to his Superintendent. 
 
An interesting pattern found in the questionnaire stage of the audit, was an apparent 
confusion about the private nature of Five Rivers. In a number of questionnaire 
narratives, for example Garda ZH appeared to assume Five Rivers was an agency within 
Tusla. Similarly, the respondent Garda ZI referred to “Fresh Start Residential Services” 
as Tusla. Fresh Start is, however, a private residential home, contracted by Tusla to 
provide residential services for children in State care.  
 
Other examples such as Garda ZJ and Garda ZK reinforced a perception emerging from 
the audit that there is a high level of uncertainty among Garda members as to the nature 
of services available to them, and their ability to distinguish between public/private 
frontline services provision.  
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Although not encountered in the interview or focus group stages of this audit, a number 
of narratives from the questionnaire stage detailed significant and sometimes chronic 
failings by private care homes contracted by Tusla. For example, the child in Garda ZG’s 
case approached the respondent Garda, as he felt unsafe in the private residential home 
in which he had been placed by Tusla. Five Rivers subsequently organised an emergency 
foster care placement for that child. Garda ZL was critical of private care home staff in 
how they managed two teenagers in their care, who repeatedly absconded.  
 
In Garda ZG’s case the respondent was very critical of a private service provider. In that 
case the child was aggressive towards staff at the private residential unit, producing a 
knife, but not threatening anyone with that knife. The staff were in fear of the child, and 
contacted the respondent’s Garda station. The child was then removed under section 12 
because of staff fears. In this case, there was no out-of-hours Tusla service available, and 
Five Rivers was unable to organise an emergency foster placement for the child. The 
respondent in this questionnaire was emphatically critical of the residential unit, 
explaining it has ultimate responsibility for the child. The respondent argued forcefully 
that the unit should ensure it has sufficient staffing and security measures to deal with 
such incidents. The respondent concluded by arguing that if the unit could not provide 
secure accommodation, it should address the situation of the particular child with Tusla.  
 
The narrative from Garda ZM was another case where the Garda respondent was highly 
critical of Tusla, as he felt responsibility for a child was deflected on Gardaí due to 
systemic inadequacies in a residential unit. In that case, the child was reported missing 
from a Tusla-contracted residential unit, but was later found by his care worker. The care 
worker feared the youth was carrying drugs or a weapon, and contacted Gardaí. The 
child was subsequently arrested, and brought to the station. The residential worker 
refused to remain at the Garda station to take custody of the youth following his release. 
The respondent complained that the residential worker believed the child could be 
detained “for no lawful purpose” by the respondent. Section 12 was eventually invoked, 
as, after lengthy negotiation, the out-of-hours services agreed to be present when the 
child was released from the care of AGS. The respondent subsequently reported to the 
Superintendent complaining about the “dubious care of [the] child and breakdown of 
agreed protocols between Gardaí and HSE”. 
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Foster Care 
A theme that emerged in various stages of this audit centred on the capacity of some 
foster placements to care for children with complex and challenging needs. 
 
A number of respondents, such as Garda W, spoke of foster care situations where the 
foster carers were unable to cope with children with complex needs. In his case, he 
described a child with challenging behavioural problems, who repeatedly absconded from 
the care of her foster carers. This respondent questioned the capacity of foster 
placements to deal with such children. Garda W echoed other respondents and stated 
that in some cases, properly resourced institutional settings were necessary for the proper 
care of the child. 
 
There were also a number of cases from the questionnaire stage of the audit, such as with 
Garda ZN, where section 12 was invoked as the child had absconded from foster care, 
and the respondent feared he would abscond again if returned to the foster carers. 
 
This evidence suggests there are issues with the management of children with complex 
and challenging needs by the foster care system in Ireland. While feedback on fostering 
in this audit was generally very positive, these examples raise doubts about the capacity 
of foster placements to manage and provide security and care for some children in the 
care system. 
 
Media and Public Awareness 
Some respondents offered interesting insights into their perceptions of media coverage 
of Garda use of section 12 and related powers. In an account touched on above, Garda B 
was critical of what he perceived to be unfair scrutiny of AGS generally. Garda W 
discussed improving public understanding of the nature and complexity of the wider 
child protection system – though he said it still fell far short of a sophisticated 
understanding.  
 
Reforms for Training in Child Protection  
Respondents were asked what kind of training they felt would be helpful and 
appropriate. As with all areas where respondents were asked to suggest possible changes 
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or improvements, this question was asked to help inform this audit’s own suggestions for 
reform.  
 
Of those who answered this question, a number, such as Garda B, Garda Q, Garda S, 
Garda T, and Garda Z, said they would like to have more joint training with social 
workers, to enable them to understand the systemic and environmental realities in which 
social workers make their decisions. Garda B felt it was important for Gardaí to be 
trained along with who he felt were the “actual professionals” in child protection in 
Ireland: child protection social workers. Garda Z explained that there was a need to 
“demystify” the decision-making processes, as there was a pervasive background 
assumption among many Garda members that social workers were often attempting to 
pass on responsibility for complex cases to AGS. Garda Z was also interested in 
understanding the different thresholds for intervention governing child protection social 
workers, and emphasised that trust between the two organisations was essential to ensure 
cooperation in cases involving children. 
 
Some respondents, such as Garda Z, were asked if they felt annual training on child 
protection would be helpful to keep them up-to-date with best practice. All of those 
asked felt this regularity of retraining would be unnecessary. This particular position 
might be informed by the rarity in which members of AGS exercise section 12 powers.  
 
5.3.14 General Reform 
Respondents were asked if they had any suggestions for reform of the section 12 system 
of child removal. The most common suggested reform related to the provision of 
dedicated out-of-hours services by Tusla. As discussed above, a number of respondents, 
such as Garda B, were explicit in their calling for Tusla support to be available on a year-
round, 24-hour basis. Another frequent suggestion for reform, also discussed above, 
centred on provision of inter-agency training in child protection, and greater inter-agency 
cooperation at an operational level. Garda T and Garda W, for example, both explained 
the operational value for Gardaí in being familiar with the systems and decision-making 
within Tusla.  
 
Garda W spoke more generally on the need for a clearer strategy for dealing with 
children with challenging behavioural problems, with whom Gardaí are regularly in direct 
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contact. Garda W also echoed the desire of many respondents for feedback from Tusla – 
an issue discussed in more detail above.  
 
Laminated Card 
Finally, all respondents were asked to comment on the usefulness of a proposed 
laminated card (discussed in more detail at 6.3.10 and Appendix 4), which would contain 
clear, concise and accessible guidance on the threshold for section 12 removal, and 
information on how to manage a child in the immediate aftermath of a section 12 
removal. All respondents said this proposal would be a useful tool in the performance of 
their child protection functions.  
 
5.4 THE FOCUS GROUPS 
 
The following section will outline and examine findings from the two focus groups. This 
section will follow a similar chronology of thematic headings to that used to explore the 
interview stage of the audit. Where relevant, findings from the questionnaire narratives 
will be cited to enrich findings from the focus group stage. 
 
Due to the different dynamics in focus groups compared to individual interviews, and 
the need to keep the focus groups confined to 90 minutes in length, a much shorter set 
of research questions was put to focus group respondents. Additionally, the focus groups 
provided an ideal opportunity to develop certain themes that had emerged in the earlier 
stages of the audit. This meant the focus groups had a slightly different direction to the 
interviews. In particular, the focus groups did not concentrate on the demographic or 
background details of the respondent Gardaí, or the children and families in their cases. 
As a result, the thematic headings that emerged with this analysis are somewhat different 
to the interview stage.  
 
The focus group consisting of rank and file members of AGS will be referred to here as 
FG 1; the focus group consisting of senior ranking members of AGS will be referred to 
as FG 2. 
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5.4.1 Respondent Details 
Respondent Gender 
FG 1 consisted of four female and two male members of AGS. FG 2 consisted of five 
male (four Sergeants and one Inspector) and one female Sergeant. This demographic data 
is noted to provide a degree of consistency across the different stages of this audit. 
Respondent gender is also noted, as the audit used gender as one of the central critical 
tools to evaluate all data derived in the questionnaire, interview and focus group stages of 
this audit. 
 
5.4.2 Garda Training 
Training in Child Protection 
As with the previous questionnaire and interview stages of the audit, focus group 
participants were asked about the training they had received, if any, as the question of 
appropriate training in child protection is central to the audit’s examination of whether 
section 12 is being used appropriately and proportionately. Appropriate training in child 
protection is essential for members of AGS to have the capacity and competence to 
critically evaluate circumstances suggesting a risk to a child, in a manner that is sensitive 
to both the rights of the child and the parent, and also the risks associated with removal 
of a child. Additionally, this data also provides a degree of consistency across the 
different stages of this audit. 
 
Specifically in relation to the exercise of powers under section 12 of the Child Care Act 
1991, FG 1 participants suggested Garda members were possibly “afraid” to use their 
power to remove children under section 12. Noting the lack of specific training and 
guidance on how to deal with situations requiring protective removal of children, FG 1 
participants said knowledge of how to use the power came from experience in using it: 
“Once you’ve done it, once, you kind of have an idea, you kind of fumble on.” More 
generally, FG 1 participants suggested that unless members of AGS took an active 
personal interest in child protection, they would not gain any understanding of the child 
protection systems operating in Ireland. 
 
This focus group also noted the rarity of situations in which they would individually be 
called upon to exercise their protective power to remove children, with one member 
explaining: “I know I’m the only person in my unit who’s ever Section 12-ed anyone”. 
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On child protection training generally, there was a consensus among FG 1 that training 
was wholly insufficient: “[t]here definitely should be more training in the guards in the 
area … In Templemore, we did classic French, and did nothing in child care.” While 
most of FG 1’s participants had not undertaken Children First training, those who had did 
not find it helpful. One participant explained:  
I’ve done the Children First course. I’d say I’ve done it about five times. And 
I honestly have no idea what I was supposed to learn of it. Not a clue. 
 
This same participant suggested the manner in which these multiple training sessions in 
Children First were provided was of no relevance. He also explained the training failed to 
contextualise its content, so members of AGS could effectively operationalise it.  
 
Some members of FG 1 also emphasised the lack of an appropriately trained and 
specialist child protection unit, highlighting such a unit as being a desirable resource. This 
came in response to general discussions about the nature of such specialist units, from a 
FG 1 participant who is a member of one such unit.  
 
There was only one contribution on the topic of child protection training in FG 2. This 
participant focused exclusively on the appropriateness of AGS performing its child 
protection function, without appropriate training, and is worth quoting in full: 
The guards are basically being asked to perform a function which is really 
health... Without any training whatsoever. We’re not psychiatric nurses. 
We’ve no expertise in child psychology or, you know, except for common 
sense... But that’s what we have to run anyway. Our own experience in 
common sense…  
 
These findings mirror findings in other stages of this audit showing Garda training in 
child protection to be limited or non-existent. As with the interview stage, focus group 
participants put a premium on experience gained while being involved at an operational 
level with AGS, repeating earlier findings about the anxiety underlying the exercise of 
section 12 for many Gardaí, due to limited guidance and procedures on how to 
undertake a section 12 removal.  
 
Training in Cultural Competency and Understanding of Diversity 
In light of the increasing ethnic and cultural diversification of Irish society, and the 
distinct sensitivities this change demands of policing practices in general, and child 
protection practices in particular, focus group participants were asked what training they 
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received in how to deal with these changes. Evaluating levels of guidance and training on 
how members of AGS should address these on-going changes to Irish society is central 
to the broader audit question about whether AGS is, or is at risk of, racially profiling 
children in its exercise of section 12. This data is relevant to whether Garda members are 
equipped with the critical skills necessary to avoid racially profiling children when 
exercising their section 12 powers. 
 
Only one member of FG 1 had received specific training on AGS’s policing strategy for 
Ireland’s increasingly diverse population. This participant was not enthusiastic about the 
training he had received, and noted that his two day training programme now meant he 
was the station’s designated ethnic liaison officer – a role he was not confident he could 
perform. Another participant explained the “only training we have is that we have a lot 
of different nationalities living in our area.” None of the FG 1 participants were able to 
describe policies from AGS in relation to the changes to policing necessitated by an 
increasingly culturally and ethnically diverse Irish population. 
 
FG 2 participants were not able to provide any details of any training they had received 
in cultural competency – nor did they provide any sophisticated understanding of the 
increasing ethnic complexity and diversity in contemporary Irish society. 
 
This finding of an absence of training in how AGS should respond to the increasing 
diversity in Ireland’s population is also reflected in the questionnaire and interview stages 
of this audit. This consistent finding raises issues that are central to the overarching 
question in this audit, namely racial profiling in the exercise of AGS’s child protection 
function. As noted above, this audit has found no evidence of racial profiling in the use 
by Gardaí of section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991. That said, this finding must be 
tempered by the finding that certain ethnic and cultural demographic data does not 
appear to be routinely documented by AGS on the PULSE system. For example, 
whether a child or parent is an Irish Traveller does not appear to be routinely 
documented by Gardaí. This means any finding that there was no racial profiling in the 
PULSE, questionnaire, and focus group stages of this audit, must be somewhat qualified 
because of an absence of consistent documenting of a child’s ethnic background. 
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Taken together, these findings suggest a possible lack of organisational coordination in 
how AGS should respond to both the historic ethnic diversity of Ireland, and also the 
changing ethnic and cultural face of its population. It also suggests a possible failure of 
any policies on how to deal with these changes, to reach through to all Garda members 
operating in the field. Additionally, it raises questions about whether those same ordinary 
members of AGS are equipped to deal with the new demands that are, and will continue 
to be placed on policing in Ireland. 
 
5.4.3 Circumstances Surrounding the Exercise of Section 12 
Who Initiated the Involvement of An Garda Síochána? 
While the purpose of the focus groups was not aimed specifically at gathering 
information on individual cases, one participant’s account of his section 12 incident, and 
how he became involved in it, is worthy of note.  
 
In this participant’s case, a family with complex and chronic needs, and who had been in 
on-going receipt of support from Tusla social workers, moved into the participant’s area. 
As this move brought the family into a new Tusla area office, they were placed on a 
waiting list for assessment by social workers from that new office. This meant the family 
were without Tusla supervision for a number of weeks following the move into the area. 
The same family were, however, also in receipt of support from a private housing and 
homecare support charity. Care workers from this charity became concerned for the 
welfare of the young children in this family, whose parents had chronic addiction issues. 
The care workers contacted the Garda participant in the local Garda station. The care 
worker and the participant then arranged to share the monitoring of the family, until 
such time as Tusla assessed the family.  
 
The participant Garda was highly critical of the gap in continuity of support from Tusla 
for these very vulnerable children, despite repeated notifications from the support 
charity:  
There was an abundance of reports done, and Tusla had done nothing ... 
The children needed to be taken into care. And so it got to the point where 
I got a phone call asking me would I go and check over the weekend. 
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5.4.4 Respondent Actions prior to Section 12 Exercise 
Focus group participants were asked to account for the circumstances surrounding their 
section 12 removal of the child. From these accounts, data was gathered in relation to the 
actions and decision-making processes undertaken by participants. The aim of this data 
collection and analysis is to critically review the context in which a respondent Garda 
decided to remove the child, and the robustness of the decision-making process itself. 
This was done to evaluate the appropriateness and legality of section 12 removal in a 
diversity of circumstances faced by members of AGS. 
 
Consultation with other Gardaí 
Data was gathered in relation to whether the participant consulted with other Garda 
members of the same, lower, or higher rank prior to the decision to remove the child 
under section 12. The question of consultation within the Garda organisation on a 
particular case reflects levels of critical self-reflection among Gardaí in their performance 
of their child protection functions. 
 
FG 1 participants were asked whether they consulted with their Sergeant-in-Charge 
before their decision to exercise section 12 powers. All of FG 1 participants said they did 
not consult with their Sergeant before they exercised section 12. This finding is 
significant given the high percentage of respondents who said they consulted with their 
Sergeant-in-Charge (71% of those who consulted internally) before invocation of section 
12 in the questionnaire stage of the audit. 
 
Consultation with other Family Members 
FG 1 participants were asked whether they consulted, or would generally consult, with 
other family members before they decided to remove the child under section 12. The 
audit asked this question as part of the general assessment of whether section 12 removal 
was being used as a mechanism of last resort – i.e. were alternative carers sought within 
the child’s family before the child was removed. 
 
FG 1 participants focused on whether the family member could be trusted. Participants 
highlighted their responsibility for the child, and the risks inherent in passing custody of 
the child on to an unknown person, regardless of whether or not they were the child’s 
family:  
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It’s a risk that you’re handing that child over to a person that you don’t 
know … if something were to happen to that child in their care, where does 
the responsibility lie then thereafter? 
 
One participant described the different knowledge base of members of AGS serving in 
rural communities in this context:  
I’m working in a country station, so generally speaking, we know the 
families, so we know the families we can leave them with … 
 
This finding supports earlier findings in relation to Garda efforts to assess suitable 
alternatives to removal of children under section 12. 
 
Consultation with the Child 
FG 1 participants were asked if they consulted, or would generally consult, with the child 
on whether there were alternative arrangements for his care. Again, this question was 
asked to evaluate whether section 12 removal was being used as a mechanism of last 
resort. It also served as part of the general exploration of how much weight, if any, 
members of AGS are giving to the voice of the child, in situations where section 12 
removal was being considered.  
 
FG 1 participants were unanimous in saying that it would depend very much on the 
child’s age. One participant explained:  
If we have a 10-year-old, and they say, ‘can I go to my grandparents’?’ and 
they seem happy enough to go, I think at 10, if there was ever an issue in 
the grandparents’ house, they’d know well at that point. 
 
5.4.5 Grounds for Invoking Section 12 
Data was gathered in relation to the grounds upon which the participant Garda based his 
decision to remove the child under section 12. This data was central to one of the 
principal questions throughout this audit: the appropriateness, proportionality, and 
legality of section 12 removals of children by members of AGS. The grounds upon 
which a Garda member removed a child are the main factual antecedents to the authority 
of a Garda member to remove a child under section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991. In 
documenting and critically evaluating these grounds for section 12 removal, the audit 
sought to account for the circumstances that members of AGS encounter, which require 
the use of extraordinary powers of intervention in the private life of the family. 
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As in the interview stage of the audit, the circumstances and grounds that led FG 1 
participants to exercise section 12 were manifold and varied. Circumstances included 
parents suffering from chronic addiction problems, and children, as discussed above, 
who were effectively ignored by the local Tusla team for a period of weeks. Participants 
also described instances of suspected physical abuse in the home, mental health issues 
within the parent, and child abandonment. On the information available to the audit, all 
the cases described by FG 1 participants involved the exercise of section 12 powers that 
were wholly justifiable.  
 
5.4.6 Evidence of Critical Evaluation of Circumstances by Focus Group Participants 
Data was gathered in relation to evidence of critical evaluation of the circumstances by 
the participant Garda in his decision to remove the child under section 12. This data is 
central to one of the principal questions throughout this audit: the appropriateness, 
proportionality, and legality of section 12 removals of children by members of AGS. 
Evidence that a Garda participant critically examined the circumstances of a case, and 
evaluated the risks flowing from that examination, is central to the lawful authority of a 
Garda member to remove a child under section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991. In 
documenting such critical evaluations by Gardaí, the audit sought to account for the 
decision-making processes employed by members of AGS in child protection scenarios, 
and examine whether those processes are sufficiently critically sophisticated. 
 
A number of FG 1’s participants detailed the circumstances in which they made their 
decision to remove the child under section 12. The accounts given reflected the general 
quality of critical analysis found among respondents in the questionnaire and interview 
stage of this audit. Consistent with findings in the interview stage, there is no evidence 
that FG 1 participants exercised section 12 lightly. Indeed, the low levels of familiarity 
among members of AGS with their power under section 12, appear to engender a degree 
of caution among Gardaí about its use.   
 
FG 1 provided an opportunity to examine the circumstances in which section 12 
invocation was not appropriate, as one of the participants had decided not to remove a 
child under section 12. This participant was invited to discuss the case with the group. In 
that case, the participant and his Sergeant, who was also present at the scene, were placed 
under significant pressure by social workers to remove a child, due to their concerns 
220 
 
about the mental health of his mother. Having consulted with both the child, who was a 
16-year-old male, and his mother, both decided it was inappropriate to remove him from 
the home. Indeed, the participant and his Sergeant were, at that time, sceptical about the 
concerns expressed by social workers about the child’s welfare:  
…we spoke outside … we’re not taking this child, there’s no imminent 
danger.  
 
This case represents a paradigm of a Garda member critically engaging with how section 
12 powers should be lawfully operationalised in particularly sensitive and complex 
situations. Following urgent warnings from the social workers dealing with the case, the 
Garda, in consultation with his Sergeant, took time to satisfy himself that the child’s 
situation did not meet the threshold for section 12 removal – as is required in the 1991 
Act. In that case, it is suggested the constitutional rights of the mother and child were 
also vindicated, through consultation and genuine critical consideration of their views by 
the participant Garda.  
 
Following their refusal to invoke section 12, the Garda participant and his Sergeant 
advised the social workers to bring their concerns to the District Court under a section 
13 application. It should be noted the court later granted a section 13 order to the social 
workers. Despite this, the approach of the participant Garda is noteworthy and 
commendable in realising the independent and subjective nature of the section 12 power. 
 
5.4.7 Treatment of the Child Immediately Following Removal 
Focus group participants were asked specific questions in relation to the care of the child 
in the immediate aftermath of the child’s removal under section 12. This data was 
relevant to the audit’s examination of the experience of the child, critical review of the 
appropriateness of practices and procedures for managing children while in the care of 
AGS, and exploration of the realities of inter-agency coordination and cooperation with 
Tusla. 
 
Initial Place of Safety 
The location of the initial place of safety, how children are cared for in that location, 
whether there are formal procedures regulating the use of that location as a place of 
safety, and the overall appropriateness of that place of safety, are central questions across 
the questionnaire, interview and focus group stages of this audit.  
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Most participants in FG 1 and FG 2 said the Garda Station was the designated initial 
place of safety. The FG 1 participant from the Specialist Child Protection Unit told the 
audit that children were removed to their office, which was not located in the Garda 
station, and was therefore a more child-friendly environment than the station. That 
participant felt their office was “better” as “the children don’t actually know they’re in 
the Garda station”. 
 
FG 1 was asked whether their stations have any explicit practices or policies to deal with 
children who were removed to the Garda station under section 12. All participants said 
they were not aware of any policies on management of children when removed to the 
Garda station. One participant explained that children were typically kept in the station’s 
canteen.  
 
Appropriateness of the Initial Place of Safety 
FG 1 participants were unanimous in their belief that a Garda Station is wholly 
inappropriate as an initial place of safety. Some expressed concerns about the resources 
required to monitor the children while they were in the station. One participant added 
that his station, which dated from the 1800s, was in a physically decrepit state, lacking in 
any appropriate resources to entertain and distract the children:  
…the station was built in the 1800s. And bringing kids back to our canteen 
isn’t ideal at all. And it’s to try and entertain them, you know what I mean? 
You’d be dealing with, maybe, children as an infant, not infants, but 3, 4-
year-olds, to try and entertain them, which I’ve done four or five times for 
three or four hours while we are waiting for a foster home... It’s very 
difficult in the station that’s falling down around you, and... You’ve a 
snooker table, and... There’s only so many times you can throw a snooker 
ball on your own to entertain them. 
 
FG 2 participants were equally emphatic that a Garda station was a wholly inappropriate 
environment for children: “A Garda station isn’t a place for children. It’s not.” FG 2 
participants described very busy inner city Garda stations, with a heavy through traffic of 
prisoners and other members of the public: “…we’ve a lot of prisoners coming through. 
That’s not a place for anyone, really.”  
 
Like FG 1, some participants focused on the quality of facilities in older Garda stations, 
and whether childcare was even a consideration in the design of modern stations:  
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So we have no place … you should be bringing them … There are no 
facilities for children at all in... Any of the Garda stations in the City Centre. 
I don’t know, but the brand new stations, I don’t think there is, either. They 
don’t think of it. 
 
FG 2 participants explained strategies used by Gardaí to limit the scope for children to 
be traumatised by the experience, and also paid credit to the Gardaí in their unit, for how 
they managed and interacted with children, when they are removed to the station:  
…My lads really are brilliant, but I bring them up the back and play 
football. Depending on the age, if they’re children and all that. It’s an 
unbelievable experience, we do show’em around the station, say, if they’re 
like 12, 13, 14... The whole of that. And bring them to a waiting room. But 
that’s just members taking it on themselves, showing them around and 
trying to get them thinking ‘you’re not here for a bad reason, nothing like 
that’. 
 
Some FG 2 participants described trying to make the experience fun for the children, 
who might be excited by being in a Garda car, with its “flashing blue lights”. A number 
of participants from both groups explained how they themselves would buy the children 
bars of chocolate or food from their own resources, to relax and appease the children.  
 
These findings are consistent with earlier findings in the interview stage of the audit. 
Garda members are in consensus regarding the inappropriateness of Garda Stations as 
initial places of safety. 
 
Participant’s Perception of the Child’s Experience 
As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, FG 2 participants touched on their 
perceptions of the child’s experience while in the care of AGS. While they were 
unanimous in describing Garda stations as wholly inappropriate, they also expressed the 
view that some children – such as older children in their early teens – may find the 
experience somewhat exciting, or that members of AGS would attempt to make the best 
of the scenario.  
 
Another participant was less comfortable speculating about the child’s experience, but 
was willing to venture a guess that children become quite bored, as the process of 
handing a child over to the next responsible agency or individual can be quite drawn out:  
What a child thinks of it? I don’t know. If you’re waiting a long time, you 
do get bored. As a child does get bored we’re trying our best to keep them 
happy while they’re waiting to make sure they’re safe. 
223 
 
What was unquestionably clear from both the interview and focus group stages of this 
audit is that members are very concerned at ensuring the child’s experience in Garda care 
is not traumatising. Indeed, the overwhelming finding in this audit is that Garda 
members commit great efforts to treating children sensitively and compassionately when 
a child has been removed under section 12. 
 
Consultation with the Child 
As noted above, a number of participants from FG 1 described a strong tendency to 
consult with the child regarding the child’s circumstances, while mindful of the child’s 
age and maturity.  
 
It is clear from both the interview and focus group stages of this audit, that the voice of 
the child removed under section 12 features strongly in the considerations and decision- 
making of members of AGS on the welfare and care of children. 
 
Access to a Lawyer 
In light of the strong legal and procedural rights afforded to both parents and children in 
Bunreacht na hÉireann, 1937, the focus groups were asked if there are routine 
procedures in relation to providing access to legal advice for parents from whose care the 
child has been removed.  
 
One participant from FG 1 said he would advise parents to consult a lawyer, but said 
there was no formal structure or requirement on Gardaí to advise parents, nor is there a 
list of nearby family lawyers which Gardaí could provide to parents should they wish to 
acquire legal advice. Most other participants said they had never considered providing 
such advice to parents.  
 
Some FG 2 participants were more explicit in why such advice for parents is unlikely to 
be considered by Gardaí removing children under section 12:  
The parents are very much secondary … I don’t think that that sort of 
advice should be given by us at all. 
 
When this participant was pushed on the rights of the parents, he offered the interesting 
response: “But a child has a higher right to their personal safety.” Other FG 2 
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participants were doubtful as to whether it is their function to give out legal advice to 
those who were not under arrest.  
 
5.4.8 Aftermath of Section 12 Invocation 
Focus group participants were asked about the aftermath of the removal of the child. 
Questions under this general heading sought to gather data on inter-agency cooperation 
and coordination, the availability of appropriate resources at appropriate times, and 
general systemic coordination within AGS.  
 
Tusla Notification 
A number of participants in FG 1 were highly critical of the Tusla notification system, 
doubting whether it was appropriate or effective in many cases to involve Tusla:  
The guards have no final role essentially, because … you’re sending it on, and 
they’re sending it back, maybe six months later … 
 
This line of commentary from FG 1 reflects a broader theme encountered in 
questionnaire and interview stages of this audit: ‘notification is not communication’. As 
with critical commentary by interview respondents regarding notification systems 
between AGS and Tusla, FG 1 was similarly unenthusiastic when discussing what it 
considered an unnecessary bureaucratic instrument. Touching again on a perceived 
culture of superficial accountability, one participant noted “it’s a paper exercise”. 
 
Another FG 1 participant provided the following insight into his concern that this 
excessive bureaucracy could jeopardise cases involving real and significant risks being 
picked up:  
If there is something you need to stress, that is not getting lost in the mass of 
it all. Like, if there’s one that, you know, this is a genuine issue, that’s not just 
your old run-of-the-mill notification for everyone. 
 
Court Proceedings 
Focus group participants were asked if court proceedings followed the section 12 
removal, particularly if Tusla had applied for a section 13 order from the District Court 
in relation to the child. Consistent with the questionnaire and interview stages of the 
audit, this line of questioning sought to examine the nature of inter-agency 
communication between Tusla and AGS, and processes and cultures among Tusla social 
workers to provide feedback on cases to Garda members who remove children under 
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section 12. This data is also relevant to the question of whether the Courts Service in 
Ireland is making appropriate efforts to facilitate the operation of an effective child 
protection system. 
 
In terms of practical issues around access to courts, one participant from FG 2 explained 
the circumstances surrounding the invocation of section 12 by a Garda in his station. In 
the following passage, he explains how section 12 was exercised to facilitate Tusla social 
workers in obtaining a section 13 order due to perceived delays in District Court sittings:  
…there was a gap there, around two hours before the District Court, or three 
hours, I forget how long it was until it would take place. So, the risk was 
considered immediate. If they went off to get their care order, mammy 
would’ve been gone with the child. 
 
Speaking more generally, that same participant from FG 2 was quick to explain that the 
District Court in his geographical area was willing to facilitate such an application.  
However, he also described a perceived reluctance on the part of Tusla to seek section 
13 orders in the courts, and instead requesting Gardaí to exercise section 12, due to 
financial considerations around legal costs.  
 
In an interesting exchange, a number of participants discussed the onerous requirement 
on families to travel to Dublin for High Court hearings relating to children requiring 
special care, and also whether the High Court was best placed to make such decisions on 
the child’s care:  
There’s almost an arrogance about that. Families, troubled families are 
expected to travel to Dublin … The Courts should come to them.  
 
Agreeing with and echoing these sentiments, another participant also suggested such 
special care hearings should be dealt with locally, perhaps as the District Court’s 
responsibility:  
[The High Court sitting in Dublin] may as well be in Japan to some of these 
families, you know? Whereas the District Court... Chances are, you know, the 
local District Judge probably has a fair idea of the families they’re dealing 
with, and they apply a higher degree of common sense, they certainly have a 
compassion, you know, for dealing with them. 
 
Another participant focused on the potential traumatising impact that travelling to 
Dublin for court hearings could have on the child. 
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Debriefing and Personal Support following section 12 invocation, and 
Background Context to Section 12 Use 
Focus group participants were asked what kind of supports were available to members 
following traumatic incidents, such as child protection cases resulting in section 12 
removal, in which they may be involved. This question was asked, as the audit was also 
attempting to gain a broader insight into the emotional impact on members of AGS 
when undertaking their child protection functions. The question was also relevant to the 
broader issue of whether sufficient systems, procedures and cultures are in place within 
AGS to facilitate and support its members in undertaking its vital child protection 
functions. 
 
As was found in the interview stage of this audit, FG 1 participants explained there was 
an absence of formal support structures for Gardaí in the aftermath of dealing with 
traumatic cases. Many also related this to the lack of feedback they receive following an 
event such as a section 12 removal:  
That’s where the follow-up would be a benefit to the guards. It’s that if 
somebody rang or emailed to say ‘listen, the kids are fine now, thanks a 
million’. 
 
Others in FG 1 noted that dealing with children in such circumstances does affect 
members of AGS:  
And you’re supposed to forget about them. You do get emotionally 
attached in a space of a couple of hours. 
 
FG 2 participants said there were some formal structures in place, but doubted whether 
they were appropriate or effective for the kind of trauma experienced by members in 
these cases:  
…management … would refer you to the employee assistance service in the 
job. But the adequateness of that, for something like this, is… 
[questionable].” 
  
These more senior Gardaí drew the question back to resources: “There’s not 
enough of them to begin with.”  
 
As was found in the interview stage, FG 2 participants also focused on inter-personal 
support provided by other members of a Garda’s unit, or station – a supporting 
atmosphere provided, in part, through dialogue:  
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We deal with it ourselves, you know what I mean? I would put my man in, 
and I would chat, and we’d go out and go for a cup of coffee and such. 
Have a talk with ourselves … And that’s how we deal with certain 
situations.  
 
There was general agreement in FG 2 that this was an organic and natural feature of the 
supporting infrastructure for members within the Garda organisation, though some were 
unsure if it was appropriate in itself: “And I think that’s how we do it. Is it proper? I 
don’t know, but that’s how we deal with it.”  
 
5.4.9 Experiences with Tusla  
Crucial questions around which this audit is centred focused on the degree of inter-
agency communication, coordination, and cooperation between AGS and Tusla in the 
area of child protection. Focus group participants were therefore asked numerous 
questions regarding their experiences with Tusla in their particular case, and more 
generally. Participants were also asked for any insights from the perspective of a Garda, 
on the operation of Tusla. 
 
Communication, Cooperation, Information-sharing and Feedback 
As with the questionnaire and interview stages of the audit, participants in FG 1 were 
critical of Tusla in terms of communication, information-sharing and feedback. One 
participant for example, was particularly annoyed at not being informed by Tusla that the 
children he had removed had been immediately returned to the parent. This participant 
explained that he discovered this when the father attended the station for a meeting with 
him:  
…they [Tusla] took the kids away, and on the Monday evening, I’d arranged 
for the two parents to come in separately to make statements to me. And 
the father arrived in with all three children with him. At no point was I ever 
told that the kids were going back, I was never asked about any of the 
details of the situation… 
 
This participant continued to describe what he perceived to be an apathetic attitude by 
social workers in relation to the case:  
I told them but they didn’t ask for any details, the situation, or the 
circumstances, like … the kids were given straight back … They [the 
parents] made their statements on the Monday, both parents, and on 
Tuesday they were back [at home] well outside of my reach. So it was kind 
of... A bit frustrating and... there seemed to be no information to this date. I 
still don’t know what social worker was assigned. 
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The Sergeant of this Garda participant was a member of FG 2, and added more detail to 
this critical account. The Sergeant explained that the Gardaí had sought to pursue a 
criminal investigation in relation to their suspicions that there may have been a case of 
domestic violence. However, that investigation was undermined by Tusla’s failure to 
communicate that the family had been reunited, and had returned to their home in the 
UK:  
We investigated it. … But Tusla entered it and got the kids back, never told 
us a word, next thing we had interviewed them, we had a file for 
prosecution, but they’d gone back. So they hadn’t told us what they were 
going to do or what they are thinking. So, there was a lot of time [wasted] in 
relation to this. 
 
Another participant from FG 1 was more positive about his relationship with his local 
Tusla team – however much of his contribution in this regard was centred on the 
benefits of a specialist child protection unit with well-developed personal working 
relationships with the local Tusla social workers.  
 
Echoing findings from the questionnaire and interview stages of the audit, FG 1 
participants also described a situation where relationships between Gardaí and Tusla 
were confined to those with senior ranking status. In other words, in many stations, 
perhaps only one Sergeant would deal with all operational interactions between that 
Garda station and Tusla. As a result of this practice, ordinary Gardaí felt excluded from 
all lines of communication with Tusla. 
 
A number of participants in FG 1 also provided a new and significant insight into inter-
agency communication not encountered in previous stages. This related to the limited 
email access Garda members have to contact individuals or agencies outside of AGS. FG 
1 participants were frustrated that such access, which they felt was a simple change, was 
not forthcoming, and felt it was a significant obstacle to developing and maintaining lines 
of communication with agencies such as Tusla:  
Yeah, I still can’t get outside access. They won’t give me outside access … 
Honestly, that’s ridiculous … I have applied for it. They told me I was 
getting it, I still haven’t got it… 
 
In another exchange, one participant took issue with a refusal by Tusla staff to hand over 
information. Other FG 1 participants were, however, also mindful of data protection 
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concerns: “There would be an issue though, of the sharing of information, that’s if they 
ring the station looking for you, you can’t give information over the phone either.” 
 
As discussed above, some participants were particularly critical of the Tusla notification 
system, which they felt was excessively bureaucratic and ineffective. Participants 
responded well to the thematic description used by the audit: “notification is not 
communication”. 
 
FG 2 participants were similarly critical of what they perceived to be a general lack of 
feedback from Tusla:  
…there’s no feedback in any situation. And we were put in a situation with 
very young children that we’re dealing with. 
 
In contrast to this experience, the Sergeant from the specialist child protection unit who 
participated in FG 2 described a much more developed and engaged relationship with 
Tusla: 
I appear for the whole district, and when we sit down like this, we each say 
what is happening with each of the cases. 
 
 
In summary, what again emerged clearly from both focus groups was the central 
importance of personal relationships between Gardaí and social workers in realising 
positive levels of inter-agency cooperation, communication, information-sharing and 
feedback. As with interview respondents, focus group participants who had developed 
such personal work relationships were positive about their interactions with Tusla. These 
same Gardaí were also quick to defend social workers, and were sympathetic to the 
resource constraints and pressures experienced by Tusla social workers.  
 
Additionally, as with previous stages of the audit, Gardaí placed a high premium on 
feedback from Tusla. Participants described both the personal emotional benefits of such 
feedback on particular cases, but also the practical operational benefits for members of 
AGS to be given evaluative feedback on their performance in such child protection 
cases. 
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Tusla Out-of-Hours Service 
One FG 1 participant, who was also a respondent in the interview stage of this audit, 
repeated his extensive account of his experiences with Tusla’s out-of-hours service in the 
greater Dublin region. As noted above, this participant spoke in very critical terms about 
this experience, in which he perceived the out-of-hours service social worker to be 
disengaged, disrespectful, unprofessional, and attempting to avoid taking responsibility 
for an extremely vulnerable child. 
 
Another FG 1 participant described this same out-of-hours service as wholly under-
resourced, with resulting delays in response times.  
 
Some participants described a queue system that governed the distribution of the limited 
out-of-hours resources. Others detailed delays of 5 and 6 hours waiting for the out-of-
hours social workers to attend the station. 
 
Participants were also uncertain to what extent this out-of-hours service worked in 
tandem with the ordinary Tusla social workers in various offices throughout the region: 
“I don’t even know if they hand over too much. I think they get, like, maybe a very basic 
report.” 
 
Another FG 1 participant described a common situation where homeless children were 
presenting themselves to Gardaí, in order to make contact with the out-of-hours service:  
Somebody presents themselves … a homeless 17-year-old… looking for 
out-of-hours to pick them up. Which we’ve had. I’ve experienced maybe 
five times. ‘Would you ring the out-of-hours for me?’… So he has to wait in 
the public office. Well, you have to keep an eye on him, because, essentially, 
he is a child.  
 
FG 2 participants also focused on delays experienced waiting for out-of-hours social 
workers to attend the station, returning again to the Garda personnel and resource 
implications of having children in the station:  
By the time you look for the out-of-hours, and get the out-of-hours, spend 
time with the kids, it can be a lengthy enough time. 
  
Those participants in FG 2 who were based outside of the area covered by out-of-hours, 
echoed general commentary encountered in earlier stages of this audit, in describing 
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circumstances where Tusla social workers refused to become involved in cases once 
standard service hours were finished:  
I am aware of a school having a problem there last weekend, and... 
Basically, they did get on to Tusla, and... It was in relation to daddy 
allegedly, you know, beating the child and that type of thing. But, basically, 
the reaction that was given was, uh, you know... ‘Well, I’m off work on 
Friday, I’m on holidays’. And the question asked was, ‘who’s there to 
replace you?’.  
 
Different Thresholds for Intervention 
Some FG 1 participants felt there may be reluctance on the part of Tusla to intervene to 
remove children because the legal thresholds they operate under were much higher than 
that for members of AGS under section 12. However, one participant who had extensive 
working experience with Tusla social workers believed resources, not legal thresholds, 
were the principal reason for this reluctance: “I think they would intervene had they got 
the resources, as in, more social workers.”  
 
Another FG 1 participant expressed his concern that Tusla social workers were operating 
under presumptions for action that were, in his experience, incorrect:  
I remember one thing. I overheard her (a social worker) saying to a 
colleague of mine. It’s that the safest place for that child to be is at home. 
And I remember thinking, how naive that was to say, you know what I 
mean? Not always and not from the guard in the field who had to invoke 
section 12. It’s not the safest place. Get them away from the danger, but 
when the danger abates, it’s okay if they want to go back. And like... That’s 
not always the case, you know? 
 
One FG 2 participant also believed there were different thresholds for intervention 
between AGS and Tusla, which he attributed to a culture of avoiding responsibility and 
accountability in Tusla.  
 
Structural Issues with Tusla Organisation 
Some participants in FG 2 were somewhat critical of what they considered to be 
opaqueness in the organisational structure of Tusla. Comparing it to the explicitly and 
transparently hierarchical structure in AGS, which he suggested was a more accountable 
model, one participant commented:  
…there’s no structure at all to Tusla. You know if you ring the Garda 
station, there’s a guard … You’re not happy, he ignores you, there is a 
sergeant. Then you have the inspector, the superintendent … I feel [with 
Tusla] … [y]ou don’t know who you’re talking to.  
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Avoidance of Responsibility or Accountability and Pressure to Invoke Section 12 
by Tusla 
As with the questionnaire stage of the audit, interview respondents were asked if they 
had ever refused to exercise section 12 when requested by Tusla social workers, or if they 
had experienced pressure from a Tusla social worker to remove a child under section 12. 
This question relates to a pattern of findings in the questionnaire, interview and focus 
group stages of the audit, which suggested Tusla social workers are at times 
circumventing the need to apply for a section 13 order from the District Court, in order 
to remove a child. The question also sought to examine evidence of perceptions among 
Gardaí that Tusla was avoiding responsibility for children at risk. 
 
FG 1 participants discussed both personal experiences and general experience by other    
members of AGS of what they perceived to be attempts by Tusla social workers to 
abdicate responsibility for a child at risk. For example, one participant suggested social 
workers had either intentionally or incompetently delayed involving AGS until just 
before the standard service hours of Tusla came to an end:  
We get a lot of, is the… call at five to five from social workers saying they 
want this place checked on over a weekend, and the first we hear about it is 
at five minutes to five. And it’s just they’re, about to finish off for the 
weekend. And they’re like, ‘oh, we’ve major concerns about this... home’. 
 
Another participant, discussed above, detailed his experience of Tusla delaying 
interviewing a family who had just moved into the area, but who were already subject to 
Tusla social worker engagement and support. In this case, the participant described 
concerns arising from care workers in a private housing support charity for the welfare of 
the children in this family. Despite these concerns being communicated to Tusla by the 
care workers, Tusla took no immediate action until the participant was forced to remove 
the children under section 12. This removal can only be described as a very traumatic 
circumstance for the children, as the intoxicated mother became very agitated and 
aggressive during the removal. The following transcript details these circumstances in 
full:  
This case had been going on for a while, Tusla were aware of the family, but 
they did absolutely nothing. The family are living in social housing, … and 
so [the housing support charity] have interaction with care workers and 
people like that. They come on a regular basis to the family. And they had 
huge concerns in relation to this family. There was, like, an abundance of 
reports done, and Tusla had done nothing. The children needed to be taken 
into care. And so it got to the point where I got a phone call asking me 
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would I go and check over the weekend. This particular weekend. … [we] 
had made arrangements that we do, spot checks on the house over the 
weekend, and… on the morning [I removed the children], I got a phone call 
to say that the children, one of the children was left in the house on his 
own. Well, he wasn’t on his own, the mother was in the house, but she was 
unconscious. And they had tried for an hour to wake her up, and this child 
is eighteen months old, in the house, left to his own devices. So I rang the 
social workers but we went in, we had to enact a section 12, because I felt 
he was at immediate risk. He was in the house, … [the housing support 
charity] tried for an hour to wake the mother, and she hadn’t woken up, and 
when I went in, of course, it all kicked off, because she realised I was a 
guard and I was in there, and I explained everything. I felt afterwards, it 
shouldn’t have got to that point. It shouldn’t have got to the point where I 
had to go in there, take a child from a screaming mother, when the social 
workers had been involved, … [the housing support charity] had been 
involved for a long period… They had done up loads of reports in relation 
to the family, and yet it was still left to us to go in and take a screaming 
child from his mother on a Friday morning. That shouldn’t have happened. 
They should’ve already had the things put in place beforehand. They had 
been aware of it, and they had done nothing. So, for me, obviously, I was 
happy to invoke section 12, because I felt that child was at immediate and 
serious risk. … After we had intervened, she took an overdose in front of 
the other guards who were there to keep her calm. So she ended up in 
hospital … And had serious health implications. But I felt it shouldn’t have 
got to that point. The kids are still in care now.  
 
It should be noted that this particular focus group participant, while clearly heavily 
critical of how this case was managed by Tusla, was also emphatic in his view that the 
principal reason his area was experiencing severe delays in Tusla interviewing families 
deemed at risk, was chronic under-resourcing.  
 
Another FG 1 participant, also discussed above, described his experience of out-of-hours 
social workers refusing to take the perceived risk to the child seriously, and effectively 
leaving the decision for the vulnerable child’s care with the child. 
 
FG 1 participants were unanimous in their belief that Tusla social workers are using 
section 12 to avoid pursuing court orders due to the onerous evidential thresholds that 
they must satisfy. One participant described section 12 as the “default” initial route for 
social workers seeking to remove a child.  
 
Another participant described a situation where he felt pressure from social workers to 
exercise section 12, despite having come to a decision in consultation with his Sergeant, 
and the child, that the threshold for removal had not been met. This participant 
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speculated that part of the reason for this was the social workers wanting to avoid going 
to court at that time.  
 
Overall, there was a perception among participants from both focus groups that social 
workers viewed Gardaí and section 12 as easier to remove a child, one that bypassed the 
courts. As with findings in other stages of this audit, focus group participants viewed 
Tusla as a somewhat dysfunctional organisation, with some taking a particularly cynical 
view on their experiences with Tusla. 
 
5.4.10 Role of An Garda Síochána 
At various points, focus group participants touched on the responsibilities and the deep 
cultural sense of obligation among members, that flowed from their role as Gardaí. For 
example, in discussions about whether there were alternative carers available to avoid 
having to remove the child to the care of AGS, participants expressed anxieties about 
handing the child into the care of someone not properly vetted by them – even if they 
were related to or known by the child.  
 
As discussed above, members of FG 1 described their sense that AGS was improperly 
treated as the “default” child protection service.  
 
Those in senior roles who participated in FG 2 also demonstrated a precautionary logic 
in resource distribution where children at risk were concerned, even where they 
suspected they may be being pressured into action by Tusla:  
I wouldn’t feel right if we get a phone call or a fax at 5 o’clock on a Friday 
with concerns over this weekend. I wouldn’t feel right if I didn’t get my lads 
to go up and make sure everything is alright. I just wouldn’t… 
 
Demand on Resources/Absence of Appropriate Resources 
As was found during the interview stage of the audit, FG 1 participants discussed the 
drain on already thin Garda resources involved in removing children under section 12.  
 
As was found in the interview stage, various factors such as whether an out-of-hours 
service was available, and whether the station was in an urban or rural area, were relevant 
to how significant a drain on resources section 12 removals were for AGS.  
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In discussions noted above, focus group participants provided detailed insights into the 
time and personnel resources that are consumed in managing children when they are 
removed to the station:  
…the length of time that we have, you know, by the time you look for the 
out-of-hours, and get to the out-of-hours ... I think, you know, you have to 
make up that time. Spend time with the kids, or deal with the kids for that 
time it takes them to come in, which can be a lengthy enough time as well. 
 
Also examined above, focus group participants described Garda members who felt ill-
equipped, and at times anxious, about exercising their child protection powers, and 
Garda stations that were wholly inappropriate for the care of children. The absence of 
out-of-hours social workers outside of the greater Dublin region was consistently raised 
as a major concern for participants in terms of resourcing and support of members when 
exercising their child protection function. 
 
Specialist Child Protection Units in An Garda Síochána 
A theme that was central in much of FG 1’s discussions, and which was largely absent 
from other stages of this audit, was the value in specialist child protection units within 
AGS. One participant in FG 1, who was deployed in such a unit in Dublin city, was able 
to describe the role he performed, and crucially, the working relationships this role 
allowed him to develop with Tusla. This participant demonstrated the most detailed 
insight into the operation of Tusla of all Garda respondents in this audit.  
 
This participant was unequivocal in his view that the specialist unit was an effective asset 
for AGS in fulfilling its child protection functions, though his unit had the drawback of 
not being a 24 hour, year-round service:  
A child protection unit? Definitely works. In terms of [my station’s district] 
you’d have to, the volume of files coming in and out... The child protection 
unit definitely works. But the only thing is, obviously, we’re not 24/7… 
 
The participant was quick to explain that he would still make himself available out-of-
hours if someone from his station contacted him looking for advice or assistance:  
…[if] someone rang me and looked, at 3 in the morning, looked for me to 
come in and... I’d come in, to be honest. And the same with most of us in 
my office. If it was a case of a child being at serious risk, we would come 
in… 
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However, this participant noted that the creation of such units was not an automatic 
means to achieve strong inter-agency cooperation and communication:  
I know of other places, even in other Garda stations, not too far from 
where I am, they’ve only started up child protection units and they’re 
finding it really difficult to make the connection with the social workers in 
Tusla. They don’t want to know, the guards, they don’t want to have the 
interaction. 
 
The kind of connections in his specialist unit, he explained, took years to develop – but 
were now extremely productive and valuable. 
 
The other members of FG 1 were unanimous in their view that such units would be 
helpful in performing their child protection functions. That said, there was a mixture of 
views about whether the same model would work in all areas of the country: 
Even if it was a divisional thing, for 24/7... I think child protection units 
need to be in every station. Because there’s children at risk from the 
smallest area to large cities to towns. There’s children at risk all the time. 
And so, I don’t know whether the work would be there to justify having 
guards 24/7, all the time, but definitely, I think... we need, the child 
protection units.  
 
Interestingly, the participant from the specialist unit, was careful to emphasise that such 
units are not a panacea in ensuring correct performance of child protection functions by 
AGS.  
 
Gender Bias in An Garda Síochána  
In response to findings in the interview stage, focus groups were asked if there was 
evidence in their experience of gender bias in the distribution of child protection related 
work among Gardaí. In particular, participants were asked if female members of AGS 
were more likely to be delegated such work, than male members. 
 
Responses to this question were interestingly mixed. One participant in FG 1 said all 
child protection work was given to female members, but this was not something he 
necessarily had an issue with: “I don’t mind, it doesn’t bother me. I actually probably 
prefer them.”  
 
Other FG 1 participants (both male and female) felt that such practices were not an issue 
for the force anymore, and that “things have changed”.  
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FG 2 was unanimous in the view that “things had changed” and that the organisation 
had “come a long way”. 
 
These and earlier findings in the audit suggest that delegation of what may sometimes be 
considered ‘low value’ and low prestige child protection work to female Gardaí may be a 
localised phenomenon within AGS.  
 
5.4.11 Other General Themes  
Perceived Changes in Child Protection Services 
Focus group participants were asked if they felt child protection systems had improved 
in Ireland in the past decade. Responses to this question were notable in that there was a 
striking division in perspective between FG 1 and FG 2.  
 
Participants in FG 1 felt that there had been no significant improvement in the past ten 
years. One participant explained that the instances of chronic systemic failure in relation 
to children with challenging behaviour were still commonplace. Another participant 
added that a culture of superficial accountability was now pervasive. 
 
The responses of ranking Garda members who participated in FG 2 to this question 
were at variance with the view of rank and file Gardaí. FG 2 participants all felt services 
were better, with one pointing out how it was now easier to source someone to take 
responsibility for a child, though conceding there was an urban / rural divide in terms of 
quality of support: “I would feel tonight, now, at 3 o’clock in the morning, I will make a 
phone call, I will have someone to come to me, where the lads in the country wouldn’t.”  
 
When it was explained that FG 1 had expressed a different perspective, some 
participants suggested this difference was due to length of service differences (i.e. the 
senior ranking members had been in the service longer, and had seen child protection 
services when they were much worse). Others felt that senior ranking members were 
more likely to be in a close working relationship with other agencies, and therefore more 
likely to see the improvements to child protection systems and practices.  
 
These findings echo other findings in this audit of a disconnect between rank and file 
and management levels of AGS: here, in terms of perception within the organisation. 
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FG Participant Understanding of Section 12 
Focus group participants were asked about their understanding of the “immediate and 
serious” risk threshold for removal of a child under section 12. This question is central to 
the audit’s examination of participant understanding of Garda powers to remove children 
from their family or legal guardian; the boundaries of that power; and participant 
understanding of the justifications for that power and its boundaries. 
 
FG 1 participants all mentioned neglect as a major background consideration for the 
decision to remove a child. If there is evidence of on-going neglect in the family home, 
or in the child’s appearance, this would be significant:  
But if they were neglected and it’s been an on-going thing. If you went in 
and a child was seriously hungry, you can see it in them, they haven’t eaten 
or drank. That’s neglect, but it’s got to the point where it could become a 
health factor. 
 
Other participants focused on a soon-to-be-realised risk of physical harm:  
I would perceive it as, as neglect, serious risk of where they are at that time, 
as in, are they going to do themselves damage? If the child was seriously 
injured just before you arrived. If you felt that there was a danger, that if 
you left, that something would happen to that child. And because you didn’t 
take it away, you’re responsible, that’s your responsibility. 
 
Other participants characterised the decision in terms of a balance of harms between 
removal and non-removal:  
…if I left the child and went away, the child would be in a worse situation. 
That child was on their own, or in a situation where they could hurt 
themselves, basically if I leave the child there and don’t take it, that’s in a 
worse situation than me taking it. 
 
One participant offered an interesting nuanced perspective on the question of immediacy 
and risk – an insight that includes a Garda member’s background understanding of 
broader institutional failure on the part of State child protection services:  
Mightn’t be in serious danger immediately, in the next hour or two. It’s not 
that the child is going to immediately die this day. But if nobody’s done 
anything to this point, and if you walk away no one is going to do 
anything… 
 
One FG 2 participant was more hesitant in offering his view, and was critical of the 
Child Care Act 1991, for not providing sufficient definitional clarity for the concept of 
“immediate and serious risk”:  
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I was looking up this, and the Act doesn’t define it, which is I feel a 
deficiency in the Act itself. Immediate is... Easy enough to find, alright, I 
think. But the ‘serious’... One person’s serious is not another person’s 
serious. I would be talking about, ... Physical... You know physical or 
psychological harm. I think it’s a bit simplistic to say that it has to be life-
threatening.  
 
5.4.12 Suggestions for Reform 
The vast majority of focus group participants’ suggestions for reform centred on the 
provision of properly resourced out-of-hours social work services, and specialist child 
protection units within AGS. In relation to the specialist child protection units, there was 
no clear consensus on whether the unit should be wholly independent within each 
station, or each division; or whether each Garda unit should have at least one person 
properly trained in child protection.  
 
Part of this absence of consensus between FG 1 participants was focused on regional 
(urban versus rural) differences in resource allocation, and the varying demands on those 
resources due to those regional differences: “…[in the country] we wouldn’t have the 
work for a full time anything. Like, we barely can cover a unit as it is”. 
 
All agreed that, at the very least, Gardaí should have another Garda member, who is a 
child protection specialist, and who is always available to contact to ask for advice.  
 
Participants also argued that whoever takes responsibility for child protection in a unit, 
station or division, is also in a position to develop and maintain close professional and 
working connections with social workers in his local Tusla station. Among FG 1 
participants, the heavy reliance on Unit Sergeants for advice on complex child protection 
measures was considered inadequate, especially where that Sergeant is newly promoted:  
Let’s say a new Sergeant that’s been promoted. They might’ve never had 
any dealings with children at all. And they don’t know exactly … Everyone 
has to ask for help eventually. 
 
However, one rurally based participant noted the need for all Garda members to be 
trained and empowered to make tough decisions when there was not a specialist 
member, unit, or social work team available for consultation. 
 
All focus group participants agreed on the need for appropriate facilities to manage 
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children when in the temporary care of AGS.  
 
Though not suggested directly by the focus groups, the audit also noted a lack of 
familiarity with procedural guidelines for members to follow in circumstances where they 
have removed children to a Garda Station. While both focus group participants and 
interview respondents alike demonstrated a very high level of commitment to avoiding 
retraumatising children while they were in their care, the audit found Garda members 
generally rely on their own common sense, instinct and decency in how they care for 
vulnerable children. 
 
The need for feedback from Tusla also represented a major convergence of opinion 
among focus group participants. As was found in the interview stage, focus group 
participants repeatedly highlighted the frustration experienced in not getting follow-up as 
a matter of routine from Tusla. Participants also emphasised the educational and 
operational value in getting such feedback.  
 
Neither FG 1 nor FG 2 participants were able to offer any suggestions for reform in the 
area of cultural competency. This absence of ideas reflects the findings from the 
interview stage of this audit, that suggest an absence of understanding among members 
of AGS about the growing cultural complexity of Irish society, and the new policing 
demands that this paradigm creates. 
 
Laminated Card 
As with the interview stage, focus groups were asked about the value of a proposed 
laminated card to guide members when considering whether to invoke section 12 to 
remove a child. Participants reacted favourably to this suggestion, particularly to the 
suggestion that the card would contain a list of agencies and numbers in the station’s 
locality for the Garda to contact in the event of a section 12 removal.  
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6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The invocation of section 12 powers involves a legal decision by AGS that intrudes into 
the private domain. While the overwhelming finding in this audit is that Garda members 
commit great efforts to treating children sensitively and compassionately when a child 
has been removed under section 12, it also identifies problems within AGS and the child 
protection system. In relation to agencies charged with child protection responsibilities: 
along with a lack of adherence to the legislation and regulations currently in place, there 
is evidence of problems with appropriate resourcing, facilities, and the general ethos of 
professionals within those agencies. Moreover, there is evidence that some vulnerable 
children are being failed by the very system which is responsible for their protection, 
their safety, and is designed to put their needs first.   
 
As found by the audit, the profile of children that are the subject of section 12 powers 
suggest that these are typically very vulnerable children who have experienced significant 
stressors in their lives. It is noteworthy that according to questionnaire findings in this 
audit, 70% of children removed under section 12 were under 16 years of age, with 54% 
of respondents in the questionnaire phase of the audit stating the child and/or family 
were previously known to members of AGS.  
 
As a number of these children were already in the care system when removed under 
section 12, there is a high likelihood for some that their difficulties are on-going, with a 
serious resulting impact on their self-esteem, their capacity to self-regulate, and their 
sense of self-efficacy. While each child’s story is unique to them, they share a history of 
having, at one or more times, been deemed to be at immediate and serious risk 
necessitating section 12 removal by AGS. How services respond to their situation then 
assumes critical importance. 
 
From the wealth of data compiled during the audit – including analysis of PULSE data, 
responses by members of AGS to questionnaires, and, particularly, themes that emerged 
from individual Garda interviews and from the two focus group discussions – it is 
possible to make a number of comments and draw a number of conclusions. 
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6.2 CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.2.1 Use of Section 12 Powers 
The audit found that the children and families in which section 12 is invoked are typically 
experiencing some level of social dysfunction, trauma or insecurity.  
 
Overall, the audit did not find evidence to suggest over-zealous use of section 12 
removal of children from families living in social or economic deprivation. 
 
6.2.2 Reluctance to Use Section 12 Powers 
While the audit demonstrates that section 12 removal was generally appropriate in the 
cases reviewed, there is evidence of a potentially problematic reluctance among some 
members to remove children even where good grounds exist.  
 
6.2.3 Role Ambiguity 
One of the overarching conclusions of this audit is that members of AGS do not exercise 
section 12 powers lightly. These findings also support the other overarching conclusion 
that Gardaí are uncertain about certain specificities of their role and powers in child 
protection. While respondents were clear that they had such a role, they were often 
unsure about the legal boundaries of this role. The high level of consultation with senior 
officers also reflects the highly hierarchical command structure of AGS, and the 
decision-making deference of junior officers to their supervising officers. 
 
6.2.4 Gender 
The audit found no evidence to suggest that gender is a significant determiner in whether 
a Garda is more likely to exercise section 12 powers if he or she is male or female. 
Female members of AGS do not appear to be over or under represented to a significant 
degree in section 12 use, and the interview and focus groups stages indicated a materially 
comparable approach to the use of section 12 powers among male and female Gardaí. 
However, the gender of the children removed under section 12 is significant, with 
adolescent males most likely to be subject to section 12 removal.  
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6.2.5 Garda Age and Years of Service 
Garda members with longer periods of service were the most likely to exercise section 12 
powers. This was in part due to the impact of the recruitment embargo in AGS, but also 
partly due to the decision to remove a child under section 12 requiring a high level of 
professional experience and confidence from Gardaí. This latter point was reinforced by 
findings from the interview and focus group stages, which indicated a high level of 
caution among Garda members in exercising section 12 powers of removal against 
children and families.  
 
6.2.6 PULSE 
Following the audit, there remain some outstanding questions, ambiguities, and concerns 
in relation to Garda practices in recording data and case narratives on PULSE. The audit 
found inconsistencies in relation to incident recording practices between members of 
AGS, and the quality of incident reports on PULSE. This raises concerns for appropriate 
oversight and accountability within AGS. AGS has confirmed that systemic reform of 
PULSE is underway, and this process of reform is clearly to be welcomed. However, 
ambiguities exist in relation to the role of the GISC in how narratives are recorded on 
PULSE, and whether it is aiding or undermining comprehensive and accurate reporting 
of cases on the system. It is also unclear whether any system change that may be 
underway, will address the inconsistencies in data and narrative recording on PULSE 
identified in chapter 3 of this audit.  
 
6.2.7 Ethnicity/Nationality 
Despite uncertainties around the ethnicity and/or nationality of children removed, the 
audit could find no evidence that the ethnic background of a child, or their nationality, 
was a significant consideration in the decision to remove a child. While the nationality of 
the children and family in one case involving Police and Social Services in England and 
Wales was undoubtedly a central concern – this factor is relevant due to international 
legal obligations on the Irish State, rather than any issue of racial profiling. As such, the 
audit found no evidence of racial profiling in decisions to remove children under section 
12.  
 
This finding must be tempered by three considerations: firstly, by necessity, the sample 
size in the interview stage is not sufficiently large to draw general conclusions about the 
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presence or absence of racial or ethnic profiling in Garda use of section 12 powers. The 
interview stage provided the audit with very valuable insights into the culture and 
professional practices of members of AGS in the performance of their child protection 
functions, but was not designed to generate data of statistical significance.  
 
Secondly, as noted in chapters 3 and 4, the apparent absence of a requirement for routine 
gathering of ethnic data on children, or other individuals, in the PULSE system makes it 
difficult for the audit to make firm determinations on the presence or absence of racial or 
ethnic profiling by AGS in the performance of its child protection functions.  
 
Finally, the audit was focused on the question of how members of AGS deal with 
children when they are performing their child protection functions. Any findings in this 
regard cannot be treated as relevant to the performance of other policing functions by 
members of AGS. More specifically, the audit’s findings cannot be used to draw 
inferences or conclusions on the question of whether children, their families, or any 
other adults, are racially profiled by members of AGS, when those people are considered 
to be possible offenders. The remit of this audit was confined exclusively to examine 
cases where a child was removed under section 12 – it did not examine any cases where 
the child was arrested for suspected commission of a criminal offence. 
 
6.2.8 Inter-Agency Cooperation 
A common finding throughout the audit was the lack of information-sharing between 
agencies involved in child protection. A broad theme encountered in the various stages 
of this audit is that ‘notification is not communication’, in that while there exist 
notification systems between Tusla and AGS, those systems are superficial, ineffective, 
and under-resourced. Touching again on a perceived culture of superficial accountability, 
one participant noted “it’s a paper exercise”. 
 
For older children who have had previous involvement in the child welfare system, the 
lack of systemic and substantive co-ordination between services, along with difficulties 
members of AGS have in accessing services for those children at times of crisis, can 
result in feelings of disillusionment with and abandonment by the system. 
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Children who have experienced inadequate or abusive parental behaviours may already 
have internal representations of themselves as being “unlovable” and unworthy. If the 
services’ response to children removed under the section is delivered in a disorganised 
and fragmented manner, the potential exists to exacerbate children’s feelings of isolation, 
of not belonging, and being unwanted. 
 
During interviews and focus group discussions, members of AGS spoke openly of the 
difficulties – at times outright resistance from partner agencies – they experienced in 
engaging follow-on services for children removed under section 12. Respondents 
described circumstances of children having to be kept occupied for hours in Garda 
Stations, while attempts were made to access the appropriate support services. Members 
spoke of how they had to attend to children’s basic care needs of providing food and 
clothing in the absence of child care services being available. A number spoke of how 
the plight of some of these children impacted upon them at a human level and how, 
when rostered off-duty, they carried a residual concern as to what child care 
arrangements were being put in place for the child. This issue is explored in detail at 
sections 5.3 and 5.4 of this audit. 
 
Respondents spoke of their frustration if the child was the subject of a number of 
successive “section 12s” due to the inadequacy or ineffectiveness, or complete lack, of a 
care plan. They also explained how some children had to be criminalised or pathologised 
in order to gain access to necessary support and welfare services. 
 
While the vast majority of members of AGS were confident in the necessity and 
justification for their use of section 12 powers, some were less confident of the adequacy 
of the response from the child care system, and whether children’s best interests were 
being served by it. There were notable examples where respondents described their total 
lack of confidence in the wider child protection infrastructure. 
 
It is speculative to discuss the degree to which children are aware of the tensions 
between services charged with their welfare, particularly in relation to securing a place of 
safety for them. However it is reasonable to assume that older children will have some 
degree of awareness of this systemic dysfunction, which can lead to a lack of confidence 
in services and a questioning of “Whom can I depend on? Whom can I trust?” 
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6.2.9 Lack of Early Intervention 
The audit’s findings contain numerous instances of children being subject to repeated 
removal under section 12. This evidence suggests systemic failings with regard to the 
child protection systems in Ireland. There were also multiple examples in each stage of 
the audit highlighting chronic systemic failures to help children with challenging 
behaviour, prior to the involvement of AGS.  
 
There is a persistent perception among a number of Garda respondents that Tusla social 
workers sometimes delay addressing a particular risk to a child, in order to force the 
involvement of AGS in the case, due to AGS organisation’s 24 hour operational basis. 
 
This data reflects a wider pattern identified in other aspects of this audit, which suggests 
the desire among Garda respondents to have the workings of Tusla “demystified”. It also 
reflects a vague understanding among Garda members that AGS and Tusla operate 
under different risk thresholds for intervention – but there is no real understanding of 
why those thresholds are different. 
 
6.2.10 Location of a Place of Safety 
Respondents in the various stages of this audit agreed that Garda Stations and hospitals 
were not appropriate locations to remove highly vulnerable children to. However, given 
the late times or weekends during which the majority of section 12 removals take place, 
they are typically the only available locations of safety. It is clear from findings in both 
the interview and focus group stages of this audit that Garda members generally attempt 
to manage the child in a sensitive manner. They are conscious that the experience in the 
Garda Station poses a risk of added trauma to the child, and generally do their best to 
minimise that risk. However, Garda members are left in a situation where there is no 
formal guidance on how a child is to be managed following a section 12 removal. Garda 
members receive no guidance on how children should be treated when in an 
environment such as a Garda station to avoid greater traumatisation. Combined with the 
general absence of training in child protection among members of AGS, this leaves 
children at high risk of further traumatisation following section 12 removal.  
 
As stated earlier in this audit, 58% of respondents to the questionnaire identified a 
hospital or Garda Station as the initial location to where the child was removed, with the 
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majority stating that the average time spent in this location was in the time range of 1 to 
6 hours. Gardaí do not have access to appropriate dedicated facilities for children 
following section 12 removal: children subject to a power designed to remove them to a 
place of safety. 
 
For a child to be removed from family care in and of itself may cause distress. This is 
particularly so in cases of forced removal, and where the child may have witnessed his or 
her parent actively resisting the removal. This issue is fully explored at page 129 of this 
audit where it is stated that members of AGS experienced resistance in 25.5% of all cases 
where section 12 powers were invoked – the vast majority of these cases involving 
parental resistance. 
 
In addition to maltreatment, disruptive attachments, mental health issues, substance 
abuse issues, and other traumas the audit found as justifications for section 12 removal, 
the child in most instances has to cope with being removed to an environment that is 
alien to him or her. The child then has to wait for several hours until an appropriate 
placement is found.  
 
6.2.11 Handover 
The circumstances of the handover of care of the child, and the person or agency into 
whose care the child was placed, were varied. As the majority of these cases took place 
outside of Tusla’s standard hours of service, a number of respondents in the various 
stages of the audit placed the child removed under section 12 with emergency foster 
placements arranged through the Five Rivers organisation. In these cases, respondents 
often had to travel significant distances to the designated foster placement, to hand over 
the child. For example, Garda W described having to drive over an hour away from the 
station to the emergency foster placement, with another Garda from the station. 
Respondents, such as Garda L considered these handovers to be enormously time-
consuming, and resource draining. It is also notable that respondents knew little or 
nothing about these placements, how they were organised, or the legal basis upon which 
these handovers took place. 
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6.2.12 Follow-on Services 
The lack of appropriate follow-on services available in a timely, seamless manner has the 
potential to further compound the difficulties already experienced by the child. This can 
result in feelings of uncertainty, isolation, shock, confusion, embarrassment and anxiety 
within the child. 
 
Garda members who invoke the section 12 powers are generally unaware of what follow-
on services are available to them until they try to access such services. In many instances, 
their supervising Sergeants were also unaware of available services, with most describing 
a vague awareness of the Five Rivers organisation as performing some important 
function. As a result, they cannot convey any sense of confidence or certainty to the 
child as to what will happen next, who will be taking care of him or her, in what location 
and for how long. Such uncertainty has the capacity to engender feelings of anxiety 
particularly in younger children. The fact that in many instances children subject to 
section 12 powers are taken to a Garda Station or hospital may contribute to an 
erroneous belief that they have done something wrong, or are in some way ill and in 
need of hospitalisation with other sick children. 
 
6.2.13 Out-of-Hours Service 
Most respondents in the various stages of the audit were stationed in regions of Ireland 
that did not have access to a Tusla out-of-hours service, though many of those incidents 
of section 12 removal took place outside of Tusla’s standard hours of service. 
 
The existing, geographically-limited out-of-hours service provided by Tusla was also 
suggested to be systemically inadequate as it could not facilitate access to case files on 
particular children by out-of-hours social workers. This finding may suggest the absence 
of a comprehensive and unified system covering the children and families with whom 
Tusla is engaging. 
 
6.2.14 Private Agencies 
The use of the private fostering service Five Rivers as the de facto official out-of-hours 
child protection service by AGS was among the most prominent themes that emerged 
throughout this audit. In nearly all areas outside of greater Dublin, Five Rivers functions 
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as the sole service to which members can turn when dealing with a section 12 removal, 
outside of Tusla’s standard service hours.  
 
Respondents who expressed opinions on the quality of the service, such as Garda W and 
Garda Q, were generally very positive. However, these positive responses were largely 
confined to the 24 hour, year round, availability of Five Rivers. It is also crucial to note 
that no respondent was able to give a detailed insight into the nature of the Five Rivers 
organisation. No respondent was in a position to explain the legal basis upon which 
children were transferred from the care of AGS into the care of an emergency foster 
placement organised by the Five Rivers organisation. None of the interview respondents 
were in a position to provide information on the regulatory oversight, if any, of the Five 
Rivers organisation. A handful of interview respondents echoed a pattern of responses in 
the questionnaire stage, in suggesting a vague assumption that Five Rivers were 
contracted in some way by Tusla to provide the out-of-hours service.  
 
History of Private Social Service and Care Provision in Ireland 
Since before the foundation of the Irish State, the private and voluntary sectors have 
played, and continue to play a central role in the provision of essential educational, 
health, addiction, homelessness, and childcare services in Ireland.90 This effective 
contracting-out of responsibility for the provision of essential social and health services 
by the State to non-State actors – typically religious organisations – is also central to the 
history of institutional abuse and exploitation of children, women, and adults with mental 
health issues in post-independent Ireland.91 The audit’s findings show that the Irish state 
continues to heavily rely on private organisations in the provision of emergency foster 
care services in Ireland.  
 
The central role of the private sector in the provision of essential emergency foster care 
services poses two key concerns. Firstly, the contracting-out of such services to non-
                                                     
90 Sarah-Anne Buckley, The Cruelty Man: Child Welfare, the NSPCC and the State in Ireland, 1889-1956 
(Manchester University Press 2013); Caroline Skehill, “The Origins of Child Welfare Under the Poor Law 
and the Emergence of the Institutional versus Family Care Debate”, in Crossman and Gray (eds), Poverty 
and Welfare in Ireland 1838-1948 (Irish Academic Press 2011).  
91 Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, Chapter 4, prepared by Eoin O’Sullivan, “Residential Child 
Welfare in Ireland, 1965–2008: An Outline of Policy, Legislation and Practice: A Paper Prepared for the 
Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse” http://www.childabusecommission.ie/rpt/04-04.php (visited 
29 March 2016); James Smith, Ireland’s Magdalen Laundries and the Nation’s Architecture of Containment (Notre 
Dame 2007). 
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State bodies, dilutes and diminishes the understanding that it is the responsibility of the 
State to provide such child protection services.  
 
Secondly, the current privatised model of emergency foster care services in Ireland 
effectively removes those services from the broader public services industrial relations 
infrastructure.  
 
6.2.15 Children with Challenging Behaviour 
The audit also revealed a pattern of private service providers refusing to organise 
placements for children with challenging behaviour. This highlights a key issue with the 
heavy reliance by the State on private, non-statutory frontline service providers. In a large 
proportion of cases, there was no agency available out-of-hours with an express statutory 
obligation to take the child into care. Where Tusla provides no service, the private service 
providers who have filled the gap appear to be under no statutory obligation to take 
children they deem to be too problematic or difficult, creating a significant and troubling 
gap in the child protection infrastructure in Ireland. Additionally, it is not clear upon 
which criteria private service providers determine children too problematic to take into 
care.  
 
6.2.16 Foster Care 
A theme that emerged in various stages of this audit, centred on the capacity of some 
foster placements to care for children with complex and challenging needs. While this is 
technically beyond the scope of the audit, many respondents offered accounts of their 
experiences of the foster care system, and its capacity to manage children with 
challenging behaviour. 
 
The evidence from the audit suggests there are issues with the management of children 
with complex and challenging needs by the foster care system in Ireland. While feedback 
on fostering in this audit was generally very positive, some cases reviewed raise doubts 
about the capacity of foster placements to manage and provide security and care for 
some children in the care system. 
 
All children needing substitute care, whatever their age, physical, mental or emotional 
disabilities, should have the opportunity to live in a foster family. That said, one of the 
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most serious problems facing social workers in Tusla is locating suitable placements for 
adolescents with behavioural difficulties. Foster placements for such adolescents appear 
highly fraught and susceptible to disruption. This is not surprising given the fact that 
troubled adolescents present the greatest challenge for those involved in the child care 
system. They often display serious behavioural problems and may have very serious 
needs. Troubled adolescents present social workers with the task of locating appropriate, 
yet scarce placements. They also present a challenge to foster parents in terms of 
managing their needs and behaviour. Training for foster parents should be a prerequisite 
of this form of care before and during placement, and also for social workers involved in 
the supervision of these placements.  
 
In order to assist foster parents in the challenge of caring for troubled adolescents, 
supports must be constructed around this type of placement. This might take the form 
of: 
(i) child care workers who can give foster parents a break or assistance in periods of 
acute stress;  
(ii) linking foster parents with residential centres which can give respite care and 
training/support;  
(iii) additional allowances and monetary assistance; and  
(iv) support from adolescent services, created by linking the efforts of current 
agencies and personnel in the field, for example Tusla and youth services.  
 
It is vital in planning foster care for adolescents with behavioural difficulties to be clear 
about the limits of foster care. International research and experience signposts the need 
for caution. Some young people have no desire to be placed in a family. Others have 
needs that cannot be satisfied in a family setting. It impacts negatively on the lives of 
young people and of foster families, and the overall perception of foster care, if these 
realities are ignored. The initial enthusiasm for foster care can blind many to its 
limitations. It has a critical and significant role to play in a network of services for 
adolescents at risk, but a policy that dictates that foster care can or should provide all 
placements in care for all adolescents is quite misguided. It is therefore necessary to 
develop a strong and cohesive residential care service alongside a thriving foster-care 
service.  
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6.2.17 Training in Child Protection 
The findings from both the interview stage, and mirrored in the questionnaire and focus 
group stages of this audit, are clear that there is little or no emphasis on formal training 
of Gardaí in relation to child protection. 
 
The vast majority of respondents explained that any training on the invocation of section 
12 was basic, and had little impact on them. Other respondents explained that little or no 
emphasis was placed on children’s rights, or on child welfare or protection, in the core 
assessment during Garda basic training in Templemore College. 
 
There is an explicit, widespread, and deeply-held culture within AGS of privileging on-
the-job learning, which has undermined respect for the value of core training in 
Templemore. This organisation-wide relegation of the importance of formal basic 
training may also reflect a cultural tendency within the Templemore College itself, to 
diminish the value of basic training. 
 
Of those members who provided information to the audit, a number, such as Garda B, 
Garda Q, Garda S, Garda T, and Garda Z, said they would like to have more joint 
training with social workers, to enable them to understand the systemic and 
environmental realities in which social workers make their decisions. Garda B felt it was 
important for Gardaí to be trained along with what he felt were the “actual 
professionals” in child protection in Ireland: child protection social workers. Garda Z 
explained that there was a need to “demystify” the decision-making processes, as there 
was a pervasive background assumption among many Garda members that social 
workers were often attempting to pass on responsibility for complex cases to AGS. 
Garda Z was also interested in understanding the different thresholds for intervention 
governing child protection social workers, and emphasised that trust between the two 
organisations was essential to ensure cooperation in cases involving children. 
 
6.2.18 Training in Ethnic and Cultural Diversity 
In light of the increasing ethnic and cultural diversity in Irish society, and the distinct 
sensitivities this change demands of policing practices in general, and child protection 
practices in particular, respondents in the various stages of the audit were asked what 
training they received in how to deal with these changes. Evaluating levels of guidance 
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and training on how members of AGS should address these on-going changes to Irish 
society is also central to whether AGS is racially profiling children in their exercise of 
section 12 powers. Finally, this data is relevant to the equally important prospective 
question of whether Garda members are equipped with the critical skills necessary to 
avoid racially profiling children when exercising their section 12 powers in an ethno-
culturally diverse Ireland. 
 
All but one of the interview stage respondents said they had not received training in 
ethnic and cultural diversity, or had no memory of having received such training. These 
findings suggest a possible lack of organisational coordination in how AGS should 
respond to contemporary ethnic and cultural diversity in the population. These findings 
also suggest a policy failure on the part of AGS management on how to deal with these 
changes, or to ensure such policies reach through to Garda members operating in the 
field. Given the recent problematic experiences, failures and successes in neighbouring 
jurisdictions (most notably policing in England), in adapting to multiculturalism from a 
policing perspective, it is important that AGS learn from its colleagues abroad. 
Additionally, AGS should seek to engage with independent child protection, policing, 
and critical race theorists and researchers, both in Ireland and abroad, when developing a 
new policy direction.  
 
6.2.19 Aftermath 
This audit reveals an absence of formal support structures for Gardaí in the aftermath of 
dealing with traumatic cases. 
 
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The audit recommends therefore that the following measures be taken:  
 
6.3.1 Change of Ethos 
A key recommendation of this audit is the need for a cultural change in the child 
protection system as a whole. Each and every person working within the system must 
take responsibility for his or her own role in promoting the welfare of children and in 
ensuring their protection.  
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Recommendation  
A cultural change must occur within the child protection system. Each and every person working within 
the system must take responsibility for his or her own role in promoting the welfare of children and in 
ensuring their protection.  
 
6.3.2 Risk Assessment 
AGS members must conduct risk assessments prior to invoking section 12 powers, 
independent of the risk assessment undertaken by Tusla. It is imperative that the 
psychological and mental health needs of children and young people form part of that 
risk assessment.  
 
In terms of a risk assessment, it is accepted that there are certain behaviours that are 
clear and strong indicators that the child/young person may be at risk or vulnerable. 
These include alcohol, drug, solvent abuse and fire-setting. Escalating patterns of ‘at risk’ 
behaviour, and poor impulse control should trigger immediate attention and responses 
from all professionals involved.  
 
Recommendation  
AGS members must conduct risk assessments prior to invoking section 12 powers, independent of the 
risk assessment undertaken by Tusla. It is imperative that the psychological and mental health needs of 
children and young people form part of the risk assessment.  
 
Risk Principles  
Professor Eileen Munro’s comprehensive review of child protection systems in England 
and Wales92 examined whether social workers should follow the lead of the Association 
of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in adopting a “Statement of Risk Principles”.93 Such 
guidance on the exercise of professional judgment is rooted in a concern that uncertainty 
in relation to probabilities that particular child protection risks might occur requires a 
mature and appropriate evaluation of the competing risks between intervention and non-
intervention by social workers or police. In other words: “Those involved in child 
protection must be ‘risk sensible’.”94 This understanding of uncertainty around risk and 
                                                     
92 Professor Eileen Munro, The Munro Review of Child Protection: Final Report – A Child-Centred 
System (Department for Education, May 2011). 
93 Munro Review – Interim Report 2011, para 4.48.  
94 Munro Review: Final Report, para 3.18. 
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probability emphasises that all options for child protection professionals, whether 
interventionary or not, pose some risk of harm to the child, and requires such 
professionals to challenge tendencies towards an unrealistic position of risk aversion.  
 
The Munro Review recommends that all child protection professionals in England adopt 
a similar, modified statement of risk principles to those adopted by the ACPO.95 The ten 
recommended risk principles are couched in pragmatic, yet generalised form, and 
encourage the empowerment of child protection professionals to engage with the 
inherent reality of risk uncertainty and competition, in circumstances where they as key 
decision-makers must act (Principle 1). The overarching welfare-oriented objectives, to 
all individuals and communities, of the activities of child protection professionals 
(Principle 2), and the requirement that those professionals balance the various potential 
harms between intervention and non-intervention to these various individuals and 
groups (Principle 3), are also included. Principle 4 explains, “Harm can never totally be 
prevented”, and encourages an emphasis on the quality of the process, rather than 
outcome, in professional decision-making. Principles 5 and 9 envisage, and encourage 
greater inter-agency cooperation and risk sharing, in pursuit of error reduction in child 
protection decision-making. Principle 6 calls for consistency in child protection logics 
and decision-making between different institutions involved in child protection. Principle 
7 deals with record-keeping. Principles 8 and 10 encourage operational learning through 
successes as well as failures, and the fostering of good quality decision-making.  
 
Munro also outlines the need to depart from the culture of blame following instances of 
individual failure, as this undermines the fostering of mature and intelligent decision-
making, and encourages risk-averse logics and practices that themselves risk harming 
children, families and communities.96 The operationalisation of the risk principles 
requires such a departure from this culture of blame. Relatedly, the Review also 
recommends learning from the lengthy experience of the police in its media relations 
practices and policies, and outlines the need for social workers, like other actors in the 
child protection framework, to adopt more sophisticated strategies to engage with, and 
manage the media, and public trust and confidence in the system.97 Munro explains that 
appropriate management of communications following highly-publicised child protection 
                                                     
95 Munro Review: Final Report, para 3.18.  
96 Munro Review: Final Report, para 7.9.  
97 Munro Review: Final Report, para 7.65-7.72. 
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failures is necessary to avoid the natural tendency of front-line professionals towards risk 
aversion following intense negative media scrutiny. 
 
The findings of this audit indicate a heavy reliance on “common sense” decision-making 
by members of AGS when undertaking their child protection functions. While “common 
sense” decision-making can often, as seen in this audit, lead to appropriate judgments 
and desirable outcomes, its opaqueness and lack of structure can lead to inconsistency, 
and can also intentionally or subconsciously mask prejudiced value judgments. As a 
result, the audit recommends the development of a more structured decision-making 
process to identify and learn from good and bad decision-making, and enable more 
consistent decisions on coercive intervention by Gardaí. In line with the Association of 
Chief Police Officers’ (ACPO)98 Statement of Risk Principles, and the risk principles set 
out in the recommendations of the Munro Review 2011,99 the following set of risk 
principles should be adopted by AGS to enhance the transparency and quality of its 
decision-making processes in child protection scenarios, and to encourage the greater 
development of a reflexive policing practice by AGS. Like the ACPO and Munro risk 
principles, these principles are designed to encourage mature decision-making in 
scenarios where members of AGS feel they may be required to exercise their child 
protection powers. The following principles are context-specific to the operation of 
policing and child protection in Ireland, and the distinct legal and organisational 
frameworks in which it operates. These principles are also informed by the general 
findings and conclusions of this audit. 
 
Recommendation  
Risk Principles for An Garda Síochána 
Principle 1: An Garda Síochána performs a central role in the child protection system in Ireland. Like 
all professionals working in child protection, members of AGS are required to make decisions in 
conditions where the degree of probability that a risk to a child’s welfare will materialise is uncertain. 
 
Principle 2: The Irish legal order expressly recognises distinct constitutional rights of the child, of the 
family, and of communities of religious belief. As agents of the State with distinct protective functions and 
                                                     
98 See https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/rbi-
communities/wpcontent/uploads/importedimages/acpo-risk-principles.pdf (visited 11 April 2016). 
99 Professor Eileen Munro, The Munro Review of Child Protection: Final Report, A Child Centred System (Crown 
Publications 2011). 
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responsibilities, members of An Garda Síochána are required to respect and vindicate those rights in any 
decision-making that has the potential to infringe those rights.  
 
Principle 3: Maintaining and protecting the safety, security, well-being, and constitutional rights of 
individuals and communities is a primary consideration in risk decision-making by State agents involved 
in child protection.  
 
Principle 4: Risk-taking involves judgment and balance, with decision-makers required to consider the 
value and likelihood of the possible benefits of a particular decision, against the seriousness and likelihood 
of any possible harms.  
 
Principle 5: Harm can never be totally prevented. Risk decisions should, therefore, be judged by the 
quality of the information-gathering and decision-making, not the outcome.  
 
Principle 6: Taking risk decisions and reviewing others’ risk decision-making is difficult. Account should 
therefore be taken of whether that decision-making involved dilemmas, emergencies, was part of a sequence 
of decisions, or might properly be taken to other agencies, or actors.  
 
Principle 7: If the decision-making is shared with appropriate partner agencies and actors, then the risk 
is also shared, and the risk of error is reduced. Decision-making on child protection concerns should 
therefore involve meaningful engagement, information-sharing, and cooperation with all responsible and 
competent partner agencies, so that a wealth of experience and insight can be brought to bear on the risk 
decision.  
 
Principle 8: Since good risk-taking depends on quality information, those working in child protection 
should share relevant information with partner agencies about people in the household affected who pose a 
risk of harm to themselves or others, or people who are vulnerable to the risk of being harmed, and devise 
effective structures, procedures and systems to facilitate information-sharing between partner agencies.  
 
Principle 9: The standard expected and required of those working in child protection is that their risk 
decisions should be consistent with those that would have been made in the same circumstances by 
professionals of similar specialism or experience. 
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Principle 10: To reduce risk aversion and improve decision-making, child protection needs a culture that 
learns from successes as well as failures. Good risk-taking decision-making should be identified, 
commended and shared in a regular review of significant events.  
 
6.3.3 Early Intervention 
Where concerns or referrals are made to Tusla with regard to a child/young person, it is 
essential that Tusla respond appropriately and immediately. The vast majority of such 
reports are likely to be genuine and require consideration within an agreed national 
assessment framework. 
 
Such early intervention is necessary to ensure that the safety, protection and well-being 
of the child/young person is given due priority. In a number of cases subject to section 
12 powers, and reviewed during the audit, the families and children involved were known 
to Tusla for some time prior to invocation of the section 12 power.  
 
In the case of HSE v LW & GW,100 it was noted that social work support and 
interventions were put in place for the family as far back as 1998 but the court noted that 
“this intervention does not appear to have been sufficient to effect any change in the 
family dynamic.” The court noted that the children were registered under the Child 
Protection Register in 2004 under the category of neglect. The Guardian Ad Litem in that 
case was highly critical that, despite the children being on the register, further abuse and 
neglect occurred of the child that remained in the home.  
 
Recommendation  
Where particular needs are identified by Tusla in dealing with a family, it must be ensured that supports 
or interventions that are put in place respond to those needs and are not merely generic or standardised 
response programmes.  
 
6.3.4 New Garda Protocol 
As discussed in detail in chapters 1 and 2, Part III of the Child Care Act 1991 seeks to 
secure the protection of children in emergency situations and provides AGS and Tusla 
with certain powers in emergency situations. Under section 12 of the 1991 Act, a 
member of AGS is given the power to remove a child to safety where there are 
                                                     
100 [2012] IEDC 4. 
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reasonable grounds for believing that there is (a) an immediate and serious risk to the 
health or welfare of the child and (b) the delay necessitated in seeking an emergency 
protection order under section 13 of the Act or applying for a warrant under section 35 
of the Act would not sufficiently protect the child.  
 
When exercising his or her powers under section 12, a member of AGS does not require 
a warrant and may, where necessary, be accompanied by such others persons as may be 
necessary (e.g. a social worker). Where a child is removed under section 12, he or she 
must be placed in the custody of Tusla in the area as soon as is possible101 and where the 
child is not returned to his or her parents, custodians or guardians, Tusla is obliged to 
make an application for an emergency care order at the next sitting of the local District 
Court, and the court must be satisfied that the criteria in section 13 of the 1991 Act are 
fulfilled.102  
 
Section 13 provides that a judge of the District Court can make an emergency care order 
which provides for short-term emergency protection on the application of Tusla where 
the Court is of the opinion that: 
(a) there is an immediate and serious risk to the health or welfare of the child which 
necessitates his being placed in the care of Tusla; or 
(b) there is likely to be such a risk if the child is removed from the place where he is for 
the time being.  
 
The threshold for granting an emergency care order is lower than that required for other 
orders under the 1991 Act as the Court need only form an “opinion” that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that either of the grounds set out in (a) or (b) are in play. It 
should also be noted that the temporary nature of the emergency care order (i.e. it can 
remain valid for up to 8 days although a court may reduce this) means that it is unlikely 
that it is in itself unconstitutional as it aims to strike a balance between giving Tusla time 
to prepare an application for a care order while ensuring that parents are not denied 
custody for an extensive period of time.  
 
                                                     
101 Child Care Act 1991, section 12(3). 
102 Child Care Act 1991, section 12(4). 
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Applications for emergency care orders must also be made on notice to the relevant 
parties and no provision allows for a direction to be sought at shorter notice.  
 
However, even in circumstances where there is an immediate and serious risk to the 
child, it may not be necessary to grant an emergency care order. An example of this is 
where the risk to a child can be alleviated by removing the abusive or hostile party, either 
by the other party applying for a barring or safety order under sections 2 or 3 of the 
Domestic Violence Act 1996 or by Tusla applying on behalf of that other party under 
section 6 of the 1996 Act. The Supreme Court in The State (DD) v Groarke103 was clear 
that a court must positively inquire into whether the welfare of the child requires the 
removal of the child from the innocent parent. Thus a court would only be justified in 
removing the child where the innocent parent was unable to protect the child from the 
abusing parent.  
 
England and Wales 
The position in England and Wales has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
 
Site Visit to London Metropolitan Police 
In February 2016, a site visit was undertaken to meet with senior members of the 
London Metropolitan Police’s (Met) Child Protection Command, at Holborn Police 
Station. Detective Superintendent Steve Williams, Detective Chief Inspector John 
Foulkes and Detective Inspector Anthony McKeown participated in the meeting, and 
gave a general overview of the operational framework of the Command, and answered 
specific questions relevant to the audit. The Child Protection Command also organised 
and facilitated a meeting with two child protection social work managers from two local 
authorities within the Met’s jurisdiction.  
 
The visit sought to gain organisational and operational insights into how the Met 
undertakes its child protection responsibilities under section 46 of the Children Act 
1989. The visit also sought to examine the operational aspects of inter-agency 
cooperation between the Met and its child protection partners in local authority social 
work teams, and elsewhere.  
 
                                                     
103 [1990] 1 IR 305. 
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There are some obvious differences between the English and Irish contexts – principally 
population numbers and density, along with significant differences in ethno-cultural 
diversity. There were also some notable differences with regard to how Met Police 
become involved in section 46 cases, with most of their referrals coming from schools – 
a pattern remarkably different from the findings of this audit in relation to instigations of 
Garda involvement in section 12 cases in Ireland. 
 
Briefly, the Child Protection Command in the Met comprises of 4 divisions; each 
division includes four teams; each team approximately consists of 1 Detective Inspector, 
2 Detective Sergeants, and 4 Detective Constables. Teams normally cover 2 Boroughs, 
though some, such as Haringey (the Borough in which the Baby P case took place) have 
one dedicated team. Each team is divided up into units, to provide 24 hour, year-round 
cover. The entire Command, which covers a population of approximately 8 million, is 
comprised of 480 specialist child protection police officers.  
 
In 2015, Met officers exercised their section 46 powers 1,845 times, a rate higher than 
other territorial police forces in England and Wales. Interestingly, section 12 of the Child 
Care Act 1991 was invoked by AGS in respect of 718 incidents in 2015.  
 
Management from both the Met and the local authority social workers were emphatic 
that the specialist child protection units were essential. The model of specialist police 
units – the “CAIT” (Child Abuse Investigation Teams) – with a closely structured 
working relationship with local authority social workers, is viewed as the most effective 
approach, and a refined result of various high-profile child protection failures, and their 
subsequent public investigations. The development of these coordinated inter-agency 
partnerships is also the result of strategic reorganisations of resources following reduced 
investment in policing, and cutbacks in local authority social work teams. A large 
proportion of these specialist units also operate as “Sapphire Units” which investigate 
sexual assault, exploitation and paedophilia. The Met interviewees explained that the Met 
envisaged future strategic co-location of the domestic violence specialist units with the 
child protection, and sexual abuse and exploitation units. Each station in the Met has 
someone dealing with child protection issues – a member of a CAIT. This officer liaises 
with other specialist teams and management in the Child Protection Command, and 
helps expand the knowledge of child protection issues at a local level.  
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In terms of training, all members of these specialist units under the Child Protection 
Command undertake, at a minimum, the Met’s dedicated one-week child protection 
training package before beginning work on their team. There is also a 2-week follow-up 
training programme, along with specialist interview training.  
 
All Met officers are required to undergo computerised diversity training, though the 
interviewees felt the best cultural sensitivity training was derived from exposure to 
London’s highly ethnically diverse population. Early community engagement was seen as 
essential to avoid tension and potentially damaging coercive police interventions, due to 
cultural norms that conflict with criminal laws and child protection objectives. In this 
regard, the Met interviewees gave the example of measures being undertaken to address 
highly politicised concerns over female genital mutilation. They also advised that such 
community engagement efforts must be committed to at management level, and properly 
resourced, in order to be effective. These strategies, the interviewees highlighted, were 
the result of some serious systemic and cultural failures on the part of the Met, in cases 
such as the Stephen Lawrence murder investigation and its aftermath. The interviewees 
were also emphatic that other police forces, such as AGS, can learn from the costly 
policy and practice mistakes they had made while adapting to increasing cultural 
diversity.  
 
The Command also takes overall responsibility to increase awareness of child protection 
issues in the general police force. Part of this involves circulating case examples, which 
illustrate complex borderline cases where child protection decision-making was involved, 
and the appropriateness of that process. The interviewees emphasised the need to share 
knowledge and experiences with the wider force for contextualised learning. 
 
Regarding recruitment, the Met interviewees explained that candidates tend to be self-
selecting: people who want to do the job; officers with empathy. These candidates are 
psychologically screened on an on-going annual basis, as part of a mandatory screening 
programme.  
 
Burnout is a consideration management attempt to monitor, though resource constraints 
limit the degree to which the Command is able to rotate specialist officers off frontline 
duty. They explained the average time in service within the Command is 3 to 5 years. 
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In relation to oversight and accountability, the Office for Standards in Education, 
Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) monitors and provides opinions on the exercise of 
section 46 by the Met. These Ofsted reports compare rates of section 46 use between 
different territorial police forces in England and Wales. The Met interviewees also 
detailed instances involving the formalised Serious Case Review system, in which 
independent Local Safeguarding Children Boards undertake statutorily-guided 
investigations into cases of child protection failures.104 This process allows for external 
investigation into such failures, and publishes findings and recommendations, so that 
operational practices, cultures and systems can be developed to avoid future failures. The 
social worker interviewees were very enthusiastic in their descriptions of the Serious Case 
Review system as a mechanism of oversight and accountability in child protection. 
Learning from errors was seen by both groups as essential. 
 
All three Met interviewees noted their concern over critical Ofsted reports on excessive 
exercise of section 46. They felt this risked creating a chilling effect where police were 
fearful of removing children under section 46, thereby putting children at risk.  
 
A general account was provided by the Met interviewees regarding normal procedures 
for section 46 removal. They explained standard practice is to try to remove the child 
with a social worker present. It is noteworthy that the social worker interviewees were 
emphatic that the decision to remove is wholly the police officers’, and is exercised under 
different thresholds and logics to the local authority social workers. The social workers 
were also highly sensitive to the subjective nature of the section 46 power.  
 
Following removal under section 46, the social worker then has immediate responsibility 
to accommodate the child – not the police officer or his or her ‘designated’ supervising 
officer. They explained it was extremely rare for a child to be brought to a station and 
kept there for lengthy periods of time waiting for a social worker. The officers also 
explained that most exercises of section 46 do not take place during the night, as many 
referrals come from schools, and the power is normally used to remove the child on the 
school premises.  
 
                                                     
104 See http://www.nspcc.org.uk/preventing-abuse/child-protection-system/england/serious-case-
reviews/ (visited 29 March 2016). 
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If a removal is undertaken at night or at a weekend, each Borough local authority has an 
emergency social work team on duty, generally consisting of one social worker. The 
social worker interviewees explained this emergency duty social worker has full remote 
access to the local authority’s child protection system. However, the local authorities do 
not operate a combined city wide database which all social workers can access.  
 
When a child is removed by police under section 46, various demographic details are 
recorded as routine, including the child’s ethnicity and the child’s views on the removal. 
A case incident cannot be closed on the Met’s computer system until all the child’s 
details and case information is inputted. The process is overseen by the ‘designated 
officer’ until social services confirm the child is in stable accommodation, and the 
incident is closed. 
 
The social worker interviewees explained that emergency foster placement of a child 
following removal is wholly the responsibility of the social worker. While the local 
authorities manage their own list of emergency foster carers, for some older children the 
local authority may need to have recourse to a private provider. However, all private 
providers are Ofsted regulated.  
 
In relation to information-sharing, social worker interviewees explained that child 
protection priorities override any data protection concerns, and they felt it was 
operationally essential for both social work teams and police to share information on 
child protection cases. Past experiences and findings from Serious Case Reviews have 
consistently pushed for greater inter-agency pooling of knowledge, expertise, and 
operational coordination.  
 
The social worker interviewees also explained that the police officers on the CAITs have 
access to the local authority’s social worker database – though it was not clear whether 
those officers’ access is confined to the database for the Borough their station is in, or 
whether they have access to all databases from all Borough social work teams. This 
access allows these police officers to immediately examine if the child is subject to a child 
protection plan. These police officers also assess the suitability of the potential family or 
friends as alternative placements following the removal on behalf of the social worker.  
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As part of this overarching organisational and ideological push towards systemic 
integration and coordination in child protection, the social work interviewees explained 
that local hospitals in the Borough have a list of children who are subject to child 
protection plans by the local authority. It is not clear if these hospitals would have access 
to lists of children from other local authority child protection teams.  
 
Met interviewees described a change of culture within the Child Protection Command in 
the last five years. Prior to this change, it had not been seen as an operationally 
significant, or strategically coordinated division. This shift had seen the development of a 
robust offender management programme, and a performance and outcomes focused 
culture, with performance meetings once a month where detection rates are carefully 
monitored by the senior management.  
 
It is suggested this shift in the Met’s policing priorities is part of an emerging 
organisational realignment in policing across England and Wales, which is seeing child 
protection and sexual violence policing reprioritised in a higher position in the hierarchy 
of policing strategies and objectives.105 However, all Met interviewees expressed the view 
that the area is still ‘low-prestige’, and only gains public attention when there is a major 
failure.   
 
Scotland 
Under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 the police in Scotland have the power to ensure 
the immediate protection of children believed to be suffering from, or at risk of, 
significant harm. Section 61 of the 1995 Act provides that in an emergency situation 
where a police officer has reasonable cause to believe that the conditions for making a 
child protection order are satisfied, and that it is not practical in the circumstances to 
make such an application, the officer may remove the child to a place of safety.106 
However, it is also possible for a local authority or any other person to make an 
application to a justice of the peace seeking authorisation to remove a child to a place of 
safety or to prevent the child from being removed from a place where he or she is being 
                                                     
105 See former Chief Constable Sara Thornton’s John Harris Memorial Lecture for the Policing 
Foundation on 20 July 2015: “We Must Re-Imagine Policing in the UK” 
http://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/npcc-chair-sara-thornton-we-must-re-imagine-policing-in-the-uk 
(visited 29 March 2016).   
106 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, section 61(5). 
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accommodated.107  
 
The primary difference between the use of such powers in Scotland and those in 
operation in Ireland, and England and Wales is the length of time for which they are 
valid – under the 1995 Act in Scotland, the powers granted by section 61 last for a 
maximum of twenty-four hours.108  
 
If the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the conditions for making a child 
protection order under section 57(1) of the Act are no longer satisfied and that it is no 
longer necessary to keep the child in order to protect him or her from significant harm, 
then he or she must not continue to keep the child. A child may not be kept in a place of 
safety under the powers conferred under section 61 if the principal report considers that 
the conditions for the exercise of that power are not satisfied or that it is no longer in the 
child’s interest that he or she should be so kept.  
 
The Scottish provisions contained in the 1995 Act draw substantially on the experience 
of England and Wales.109 However, in addition to the shorter validity of the order, it is 
also necessary for an officer to be satisfied that it is not practicable to apply to a sheriff 
for a child protection order.110 
 
Australia 
In the Australian State of New South Wales, under section 46 of the Children and Young 
Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 where there is an urgent need to protect a child 
or young person, the community services can apply to the Children’s Court for an 
Emergency Care and Protection Order (ECPO). The Children’s Court can make an 
ECPO where it is satisfied that the child or young person is at risk of serious harm. The 
ECPO places the young person in the care of the “Secretary of the Department” or the 
person specified in the order and has effect for a maximum of fourteen days and can be 
extended once only for another fourteen days. 
 
 
                                                     
107 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, sections 61(1) and 61(2). 
108 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, section 61(4). 
109 J. Masson with D. McGovern, K. Pick and M. Winn Oakley, Protecting Powers: Emergency Intervention for 
Children’s Protection, (Wiley, 2007) at p. 47. 
110 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, section 61(5). 
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Site visit to New York City 
In April 2016 a site visit was undertaken in New York City, where inter-agency child 
protection innovations have been legislatively formalised in the aftermath of the death of 
Nixzmary Brown in 2006. The New York Police Department Special Victims Division 
coordinates its child protection functions through Child Advocacy Centres to promote 
inter-agency cooperation in circumstances where a child is removed by a police officer. A 
child is taken to a Child Advocacy Centre by the police officer where all child protection 
partner agencies, which are co-located onsite, jointly handle the case. The Centres house 
a specialist child protection unit and a forensic paediatrician. These inter-agency teams 
interview not only victims but also siblings to obtain a complete picture of the 
circumstances surrounding the removal of the child. 
 
The audit examined the impact of the innovations in the Bronx district of New York in 
which the latest Child Advocacy Centre was opened in 2015. A site visit, organised by the 
Deputy Chief Commanding Officer of the New York Police Department Special Victims 
Division, Michael J. Osgood, provided the audit with an invaluable insight as to the 
operation of the Centre.   
 
The Centre is a safe, child-focused space for a child to be interviewed. A team of highly 
motivated professionals from law enforcement, child protection services, the prosecution 
services and medical services all work together in the same place to respond to the child 
protection concerns. The co-location of services includes investigation and prosecution 
of child abuse, support services and counselling for victims. This on-going co-location of 
these child-protection disciplines in the same unit promotes meaningful inter-agency 
cooperation through genuine partnership in child protection. Moreover, the availability 
of a forensic paediatrician improves the quality of the evidence gathered during 
engagement with a child, to enhance the prospect of both detection of child abuse, and 
successful prosecution. 
 
The Child Advocacy Centre (CAC) model111 offers many advantages, including 
reductions in expenditure in pursuing child abuse investigations, and court proceedings. 
                                                     
111 A similar multidisciplinary model, called the Children’s House (see http://www.bvs.is/media/forsida/Barnahus,-
an-overview.pdf), has been pioneered in Iceland and is currently being piloted by the Crown Prosecution Service in 
London: https://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/children_and_young_people_as_witnesses_-
_alison_saunders_dpp/. 
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The US National Children’s Alliance estimates that the CAC model achieves $1,000 
savings per case compared to non-CAC approaches. The CAC model provides 
significantly higher rates of coordinated investigations and increased successful 
prosecution of child abuse perpetrators. An indirect benefit of the CAC model sees child 
victims of sexual abuse receiving services at CACs as four times more likely to receive 
forensic medical examinations and referral for mental health treatment, when compared 
to non-CAC approaches.  
 
Recommendations  
The section 12 power is not subject to any external oversight prior to its execution and while such 
extraordinary measures may be necessary at times to protect the health and welfare of vulnerable children, 
it should be stressed that these measures are to be used as a last resort. Clear guidelines for the use of 
Garda powers under section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 should be produced and made available to 
the public. Such guidelines should clearly stipulate that the powers granted under section 12 of the Child 
Care Act are to be used only as a last resort.  
 
AGS should develop a protocol requiring the exercise of section 12 powers to be confirmed by a member 
not below the rank of Sergeant at the earliest possible convenience following removal. 
 
6.3.5 Drug and Alcohol Abuse 
In a significant number of cases reviewed as part of the audit, it was evident that drug 
and/or alcohol abuse by parents was compromising their ability to consistently parent 
their child. Indeed, in some cases, drug and/or alcohol abuse by the child was the key 
factor in the child/young person being referred to Tusla or being subject to section 12 
powers. This is a problem which has to be tackled. When a social worker comes into 
contact with a family where drug/alcohol abuse is significantly disrupting familial life, it 
is essential that such abuse is addressed in a robust and meaningful manner. Additionally 
AGS, Tusla and other relevant partner State agencies and NGOs should be coordinated 
to ensure addiction services, and other supports are available and accessible. 
 
Recommendation  
Drug and alcohol abuse place an insurmountable burden on the State agencies and must be viewed as a 
key risk indicator in terms of child protection.   
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6.3.6 Data Sharing 
Data sharing between AGS and Tusla should be provided for on a statutory basis with a 
premium placed on child protection. The Data Protection Acts 1988 - 2003 contain rules 
relating to the protection of personal data. “Personal data” is defined in section 1 of the 
Data Protection Act 1988 as amended by the Data Protection Act 2003 as data relating 
to a living individual who is or can be identified either from the data or from the data in 
conjunction with other information that is, or is likely to come into, the possession of 
the data controller. The requirements of the Data Protection Acts are heightened if the 
relevant data falls within what is termed “Sensitive Personal Data”, which includes data 
as to racial or ethnic origin, physical or mental health, and the commission or alleged 
commission of any offence. “Sensitive personal data” is defined as personal data as to: 
 the racial or ethnic origin, the political opinions or the religious or philosophical 
beliefs of the data subject; 
 whether the data subject is a member of a trade union; 
 the physical or mental health or condition or sexual life of a data subject; 
 the commission or alleged commission of any offence by the data subject; or 
 any proceedings for an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by the 
data subject, the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court in such 
proceedings. 
  
The data subject refers to the individual who is the subject of personal data.  
 
Pursuant to section 2 of the 1988 Act as amended, the data controller must, inter alia, 
take appropriate security measures against unauthorised access, alteration, disclosure or 
destruction of personal data. Section 2A states that personal data shall not be processed 
(the definition of which includes disclosure) until section 2 is complied with and one of 
the conditions within section 2A is met. The conditions under section 2A are: 
 The consent of the data subject or person acting on his or her behalf (only in certain 
circumstances) is obtained; 
 The processing is necessary for the performance of a contract, to take steps at the 
request of the data subject prior to entering a contract or for compliance with a legal 
obligation to which the data controller is subject (other than a contractual 
obligation); 
271 
 
 To prevent injury or damage to the health of the data subject or serious loss of or 
damage to the property of the data subject; 
 The processing is necessary for the administration of justice, for the performance of 
a legislative function conferred on a person, for the performance of a function of the 
Government or a Government Minister or for the performance of any other 
function of a public nature performed in the public interest by a person; or 
 The processing is necessary for the legitimate interests pursued by the data controller 
or a third party to whom the data is disclosed except where the processing is 
unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the fundamental rights 
and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject.  
 
It is essential that agencies under the umbrella of the child protection services can share 
information relating to vulnerable children and their families. Such free flow of 
communication is imperative to the proper functioning of the services. It may be 
necessary to amend the existing legislation and communications infrastructures to allow 
for the passing of information between agencies involved in child protection. While 
there is an immediate need to reorganise and reform internal communications within the 
child protection system, it is also essential that any reforms enhance the robustness of 
external security and protection for that information database. This includes appropriate 
training on data protection responsibilities of all individuals with access to such 
databases. 
 
Garda Z noted that it appeared the out-of-hours service did not have access to the 
child’s case history, which he felt was a significant inadequacy for any such service. This 
is in stark contrast to the information-sharing that occurs in similar circumstances in 
England and Wales. Tusla should consider developing a database that is not restricted by 
regional barriers, as children can easily find themselves in districts outside of their normal 
area of residence. 
 
Recommendation  
The Data Protection Acts, and the operationalisation of the Acts by State agencies, should be reviewed 
in an appropriate way to ensure no legislative roadblock impedes child protection services sharing 
information relating to vulnerable children and their families. 
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6.3.7 Inter-Agency Cooperation 
The audit provides clear evidence of a professional silo mentality in protecting vulnerable 
children. Canada is a jurisdiction that provides a template for placing trust at the centre 
of inter-agency cooperation with a focus on building personal relationships. In Alberta, 
for example, trust is implicit in inter-agency cooperation. While the Children First Act 
2015 provides an improved legislative framework for promoting inter-agency 
cooperation, cultural change within AGS and Tusla is required to respect the role of 
both organisations in protecting children. 
 
Recommendation  
The implementation of the Children First Act 2015 (when fully commenced) should be reviewed from the 
perspective of An Garda Síochána and clear guidelines on how cooperation should work in practice 
between An Garda Síochána and other State agencies should be drafted.   
 
6.3.8 Training 
The audit identified significant weaknesses in the training within AGS, and the view that 
didactic lectures are of limited value in terms of learning outcomes. Comprehensive 
training on child protection should be provided as part of the training programme 
reflecting the current law and international best practice, together with case study 
examples. There should be appropriate assessment of this coursework to ensure 
meaningful engagement with the material. Child protection should be given due 
importance in basic Garda training, to tackle perceptions that it is low-prestige and low-
importance work. Contextualising the importance of child protection in broader 
contemporary policing strategies would be helpful and appropriate in this regard. 
 
Recommendation  
Comprehensive training on child protection should be provided as part of the Garda training programme 
reflecting the current law and international best practice. 
 
6.3.9 PULSE 
Members should be required to complete mandatory information fields on PULSE, as 
set out in Appendix 6. The objective in having clearly defined categories in PULSE is to 
obviate, insofar as possible, the use of the narrative field as the main source of 
information or record. This appears to be the position at present. The necessity to 
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complete each field should also act as a safeguard or check for members, and indeed a 
reminder, to complete each step in compliance with the stipulated requirements. 
 
AGS should introduce a standardised ethnic identifier as part of the data inputted into 
PULSE as per recommendation 5 of the 2016 Report on policy and practice in ethnic 
data collection and monitoring entitled Counting Us In – Human Rights Count.112 Full and 
accurate demographic data collection is an essential tool for on-going oversight and 
assessment of policing practices and policies. 
 
A monthly or other regular review by an appropriate person of data entries relating to the 
invocation of section 12 powers is also recommended. Such a post-event review process 
should capture difficulties and/or errors, if any, with regard to correct practice and 
procedure. It would also allow a practical review of the operation of any new provisions 
to be introduced in due course. 
 
The Garda PULSE system does not routinely record instances where section 12 was 
considered but decided against. Such information should be recorded on PULSE. 
Indeed, it is suggested the findings of Garda reluctance in some instances to use section 
12 may create a situation where children are not removed from situations where it would 
be best to do so. 
 
Recommendations  
Members should be required to complete mandatory information fields on PULSE as set out in 
Appendix 6. The Garda PULSE system does not routinely record instances where section 12 was 
considered but decided against. Such information should be recorded on PULSE. 
 
In overall terms, the average number of section 12 removals per annum is not so large that a full 
reporting of relevant information would present an onerous task for a Garda member. A monthly or 
other regular review by an appropriate person of data entries relating to the invocation of section 12 
powers is also recommended. Such a post-event review process should capture difficulties and/or errors, if 
any, with regard to correct practice and procedure. It would also allow a practical review of the operation 
of any new provisions to be introduced in due course. 
 
                                                     
112 Pavee Point, Counting Us In – Human Rights Count! (March 2016). 
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6.3.10 Laminated Card 
A laminated card as set out in Appendix 4 should be furnished to every member of AGS. 
 
Recommendation  
A laminated card as set out in Appendix 4 should be furnished to every member of AGS. 
 
6.3.11 Child Safety Belts and Car Seats 
All Garda vehicles should be equipped with child safety belts and car seats, in the event 
that it is necessary to drive with children following the use of section 12 powers. 
  
Recommendation  
All Garda vehicles should be equipped with child safety belts and car seats in accordance with the law. 
 
6.3.12 Specialist Child Protection Units 
The vast majority of suggestions for reform by audit respondents centred on the 
provision of properly resourced out-of-hours social work services, and specialist child 
protection units within AGS. In relation to the specialist child protection units, there was 
no clear consensus on whether the unit should be wholly independent within each 
station, or each division; or whether each Garda unit should have at least one person 
properly trained in child protection. However, it was clear that such units must be 
located in a manner effective in terms of access, availability, and local knowledge (i.e. 
knowledge of local operational strategies and practices, local cases, and local relationships 
with partner agencies). 
 
Recommendation  
Specialist child protection units within An Garda Síochána should be established on a national basis. 
 
6.3.13 Social Workers Assigned to Specialist Child Protection Units 
Consideration should be given to having social workers assigned to specialist child 
protection units. There are various models used in England and Wales, with some, such 
as Thames Valley Police’s Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub, employing a co-location 
model where social workers and specialist police operate from the same office. Further 
research should be undertaken to examine which partnership model of child protection 
would best suit the Irish context. 
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Recommendation  
Consideration should be given to having social workers assigned to specialist child protection units. 
 
6.3.14 Child Welfare and Mental Health 
From a child welfare perspective when considering the findings that emerged from the 
audit, three recommendations in particular emerge: 
 
Recommendations   
From a child welfare perspective, any child who is the subject of section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 
should have a developmentally informed, culturally sensitive, comprehensive assessment that addresses his 
or her basic needs, his or her safety, barriers to effective parenting, the appropriate fit between the type of 
care needed and between caregiver and child. This assessment should also address the child’s medical, 
educational, emotional and behavioural needs. 
 
The assessment should of necessity be sensitive to any emotional trauma the child may have experienced as 
a result of being removed under the section and address the effects of separation from his or her family and 
the effects of disrupted attachments. In particular if a child, as a result of the section being invoked, has 
been placed in a different geographical location away from community, school and peer supports, the 
assessment should address as a matter of priority, how to return the child to his or her natural 
environment as soon as is possible and practicable. 
 
An awareness of the likely traumatic impact of the predisposing factors that exist in the child’s life prior 
to the section being invoked, together with a sensitivity of the likely impact on children who are removed 
under section 12, should permeate all aspects of organisational functioning within AGS and Tusla. 
 
6.3.15 Education, State Care and Social Mobility 
International research literature113 shows a strong correlation between children who are 
subject to State removal from parental care, and low levels of educational achievement by 
those children. This low educational achievement is rooted in a number of factors, 
                                                     
113 O’Higgins, Sebba & Luke, What is the relationship between being in care and the educational outcomes of children? 
An international systematic review (REES Centre in Fostering and Education, University of Oxford, 
September 2015).  
http://reescentre.education.ox.ac.uk/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/ReesCentreReview_Educ
ationalOutcomes.pdf (visited 29 February 2016); Dill, Flynn, Hollingshead, & Fernandes, “Improving the 
Educational Achievement of Young People in Out-Of-Home Care” (2012) 34(6) Children and Youth 
Services Review 108.   
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including low educational achievement among the parents of those children, other pre-
care environmental factors affecting the child, and generally unstable home lives which 
necessitated State interventions that are detrimental to academic success.114 This low 
educational achievement is in turn relevant to social mobility for those subject to removal 
from the family home, and other social achievements.115 While the international research 
evidence does not show that State care is itself harmful for a child’s educational 
prospects, it does show that State care does not significantly improve the child’s 
educational prospects.116 
 
Evidence from international comparative research also suggests a strong correlation 
between access to, and achievement in higher education and social mobility.117 In some 
jurisdictions, such as England and Wales,118 the fact that a child spent a month or more 
in State care is a relevant consideration to the evaluation of academic achievements in 
university application processes. This procedural and substantive consideration of a 
child’s history in care, reflects institutional acceptance that those removed from parental 
care have limited future educational and employment prospects, that State care does little 
to improve those prospects, and that measures must be taken at a much later institutional 
level to enable children removed from parental care to access those significant social and 
economic benefits. Such measures may include consideration of a child’s history in State 
care as part of the CAO application process for third-level education.  
 
Recommendation  
Measures must be taken at a much later institutional level to enhance and enable children removed from 
parental care to access significant social and economic benefits lost due to the reception into care.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
114 O’Higgins et al (2015). 
115 Dill et al (2012). 
116 O’Higgins et al (2015). 
117 The Equality Trust, Social Mobility and Education: https://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/social-mobility-and-
education (visited 28 February 2016); Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson, The Spirit Level: Why Equality 
Makes Societies Stronger (Bloomsbury 2011). 
118 For example, see the University of Oxford’s undergraduate admissions criteria guidelines on 
“Contextual Data”: https://www.ox.ac.uk/admissions/undergraduate/applying-to-
oxford/decisions/contextual-data?wssl=1 (visited 20 March 2016). 
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6.3.16 Diversity Training 
In establishing the Garda Racial and Intercultural Office (now named the Garda Racial, 
Intercultural and Diversity Office: GRIDO), AGS demonstrated a commitment to 
responding to the fact that 12% of the Irish population are non-Irish nationals.  
 
The appointment of 277 Ethnic Liaison Officers for the purpose of directly engaging 
with members of ethnic minority communities and the Traveller Community is a positive 
development in building trust and confidence between AGS and all sections of Ireland’s 
minority communities. However, in light of this audit’s findings in relation to Garda 
members’ cultural sensitivity, which indicates current policies and practices in this regard 
have not filtered through to most Garda members, AGS should undertake further 
training to promote diversity and cultural awareness and sensitivity among all Garda 
members. AGS should also pursue wider organisational research and strategies to 
meaningfully engage with Ireland’s minority ethnic communities.  
 
Recommendations   
GRIDO should be expanded and reviewed to ensure that the positive work undertaken by the Office is 
relevant to all members of An Garda Síochána and not only members occupying the higher levels within 
the organisation’s hierarchy. 
 
All members of An Garda Síochána should be required to undergo diversity training. 
 
6.3.17 Out-of-Hours Social Work Service and Private Providers 
A key issue to emerge in the audit was the widespread use of private providers in the 
provision of emergency child protection placements.  
 
In November 2015, Tusla commenced an Emergency Out-of-Hours Social Work Service 
(EOHS) which cooperates with and supports AGS in relation to the removal of a child 
from his or her family under section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 and separated 
children seeking asylum. Through the service, AGS can contact a social worker by phone 
or arrange access to a local on-call social worker. The EOHS is to be welcomed as it 
strengthens inter-agency cooperation. That said, there continues to be no comprehensive 
social work service that is directly accessible to children or families at risk outside of 
office hours. 
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The Legal Position 
During the audit, a number of questions emerged concerning the legal position 
pertaining to private providers involved in emergency accommodation which may be 
distilled as follows: 
A. Whether Tusla can delegate a core part of its child protection work to an 
entity that is essentially a private provider?  
 
B. Whether section 38 of the Health Act 2004 was properly extended to cover 
Tusla upon the latter’s creation? 
 
C. Does placing children in emergency situations with a private provider come 
within section 36(1)(a) of the Child Care Act 1991? 
 
D. Do the 1995 Regulations (S.I. 260 of 1995) apply to emergency placements 
and can a private provider be absolved from the application of the Child Care 
Act 1991 or regulations made thereunder?  
 
In answering these questions, a number of documents were received from Tusla. These 
are set out below: 
 A one page letter of May 2009 from external legal advisors on behalf of the HSE 
to the Department of Health (‘the Letter’). 
 
 A document from Tusla entitled ‘Tusla Out of Hours Services: Section 12 
referrals and placements’.  
 
 A ‘Service Arrangement’ contract between the HSE and a private provider for 
the period 1 April 2013 to 30 September 2013. 
 
Whether Tusla can delegate its functions arising out of section 12(4) of the 1991 Act to an entity which 
is a private provider? 
Section 12(4) of the Child Care Act 1991 provides: 
(4) Where a child is delivered up to the custody of [the Agency] in accordance 
with subsection (3), [the Agency] shall, unless it returns the child to the parent 
having custody of him or a person acting in loco parentis [or an order referred to 
in section 35 has been made in respect of the child], make application for an 
emergency care order at the next sitting of the District Court held in the same 
district court district or, in the event that the next such sitting is not due to be 
held within three days of the date on which the child is delivered up to the 
custody of [the Agency], at a sitting of the District Court, which has been 
specially arranged under section 13(4), held within the said three days, and it shall 
be lawful for [the Agency] to retain custody of the child pending the hearing of 
that application. 
 
It should also be noted that subsections (1) and (2) of section 13 of the 1991 Act 
provide: 
13.—(1) If a justice of the District Court is of opinion on the application of [the 
Agency] that there is reasonable cause to believe that— 
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(a) there is an immediate and serious risk to the health or welfare of a child which 
necessitates his being placed in the care of [the Agency], or 
 
(b) there is likely to be such a risk if the child is removed from the place where he 
is for the time being, 
 
the justice may make an order to be known and in this Act referred to as an 
“emergency care order”. 
 
(2) An emergency care order shall place the child under the care of [the Agency] 
for a period of eight days or such shorter period as may be specified in the order. 
 
Whether delegation to a private provider gives rise to constitutional considerations?  
Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution places limits on the delegation by the Oireachtas of 
law-making powers to other entities, in that the Oireachtas must always stipulate the 
‘principles and policies’ which are to apply, although others can ‘fill in the details’119. 
Article 34.1 and Article 37.1 provide that only limited powers and functions of a judicial 
nature can be delegated or conferred upon entities which are not courts, and only then in 
non-criminal matters. Article 28.2 seems to envisage at least some facility for delegation 
of the Executive power because it provides that such power shall be exercised “by or on 
the authority of the Government”. 
 
Insofar as they apply to private providers, the relevant functions at issue are certainly not 
legislative or judicial, nor do they seem to be executive. They are functions conferred 
under statute and might be characterised as part of the ‘administrative’ power of the 
State.  
 
In An Blascaod Mór Teoranta v Commissioner of Public Works120 Budd J., referring to the An 
Blascaod Mór National Park Act 1989 stated: 
Section 5(2) expressly excludes from the ambit of delegations the functions of 
the Commissioners in respect of the making of bye-laws in section 3 and in 
regard to acquisition of land in section 4 and in the schedule. Accordingly, it 
would seem that all other functions of the Commissioners are capable of 
delegation and this would include the power of the Commissioners under section 
8(5) to appoint in writing a person to be an authorised person for the purposes of 
section 8 which gives powers to members of the Garda Síochána and authorised 
persons to police the park. If this power under section 8(5) of the 
Commissioners was to be excluded from the provisions authorising delegation in 
section 5(2) then one would expect mention of this exclusion as there is of 
                                                     
119 Cityview Press v AnCO [1980] IR 381. 
120 [1998] IEHC 38. 
280 
 
sections 3 and 4 and the schedule to the Act. While it seems highly unusual that 
park-ranger type persons might be appointed by the Foundation after delegation 
of authority from the Commissioners, nevertheless no Irish case has been cited 
on the point that this giving of policing powers to a private body with no obvious 
public accountability would be repugnant to the Constitution. Furthermore, 
section 5(5) makes provision for an order delegating functions by the Minister to 
the Foundation to be laid before each House of the Oireachtas as soon as may be 
after it is made. The Oireachtas may pass within 21 days a resolution annulling 
the order and thus retains some supervisory role in respect of this delegation of 
power. I accept the Plaintiffs’ points that delegation of policing and park-ranger 
powers to a private body seems dubious and places the Commissioners in the 
role of a conduit pipe for these powers and functions. Nevertheless in the 
absence of an Irish case or other strong authority indicating that this is repugnant 
to the Constitution, and being conscious of the presumptions in favour of 
constitutionality, I am not persuaded that the provisions enabling such 
delegation, subject to the supervisory powers contained in section 5(5), are 
invalid.121  
 
Thus, even delegations which might “seem dubious” will not be struck down as 
unconstitutional unless there is a constitutional basis for so doing. 
 
As stated in chapter 2, Article 42A.2.1˚ of the Constitution provides:  
In exceptional cases, where the parents, regardless of their marital status, fail in 
their duty towards their children to such extent that the safety or welfare of any 
of their children is likely to be prejudicially affected, the State as guardian of the 
common good shall, by proportionate means as provided by law, endeavour to 
supply the place of the parents, but always with due regard for the natural and 
imprescriptible rights of the child.122 
 
It is doubtful that the reference here to ‘the State’ would be such as to render 
questionable the placement (under and by virtue of statute) of children with private 
parties. First, all foster parents are by definition not “the State” and there is no indication 
that the Article (or its predecessor the former Article 42.5) was intended to apply a 
monopolistic and exclusive view of the State in this regard. Second, the State shall 
endeavour to supply the place of the parents “by proportionate means as provided by 
law”. The facility for a placement of a child with a private entity does indeed appear to be 
“provided by law” (see further below) and may well be more “proportionate”, in the 
sense of having a lesser adverse impact on the child than placement in ‘State care’ as 
such. 
 
                                                     
121 Emphasis added.  
122
 Emphasis added. 
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The better view is that there is no evident basis for considering that the delegation to a 
private provider would be unconstitutional. It is not a delegation of either the legislative, 
executive or judicial powers of the State. As such, everything will depend on whether 
statute enables it or not. That question will be examined next. 
  
Section 15 of the Child Care Act 1991 as amended and the arrangement as characterised by the HSE 
Letter of 29 May 2009 
Section 15 of the Child Care Act 1991 (as substituted by the Health Act 2007) provides: 
15.—The [Child and Family Agency] shall provide or make arrangements with 
suitable persons for the provision of suitable accommodation for the purposes of 
this Part.123 
 
The reference to ‘this Part’ is to Part III of the 1991 Act which includes both section 12 
and section 13.  
 
Section 18 of the Interpretation Act 2005 is of relevance here. It provides that references 
in legislation to a “person” include references to a body corporate, unless the context 
otherwise requires. Therefore the fact that a private provider may be a company does not 
necessarily prevent it from being a “suitable person” for the purposes of section 15.  
 
Section 15 may confer a legal basis for Tusla to enter into arrangements with a private 
provider. The HSE had the same power prior to the commencement of the Child and 
Family Agency Act 2013. It should be noted that the relevant power is not a power to 
place a child for fostering or with a foster parent but only for suitable “accommodation” 
to be provided. Notwithstanding that limitation – and indeed perhaps because of it – 
section 15 appears to be in harmony (subject to three caveats) with how the HSE Letter 
described the arrangement between the HSE and the private provider for the purposes 
of section 12(4). This is because: 
Paragraph 2 of the Letter described the HSE as “…making an arrangement with 
[the private provider] to provide accommodation for children placed in its 
custody by An Garda Síochána under section 12(4) …”  
 
Paragraph 4 of the Letter states that: “The placement of children in emergency 
situations with [a private provider] is not regarded by the HSE as a fostering 
arrangement within the meaning of section 36(1)(a) of the Child Care Act 1991”, 
which is correct in respect of section 15, because the role which section 15 
envisages in respect of a “suitable person” does not extend that far.  
 
                                                     
123 Emphasis added. 
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The second sentence of paragraph 5 of the Letter states:  
The HSE retains its powers, duties and functions under section 12 of the 
Child Care Act. 
 
The three caveats alluded to above are as follows. 
 
First, paragraph 2 of the Letter states that the legal basis for the arrangement is in fact 
section 38(1) of the Health Act 2004. However, the omission to quote section 15 should 
not necessarily be regarded as a statement or indication that it is legally irrelevant 
(although, as set out below, there are indications that it may not in fact be broad 
enough).  
 
Second, paragraph 6 of the Letter states that “Day to day care will be provided by [the 
private provider] as agent for the HSE”. This seems to indicate - contrary to the 
intimation in paragraph 2 of the Letter that the relevant function is “to provide 
accommodation” - that more is at play than “accommodation”. Indeed, “care” is a 
concept which surfaces elsewhere in the 1991 Act. Thus, while section 12(4) refers to a 
child being in the “custody” of Tusla before an emergency care order is applied for, 
section 13(2) provides that the effect of such an order is to place the child “under the 
care” of Tusla.  
 
However, case law exists indicating that a statutory power or function also confers power 
to do things which are ‘necessary or incidental’ to that power or function (e.g. the 
Supreme Court in McCarron v Superintendent Kearney124). Thus, it could not entirely be 
excluded that if section 15 confers a power for Tusla to enter into arrangements with a 
provider for the purposes of providing accommodation in the emergency situations 
envisaged by Part III of the 1991 Act, that this might also extend to a power to contract 
with the provider for the provision of meals etc.  
 
The third caveat is possibly the most important. The first sentence of paragraph 6 of the 
Letter states:  
The HSE will formally confirm in writing to An Garda Síochána that the HSE 
retains custody, within the meaning of section 12 of the Child Care Act, through 
                                                     
124 [2010] 3 IR 302. 
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its agent [the private provider], of a child placed with [the private provider] by An 
Garda Síochána under section 12(4) of the Child Care Act, 1991.125  
 
Although this sentence is merely a statement of what will be set out in correspondence, 
the interaction between this first sentence of paragraph 6, and the second sentence of 
paragraph 5, is not without vagueness.  
 
Paragraph 6 does appear to suggest, however, that the private provider itself is actually 
exercising custody, albeit that it is doing so on behalf of the HSE/Tusla. 
 
The question of custody rather than mere accommodation (and ancillary matters such as 
meals) is important. ‘Custody’ implies additional rights and powers in respect of the 
child. What if the child were to seek to run away for example, or exercise their ordinary 
liberty or freedom of movement in ways that were a danger to themselves or others? It is 
not evident that the provision of accommodation under section 15, even if stretched to 
what is necessary or incidental, would extend to coercive powers or authority. There is an 
argument that coercive powers or authority (not least because they infringe upon a 
child’s constitutional and other rights) would have to be clearly conferred. The reference 
to Tusla having “custody” over the child is probably sufficient for that purpose, but it is 
not clear that the statute (at least in section 15) clearly provides that Tusla may delegate 
such custody to an agent in a section 12(4) situation. This point is of relevance to the 
audit in that the most problematic cases and the cases where children received a sub-
optimal service were cases where children had emotional or behavioural problems. These 
cases are set out in section 3.7 of this report. 
 
The foregoing discussion gives rise to the question of what a private provider is actually 
doing in an emergency situation. This is not clear, though the Letter asserts that it is not 
a fostering arrangement within the meaning of section 36. The fact that section 15 may 
not be broad enough to allow ‘custody’ to be delegated (if indeed that is what is 
happening) makes it necessary to look to other statutory provisions. For this reason, it 
may be prudent to amend the Child Care Act 1991 to remove any ambiguity surrounding 
the status of private providers.  
 
 
                                                     
125 Emphasis added.  
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Provisions in respect of service provision 
Section 9 of the 1991 Act provided: 
9.—(1) A health board may, subject to any general directions given by the 
Minister and on such terms or conditions as it sees fit, make arrangements with 
voluntary bodies or other persons for the provision by those bodies or other 
persons on behalf of the health board of child care and family support services 
which the board is empowered to provide under this Act.126 
 
However, this was deleted by the Health Act 2004 (possibly in light of the provision 
made in section 38(1) of that Act).  
 
Section 38(1) of the Health Act 2004 (which does not appear to have been amended) 
provides:  
The Executive may, subject to its available resources and any directions issued by 
the Minister under section 10, enter, on such terms and conditions as it considers 
appropriate, into an arrangement with a person for the provision of a health or 
personal social service by that person on behalf of the Executive. 
 
Section 2 of the 2004 Act provides inter alia: 
“health and personal social services” means services that immediately before the 
establishment day were provided under the Acts referred to in Schedule 1 by a 
specified body as defined in section 56 of this Act, and references in this Act to a 
health or personal social service are to be read as references to any of those 
services. 
 
The “Child Care Acts 1991 and 2001” are listed in Schedule 1 to the 2004 Act.   
 
Section 56 of the Child and Family Agency Act 2013 (entitled ‘Arrangements with service 
providers’, in the marginal note) now provides as follows: 
(1) The Agency may, subject to its available resources and having regard to the 
required level of service identified in the corporate plan or annual business plan 
and any directions issued by the Minister under section 47, enter, on such terms 
and conditions as it considers appropriate, into an arrangement with a person for 
the provision of child and family services or services provided pursuant to 
section 8 (3)(b). 
 
… 
 
(6) The Agency may make such arrangements as it considers appropriate to 
monitor— 
              
(a) the expenditure incurred in the provision of services by service 
providers exempted under subsection (5), and 
(b) the provision of those services by such service providers. 
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(8) The Agency may request from a service provider any information that it 
considers material to the provision of a service by the service provider. 
… 
 
(12) Nothing in this Act shall empower the Agency to delegate to a service 
provider the duty imposed on it under section 4 of the Child Care Act 1991 to 
take a child into its care or to make an application for an order under Part III, IV, 
IVA (as amended by the Child Care (Amendment) Act 2011) or VI of that Act. 
 
(13) The Minister may prescribe requirements in respect of— 
 
(a) the expenditure incurred by the Agency in the provision of services by 
service providers, and 
(b) the provision of those services by service providers. 
 
(14) For the avoidance of doubt, an arrangement under this section shall not give 
rise to an employment relationship between a service provider, its employees or 
agents on the one hand and the Agency on the other. 
 
(15) In this section “service provider” means a person involved in the provision 
of child and family services otherwise than for profit, which services, in the 
opinion of the Agency, are services that are similar to activities carried out by the 
Agency and consistent with its functions.127 
 
Although section 56(1) refers to Tusla entering into an arrangement with “a person” the 
remainder of the section proceeds to refer to a “service provider”. That in turn is defined 
in section 56(15) as the provision of child and family services “otherwise than for profit”. 
There are indications that existing private providers may in fact meet the definition of 
conducting relevant operations “otherwise than for profit”.  
 
The question nonetheless arises whether the power/function referred to in section 12(4) 
of the 1991 Act – namely that “it shall be lawful for the Agency to retain custody of the 
child pending the hearing of that application” i.e. within 3 days – is in fact apposite to fall 
within the concept of an “arrangement with a person for the provision of child and 
family services or services provided pursuant to section 8 (3)(b)” for the purposes of 
section 56(1) of the 2013 Act. For example, such custody would not easily fall within the 
ordinary literal understanding of a ‘service’.  
 
This point is not without uncertainty and would benefit from clarity in amending 
legislation. That said, it is possible to argue that such a service can be contracted out 
under section 56.  
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First, “child and family services” are not defined in the interpretation section of the 2013 
Act. The phrase only appears twice in the Act, on both occasions in section 56 itself. It 
would therefore appear that the definition is provided by section 56(15) namely that the 
relevant services are those which “in the opinion of the Agency, are services that are 
similar to activities carried out by the Agency and consistent with its functions”.128 This is 
important because, although there is an argument that Tusla’s functions under section 
12(4) of the 1991 Act are not ‘services’ per se, there is a clear argument that can be made 
that they are in fact ‘activities’.129  
 
Second, section 56(12) provides that:   
Nothing in this Act shall empower the Agency to delegate to a service provider 
the duty imposed on it under section 4 of the Child Care Act 1991 to take a child 
into its care or to make an application for an order under Part III, IV, IVA (as 
amended by the Child Care (Amendment) Act 2011) or VI of that Act.130 
 
This might be argued to indicate that the Oireachtas did indeed give consideration to 
what types of powers and functions could not be contracted out, and specifically did not 
include the three days of custody referred to in section 12(4). Rather, non-delegability 
was only provided for in respect of the “application” for a Part III order, and indeed the 
“duty” under section 4 to take a child into care (although not the care itself). Although 
such inclusio unius exclusio alterius arguments can tend to sweep quite broadly, they can 
sometimes be a guide of sorts to the legislature’s intent.  
 
Third, section 8(3) of the 2013 Act provides:  
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), in supporting and 
encouraging the effective functioning of families pursuant to subsection (1)(c), 
the Agency shall provide— … (b) care and protection for victims of domestic, 
sexual or gender-based violence, whether in the context of the family or 
otherwise.  
 
Although the power/function appears to be made subject to “supporting and 
encouraging the effective functioning of families”, it may well be possible to argue that 
that is not always incompatible with taking children into care, in particular for a short or 
emergency period. On one view, therefore this stipulation is very apposite to emergency 
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 In this respect there seems to be a clear difference with “health and personal services” under sections 2 and 38(1) 
of the Health Act 2004.  
130 Emphasis added. 
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out-of-hours services, if the out-of-hours services are necessary by reason of children 
being the victims of any of the types of violence referred to.  
 
Even if section 8(3)(b) is not co-extensive or overlapping with the section 12(4) 
provisions as to custody – and the two are indeed separate statutory provisions – the fact 
that section 8(3)(b) was expressly stipulated by the Oireachtas to be something which 
was delegable to a private (not for profit) service provider does confer an argument that 
it is not inconceivable that the Oireachtas also intended that the not dissimilar functions 
in section 12(4) of the 1991 Act would also be delegable (and indeed it did not exclude it 
from the scope of delegation, although other powers/functions were excluded as already 
noted).  
 
Fourth, the fact that as far back as the Child Care Act 1991, through section 15 (already 
considered above), the Oireachtas made provision for arrangements with “suitable 
persons” to be made in respect of the provision of accommodation where necessary 
under Part III, is once again consistent with the proposition that private sector 
involvement in the section 12(4) process cannot have been considered an anathema to 
the Oireachtas, which strengthens the argument on the interpretation of section 56 set 
out above.  
 
Whether section 38 of the Health Act 2004 was properly extended to cover the Child and Family 
Agency / Tusla upon the latter’s creation? 
This question has essentially been addressed above. It is not clear that section 38 remains 
of relevance for present purposes in circumstances where the Oireachtas has, through 
section 56 of the 2013 Act, conferred powers upon Tusla to delegate to service 
providers.  
 
Does placing children in emergency situations with a private provider come within section 36(1)(a) of the 
1991 Act? 
Section 36(1) of the 1991 Act (as substituted by the Health Act 2007, and subsequently 
further amended) provides as follows: 
36.—(1) Where a child is in the care of the Agency, the Agency shall provide 
such care for him, subject to its control and supervision, in such of the following 
ways as it considers to be in his best interests— 
 
(a)    by placing him with a foster parent,  
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(b)    by placing him or her in residential care (whether in a children’s residential 
centre or in a school or other suitable place of residence), ...131 
 
Section 36(2) provides:  
(2) In this Act, ‘foster parent’ means a person other than a relative of a child who 
is taking care of the child on behalf of the Agency in accordance with regulations 
made under section 39 and “foster care” shall be construed accordingly. 
  
The Letter states at paragraph 4:  
The placing of children in emergency situations with [the private provider] is not 
regarded by the HSE as a fostering arrangement within the meaning of section 
36(1)(a) of the Child Care Act, 1991. 
  
The approach taken by the Letter in this regard is problematic, first of all, due to the fact 
that the private provider alluded to in the Letter describes and holds itself out as being 
connected with fostering and indeed a “provider” of fostering services.  
 
Moreover, it is questionable whether an emergency placement is necessarily inconsistent 
with foster care because Reg. 6(2) of S.I. 260 of 1995 provides: 
(2) Where a child is placed with foster parents in an emergency, the health board 
shall carry out an assessment of the child’s circumstances as soon as practicable. 
 
Similarly, Reg. 11(2) of the same Regulations provides that:  
(2) Where a child is placed with foster parents in an emergency, the health board 
shall prepare [a care] plan as soon as practicable. 
 
The approach taken in the Letter may be justified by reference to the fact that sections 
12(4) and 13(2) are discrete statutory provisions, which do not refer to fostering, and 
which stand separately from section 36.  
 
Moreover, section 12(4) provides that a child shall be in the “custody” of Tusla, but 
section 36 is concerned with a situation “where a child is in the care” of Tusla. Although 
there is a risk of making too much of linguistic differences, there is an argument that a 
child is not in the “care” of Tusla until an order has been made under section 13(2), 
because the latter subsection provides that that is the effect of an emergency care 
order.    
                                                     
131 Emphasis added. 
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Furthermore, it is not clear whether the private provider referred to in the Letter is itself 
a “foster parent” for the purposes of section 36. A perusal of one of the private 
providers company’s website reveals, on the main page, under the title ‘What we do’ that: 
“At [the private provider], we recruit, train and support Foster Parents and Foster 
Children.” This might suggest that it is something of a middleman. In the ‘About Us’ 
section of its website, under ‘Aims and Objectives’ it states: “[The private provider’s] 
main objective is to be a leading provider of high quality foster care services” and that 
“…[The private provider] has a wide range of foster families available and can offer 
many different types of foster families who can meet various placement needs.” 
 
Legislative clarity is recommended in that while the statement at paragraph 4 of the 
Letter is arguably a basis for the position taken, there are certainly grounds for 
questioning it.  
 
However, even if the Letter is correct in that respect, this does not mean that standards 
and safeguards could not be provided for, or do not apply, in emergency situations, and 
indeed (as noted) S.I. 260 of 1995 does appear to refer to emergency situations (although 
the relevant basis for present purposes of the legal basis under which the Regulations 
have been made does appear to be section 39 which admittedly refers back to section 
36).  
 
Do the 1995 Regulations apply and can a private provider be absolved from the application of the Child 
Care Act 1991 or regulations made thereunder?  
While the Letter does not necessarily take the position that the 1995 Regulations do not 
apply, it appears to take the position that the 1995 Regulations do not afford “the legal 
basis for the new service”. This is a justifiable position. There is an argument that the 
legal basis is afforded by the interaction of section 12(4) with what is now section 56 of 
the 2013 Act and/or perhaps section 15 of the 1991 Act.  
 
The audit concludes that it would be absurd or would fail to reflect the Oireachtas’ intent 
for the purposes of section 5 of the Interpretation Act 2005 if an agency like Tusla could 
take children outside the sphere of statutory provisions simply by delegating (even if 
lawfully) certain of its activities to a private provider.  Moreover, it would be absurd or 
fail to reflect the Oireachtas’ intent if the level of protection available to children could 
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vary (in legal/regulatory terms) depending on the type of person or service provider they 
were placed with.  
 
The foregoing argument is particularly strong in respect of the provisions of the Child 
Care Act 1991 itself. For example, and although the context is slightly different, it may be 
noted that in Burke v Minister for Labour,132 Henchy J., giving the judgment of the Supreme 
Court in respect of powers delegated to Joint Labour Committees by the Industrial 
Relations Act 1946, stated at 361-62: 
Where Parliament has delegated functions of that nature, it is to be necessarily 
inferred as part of the legislative intention that the body which makes the orders 
will exercise its functions, not only with constitutional propriety and due regard 
to natural justice, but also within the framework of the terms and objects of the 
relevant Act and with basic fairness, reasonableness and good faith. The 
absoluteness of the delegation is susceptible of unjust and tyrannous abuse unless 
its operation is thus confined; so it is entirely proper to ascribe to the Oireachtas 
(being the Parliament of a State which is constitutionally bound to protect, by its 
laws, its citizens from unjust attack) an intention that the delegated functions 
must be exercised within those limitations. 
 
The audit concludes that it is highly likely that when the Oireachtas made provision in 
respect of the delegation of certain child care matters or functions to private parties (e.g. 
in section 56 of the 2013 Act) an intention is similarly to be imputed to the Oireachtas 
that such delegated functions would be exercised “within the framework of” and 
therefore subject to, the relevant legislative framework, including the Child Care Act 
1991.  
 
Furthermore, the definition of what may be delegated under section 56(15) of the 2013 
Act is “services that are similar to activities carried out by the Agency and consistent with 
its functions” and the latter use of words might indicate or support an intention on the 
part of the Oireachtas that relevant provisions of statute are to continue to apply, and 
not to be ousted in the event of a delegation. 
 
Regarding whether a private provider can be absolved from the provisions of a statutory 
instrument, there is an argument that section 56 of the 2013 Act provides full scope for 
the same (or indeed, higher) levels of regulatory requirements or oversight to be applied 
to private service providers. Thus, section 56(6) provides that Tusla may make 
arrangements in respect of the monitoring of the provision of services by private 
                                                     
132 [1979] IR 354. 
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providers and section 56(13) provides that the Minister may stipulate requirements in 
respect of the provision of those services.  
 
It is also, of course, possible to do so by contract, in addition to these powers. The April-
September 2013 contract between the HSE and the private provider makes reference to 
various provisions of statute and statutory instrument. The 1995 Regulations do not 
appear to be included here. It is not clear why such a key component of the child 
protection infrastructure has not been included in the contract. Given the non-inclusion, 
the private provider may well have an argument, at least as a matter of contract law, that 
its contractual obligations do not include compliance with the 1995 Regulations per se – 
an unsatisfactory position with regard to the protection of the rights and interests of the 
child. 
 
Even if such a contractual obligation did exist between the private provider and Tusla 
with regard to the 1995 Regulations, this still creates an accountability gap between the 
provider of an essential frontline service to the child, and the statutory agency 
responsible for that child’s welfare when removed from parental care. As a matter of 
contract law, a child cannot enforce the contractual obligations of the private provider to 
Tusla – this is a legal right held only by Tusla. If the service provider fails to adhere to 
the standards set out in the Regulations, and that failure results in actionable damage to 
the child, the child must bring an action against Tusla for that failure. This particular 
route to legal accountability against the State, where children are in receipt of essential 
State services through State-funded private providers, has been profoundly problematic 
in the area of primary education.133 
 
Key Issues  
Given the social nature of the Child Care Act 1991 and the vital role Tusla performs 
under this statute, it is imperative that absolute clarity exists when it delegates its powers. 
 
The ambiguities around both the operational and legal meaning of concepts of “child and 
family services”, “suitable accommodation” and “custody”, raise questions about the 
legality of some of the activities performed by private providers. 
 
                                                     
133 O’Keeffe v Hickey [2008] IESC 72. 
292 
 
In circumstances where a private provider is the only service available out-of-hours, is it 
lawfully empowered to make decisions about the custody134 of the child (i.e. in 
circumstances where it advises the Gardaí to return the child to the family home, or 
advises the Gardaí to hand the child over to another family member)?  
 
With regard to section 12 specifically, the concept of providing “suitable 
accommodation” is qualitatively and substantively different from other core decision-
making which Tusla is statutorily obliged to undertake in protecting the health and 
welfare of the child. In many circumstances, Tusla’s decision-making is informed by 
access to its own child protection files and databases – which it is assumed the private 
provider does not have access to out-of-hours. In many instances reviewed for the 
purposes of the audit, the post section 12 removal circumstances involve, far more than 
mere provision of alternative accommodation for the night/day. 
 
This other core decision-making may be captured by the concept of “child and family 
services” – which would suggest that under section 56 of the 2013 Act, Tusla can 
delegate that kind of core decision-making. This might mean that a private provider is 
able to provide both “suitable accommodation” under section 12, and also make other 
core decision-making with regard to the child’s welfare in the post section 12 removal 
stage, under the lawful delegation of “child and family services”. However, this depends 
on how the interplay of these different legal provisions is constructed.  
 
With regard to the non-delegability of Tusla’s statutory duties to the child: Tusla can only 
create contractual duties with the private provider. This poses a number of problems for 
children seeking accountability. Importantly, the child cannot enforce any contractual 
rights against a private provider for a failure of service – only Tusla can do this. This is a 
legal obstacle to accountability. This could be remedied by the child taking a case against 
Tusla, with it in turn being able to join the private provider as a third party to seek 
indemnity/contribution assuming the provider did not agree to indemnify. If the child 
comes to harm that would presumably be a breach of the express or implied terms of the 
provider’s contract with Tusla. The ‘child’ (when an adult or otherwise) does not have 
any contract with the private provider and would be barred by lack of privity from suing 
in contract, although there could be a suit in negligence – depending on the nature of the 
                                                     
134 Emphasis added. 
293 
 
failure. However, this added level of legal complexity in seeking accountability is an 
additional obstacle in the already onerous mechanisms for accountability in our legal 
system – creating potential injustice.  
 
Many of the concerns of the audit on the subject of private providers do not concern the 
legality of private providers – they are practical and ethical concerns about the legal 
frameworks in which these services are provided. The data emanating from the audit 
reveals a core area of child protection ‘work’ being delegated by Tusla when the young 
person is most vulnerable. This is an issue of concern given the history of institutional 
failure to protect children in Ireland due to heavy reliance on non-State actors. 
 
Recommendations  
1. There is no evident basis for considering that the delegation or arrangement as 
between Tusla and a private entity would be unconstitutional. It is not a delegation of 
either the legislative, executive or judicial powers of the State.  As such, everything will 
depend on whether statute enables it or not. Section 15 of the 1991 Act permits Tusla to 
enter into arrangements with other persons for the provision of accommodation for the 
purposes of Part III of that Act, which includes sections 12 and 13. There is authority 
that statutory powers can extend to what is necessary or incidental to their exercise, and 
as such this might include the provision of meals etc. Notwithstanding this, it does not 
appear that section 15 would be broad enough for present purposes to encompass the 
full extent of the section 12(4) function that might be involved (and it is unclear what the 
private providers’ precise role and activities are in this regard). However, it is possible to 
argue that section 56 of the Child and Family Agency Act 2013 is in fact broad enough to 
enable Tusla to contract with a private not-for-profit provider with respect to emergency 
placements under section 12(4). That said, legislative clarity in this regard is desirable. 
 
2. There may be grounds for questioning the statement at paragraph 4 of the HSE letter 
that the placing of children in emergency situations with a private provider is not 
regarded as a fostering arrangement within the meaning of section 36(1)(b). Legislative 
clarity in this regard is desirable. Even if the Letter is correct in that respect, this does not 
mean that standards, safeguards etc. could not be provided for, or do not apply, in 
emergency situations, and indeed S.I. 260 of 1995 does appear to refer to emergency 
situations. 
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3. The audit concludes that Tusla cannot, through delegation under section 56, absolve a 
private provider of compliance with the 1991 Act. Section 56(6) and section 56(13) of the 
2013 Act provide ample scope for both Tusla and the Minister for Children to subject 
private providers to the provisions of S.I. 260 of 1995, although it is noted that the 1995 
Regulations do not appear to be expressly referred to in the 2013 contract between the 
HSE and the private provider. The 1995 Foster Care Regulations should be expressly referred to in 
any contract between Tusla and a private provider. 
 
4. The legal framework applying to emergency placements with private providers should be clarified to 
remove any ambiguity as to the standards to be applied in respect of such placements, particularly in cases 
where children have emotional and behavioural problems. 
 
5. A social work service that is directly accessible to children or families at risk outside of office hours 
should be developed as a matter of priority to ensure a comprehensive and unified child protection system.    
 
6.3.18 Implementation and Review 
Ultimately recommendations are meaningless unless given effect to. Experience suggests 
that reports are often commissioned by way of reaction to the revelation of serious child 
protection and welfare issues, and in many cases to quell public anger directed towards 
politicians. However, child protection and welfare ought not to be merely reactive but 
must also be proactive. Action needs to be taken on foot of reports.   
 
Recommendations  
To address any concern that the section 12 power is not being used appropriately and proportionately, An Garda 
Síochána should publish statistics on an annual basis on the invocation of section 12 in the preceding year. This 
reporting should also include details on the challenges/difficulties experienced by Gardaí in the exercise of the 
power. 
 
Any review process on the exercise of section 12 should make explicit reference to the monitoring of ethno-cultural 
demographic patterns in those children subject to section 12 removal, with the possibility of a robust investigation of 
such patterns, using a methodology comparable to this audit (access to all PULSE data, and the authority to 
interview select Gardaí about particular cases of relevance).  
 
It is suggested that one year after submission of this report, An Garda Síochána examine the 
implementation of the recommendations of this audit and, if any recommendations may not have been 
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implemented, provide reasons explaining why they have not been implemented, together with proposals to 
address such an event. 
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6.4 CONCLUSION 
Children grow up best in an environment that is nurturing, enduring and predictable. 
The requirement for stability and security in their lives coupled with a need to feel that 
their environment is attuned to their needs cannot be overstated. 
 
The invocation of section 12 powers is just one part of a child protection and welfare 
system. It is an emergency response and needs to be followed by continuity of care 
informed by cooperation and integration with other child welfare systems to ensure the 
best interests of the child are always being met. Communication that goes beyond a 
paper exercise of notification, and appropriate feedback between agencies as to who is 
doing what, when and for what purpose, is essential to ensure that the “best interests of 
the child principle” does not become a meaningless construct.  
 
Such communication and feedback will also ensure that interventions with children are 
proportionate, developmentally appropriate and culturally sensitive. 
 
In the absence of such cooperation and coordination, the very real potential exists that 
services designed to ensure children’s welfare and protection at a time when children are 
most in need of them, will themselves cause further trauma and impact on children’s 
view of themselves, others and the world. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Audit of Processes and Procedures adopted by An Garda Síochána in initiating the 
provisions of Section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 
 
Aim of Audit: To conduct a comprehensive review of what the current work practices are in 
this area, with a particular emphasis on what works well and what shortcomings exist, with a 
view to informing policy and practice. 
 
Process of Audit 
 Analyse data compiled by An Garda Síochána (File review/PULSE system review); 
 Questionnaires; 
 Semi-structured interviews - random sample of Gardaí; 
 Focus Groups; 
 Interview additional professionals that could provide useful information for the audit;  
 Examine work practices in other jurisdictions;  
 Research literature on international best practice. 
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Data to be Collected 
 
Need to determine what is desirable/what is essential data for review to be completed. 
 
Different Stakeholders 
 
Questions for Gardaí 
1. What were the circumstances surrounding the section 12 powers being invoked?  
2. What evidence was available prior to invoking the section 12 powers?  
3. Evidence of critical evaluation of the information furnished?  
4. Were discreet inquiries made before section 12 powers were invoked?  
5. Is there any evidence of the application of HQ Directive 48/2013 i.e. application of the 
policy on the investigation of sexual crime, crimes against children and child welfare 
(2013)?  
6. Is the subsequent history of the case recorded on PULSE? 
7. Is there an annual internal audit of the use of the section 12 powers?  
8. What training documents are used? 
9. Is specific guidance provided on unusual situations? 
10. What training is provided? 
11. Is any interdisciplinary training provided? 
12. What evidence exists of diversity training and compliance with the Garda Síochána 
Diversity Strategy 2014 – 2016? 
13. How many members of An Garda Síochána were involved? 
14. Was there a risk assessment? 
15. Was the Tusla social worker contacted prior to the section 12 powers being invoked? 
16. What support do Gardaí receive after the exercise of section 12 powers (i.e. debriefing)? 
 
Demographic Data 
In relation to child and family; 
1. Age 
2. Gender 
3. Area in which they reside 
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4. Socio-economic background of family (Is there an adult in the household in full or part-
time employment? What kind of employment are they engaged in? Is the family in receipt 
of social welfare assistance? Are the family residing in local authority housing?)  
5. Nationality? 
- Irish  
- Irish Traveller “settled”/ not 
- EU National 
- Non-EU National 
6. Home Circumstances (e.g. living with parents, NFA, Hostel, Traveller)?  
7. Country of Birth?  
8. Religion?  
9. Disability?  
10. Number of children in the family? 
11. Family previously known to Gardaí?  
 
In relation to Garda involved in initiating section 12 
1. Gender? 
2. Number of years in force? 
3. Training in child protection? 
4. If yes, what kind of training?    
5. Joint training with social workers or internal Garda training? 
6. If yes, what kind of training? 
7. Training in cultural competency? 
8. If yes, what kind of training?                                                                                                                
 
Process involved in initiating section 12 
1. Who initiated involvement of Gardaí? (Family member/ G.P./Hospital/ Mental Health/ 
Tusla/ Neighbour etc.)  
2. What time of day? 
3. Number of children removed?  
4. Were any children left? 
5. Place to where children removed, including initial place of safety and handover place of 
safety?  
6. Length of time child/children spent in place of safety?  
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7. Grounds on which child/children removed?  
 located within child i.e. abuse or neglect  
 located within parent i.e. Domestic Violence/ Mental Health issues                                                                                        
8. Parents present at time of removal?  
9. Gardaí experience resistance at time of removal of children (from parents or child or 
other)?  
10. If so, did children witness this?  
11. Were Gardaí accompanied by social workers when children were removed?  
 
Criminal Investigations 
Was there a criminal investigation subsequent to the section 12 powers being invoked? 
 
Communication 
Both internally within An Garda Síochána and externally with other agencies and with other 
family members pre, during and post initiating section 12 powers. 
 
During consideration to invoke section 12 power: 
1. Consultation with Sergeant, Inspector, Superintendent (or other known ‘expert’ Garda) 
during consideration to invoke section 12? 
2. Consultation with Tusla depending on time/circumstances/relationship? 
3. Consultation with other NGOs/agencies who are present at the home/reported 
concerns? 
4. Contact with Tusla to arrange delivery of children? 
 
Post section 12:  
1. Contact with Tusla to arrange delivery of children? 
2. PULSE recording? 
3. Report to Superintendent? 
4. Tusla Notification for Superintendent to sign and forward? 
5. Daily Performance Accountability Framework (PAF) Meetings? 
6. Strategy meetings, case conferences with Tusla? 
 
If Garda Rostered Off-Duty?  
1. If the Garda went off-duty during the incident, to whom was responsibility handed over?  
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Questions for Tusla 
1. Had child protection social services previous engagements with that family? 
2. If yes, for how long had the family been engaging with those services? 
3. During 2014, did a Garda refuse to exercise his or her section 12 powers when 
requested by you to do so? 
4. Was an Emergency Care Order applied for? 
5. If not, why not, in so far as this information may be ascertainable? 
6. Was the child received into voluntary care following exercise of the section 12 powers? 
7. If an Emergency Care Order was applied for, was it granted? 
8. If not, why not in so far as this information may be ascertainable? 
9. Was an Interim Care Order applied for? 
10. If not, why not? 
11. Was a full Care Order applied for? 
12. If not, why not? 
13. Was the Garda or other Gardaí involved in case conferences, strategy meetings or care 
order hearings? 
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Questions for Gardaí and Tusla 
1. Ascertain whether a joint notification sheet between the Gardaí and Tusla as 
recommended in the Children First Guidelines was completed. (This question addresses 
the notifications made re child abuse or the Joint Action Plan.)  
2. Do members of An Garda Síochána have access to Tusla’s National Child Care 
Information System? 
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Questions for Courts Service 
1. Was an Emergency Care Order subsequently granted? 
2. If not, why not? 
3. Was an Interim Care Order subsequently granted? 
4. If not, why not? 
5. Was a Supervision Order subsequently granted? 
6. If not, why not? 
7. Was a Care Order subsequently granted? 
8. If not, why not? 
9. Was the Garda or other Gardaí involved in the care order hearings? 
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Outcome of Cases  
1. Emergency Care order sought? 
2. If so, was it granted? 
3. What evidence was adduced before the Court? 
4. What was the foundational evidence? 
5. Interim Care Order sought? 
6. If so, was it granted? 
7. Supervision Order sought? 
8. If so, was it granted? 
9. Care Order sought? 
10. If so, was it granted? 
11. Voluntary Care? 
12. When was the child returned to the family? 
13. Was the case discussed at the CPCC? 
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More subjective questions for semi-structured interviews  
1. Was section 12 invoked after 5 p.m.? 
2. Was an out-of-hours social work service available?  
3. If not, would section 12 powers have been invoked if such a service had been 
available at the time? 
4. Were efforts made to contact a responsible / competent relative to care for the 
child/children to avoid exercising section 12? 
5. Was there an attempt to encourage the parent/s to cooperate voluntarily with having 
the child removed from the household? 
6. Is the potential exercise of section 12 ever used, either expressly or implicitly, to 
encourage voluntary cooperation from parent/s? 
7. Is section 12 used to bypass delays in obtaining court orders? 
8. Are social workers reliant on police use of section 12 to undertake ordinary child 
protection tasks (i.e. is section 12 used where a court order could have been obtained 
with little or no additional risk to the child)? 
9. What general presumptions operate for Gardaí in their use of emergency protective 
powers for children (e.g. does the Garda generally presume a child is best left in the 
care of their parents or another family member, or do Gardaí operate under a 
precautionary logic – i.e. best to remove a child where any doubt about his or her 
safety exists)? 
10. How seriously do Gardaí or Social Workers or other professional respondents view 
the exercise of section 12 powers by the Gardaí? 
11. Do Gardaí consider they have sufficient training in child abuse/cultural issues? 
12. Do Gardaí consider they receive sufficient feedback from Tusla on the final 
disposition of a case such as to inform their policy and practice? 
13. Do Gardaí understand the threshold criteria? 
14. Do Gardaí understand the evidence required to satisfy the threshold criteria? 
15. Do other professionals feel that section 12 powers are being misused?  
16. If so, what needs to be done to address this issue?     
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 Discuss the transfer between the Gardaí, out-of-hours and day teams. 
 Access to a lawyer? 
 How long has the social worker been aware of a situation and failed to apply for a 
section 13 Order? 
 What has changed to suddenly create an immediate and serious risk to the welfare of 
the child? 
 Despite this, there may be an immediate and serious risk now and Gardaí must 
consider that issue. 
 The immediate and serious risk must exist in the mind of the Garda but Garda may 
rely on information provided by the social worker. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Questionnaire 
This questionnaire relates to occasions on which section 12 powers were invoked during 2014. A questionnaire 
must be completed in respect of each time section 12 powers have been invoked.  
 
PART 1 
Provide an account of the circumstances which led you to exercise the section 12 
powers. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
PART 2 
1. Gender 
2. Number of years working in An Garda Síochána 
3. Garda District in which you were based in at the time of invoking section 12 powers 
4. PULSE incident number for the section 12 event 
5. Is there a paper file? 
6. Have you had training in child protection?             
Yes/No 
7. If yes: Was this part of your general training?            Yes/No 
8. Was this specialist training?               
Yes/No 
9. Was this training conducted jointly with social workers?           
Yes/No 
10. Do you think you have had sufficient training in child protection?           
Yes/No 
11. Do you have available to you any training documents/directives that assist you in 
reaching a determination regarding the invoking of section 12 powers?         
Yes/No  
If yes, please specify 
12. Have you had any training in diversity?                                 Yes/No 
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PART 3 
In relation to the case/cases wherein you have invoked section 12 powers: 
1. Who initiated involvement of Gardaí? 
2. Number of children removed 
3. Initial place to where child/children removed 
4. Age of child/children 
5. Length of time (approximately) child/children spent in initial place of safety 
6. What location was the handover place of safety? 
7. Into whose care was/were the child/children placed?  
Tusla Social Worker 
Hospital Staff 
Residential Unit 
Other (please specify) 
8. Length of time (approximately) child/children spent in this location after the handover 
9. Were you accompanied at the time of invoking section 12 powers?      Yes /No 
If yes, who accompanied you? 
Garda colleague/colleagues.         Yes/ No      
How many? 
Tusla social worker/workers.        Yes/No  
How many? 
Other (please specify) 
10. Did you experience resistance?         Yes/No 
If yes, please specify from whom 
11. Grounds on which you invoked the section 12 powers 
- Suspicion or concern that child being abused or neglected 
 Concern for child welfare (public safety) 
 Suspected emotional abuse 
 Suspected neglect 
 Suspected physical abuse 
 Suspected sexual abuse 
- Child a danger to self/others 
- Domestic violence 
- Mental health issues within parents 
- Mental health issues within child 
- Active substance abuse within parents leading to abuse or neglect 
- Other, please specify  
12. From whose care was the child removed? 
13. Was this child or family previously known to you or your colleagues?          Yes/No 
14. Did you have an opportunity to gather background information on the family?        Yes/No 
             If yes, from what source? 
15. During your consideration to invoke section 12 powers, did you consult with anyone?  
    Yes/No 
If yes, was this within your own agency and if so with whom? 
Was this with an outside agency and if so with whom? 
16. Have you ever declined to exercise your section 12 powers when requested by a social 
      worker?              Yes/No 
17. Would you have liked to have a consultation on the case but were unable to do so?                            
    Yes/No 
If yes, reason why this opportunity was not available 
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18. Did you complete a HSE/Tusla notification form?        Yes /No 
19. Was a joint action plan completed?          Yes /No/Don’t know 
20. Did you subsequently attend at either: 
A strategy meeting 
Child protection case conference 
Care order hearing 
(If yes, please circle above as it applies) 
If you didn’t attend such a meeting was this because 
(a) you weren’t asked to 
 (b) you were invited but were unable to attend 
 (c) case didn’t require such a meeting 
21. Do you consider you received appropriate feedback on the final disposition of the case?  
              Yes/No 
If yes, was this from your own agency? 
Tusla? 
22. If the section 12 powers were invoked after 5 p.m. or at a weekend was an out-of-hours 
social work service available to you?            Yes/No      
23. If yes, what did it involve? 
24. If no, would section 12 powers have been invoked if such a service had been available at the 
time?                                                                                  Yes/ No/ Not Sure 
  
 
 
Many thanks for your cooperation in completing this questionnaire. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Focus Group Questions – Garda Questions 
1. Was an out-of-hours social work service available?  If not, would section 12 powers 
have been invoked if such a service had been available at the time? 
2. Were efforts made to contact a responsible / competent relative to care for the 
child/children to avoid exercising section 12? What general presumptions operate for 
Gardaí in their use of emergency protective powers for children (e.g. does the Garda 
generally presume a child is best left in the care of their parents or another family 
member, or do Gardaí operate under a precautionary logic – i.e. best to remove a 
child where any doubt about his or her safety exists)? 
3. Is section 12 used to bypass delays in obtaining court orders? 
4. Do Gardaí consider they have sufficient training in child protection/cultural issues? 
Do Gardaí consider they receive sufficient feedback from Tusla on the final 
disposition of a case such as to inform their policy and practice?  
5. What is the evidence required to satisfy the threshold criteria? What has changed to 
suddenly create an immediate and serious risk to the welfare of the child? 
6. Discuss the transfer between the Gardaí, out-of-hours and day teams. 
7. Have you ever said no to invoking section 12 powers? 
8. Access to a lawyer. 
9. Support and debriefing. 
10. Gender stereotyping. 
11. How do you see the child protection system operating? 
12. Any issues members would like to address. 
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Focus Group Questions – Management Questions 
1. Was an out-of-hours social work service available?  If not, would section 12 powers 
have been invoked if such a service had been available at the time? 
2. Were efforts made to contact a responsible / competent relative to care for the 
child/children to avoid exercising section 12? What general presumptions operate for 
Gardaí in their use of emergency protective powers for children (e.g. does the Garda 
generally presume a child is best left in the care of their parents or another family 
member, or do Gardaí operate under a precautionary logic – i.e. best to remove a 
child where any doubt about his or her safety exists)? 
3. Is section 12 used to bypass delays in obtaining court orders? 
4. Do Gardaí consider they have sufficient training in child protection/cultural issues? 
Do Gardaí consider they receive sufficient feedback from Tusla on the final 
disposition of a case such as to inform their policy and practice?  
5. What is the evidence required to satisfy the threshold criteria? What has changed to 
suddenly create an immediate and serious risk to the welfare of the child? 
6. Discuss the transfer between the Gardaí, out-of-hours and day teams. 
7. Have you ever said no to invoking section 12 powers? 
8. Access to a lawyer. 
9. Support and debriefing. 
10. Gender stereotyping. 
11. How do you see the child protection system operating? 
12. Any issues members would like to address. 
13. Cooperation with Tusla at management level. 
14. How do you feel the system should change in the interests of children? 
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APPENDIX 4 
Laminated Card 
 
Section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 
Introduction 
AGS members, as first responders, have important and unique child protection responsibilities 
and powers. Under section 12 of the Child Care Act 1991 a Garda can remove a child into the 
care of AGS in certain emergency scenarios.  
 
Section 12 is a power exercisable by a Garda of any rank, on his or her own judgment. Once the 
conditions for section 12 removal are met, a Garda can enter any property without warrant – 
including forcible entry – in order to remove that child. 
 
When can section 12 be used to lawfully remove a child into the care of An Garda 
Síochána? 
There are two stages to establish a lawful section 12 removal scenario: 
 
Stage One 
1. Is there a serious threat to the physical, emotional or psychological health and wellbeing 
of the child? If yes, move on to question 2. 
 
Examples of a serious threat include a child without the care of an appropriate adult; a child in the 
care of an adult that is seriously intoxicated such that he or she cannot care for the child; a child 
that has been excluded from the family home following a domestic dispute, with no alternative 
appropriate accommodation; a child in the company of someone who poses a serious risk to his 
or her health and welfare; a child who poses a serious risk to his or her own health and welfare.  
 
2. Is that threat immediate? In other words, do you think the threat will eventuate 
imminently or soon after, if you do not remove the child into the care of AGS? If yes, 
move on to question 3. 
 
3. Are the grounds on which you believe that threat is serious and immediate reasonable? 
In other words, would the average person agree, after assessing the available evidence, 
that a serious and immediate threat to the child’s health and welfare exists? 
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If you answered yes to each of the above three questions, you have established that stage one 
circumstances are met, move on to stage two. 
 
Stage Two 
Would that threat to the child also be prevented if you waited for Tusla to make an Emergency 
Care Order application in the District Court? In answering that question, you can have regard to 
the locally available resources in both AGS and Tusla at that time, and the availability of the 
nearest District Court for an emergency hearing.  
 
If the answer to this question is no, you can lawfully remove the child into the care of AGS. 
 
After Child is Removed 
Once you have removed the child, you, or another Garda member, must maintain custody of 
that child until custody can be transferred to Tusla. Once a child has been removed under 
section 12, Tusla is the only agency with lawful authority to make decisions regarding the future 
care of that child.  
 
Care of Child Following Removal 
It is essential to understand that children enjoy strong constitutional rights under Article 42A of 
the Constitution. Those strong constitutional rights place substantial responsibilities and duties 
on AGS when it has a child in its care.  
 
When a child is in the care of AGS, serious consideration and effort must be made to minimise 
the potentially traumatising experience of section 12 removal for the child.  
 
A Garda station is not an appropriate place to care for a child: if the child must be 
accommodated in the station while in the care of AGS, a quiet and safe location in the station 
should be provided for him or her, away from the day-to-day work of the station, particularly any 
prisoner traffic through the building.  
 
Consideration must also be had for the needs of a child when in such unfamiliar surroundings, 
including appropriate food and clothing, and the need to be dealt with in a sensitive manner by 
properly trained Gardaí.  
 
 

315 
 
APPENDIX 6 
 
Mandatory fields to be completed on PULSE for all Section 12 Incidents 
 
 
Heading  Fields to be completed Response  
 
General Incident 
Details 
 
1. PULSE Incident Number 
2. Category 
3. Type 
4. Reporting Garda 
5. Reporting Station 
6. Date of Incident 
7. Time of Incident 
8. Date Reported 
9. Time Reported 
10. Garda Region 
11. Garda Division 
12. Garda District 
13. Garda Station 
 
 
 
Details relating to 
child 
 
 
1. Name of child 
2. PULSE Identification Number  
3. Date of birth 
4. Gender 
5. Nationality 
6. Ethnicity 
7. Any disability, mental or 
physical  
8. Religion 
9. Appearance, to include any 
identifying features 
10. Home circumstances and/or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
316 
 
living arrangements 
11. Alien Flag 
12. Any other relevant 
information 
  
 
Details relating to 
incident 
 
1. Location of incident 
2. Particulars of other relevant 
persons, to include witnesses 
3. Contributing factor(s), to 
include consumption of 
alcohol or other substances 
4. Ground(s) for invoking 
section 12  
5. Who initiated the involvement 
of Gardaí? 
6. Person(s) from whom the 
child(ren) was/were removed 
7. Person(s) present at removal, 
including social workers or 
other third parties 
8. Resistance at the time of 
removal? 
9. Any other relevant 
information 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consider a drop-down 
function to select certain 
defined grounds 
 
 
Actions taken by 
Gardaí prior to 
invoking section 12 
 
1. Consultation with social 
worker or other person(s) 
prior to invoking section 12  
 
 
 
2. Consideration of availability of 
 
Y/N 
Name of person(s) 
consulted to be added and 
the nature of the 
consultation, if any 
 
Y/N 
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alternative(s) to invocation of 
section 12, to include contact 
with relatives and/or others 
3. Availability or otherwise of 
out-of-hours service 
4. Any other relevant 
information 
 
Provide details, where 
appropriate 
 
 
Actions taken by 
Gardaí subsequent to 
invoking section 12 
 
1. Place of safety where child was 
initially brought  
2. Any subsequent place(s) where 
child was placed 
3. Consultation with social 
worker or other person(s) 
subsequent to invoking section 
12 
4. Joint Notification Sheet or 
relevant liaison with Tusla 
5. Any other relevant 
information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confirm when submitted 
 
Compliance with 
legislation  
 
Member of the Garda Síochána had 
reasonable grounds for believing that  
 
(a) there is an immediate and 
serious risk to the health or 
welfare of a child, and 
 
(b) it would not be sufficient for 
the protection of the child to 
await the making of an 
application for an Emergency 
 
 
 
 
Confirm  
 
 
 
Confirm  
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Care Order by Tusla 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
